Political cleavages and the left–right schema – a literature review

By virtue of forming a continuum containing a central position and lending itself to simple visualization, the left–right schema is comprehensible and translatable across cultures (Laponce, Reference Laponce1981: 24–7). Highlighting its utility, Inglehart states that ‘the Left–Right image is an oversimplification, but an almost inevitable one, which in the long run tends to assimilate all important issues’ (Reference Inglehart1990: 292). While political conflicts in any given society rarely revolve solely around a single issue, concepts of left and right offer a framework capable of incorporating multiple issue dimensions.Footnote ¹ Thus, according to Inglehart and Klingemann, ‘the left–right dimension is more often than not used by political elites and mass communication to label the most important issues of a given era’ (Reference Inglehart, Klingemann, Budge, Crewe and Farlie1976: 244, original italics). These ideological labels can serve as useful guides to both voters with specific policy preferences and others who simply wish to reduce the cost of information gathering, leading Sigelman and Yough to assert that ‘party systems throughout the world can meaningfully be profiled in terms of polarization along the left–right continuum’ (Reference Sigelman and Yough1978: 356).

The extent to which left–right semantics convey political meaning and influence vote choice has received empirical confirmation. Fuchs and Klingemann identify three fundamental features of this schema: ‘The semantic space of left–right is inhabited by a limited repertory of generalized meaning with largely binary associations’ (Reference Fuchs, Klingemann and Kent Jennings1989: 233; original italics). In a seminal article examining nine European countries, Inglehart and Klingemann distinguish partisan and ideological components of the left–right dimension, and emphasize the greater impact of party affiliations on publics’ left–right self-placement than that of issue preferences (Reference Inglehart, Klingemann, Budge, Crewe and Farlie1976: 260). However, analyzing results from a three-nation survey, Fuchs and Klingemann note a trend toward value-related rather than partisan basis of left–right identification (Reference Fuchs, Klingemann and Kent Jennings1989: 232). Knutsen (Reference Knutsen, van Deth and Scarbrough1995) builds on these findings to demonstrate that values and party choices are highly correlated, and concludes that left–right orientations derive from a compound function of both value orientations and partisanship. In other words, these semantics have analytical value independent of party attachments, and may come to play a greater role with increasing partisan de-alignment.

Having established the value of the left–right schema as a useful and meaningful device structuring political orientation, it is natural to ask what these labels stand for. To this question, Lipset offers the classic answer: ‘More than anything else the party struggle is a conflict among classes . . . in virtually every economically developed country the lower-income groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right’ (Reference Lipset1960: 223–4). Changes in the next quarter century prompted Inglehart to revise slightly what defines left and right as ‘whether one supports or opposes social change in an egalitarian direction’ (Reference Inglehart, Dalton, Flanagan and Allen Beck1984: 37). While the underlying issue animating conflict between left and right remains the struggle over equality, it is notable that the basis of competition has shifted from group identities to individual beliefs.

An important feature underpinning the relationship between identities and beliefs on the one hand and left–right orientations on the other is the causal linkage leading from the former to the latter. Whereas individuals can take demographic characteristics and organizational affiliations as given, and respond to questions soliciting views on specific issues, comprehending ideological notions requires a higher level of conceptualization that challenges most citizens’ cognitive aptitude (Converse, Reference Converse and Apter1964; see also Klingemann, Reference Klingemann and Barnes1979). In short, publics have a greater capacity for identifying with concrete rather than abstract objects. Thus, one can logically expect that insofar as citizens possess a coherent ideological conception, it is who they are and what they believe in that would affect where they place themselves along the left–right spectrum, rather than vice versa.

Lipset and Rokkan's (Reference Lipset, Rokkan, Lipset and Rokkan1967) influential work elucidating four social cleavages and proposing a ‘freezing hypothesis’ that links these cleavages to the formation and stability of western Europe party systems has generated numerous studies and debates (e.g. Knutsen, Reference Knutsen1989; Dix, Reference Dix1989; Mair, Reference Mair, Karvonen and Kuhnle2001; McAllister, Reference McAllister2007). While earlier works stress the importance of religion and social hierarchy (Laponce, Reference Laponce1972; Rose and Urwin, Reference Rose and Urwin1969), more recent studies note the decreasing salience of class conflict as both a basis of party competition (Franklin, Reference Franklin, Franklin, Makie and Valen1992; Thomas, Reference Thomas1979) and a defining element undergirding the left–right schema (Huber and Inglehart, Reference Huber and Inglehart1995).Footnote ² Instead, Inglehart proposes that ‘western politics are coming to polarize according to social class less, and according to values more’ (Reference Inglehart1990: 261), highlighting issues of post-materialism as a new axis demarcating opposite sides of political conflict. Similarly, Kitschelt argues that structural changes in postindustrial societies have induced a shift in the main axis of competition from left versus right to left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian (Reference Kitschelt1995a: 15).

In response to concerns that a linear spectrum is inadequate for capturing emerging issues, cross-cutting its more traditional components, Budge and Farlie offer the assurance that ‘most evidence on the dimensionality of the space of party competition is broadly compatible with Downs’ spatial framework’ (Reference Budge and Farlie1977: 144). Indeed, Downs's analysis is grounded in the assumption that a position along the left–right axis consists of weighted averages of positions on each particular issue (Reference Downs1957: 132–3). Instead of decreasing relevance, Inglehart foresees that ‘the new axis of polarization . . . may be assimilated into a new synthesis’ (Reference Inglehart, Dalton, Flanagan and Allen Beck1984: 68), and Fuchs and Klingemann also ‘consider it likely that the left–right schema will be retained even if the conflict structures of advanced industrial societies are changing’ (Reference Fuchs, Klingemann and Kent Jennings1989: 234). In short, shifts in issue salience may alter the components, but do not obviate the applicability, of left–right semantics.

Data and hypotheses

Data for this study are taken from the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted during the period 1995–2001.Footnote ⁸ Percentages of respondents able to place themselves along the left–right spectrum in each countryFootnote ⁹ are as follows: Japan, 75.6%; South Korea, 100%; the Philippines, 95.7%; Taiwan, 96.9%; Australia, 87.6%; New Zealand, 69.8%. These figures demonstrate emphatically that publics in new democracies express greater familiarity with the left–right schema, a counter-intuitive result in view of constraints on ideological debate imposed by authoritarian regimes during the period when a majority of respondents in these countries were socialized. However, high cognition levels do not necessarily imply firmer anchoring of left–right positions in terms of either identities or beliefs. The extent to which these factors structure left–right orientations will be analyzed below.

As the previous section suggests, sources underlying one's left–right positions may derive from both identities and beliefs. The former comprises of both demographic characteristics and organizational membership, in other words factors that are not intrinsically linked with issue preferences but can contribute to one's political socialization. The latter category covers attitudes concerning traditional socioeconomic and religious cleavages, ‘new politics’ issues, and evaluations of democracy. This last set of factors, which may be especially pertinent in societies that have only recently transitioned from authoritarian rule, warrants some elaboration. Due to conflicts leading up to democratization, in new democracies ‘the democratic–authoritarian dimension may overshadow the classical conflict over issues of economic redistribution and define the central meaning of left and right’ (Moreno, Reference Moreno1999: 2), as ‘democratization of a right-wing dictatorship shifts the masses to the left, while the democratization of a left-wing dictatorship shifts them toward the right’ (Shin and Jhee, Reference Shin and Jhee2005: 394). The following paragraphs set out hypotheses regarding each of these variables.

As mentioned in the literature review, demographic variables constitute important predictors of partisanship in a number of East Asian countries. Similar to patterns found across most advanced democracies, one expects that older generations are more likely to locate themselves toward the right, while younger cohorts lean to the left. In new democracies, age also stands as a proxy for period of socialization, with those growing up under authoritarian rule more likely to identify with the former regimes’ professed ideology (due in part to a truncated left–right spectrum as governments suppressed alternative political views). In three of the cases examined here, the previous regimes were right-wing dictatorships claiming anti-communism as a legitimizing device, which may reinforce right-leaning propensities among cohorts who grew up during their period in power. Thus, one expects age to be a more significant factor for distinguishing left and right in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, whereas it should play a lesser role in countries with longer democratic histories such as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.

Neither gender nor education is expected to be significant factors in shaping left–right dispositions in established democracies, while education in particular may be important in new democracies where it is related to opposition to former regimes; in that case, one expects highly educated segments of the population to lean toward the left in reaction to right-wing authoritarian governments. Town size reflects parts of both the traditional land–industry and center–periphery cleavages, though place of residence and occupation are no longer as closely linked today as when these cleavage structures are initially theorized. In addition, this variable does not capture regional divides, such as those in Korea. To the extent that town size differentiates ideological dispositions, one may expect rural residents to be positioned on the conservative side of the spectrum, regardless of the length of democratic experience.

Social class and income continue to be key features distinguishing left and right in many western European polities, even though their importance may have been challenged by ‘new politics’ issues in some cases. The question of whether these variables are influential in defining left and right in East Asian countries has yet to be tested. If they indeed turn out to be significant, one expects that the results will resemble patterns found in western democracies, with those with higher income and class status placed toward the right due to their interest in preserving a status quo that has allowed them to achieve and retain their present privileged positions.

Regarding organizational affiliations, one can infer from the literature that memberships in churches and labor unions are most likely to effect left–right positions. In many established democracies, secularism and working-class interests have long been rallying cries of the left. Even as membership in both churches and labor unions has declined considerably in recent decades in most of these countries, churchgoers continue to identify with the right, and union households with the left. This provides evidence of a persisting influence that these organizations exert on ideological orientations. Yet because these associations reflect social structures deriving from historical trajectories in western societies rather than any qualities intrinsic to democratic political competition, one may question the extent to which similar trends are replicated in East Asia.

Church–state conflicts fundamental to the formation and development of many western states are conspicuous by their absence in the annals of modern East Asian history. This does not mean that citizens in these countries are any less devout or engaged in religious practices – whether Buddhist (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), Catholic (Korea, the Philippines), Protestant (South Korea), or Taoist (Taiwan) – than in the west, nor does it imply that religious organizations do not play any role in politics.Footnote ¹⁰ In contrast to western and even some eastern European countries, however, religious affiliations or values do not seem to inspire East Asian party platforms and appeals.Footnote ¹¹ Therefore one does not expect to find church membership a significant influence on left–right disposition in this region.

Labor movements provided the foundation of, and retain links with, many left-wing parties in western Europe, and their East Asian counterparts share the objective of advancing workers’ rights. However, the latter had long suffered from repression by authoritarian regimes preoccupied with pursuing economic growth, and were often tarred with the communist brush. As a consequence of government restraints, and also due in part to patterns of economic development, company- rather than industry-based unions are not uncommon in parts of East Asia, thus creating a further barrier to peak national organizations, as members are more concerned with the profit margins of their employers. While parties founded on union backing are represented in Japan and South Korea, their seat shares are marginal.Footnote ¹² In contrast, labor parties in both Australia and New Zealand have historically been major contenders for power, indicating the salience of issues centering on resource redistribution that are rooted in a class cleavage. In view of this, one expects union membership to be more significant in these two ‘western’ countries than in their East Asian neighbors.

As social modernization progresses, increases in both the availability of information and citizens’ cognitive capacities induce the basis of political orientation to shift from group identities toward individual beliefs (Dalton, Reference Dalton1996). Accordingly, the degree to which attitudes toward ‘pre-industrial’, ‘industrial’, and ‘post-industrial’ factors (Inglehart, Reference Inglehart1977) structure left–right self-placements likely depends on a society's level of economic development. At the same time, this causal linkage may be mediated by the length of democratic experience. Populations in many new democracies display different value orientations compared with citizens in established democracies, an observation at least as attributable to socialization under authoritarian rule as differences in gross domestic products. In addition, clarity of political choices, in the form of stable patterns of party competition and clear programmatic differentiation among parties, may also affect citizens’ ability to form coherent ideological dispositions.

Distinguishing between organizational affiliation and attitudinal orientations, two sets of variables are introduced to capture socioeconomic and religious beliefs. The first measures confidence in labor unions, major companies, and a composite index covering a range of questions constituting the traditional class cleavage such as income inequality, public versus private ownership, and the extent of government responsibility. Where socioeconomic factors form the basis of left–right orientations, one expects respondents expressing greater trust in unions, skepticism toward big business, and favoring a larger role for the government in directing the economy and re-distributing wealth to identify with the left. Religious beliefs comprise of confidence in churches, the extent of respondents’ religiosity, and the importance of God in their lives. If religious factors contribute to influencing left–right positioning, those having greater trust in churches, considering themselves more religious, and assigning a higher place to God in daily life are likely to lean toward the right.Footnote ¹³

If the ‘new politics’ issues are becoming increasingly salient, one can logically hypothesize that value changes giving rise to these new dimensions of political competition also exert a growing influence in shaping publics’ left–right orientations. Four variables are selected to encapsulate the ‘new politics’ dimension: post-materialism, gender equality, environmental protection, and political activism. While the first three items are largely self-explanatory as indicators of progressive causes, the last warrants some elaboration. This composite index includes a range of direct participatory activities, which require greater initiative than simply casting ballots. These forms of participation, from signing petitions and joining boycotts to taking part in strikes and occupying buildings, reflect a high degree of interest in, and commitment to, certain causes that encourage citizens to go beyond conventional channels of political action. While the divergent array of issues motivating these activities covers the gamut of, and sometimes transcends, the left–right spectrum, their elite-challenging rather than elite-directed nature suggests that actual and potential participants may be more inclined toward the left.

Finally, as explained at the beginning of this section, beliefs in democracy can play a particularly important role in newly democratized countries, since conflicts between supporters and opponents of the former authoritarian regime may continue to shape political identification in the years following transition. This is especially pertinent in cases where one major competitor for power is based on the former ruling party or a successor thereof. The persistence of this ‘regime divide’ has potentially deleterious effects on prospects of democratic consolidation if one side disputes the legitimacy of the new regime. These concerns do not apply to established democracies where the rules of the game have long been accepted by the general public as well as all major political actors, so one expects that attitudes toward democracy would influence left–right orientations only in newer democracies.

Support for democracy can be conceptualized at different levels, ranging from identification with one's political community at the most abstract end, to confidence in the current government at the most concrete. Adopting Norris's (Reference Norris and Norris1999) schema, I use four categories of democratic support, in order of increasing specificity: identification with one's political community, democratic qualities, institutional trust, and confidence in government. The first variable measures respondents’ pride in, and willingness to fight for, their nations; the second consists of appraisals of whether democracies are indecisive, lead to negative outcomes in terms of the economy and public order, and whether respondents regard it as the best form of government despite its shortcomings; the third evaluates respondents’ views toward the parliament and political parties in general; and the fourth assesses how they view political actors currently in power. While the first three items appear most pertinent in new democracies, the last probably distinguishes left and right in all countries, as right-leaning respondents rate a left-wing government negatively, and vice versa. One can hypothesize that system support variables, particularly views on democratic performance and institutions, may influence left–right orientations in transitional societies still coming to terms with legacies of past authoritarian regimes which sought legitimization through ideology (e.g. anti-communism), whereas in established democracies such a divide should no longer exist as all segments of the population come to accept democratic norms.Footnote ¹⁴

Returning to the three conditions that are conjectured to influence the relative weights of factors structuring left–right orientations, one expects that: (1) higher levels of economic development increase the importance of ‘new politics’ issues as predictors of ideological dispositions relative to traditional class and religious divides (though some of these Lipset–Rokkan cleavages were less politically relevant in East Asia in the first place); (2) longer democratic experience reduces the salience of democratic support as a predictor of left–right self-placements since the questions over regime type and institutions have gained acceptance from all sides and no longer animate debate (though the importance of current government evaluations may not vary with length of democratic history); (3) more institutionalized party systems, characterized by greater continuity in party names and programs, offer a firmer anchor to citizens’ understanding of what left and right represent, hence resulting in greater variance in left–right positions explained by attitudinal variables.

About the author

Willy Jou is a post-doctoral researcher at Kansai University. His current research focuses on the contents and implications of the left–right schema in new democracies in East Asia and Eastern Europe. His articles have been published in the Journal of Democracy (co-authored), Japanese Journal of Political Science, Asian Survey, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, International Political Science Review, Party Politics, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, and German Politics and Society (co-authored).