There is no consensus on whether foreign aid promotes economic growth, particularly where most of the world's poorest countries are concentrated—sub-Saharan Africa. Jeffrey Sachs has argued that a “big push” amounting to a doubling of aid flows is needed for African countries to overcome the structural constraints that keep them trapped in poverty. But William Easterly has countered that the trillions of dollars in aid already spent to date have had a negligible impact on African economies; the conditionalities that were supposed to produce reform, and thereby stimulate growth, were neither enforced by donors nor implemented by recipients. Much of the research over the last decade has sought to bridge the gap between these conflicting perspectives by identifying the conditions under which aid might be deployed to enhance growth. In the process, we have come to believe that the quality of governance in recipient countries is a principal determinant of aid's effectiveness. Yet there remains much we do not know about how institutions can be designed or politics constrained to channel aid for its intended purpose.
This is the point of departure for the two edited books under review. Both broadly examine how the evolving relationship between donors and recipients has affected the design and implementation of aid in African countries. The books provide distinct perspectives on that relationship based, in large part, on the emphasis they place on domestic politics. The contributors to Smart Aid for African Development argue that donors must pursue aid strategies that promote greater accountability in countries that are badly governed. For aid to be effective, they claim, it must not only be designed to circumvent weak and corrupt institutions; it must aim to change the very mode of patronage-based governance found in most African countries. By contrast, for the contributors to The Politics of Aid, it is the continuous intervention of donors that has prevented African governments from adapting aid to their own development needs. The ability of African governments to effectively manage their aid has been undermined, according to this argument, by the dominance of donor agencies and the proliferation of their demands.
Edited by Richard Joseph and Alexandra Gillies, Smart Aid for African Development is concerned with identifying the strategies for what they call “smart” aid, meaning effective aid. The contributors to this volume focus on how donors might develop policies and programs that target aid to countries that meet minimum governance standards. The book's 12 substantive chapters are written by scholars of African politics and experienced development policymakers. The chapters are divided along three themes that examine how donors can influence aid's effectiveness, how donors can integrate measures for enhanced accountability into their aid programs, and how donors can improve the prospects for greater democracy and better governance among recipient governments. Although the chapters lack an overarching theoretical framework that advances a single argument, there is a common emphasis on the need for donors to change the current aid system by creating better targeted programs that either are insulated from local politics or attempt to change the neopatrimonial nature of those politics. The contributors are writing for a broad audience, synthesizing donor experiences and innovations, rather than proposing new theories or empirical tests. Five of these chapters stand out as ideal assigned readings for undergraduate courses in African or development politics.
In “How Smart Are Aid Donors?” Carol Lancaster explains how domestic institutions like presidential initiatives, congressional earmarking, and agencies with overlapping mandates constrain the content and delivery of American aid. As a result, the United States can offer recipient countries only particular types of assistance, regardless of their needs. Joel Barkan's “Rethinking Budget Support for Africa” examines the relative merits of channeling development funds directly into the treasuries of recipient governments. Budget support may be touted as a strategy for reducing transaction costs and rewarding reformist governments, but Barkan makes the point that its effectiveness depends on the nature of politics. Observing that “the [World] Bank's understanding of the concept of governance is flawed because it is an interpretation largely devoid of politics,” he argues that the guidelines for fiscal management are likely to be circumvented wherever politicians need resources to fuel patronage networks (p. 75). Will Reno's “Rethinking Anticorruption Efforts in Liberia” offers a contrary perspective by suggesting that donors might do more harm than good in seeking to displace the patronage networks that organize political life in countries with otherwise weak institutions. Because such moves are likely to create further disorder, economic as well as political, he advises donors to consider accommodating or integrating these networks into their development plans.
In “Voters But Not Yet Citizens,” Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan examine the demand side for government accountability in African countries. Analyzing data from Afrobarometer surveys, they show that the demand for government accountability remains underdeveloped, as citizens cede oversight responsibilities to their leaders. It is interesting to note that Bratton and Logan find this lack of demand for vertical accountability driven by the historical legacy of repression, rather than by socioeconomic indicators. The challenge of promoting a culture of democratic accountability is taken up in Darren Kew's chapter, “Democratizing Donor-Civil Society Relations.” Using Nigeria as a case study, Kew discusses how donors often structure their relationships with local civil society partners for administrative convenience. But in doing so, they undercut the effectiveness of their democracy and governance work by unwittingly reinforcing the logic of neopatrimonialism among the very organizations that are supposed to educate citizens about democracy.
The Politics of Aid, edited by Lindsay Whitfield, is an ambitious work that focuses on what recipients, rather than donors, can do to make aid more effective. The contributors attempt to assess the extent to which African governments can claim ownership over the policy outcomes of their negotiations in an aid system characterized by multiple donors and their multiple demands. The book begins with the introduction of a theoretical framework that attributes a recipient's negotiating capital, or leverage, to four structural conditions: economic dependence, political legitimacy, ideological coherence, and institutional capacity. Two additional chapters provide an overview of aid relationships, both historic and contemporary. The core of the book comprises eight case studies in the form of thick descriptions that investigate recipient negotiating strategies and their impact on policy outcomes in Botswana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. Concluding chapters provide a comparative analysis of the cases and assess prospects for change in the four structural factors influencing the negotiating capital of African countries.
The contributors find that their eight cases represent a spectrum of government control over aid-funded policies, that is, the proportion of the policy agenda decided by the recipient itself, rather than by its donors. Botswana exercises the most control, followed Ethiopia and Rwanda, with all other cases having weak control. The conditions that set apart the more successful cases—Botswana's gems, Ethiopia's geopolitics, and Rwanda's genocide—provide those governments “the confidence to translate a country's conditions into negotiating capital and deploying it effectively in aid negotiations” (p. 20). The contributors elaborate by arguing that the outcomes of weak control are not simply due to their structural condition of economic dependence. Ongoing negotiations with donors, they suggest, has sapped the confidence of these countries: “The weak or fragile domestic political support of governments combined with their dependence on aid to shore up their political legitimacy provide strong incentives for remaining in a subordinate position to donors, and the conditions of permanent negotiation and institutional entanglement provide strong disincentives for recipients to challenge their subordination” (p. 356).
By focusing the analysis on recipient agency in aid negotiations, this book provides a substantive contribution to a literature that has largely been concerned with the donor side of those negotiations. Its argument is noteworthy in that it shifts the analysis away from the economic and neopatrimonial explanations that also dominate this literature. However, in this respect, the analyses suffer from considerable shortcomings that raise doubts about the interpretation of their findings. Part of the problem stems from the vague operationalization of “ownership” over aid policy, as well as the lack of any explicit scope conditions for the subject matter of those aid negotiations, both of which make it difficult for the reader to arrive at the same conclusions as the authors. For example, strong ownership is found in Botswana, where the aid negotiations largely concerned donor funding for HIV programs. Mozambique, by contrast, is found to have weak ownership, although its government is shown to have consistently resisted donor pressure to change its land tenure system. One might argue that aid negotiations over agriculture—a highly political issue in Africa's agrarian societies—entail higher stakes than those concerning health care. Mozambique's classification also seems inconsistent because Ethiopia, another country that resisted donor pressure over its land tenure system, is judged as having strong ownership.
In attempting to shift the explanatory emphasis to nonmaterial factors, such as the ideological coherence of recipient governments, the book too readily dismisses the conventional wisdom regarding the impact of neopatrimonialism on government behavior. The authors make clear at the outset that they seek to “challenge the dominant view that portrays African governments as inevitably anti-developmental or as driven by innate conditions to act in neo-patrimonial ways” (p. 14). Nevertheless, the neopatrimonial logic creeps into the narrative of each of their weak cases, but such references are notably absent from their stronger cases. In Ghana, for instance, they find that politicians are driven by an “imperative to deliver visible goods and services,” which provides “a strong incentive to go along with donor initiatives” (p. 188). The authors may consider neopatrimonialism to be a facile explanation, yet the negotiations they delineate in each of their weak cases are somehow influenced by it. If this is the case, then the claim that recipient control over aid policy is largely undermined by donor impositions becomes more difficult to uphold.
