Roger Scruton's 530-page blockbuster The Aesthetics of Music was published by Oxford University Press in 1997.Footnote 2 A paperback edition followed two years later. Neither received more than a handful of notices, a few appreciative, but some grudging and some actually hostile. As its quality has come to be recognized, and as the resentments it provoked have either died down or found newer targets, the book has gradually achieved a certain canonical, even classic, status. Students of the subject now seem to feel that, however unpalatable some of its conclusions may have been, it can no longer safely be ignored. The questions, it appears, are the right ones, even if we don't care for Scruton's answers. (Thus far the pop critic Simon Frith, who said as much from the start.)Footnote 3
The book actually covers more than aesthetics, being nothing less than a complete philosophy of music. There are some major omissions: of non-Western music, for example. But they are justifiable, given that Scruton's project is analytical rather than documentary. Some extra-aesthetic matter is inevitable, since it is scarcely possible to deal in isolation with any art form's purely aesthetic element (assuming there really could be such a thing). But with music Scruton casts his net wider even than he did in his early The Aesthetics of Architecture (1979). In The Aesthetics of Music he extends his inquiry to virtually every aspect and ramification of the phenomenon in question. (His book Sexual Desire [1986] aspired to a similar comprehensiveness regarding matters still more elusive and even less tractable.)
One reason for the present work's greater scope is presumably that Scruton has not so far numbered the practice of architecture among his accomplishments (though he has built, in polychrome brick, a most aesthetic pigsty). Over and above the theoretical discussions in The Aesthetics of Music, the book's sheer density of technical detail testifies to a serious practitioner's interest (there are 250 musical quotations). Scruton makes no great claims for his own compositions, but once or twice quotes from them in illustration of some minor point. He has written a couple of chamber operas in broadly tonal, semi-Brittenesque idiom, one of which, The Minister, has been performed several times at home and abroad. As he says, he cannot compete in this respect with another philosopher, Rousseau, whose opera The Village Soothsayer drew praise from Gluck himself, and had 400 performances. Nevertheless, in the generous words of his critic and rival in aesthetics Jerrold Levinson, Scruton's musical culture is ‘simply astounding’. Even if, like Levinson, one dissents (as I do not) from Scruton's ‘phenomenological-idealist’ assumptions,Footnote 4 one might still agree with him that The Aesthetics of Music is not only ‘the most valuable work to date on the subject’, but also ‘an advanced primer in the appreciation of music, one worthy to be set alongside those of distinguished predecessors such as Copland, Bernstein and Tovey’.Footnote 5
A reader familiar with Scruton's other works, which include two witty fictions in mock-Platonic dialogue – Xanthippic Dialogues and Perictione in Colophon, both containing much about musicFootnote 6 – will soon perceive that The Aesthetics of Music follows the general drift. I do not mean that Scruton simply clamps the same ideological grid over every topic he treats and then reads off the approved answers. On the contrary, he always begins with the phenomenon as generally experienced, and works back to the underlying principles. A radical anti-reductionist, Scruton has never tried to hypostatize those principles into a catch-all theory. If they converge, that testifies less to a one-track mind on his part than to his having uncovered a genuine, common reality, one no less objective for being founded, not in physical nature, let alone in the supernatural, but in historic human experience, which is ‘objective’ in the qualified sense of simply being shared.Footnote 7 If Scruton persuades us, that is for no fancier reason than that we recognize that this, in fact, is the way things seem. Ours is a world of seeming, not being; or rather, since there is no escape from it, seeming, for all practical purposes, is being.
All Scruton's thinking is humanistic, in the sense that it postulates a clearly-demarcated, definitively human ‘world’ or Lebenswelt, whose values, pursuits and conceptions are to be understood first and foremost in their own terms. Such things are not to be explained from outside, as simply passive functions, products or epiphenomena of the underlying material processes – political, economic, physical, biological and so on – on which they may variously depend. Further, unlike other brands, Scruton's humanism is neither sentimental, nor anti-religious, nor incompatible with religion, at least in his own largely non-doctrinal understanding of it. For him religion is definitively and uniquely human, as are music, morals and the erotic.
All these things are unknown in the animal world. The higher animals manifestly have immediate, action-guiding beliefs (at least to judge by their behaviour), but neither religious beliefs, nor any beliefs they could articulate. To attribute opinions to an animal – that is, settled beliefs regarding categories of events both actual and possible, independently of particular instances (though applicable to and ideally generalized from them) – is absurd or comic, and quite literally the stuff of fable (for example, Chaucer's cock Chauntecleer learnedly discussing dream interpretation). Animals make decisions, but on the spot, not self-consciously, and certainly not in the light of ethical conceptions, as we do. They are not moral beings, and are therefore not answerable for their actions. They have no duties, and their so-called rights are merely our shorthand for the importance we attach to their welfare. They have sexual urges, as they have affections, but not erotic experience, since that involves not the mere conjunction of organs, but the mutual disclosure and embodiment of selves. Often more acutely than we, animals hear and can discriminate between sounds; birds ‘sing’, as lions roar, apparently with communicative intent, but, however pleasing the result, their song is not, in Scruton's terms, music, any more than a hyena's so-called laugh testifies to its sense of humour.
It is plausible to conclude, with Aristotle and others, that animals' limitations in the foregoing respects are due to their lack of self-consciousness, and that that in turn is due to their lack of language. For language alone can capture whatever lies beyond the moment – self, past, future, projects, ideas, possibilities, imaginary or hypothetical situations, other selves – and hold it suspended in contemplation. (That, however, is not to equate music directly with language, as we shall see.)
Scruton's key distinction in this book, from which all else stems, is between sound and tone. Very little work has been done on the metaphysics and ontology of sound, as the comparative sparseness of Scruton's references in Chapter 1 indicates. This chapter contains some exceedingly novel, interesting and true observations, such as that sounds, unlike most visual objects, are not opaque, so that one sound does not occlude another.Footnote 8 Further, sounds, unlike colours, are not qualities or properties, but objects, albeit ‘secondary objects’, like smells and rainbows. They are ‘pure events’,Footnote 9 conceptually isolable from their material sources, and constituting their own independent ‘sound world’.
The sound world, Scruton claims, is a quasi-spatial order, in which we detect both position (high and low, i.e. pitch) and consequently movement (for example, ‘up’ and ‘down’), though those things, like much else under consideration, are what he calls ‘indispensable metaphors’,Footnote 10 an expression which, as we shall see, has caused much (to my mind) superfluous trouble. We might add that although Scruton speaks of position and movement as applying to pitched tones and sequences thereof, they apply equally well to noise. Consider the Doppler effect, to the ears of a stationary listener, generated by a fast-moving noise-emitting object, a train, say, or a projectile. Or the see-saw, indeed hee-haw, undulations of a siren or a car alarm. Even noise can be high or low, and thus appear to move ‘up’ or ‘down’.Footnote 11
Though it belongs to the sound-world (in other words, is sound), tone differs from sound in general in being one step – a crucial one – further removed from the realm of primary objects, substances and the rest, viz. in being a ‘tertiary object’.Footnote 12 Sounds might seem ‘material’ in comparison to tones, but they are immaterial (and thus ‘secondary’) in comparison to their physical source (a flute, an explosion) and description (audible pressure waves or vibrations induced in a suitable medium by a flute, an explosion, etc.).
Tone is a ‘tertiary’ phenomenon in that it belongs exclusively to the intentional realm, which is to say, the human or self-conscious order, the world of deliberate meanings and purposes. It is not a question merely of pitch, or of a singular, identifiable frequency (concert A, say). In the natural world there are not many pure pitches, but such as there are, are not in themselves musical tones, though they may be acoustically identical. (I am elaborating somewhat on Scruton here.) A pitched sound only becomes a musical tone when deliberately brought into relation with others,Footnote 13 that is, sounded alongside them, either successively or simultaneously, in what we respectively call melody and harmony. Pitches, or notes, and their duration, volume and so on have a physical description (or at least formula: e.g. concert A has a frequency of 440 Hz), but melody, harmony, movement and the rest do not. These, as it were, are emergent patterns or Gestalten – melody, incidentally, being a paradigmatic example of Gestalt,Footnote 14 according to the founders of Gestalt psychology – which we perceive in the sonic surface, just as the composer who specified that sonic surface (and the patterns perceived in it) meant that we should; and indeed much as, looking at a picture, we recognize a face in what are literally only patches of pigment; as we detect a certain expression on a real or pictured face; or as we see now a duck, now a rabbit, in Wittgenstein's celebrated duck-rabbit figure.
All three examples are Scruton's, and he has repeatedly used the ‘face’ examples in other contexts. The duck-rabbit analogy, I think, works well enough, but only up to a point, and perhaps the same is also true of the whole ‘seeing-as’ and ‘seeing-in’ scenario (alias ‘aspect perception’)Footnote 15. We don't, subjectively, hear the sound as music, or hear the melody in the succession of notes. Unless we make a deliberate effort to do so, we hear neither the sound qua sound nor the notes qua notes; what we hear, and all we hear, is the music (the melody, harmony, etc.), rather as, in language, we hear the words themselves, not the sounds of the words.Footnote 16 (That is, we normally hear not two things, but one, that being only as much as is immediately necessary to the communication of the ‘meaning’, anything more being cognitively diseconomical.) Though all depends on perception, let me add, an intended pattern is quite different from an unintended pattern, such as when children ‘see’ pictures in the fire, or when Hamlet ironically invites Polonius to see a whale or a camel in the clouds. Both kinds of perception require imagination, but for the event to be meaningful as music is meaningful, there has, as with language, to be utterance as well as perception (which then becomes reception). In other words, although the thing perceived is imagined, and although it may lack an exhaustive physical description or explanation, it is not ‘imaginary’, as pictures in the fire are. It is really, objectively there; and it is there because somebody put it there, with the intention that it be both recognized (identified), and recognized as having been put there with that intention. The circuit of communication is completed when both recognitions take place. The philosopher H.P. Grice famously, and in my view persuasively, accounted for linguistic meaning in terms of the reciprocal recognition of intentions, and a similar anatomy of musical communication would, I think, be equally plausible.Footnote 17
As in language – though the analogy cannot be pressed indefinitely – every item in the tone-world, be it single (a note) or composite (a key, a phrase, a theme, a melody), derives its meaning, identity and direction from its fellows, which collectively summon into being, and inhabit, what Scruton calls a ‘field of force’.Footnote 18 Tone, and thus music, which (for Scruton's purposes) is composed entirely of sounds heard as tones, can be perceived and understood only by rational beings.Footnote 19 Again as in language, and even though we are here obviously dealing in metaphor (or something like it), only rational beings can identify musical ‘statements’, ‘questions’, ‘answers’ and the like. We may need instruction in how to do this, which indicates that, unlike their secondary counterparts, ‘tertiary’ phenomena and perception fall to some extent into the province of will.Footnote 20 Except by blocking my ears, I cannot choose not to hear a given sound; but I am able, and up to a point can choose or not, to hear it as exhibiting these or those musical features, or not, as may be. (It is possible, for example, by suppressing one's normal diatonic expectations, not to hear atonal music as discordant, and also possible, as I have already suggested, to hear it, or any music, not even as music, but rather as ‘sound-art’, a series of abstract sound-patterns.)
The ability to perceive the expressive features, or content, of a piece of music is similarly responsive to instruction; though whether or how far one is actually free to perceive them this way or that, as one may switch ad lib. between ‘duck’ and ‘rabbit’, may be doubted. The philosopher Nietzsche was no musical ignoramus, but a highly accomplished musician. Yet it is certainly possible, as he did, to miss the retrospective irony in the Prelude to Wagner's Die Meistersinger (especially, one might add, in its pompous opening theme) – Nuremberg's musical tradition, Wagner subsequently implies, could well do with Walther's radical challenge to it – and to lay its expansive burgherly self-importance directly at Wagner's (and Germany's) door.Footnote 21 But such a mistake is not based on a misapprehension or mischaracterization of the actual music, such as would be involved in sincerely describing that particular theme as (say) ‘Angst-ridden’, or ‘vivacious’, or ‘delicate’. In fact, aberrations of the latter type are surely so gross as to be inconceivable.Footnote 22 We should, however, distinguish such aberrations from confusing the mood of the music in itself with its dramatic effect, which (as just noted) may not be the same thing. At the Vienna premiere of Gluck's Orfeo in 1762, the Venetian ambassador's wife acutely observed that Orpheus's aria ‘Che farò’ (‘What shall I do without Eurydice?’) was ‘too light-hearted for a man who wants to kill himself’.Footnote 23 That is (we might say), it would be more appropriate to a reunion with Eurydice than to her irretrievable loss. So perhaps here it is the dramatic context which makes the aria pathetic, Orpheus's loss being all the more poignant for being rendered in the accents of a past happiness (a happiness shortly to be recovered in their miraculous, unexpected reunion).
Let us return to Scruton's account of metaphor in music, which, as I have said, has caused much trouble to Malcolm Budd and other perplexed commentators, and indeed probably more than it is intrinsically worth.Footnote 24 For even if Scruton is right about metaphor's centrality to the musical experience,Footnote 25 if I am right nothing very much follows from it, despite the fact that it could be true and is certainly interesting. (I am taking up a suggestion once made to me by Dr Guy Dammann, who said – perhaps provocatively – that to him a tune's going ‘up and down’ was no more or less metaphorical than a thing's going up and down in the air.) The fact, I suspect, is that when we hear (for example) a melody going ‘up’ and ‘down’, or lines of counterpoint ‘converging’ or ‘diverging’ (as in staff notation they visibly do), or a leading note (as its name implies) somehow ‘striving’ towards the tonic or keynote, and so on, we do so not metaphorically but literally, as those terms are applied in the context of music. We forget – if it had occurred to us, as it might never have done, even to musicians of the highest competence – that ‘up’, ‘down’, ‘tension’, ‘resolution’ and the rest were ever metaphors at all, since their musical meaning seems to us more or less continuous with their other meanings, and, for all practical purposes, just as literal. They have become so habitual, so useful, or, as Scruton says, so ‘indispensable’ in their musical application as virtually to have borrowed their ‘literal’ meaning from their origins.Footnote 26 A metaphor so constantly employed as to be indispensable or ineliminable might just as well be no metaphor at all. Some writers have claimed that all literal usages are in fact dead metaphors; others, such as Nietzsche and Derrida, that metaphors never really die. The first group could be right; the second are demonstrably wrong.Footnote 27
A further point, not made by Scruton, is that we use such metaphors all the time in non-musical contexts without considering how far they actually are metaphors. There is nothing special about their application to musical phenomena. It is both true and interesting, as Scruton says,Footnote 28 that when we say the music, or the melody, moves up or down, nothing, or nothing physically measurable, moves at all.Footnote 29 The individual notes stay exactly where they are relative to each other, and it is only their being played sequentially which gives the appearance of movement. If the notes themselves don't move, what is it then that we think does move?Footnote 30 We speak, outside music, of a ‘flight’ of steps (notice, by the way, that the musical term ‘scale’ derives from the Latin scala, meaning a ladder or staircase). Yet nothing flies, and the steps are stationary. The path ‘leads to’ the castle, and beyond the castle the ground ‘falls away’ into the gorge. In builders' jargon, the waste pipe has a ‘fall’ of 1 in 40. But the path does not take us by the hand and physically conduct us to the castle, and no part of either the ground or the pipe changes its vertical position. Since these expressions, once you think about it, are manifestly not literal, they must be metaphors (or so it seems at first sight). But we use them, quite unconsciously, and without the imaginative effort involved in understanding a ‘live’ metaphor, as if they were literal, and no harm or confusion comes of it. We know what we mean, and so do our hearers. More strikingly, they do apply literally (or near enough), not to the original items falsely credited with motion, but to other things which are potentially part of the scene, waiting in the wings as it were. The steps do not move, let alone ‘fly’; but when I mount them, if I do not exactly fly, I certainly rise. The ground itself does not ‘fall’, but if I drop something, that thing may literally fall down the slope. The pipe doesn't literally fall, but the waste entering it does. And so on.
Now, I, the thing I have dropped and the waste are all quite as tangible as the stationary objects – the steps, the path, the ground and the pipe – which we metaphorically, and thus falsely, credit with movement. It is the first group of things which actually move, and they are not different in kind from those to which the predicate of motion is transferred. In music, however, the thing which is alleged to move, the melody (say), though it can certainly be described, has no physical description, or even physical existence, unlike the notes of which it is composed. Yet it is no less real and no less objective for that. So I would suggest that it does indeed move, and is perceived to move, and that movement is the core feature of its description. It (or something in it, perhaps analogously to a pencil point inscribing a figure) moves in just the same way as it exists, that is, non-physically, as melodies do. If you want to protest that what we are really talking about is ‘virtual’ movement or ‘the appearance of’ movement, that's fine. The entire world of tertiary objects and their associated qualities is a world of appearance, and as Scruton pointed out thirty-odd years ago in his notorious book The Meaning of Conservatism, those are the things that really matter to us. That is what he there meant by his key phrase ‘the priority of appearance’.Footnote 31
I have suggested that movement, position and other musical terms have grown so familiar as virtually to have become literal, and therefore effectively to have lost whatever metaphorical status they may once have had. This means, in effect, no more than that the supposedly prior, literal, pre-metaphorical meanings of certain terms are plausibly extended into new areas without losing their explicit link with the original meaning. And that may be to say that the newer meanings were never genuinely metaphorical at all.Footnote 32 This seems obvious when the music has a narrative or illustrative function, as in opera, song, ballet, film scores and ‘programme music’, when music exemplifying the extended, allegedly metaphorical meaning is used to suggest or accompany something exemplifying the original, literal meaning. The beautiful Grail theme (as it turns out to be) with which the Prelude to Act I of Wagner's Lohengrin opens (indeed, of which it almost entirely consists), enters in an ethereal, almost inaudibly high string register, redolent of innocent angelic voices and heavenly, other-worldly things. Its so-called ‘bass’ part is actually located far up in the treble, so that there is no ‘earthly’ component in the harmony. The (supposedly) metaphorical altitude of the scoring is clearly meant to suggest the imagined but still quite literal height of the heavens above us and their distance from earthly concerns. In Beethoven's Ode to Joy (the final, choral movement of the Ninth Symphony) the chorus asks the world whether it senses its Creator (‘Ahnest du den Schöpfer, Welt?’). Accompanied by whispered exhortations to seek him beyond the Sternenzelt (‘tent of stars’), the orchestra then settles into a prolonged, widely-spaced (or ‘hollow’) chord consisting of Grail-textured, mysteriously ambiguous diminished seventh harmonies right at the top, pulsing and twinkling in tremolando triplets like the said stars, nothing much in the middle registers, and the whole underlain by a deep throbbing bass in cross-rhythmic quadruplets on the dominant A (thus revealing the high diminished seventh chord, containing a B flat, to be part of an all-inclusive minor ninth chord), all this suggesting the awesome, inscrutable presence of God spanning both the furthest heights and the profoundest depths of the vast cosmos. Here again high (or, if you prefer, ‘high’) notes suggest height, while added to them are deep notes suggesting depth. I am sorry if all that sounds childishly crude, but what I am trying to describe is anything but, as those familiar with the passage will know. At all events, one could give endless examples, but in those just given the music, being paired with a narrative, can fairly easily be said to have a kind of literal meaning (or even reference, since it accompanies one). It would be no surprise, therefore, if such associations persisted even in music with no narrative content. Conversely – who knows? – such musical effects might be deployed in narrative contexts precisely because of the associations they already bore.
In sum, if, by everyday consensus, so-called ‘high’ notes can nevertheless suggest, even signify, literal height (and so on), it is not clear that the ‘up’ and ‘down’ we associate with relative pitches and the ‘movement’ of a melody, nor such ‘movement’ itself, really are metaphors in any full-blooded sense. There are many and conflicting theories of metaphor, from Aristotle to Goodman, Davidson and the present, but most agree that metaphor, to be intelligible, invites us to perceive at least some similarity or basis of comparison between two or more disparate things.Footnote 33 Not for the first time in his writings, Scruton gives a striking example from Rilke,Footnote 34 in which a bat's zigzag flight through the dusk is ‘seen as’, or (as Scruton would say) fused with the image of, a crack running through porcelain. There is doubtless more involved, but it will surely be admitted that the core of the metaphor is an implied resemblance. When we ask, however, in just what respect a ‘high’ note is actually like a literally (i.e. physically) high object (the heavens, say), we find ourselves at a loss for an answer. It certainly doesn't sound like one. And to say ‘it vibrates at high frequency’ merely displaces the problem, for how, any more than its corresponding pitch, or a price, or a number, can a frequency literally be ‘high’? It seems, on reflection, that there is no similarity at all between high pitch and physical altitude, except for the facts that we (and others) call them both ‘high’,Footnote 35 and that the first, in a musical context, is generally understood (when appropriate) to suggest or represent the second. So ‘high’ and ‘low’, when used of sounds, tones and other immaterial things, appear to exclude what would normally be thought a key feature of metaphor, namely resemblance. At the same time, this non-resemblance to physically high or low things (if we regard those meanings as primary) means that ‘high’ and ‘low’, in non-physical matters, cannot be unambiguously literal, even though in musical or other specialized applications (e.g. quantitative ones, such as ‘high prices’) we unthinkingly employ them as though they were. So if such usages, and the associated conceptions, are neither strictly metaphorical nor strictly literal, what are they? While agreeing with Scruton that they are indispensable, if (as I think we must) we are to understand music as virtual movement from and to somewhere, I should incline rather to call them quasi-metaphors, though I admit this looks pretty much like – in fact, is – a capitulation in the face of the inexplicable.
Let us return to the question of meaning in music. Despite the examples given earlier, of music's ability to illustrate, reinforce or suggest extra-musical ideas, a literal meaning, in general, and strictly construed, is just what music doesn't have. This is because, again in general, and unlike language, music doesn't refer to anything. (Music is, rather than means.) However, neither does literature have a straightforwardly literal meaning, despite being composed of words which do, and, despite inviting us, though it is admittedly fictional, to imagine people and situations sufficiently close to real life, even in fairy tales, to be believable.Footnote 36 Literature is often said to be symbolic, and ‘symbolism’ in the orthodox literary-critical sense is part of its stock-in-trade (there was once a literary and pictorial movement called Symbolism, though it was unclear just what was being symbolized),Footnote 37 but, though largely representational, literature and literary language are not symbolic in the same way as declarative discourse, where words are presumed to relate directly to the so-called ‘real’ world (i.e. to ‘stand for’, or represent, things in it).
Music is not symbolic in any sense, for the same reason as it is not truly representational, and even though it may serve as an adjunct to narrative. It cannot systematically denote or refer, because, unlike language, literature and pictures, it is not finally separable from the things it might be thought to refer to or depict if it could. (Reference implies a generic distance, or category distinction, between sign and referent.) Those are not typically items in the external world (though they may very occasionally be), but rather mental and emotional states, gestures, attitudes and processes.Footnote 38 Because music is inseparable from such intangibles, it cannot be said to symbolize them. We usually say that what it does is express them. Obviously emotions and mental states (and so on) exist independently, but music is not typically a means or vehicle for their transmission. It is not a receptacle into which they are poured and from which they are subsequently dispensed to a grateful audience. In other words they are not first experienced (or rather, conceived as experiences), then symbolized in music, then reconstituted as the listener's experience. The thing expressed, rather, is identical with its expression. (It was for some such reason that Schopenhauer thought that music was not an oblique representation of the Will, i.e. was not mediated via ideas, concepts, images or symbols, but was rather its direct emanation, reality itself as he conceived of it.)Footnote 39
Sadness, happiness, doubt, resignation, determination, triumph and despair all exist independently of music, as I have said, and are also expressible in music; but what an actual piece of music expresses, here and now, is a particular and complex bundle of emotions, gestures and mental states which can be fully expressed, or if you like embodied, in no other way. A piece of music ideally considered (that is, so-called absolute music) presents something rather than represents it,Footnote 40 even if it can also suggest or allude to things outside itself, including other pieces of music. In the latter case, of course, it is not – so to speak – breaking musical ranks. A striking example, which I mention more for its interest than its strict relevance (since there is a narrative dimension), is found in Schubert's viscerally gripping song Der Zwerg (‘The Dwarf’, D. 771). The poem is a frankly lurid Romantic Schicksalslied, or song of fate, in which a remorse-stricken young queen willingly submits to being murdered by her dwarf (her ex-lover), for having betrayed him by marrying the king. (There is even a hint that she drops dead of grief before he can strike the fatal blow.) In its bass line the piano accompaniment, first rhythmically and then melodically, mimics, develops and distorts the ominous opening motto from Beethoven's 5th Symphony, stretching it at the climax across a horrible tritone interval. Schubert must certainly have known that Beethoven had characterized this motto as ‘Fate knocking at the door’. (Perhaps, since the trail of allusion here ends in a concept, Schubert was breaking musical ranks after all. Or maybe Beethoven was, or both were. Though Schubert's musical allusion would have been effective even if Beethoven had never given the ‘fate’ motto a name.)
But to return: if the musical content or experience is inseparable from its expression, how are we to describe it, perhaps because we wish to discuss it? And what are the consequences of our responding to a piece of music as directly and immediately as it is presented to us, so that we effectively become one with it?
An obvious answer to the first question, how we can describe musical experience, is via our old friend metaphor, which will naturally not be a perfect fit. The same is true, in lesser degree, of any artistic experience. It is just that in painting or literature exposition is given more of a handle, because there the work's content is already couched in symbolic terms. Even so, the only genuinely exhaustive characterization of any work of art would be to duplicate or repeat it. The New Critics of the 1940s used to condemn ‘the heresy of paraphrase’. If a work of art really could be fully translated into declarative terms without remainder, then one could presumably dispense with the actual work and content oneself with the description. But, since it would lack the imaginative dimension – which is to say, there would be a remainder – this would seem peculiarly pointless. To hear a thing described is quite different from living it, which is what art makes us do. (As, in its way, does metaphor.)
Music criticism, as distinct from from pure formal analysis, depends overwhelmingly on metaphor. Some of the most vivid and suggestive criticism is contained in metaphorical one-liners, such as Schumann's brilliant characterization of Chopin's polonaises as ‘cannons buried in flowers’, or Debussy on Grieg's Lyric Pieces for piano: ‘pink bonbons stuffed with snow’. Or, with equal brilliance, and an analytical bonus, here is Scruton himselfFootnote 41 on Bach's great D minor Chaconne, which he movingly and truthfully describes as being:
… one of the most noble and profound utterances for solo violin in the history of music, and a remarkable study in implied harmony. Its effect of titanic strain, as of a giant Atlas, bearing the burden of the world's great sadness, is inseparable from the the way in which the performer must stretch across the four strings of the instrument, to provide as many voices as can be produced by it, and to imply as many more. The performer's effort must be heard in the music, but heard too as part of the music. The brilliance of Bach's writing was precisely to achieve that effect: to make the difficulty of the piece into a quality of the music, rather than a matter of virtuosity.
Such illuminations are rare in critical prose. They are not so rare, however, in music teaching, particularly practical, hands-on instrumental teaching. Béla Bartók was a great pianist as well as a great composer. But according to the late Sir George Solti,Footnote 42 one of his piano pupils (one, moreover, who revered him), he was a terrible teacher, probably (one supposes) on account of his famous, almost neurotic reticence. Solti would play a passage, and Bartók would say simply, ‘No, you must play it like this,’ and then do so himself, without explanation. A good teacher, by contrast, will occupy himself (or herself, of course) with the minutest details of interpretation, alongside matters of execution. He will insist on tiresome scales, arpeggios and exercises, since intrepretative competence is useless until there is sufficient technique to realize it. But typical explanations will be small-scale, local, and limited to what the performer can hope to make a listener hear. With what delight a child, say, might greet the teacher's pointing out Arthur Sullivan's clever, gratuitous and in the context really quite cheeky imitative swapping of vocal lines between the tenor and treble parts in the first eight bars of ‘Onward, Christian Soldiers’. And with how much more delight he would learn to recognize, and to bring out, similar devices in less utilitarian compositions such as the easier of Beethoven's late piano bagatelles.
At the core of this kind of instruction is ostension or demonstration, which is not to say that verbal encouragement and explanation are superfluous. Maybe demonstration is what Bartók thought he was providing; but maybe he was also cutting corners or just not very good at it. Where understanding is sought, and analysis and metaphor have proved inadequate, ostension – literally, pointing out – is our last (but not inferior) resort. (It was ideally F.R. Leavis's literary-critical approach: you interpret a passage, says Leavis, you show it to your interlocutor, and say, ‘This is so, isn't it?’ And he replies, ‘Yes, but …’. And so on.)Footnote 43 Suitably guided, and perhaps after lengthy trial and error, the novice eventually sees the point or masters the skill. To be sure the process resists description, and is thus far ‘ineffable’, like its object, and also (it is said) like God; but in fact there is nothing mysterious, still less mystical, about it, and it is quite familiar, especially to skilled tradesmen and manual workers, as we know from books such as George Sturt's The Wheelwright's Shop and Matthew Crawford's recent (and brilliant) best-seller Shop Class as Soulcraft. Scruton likens our understanding of music to the philosophers' ‘knowledge by acquaintance’,Footnote 44 and, like Gilbert Ryle's ‘knowledge how’, it may be effectively a practical accomplishment, despite its subsequent rationalization in theory. Indeed, in some musical traditions, such as jazz or Indian music, one learns entirely by apprenticeship, or total immersion. That this is not ‘knowledge by description’, and therefore cannot be written down or got out of books, does not make it any the less knowledge. The mechanical principles behind riding a bicycle are readily intelligible to an adult; but no abstract familiarity with them in advance can teach you actually to ride one, something which many an ignorant five-year-old can do.
And so, perhaps, with music. The early 20th-century musicologist Heinrich Schenker thought he had detected hierarchical, hugely extended formal structures underlying masterpieces in the tonal tradition, all, though masked by various disguises and displacements, reducible in the end to the familiar harmonic progression (‘I-V-I’) from tonic to dominant and back.Footnote 45 This suggestion has a certain plausibility, in that in most musical compositions we normally sense something like a circular A-B-A pattern, one jointly signalled, exemplified and reinforced by harmonic sequence; but Schenker's cadential Ursatz (fundamental structure), otherwise ‘background’, is unlikely to fire any learner's or performer's imagination,Footnote 46 since it is on the auditory surface, in the Schenkerian ‘foreground’ – that is, in the elaborations of the supposedly latent Ursatz – that our primary interest lies, rather than in the Ursatz itself. The latter (the I-V-I sequence), being the commonest of musical building blocks, and thus (on unwitting Schenkerian assumptions) underlying not just masterpieces, but all tonal music, is almost bound to be banal, if harmlessly so.Footnote 47 Similar reductions were performed by Freudians, for whom in the end everything stemmed from unconscious inner conflicts (notably the Oedipus complex); by Marxists, for whom socio-cultural (or ‘tertiary’) phenomena were all ‘in the last analysis’ (as Engels put it) economic in origin; and by literary formalists (e.g. Propp, Greimas), for whom all narratives were effectively large-scale variations upon the classic sentence-pattern of subject, verb and object.Footnote 48 If such all-embracing theories are true, then nothing really remains to be learnt, since all is known in advance, and our immediate objects of concern, the individuating details and differences in which we had taken the significance of things to reside, are after all trivial. But a theory which does not engage with or illuminate our immediate concerns is not true in any sense that matters. It is not they, but the theory, that is trivial. As Dr Johnson said, that book is good in vain, which the reader throws away.
Such small-scale, practical, detail-based explication and instruction as I have been commending may be compared with what Karl Popper and many of his fellow-Austrians favoured in politics, viz. ‘piecemeal engineering’ and the avoidance of grand, or overarching, theory. So-called grand theory is like the dirigiste, over-centralized government which is actually needed to put it into practice. Both are disconnected from the reality of everyday existence (the Lebenswelt), which is a myriad of dispersed individual acts, desires and predicaments, and their constant mutual adjustments and accommodations. In musical interpretation, however, the lack of a central explanatory principle is no great matter. As we have seen, music tends to elude any non-figurative description, other than the purely formal (which may be correct but uninteresting). But this is not necessarily disadvantageous to musical understanding. Because music comes to us unmediated by concepts, our encounter with it (to exaggerate only slightly) is like a face-to-face encounter with a person, an ‘I-Thou’ relationship, to use Martin Buber's term. The ‘other’ (music) requires no introduction, because one already knows him sufficiently well and (metaphorically, if not literally) he speaks one's language. Already semi-transparent, the relationship is potentially intimate, and may proceed to friendship on the basis of shared experience and common sympathies.
Like many thinkers since antiquity, especially, though not exclusively, those of a conservative stamp, Scruton comes on strong regarding the solidarity-inducing qualities of music.Footnote 49 However, and like the other arts, music has always been conscripted for political use by regimes of every stripe, some of them very nasty. It may well foster solidarity, but the question is, of what kind? If, as Dryden tells us in his ‘Song for St Cecilia's Day’, music can both raise and quell any passion, the sympathy it excites among its listeners can be diverted to a variety of ends, some good and others not.Footnote 50 In this respect music is like any art, which, if it can ennoble, can also deprave. The idea that a shared emotion creates a common identity among the sharers resembles R.G. Collingwood's even more radically idealist notion that since a mind is indistinguishable from its contents, then minds sharing a single thought effectively become a single mind (so that to read Plato is temporarily to become him). Of course, if the shared thought is this, that I am utterly separate from all these other people, then that must create problems for the single-mind hypothesis, even if it also throws some light on the role of pop music in at once provoking and alleviating adolescent Angst. So must it if the shared thought is that we are all incorrigible egoists. But I shall come to all that. The point is that a shared thought, or a shared emotion, is not necessarily virtuous simply because it is shared, nor necessarily productive of social harmony.
The solidarity that, according to Scruton, music (or rather, ‘good’ music) engenders in us begins less in unmediated emotion – though that, in the end, is of the greatest importance – than in the comparatively technical areas of harmony, polyphony and collective music-making, perhaps particularly when choral (the ‘voices’ there being literally human). This recalls Thomas Mann's rambling pro-German polemic from the First World War, Reflections of a Non-Political Man. Mann, then very much the conservative, quotes Luther, who was famously musical, as saying that music is ‘a semi-discipline and taskmaster that makes people softer and more gentle, more moral and more reasonable’, and himself goes on to say that the great German fugal tradition represents the ‘powerfully polyphonic joining of self-will and subordination’ and is ‘the artistic-spiritual reflection of German life itself’.Footnote 51 It is certainly true that there could be, and is, an implicit ‘politics of music’, or at least of group music-making, just as there is an implicit politics of team sports, which require precisely Mann's combination of individuality and self-subordination. Scruton also alleges that our response to music is partly informed by an underlying impulse to dance.Footnote 52 There is something in this, but it cannot apply to all music.Footnote 53 Nietzsche likened music of the classical era to dancing, with its precision, courtesy and grace. But he likened Wagner's music to swimming (and, he half-suggested, drowning).Footnote 54 And, though Wagner called Beethoven's Seventh Symphony ‘the apotheosis of the dance’,Footnote 55 there is much in Beethoven that is not even remotely dance-like, but prayerful, inward and meditative. At all events, in dancing we become our bodies (and they us), rather than merely inhabiting them, and dancing, of the kind Scruton favours, is a communal activity, requiring spontaneity, to be sure, but within a formal framework of discipline and co-operation. And here of course, there is a tenuous link not only to politics but also to sex, because in both dancing and erotic experience I actually become incarnate in my body.
The implications of this complex of ideas are suggestive but not altogether clear. The combined individuality and community exemplified by co-operative music-making may well be a model of desirable social relations, especially since the activity is voluntary, being driven only by each participant's desire to participate, and the product being an end in itself. (This is true even of professional musicians: except for star performers, the remuneration, as in academe, is too paltry, on its own, to count as a serious career incentive.) But the quality of the music thus produced could in principle be entirely irrelevant. The close harmony of a barber-shop quartet is pleasing, or at least tolerable, in small doses (e.g. while waiting to get one's hair cut), while the performers' timing, polyphonic virtuosity and dramatic vocal interaction often surpass anything found in ‘serious’ music-making. In its socio-political implications, barber-shop is unimprovably Scrutopian (to use Nick Zangwill's amusing expression). The music itself, however, is usually banal, sometimes extremely so, and, when so, worthless except as a vehicle for the performance. So why should we prefer serious music to barber-shop? Indeed, should we? Would Scruton himself? Do we even need the music? Wouldn't Busby Berkeley, or synchronized swimming, do just as well, with the sound turned off?Footnote 56
Kant called music ‘a mere playing with sensations’Footnote 57 and was notoriously insensitive to it, except as regards the annoyance it caused to neighbours (notably himself). But many other intelligent people, such as Dr Johnson, Jane Austen and Evelyn Waugh, have also disliked it, and some, as it seems, have resented its threat, not to their physical, but to their emotional, peace and quiet.Footnote 58 That, of course, is an unconscious tribute to its power, and is prompted, perhaps, by a fear of ‘losing control’. (There is something of this in many people's violent dislike of Wagner, which is the obverse of others' near-worship of him.) Simply as a practical matter, successful group music-making obviously requires a common understanding among the players; but the same sympathy, projected on to society as a whole, is also intimated in the dynamic interactive relationship between the written parts (this is Mann's point, I take it, about polyphony and German-ness). In Scruton's highly plausible view an audience, even a solitary person listening to a recording, actually does participate empathetically in the performance, much as (again according to Scruton) the music prompts him subliminally to rehearse bodily movements which are never translated into actual motion. Such a performance need not be brain-teasingly polyphonic or German. And even more fundamental is the situation in which the listener identifies himself simply with the music itself, which is to say with the entire ensemble of work, composer, performer and real or imagined audience. Here all, and by definition the listener himself, become both a single thing and a virtual community. In The Dry Salvages T.S. Eliot speaks, profoundly, of ‘music heard so deeply / That it is not heard at all, but you are the music / While the music lasts’,Footnote 59 and embellishes the insight with all kinds of religious and semi-religious images and suggestions, most notably to the effect that the experience resembles the Incarnation, in being ‘the intersection of the timeless with time’.
What of the idea that music takes you out of yourself, that this is what you seek and find fulfilling, and above all, that it must be good, both for you and for the community at large? Must it? The foregoing reflections would seem to say, yes. But could there be a another sense, in which to be ‘taken out of oneself’ was a bad thing? In his book of 1921, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud suggests one answer, which we may contemplate simply as a fable, without buying into his overall vision. He introduces the concept of the ego-ideal (later renamed the superego), an internal monitor, originally modelled on an external figure (typically a parent), which activates the mechanism of repression. By this means unsafe, socially undesirable, or what the unscientific call ‘immoral’ impulses are (allegedly) excluded from consciousness and either blocked completely or diverted to proxy gratifications.
The ego-ideal, in short, is the moral conscience. Freud speculates how this programme might have operated at the dawn of mankind, in what he calls the ‘primal horde’. Rather than what we would call a society, the primal horde is essentially a human herd, united under a single powerful, charismatic leader (an ‘alpha male’, in modern ethological parlance). Social solidarity and co-ordinated action, Freud suggests, are secured by each follower's transferring his ego-ideal to the leader, or (to put it another way) introjecting the image of the leader in the place of his ego-ideal,Footnote 60 so that the leader's command is now the follower's moral conscience, and the follower himself is relieved of all responsibility except for obedience, in fact, in exchange for obedience. The consequence, Freud says, is that the followers effectively become a single ego or consciousness, united under the absolute authority of the leader.
This may or may not have been true of the primal horde, if it ever existed, but it is certainly prescient of the fascist and communist regimes looming on the horizon as Freud wrote, with their personality cults and murderous ruthlessness. (There are not many laughs in fascism; but the final article of the official Fascist Decalogue is one of them, and illustrates Freud's point to a T: ‘10: Mussolini is always right.’)Footnote 61 If to be taken out of oneself means this, to surrender one's moral judgment to a dictator and submerge oneself in an amorphous mass of indistinguishable others who have done the same, and in so doing to be redeemed from one's loneliness and powerlessness, it is clearly not to be encouraged. But in liberal societies, such as our own, where it is neither compulsory nor the principle of political order, it, or something structurally very similar, is both encouraged and embraced, only in spheres other than politics, viz. football, celebrity culture, and pop music. Being ‘taken out of oneself’ in this way is – perhaps not invariably, but often – an abnegation, not of self, but of the power of choice and self-direction, which is central to one's ‘real’ self. It is a kind of voluntary slavery, and, appearances notwithstanding, profoundly selfish. The moral, responsible self that should be fulfilled is surrendered in favour of the timid, hedonistic self seeking only temporary security and shallow gratification, things which, because they can be withdrawn at the slightest sign of non-conformity, imprison the subject in perpetual infantile dependence. If significant numbers in a free society still choose such a shrunken existence, it suggests that totalitarian societies were not as unpopular as they seemed to be, and that the grotesque travesty of social membership that they offered was evidently better than nothing.
Real social membership is not easy to anatomize. But let me note that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with football, popular music, or even an interest in celebrities. No doubt this is my timid, hedonistic self speaking, out of fear of brickbats to come, but football, like other team sports, demands courage, skill, dedication and endurance, and also has many sensible, mild-mannered devotees, probably the majority, who rightly admire those things about it and take no interest whatever in the vicarious life it offers to its more deluded fans or in the tabloid squalor in which its luminaries seem permanently sunk. Even celebrity culture is neither new (remember Mr Guppy in Bleak House?) nor as stupid as it may often seem. Like soap operas, gossip, and even the great Victorian serial novels, it provides an arena for the exercise, exchange and development of our moral ideas. Not everyone interested in celebrities necessarily approves of them. It is often said that the world of celebrities, like reality TV, resembles a zoo. But did anyone ever watch the admirable, and now banned, chimpanzees' tea party expecting to learn table manners from it, except negatively?Footnote 62
As for pop music, well, there is pop music and pop music, as well as popular music in the old sense, a category to which some pop music still belongs, and of which Scruton approves, unlike Theodor Adorno, the high-minded and frequently insufferable Frankfurt School Marxist. Adorno could have got away with it, indeed did so at the time, being on the Left, but nothing recent has earned Scruton more opprobrium than his attacks on contemporary pop, unless it be his strictures (contrary to Adorno) concerning serialism and the avant-garde. No matter how wholesome your intentions or accurate your aim, if you take simultaneous potshots at both the market-supplied proles and the taxpayer-supported toffs, you can expect trouble.
Despite the offence they have caused, Scruton's by no means blanket criticisms of pop occupy only a couple of pages in The Aesthetics of Music, though he has expanded on them since. They and his objections to serialism and the likeFootnote 63 centre on the proposition that neither genre is really music, as both philosophy and common sense (not always allies) conceive of it, since both, in essence, have reduced music proper to mere sound. That in itself might not matter, we might reply, since not all ‘sound-art’ is worthless, any more than the natural sounds of wind and waves are worthless or unpleasurable. But pop of the bad sort is bad anyway, Scruton thinks, not just because it is intrinsically anti-musical, nor just because such real musical expression as survives in it is feeble, monotonous and uninventive. Techno music in particular, he says, has become little more than a tonally incoherent, electronically-generated noise, driven not by melody or harmony, which are vestigial at best, but by an external, purely mechanical beat, accompanying a tuneless declamatory gabble of fragmentary, nihilistic word-clusters.Footnote 64 Such head-banging stuff intimates no real renunciation of the self or its expansion into true community, but only, and at best, an extinction almost to be welcomed.
It is as difficult to say what is good about good music as it is to define the good society and relate it to music. But here goes. In aesthetic as in ethical matters, the very word ‘good’ signifies a communal, shared, so far objective and even compulsory dimension. (If a thing really is good, rather than merely desired, be it an object, an artefact, an action or a person, then you and I are somehow, if obscurely, ‘obliged’ to see it as good, and to do so at first hand, not on others' say-so.) It is not so much the shared nature of an experience that makes it valuable, though that is necessary, as its quality, and – which is the same thing – the quality of the selves who share it. Is it a genuine community, a Gemeinschaft, bound by a selfless love of each for the others, and of all for the community thus composed, or a purpose-driven Gesellschaft or association, another kind of sharing, to which each subscribes basically for what he personally can get out of it, and whose subscription may lapse as soon as the association fails to deliver?Footnote 65 There is nothing wrong with Gesellschaft. It is the root of commerce, it puts clothes on our backs and food on the table, it makes Gemeinschaft, duty and charity affordable, and it is copiously overwritten with Gemeinschaft anyway (as when I use this shop rather than a cheaper, because I like the proprietor, and his children go to school with mine). But a life lived exclusively under its banner – ‘materialism’, in short – would not be fully human.Footnote 66
Scruton occupies himself at some length with the problem of sentimentality,Footnote 67 which we might call fake Gemeinschaft or bogus altruism. Courage, stoicism, generosity, charity, self-sacrifice, compassion, modesty and even humility: all are both broadly altruistic and difficult of achievement, given the universality, and even up to a point the necessity, of egoism. But, unlike egoism, they are admired, and admiration is something everyone wants and even needs, whether he deserves it or not. The easiest route to it, therefore, in one's own eyes as in others', is to simulate such virtues (especially compassion) whilst concealing even from oneself the underlying purpose, which is to look good, or, failing that, feel good, as cheaply as possible. When we all do this, united by a collective self-interest rather than by any real sympathy, we agree to keep up the common pretence and band together to wreak the severest vengeance on any outsider who points out its hollowness.
Real sympathy is different, and stems from strength, not weakness. I surrender to the music because I can afford to, and I lose nothing by doing so except my egoism. I abjure neither my autonomy nor my self-respect. I do not seek my private joy or sadness in the music; instead, for so long as I listen, I make the music's joy or sadness my own, and return to my mundane existence refreshed and revivified by this glimpse of a life which, while like mine, is not mine, and is the better for not being mine. Nor is it the composer's, for his egoistic concerns are no more interesting than my own or anyone else's, and if he fills his music with his own joys and sadnesses that leaves less room for the joys and sadnesses that we all feel, and which bring us together in our common sympathy. As Wilfrid Mellers wrote of that least self-absorbed, least self-regarding, least self-dramatizing and consequently most truly dramatic of artists, concerning his G minor Symphony, no. 40: ‘The suffering is not ours, or Mozart's, but all mankind's.’Footnote 68
