Sixty years ago, the late political scientist Kenneth Waltz outlined three levels of analysis in the study of global affairs: the individual, the state, and the international system. Roham Alvandi's analysis of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah's Iran blends all three, but underscores the paramount importance of individuals. The author regularly reminds the reader that, between 1969 and 1974, the relationship between Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and the shah “was not simply a reflection of geopolitical realities” (p. 176). By identifying individual agency and powerful friendships as the drivers of history, and by treating the early 1970s as a distinct historical era, Alvandi challenges the hitherto dominant teleological narrative that reads the Iranian Revolution backward into the entirety of Iran's Cold War.
Contrary to the image of the shah that dominates much of the postrevolutionary scholarship, Alvandi's shah is no American puppet. Rather, the monarch is a powerful actor whose foreign policies—although not his domestic policies—were bold, calculating, and prudent. In 1941, when Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah succeeded his deposed and exiled father, it would have been a pipedream to think that Iran, under the then-timid shah's leadership, would become the hegemon of the Persian Gulf region. But thirty years later, when Britain withdrew from its posts “East of Suez,” it was Iran—not Iraq or Saudi Arabia—that called the shots from the Gulf's northern shore. That he accomplished this with US assistance is undeniable, but Alvandi demonstrates how, during the Nixon era, the shah determined the means necessary for blunting Soviet and Arab nationalist influence and the ends to which those means would be applied. By 1972 it was necessary for Nixon to ask the shah to “protect me” (p. 63), and in 1976 the shah confidently peered through his thick-rimmed glasses and told American officials that he alone controlled Iran's destiny (p. 169).
Three case studies buttress the author's primary claim about the shah's agency. The first begins in January 1968, when Great Britain announced its intention to withdraw from the Gulf, and ends with the Tehran summit of May 1972. Alvandi's aim is to demonstrate why and how the Nixon administration abandoned the “twin pillars” policy, which the Johnson administration employed to balance Saudi Arabia and Iran, for a strategy of “Iranian primacy.” Rather than point to the Vietnam-era limitations on American power, the author asserts that the personal relationship between the three titular principals accounts for the strategic shift. That shift was the result of “the shah's relentless lobbying” (p. 41) and the fact that he “skillfully employed the logic of the Cold War and the language of the Nixon Doctrine” (p. 55) to make himself an invaluable partner—rather than an expendable client—of the United States. The unprecedented influence that the shah established in Washington was not so much a case of the tail wagging the dog as it was the acknowledgment that there were, in fact, two different dogs.
The second case deals with the Kurdish-Iraqi War of 1974–75. Here, Nixon and Kissinger ignored the advice of their entire foreign policy bureaucracy, listening instead to the shah, who urged the United States to provide covert aid to the Kurds. The Kurdish case study provides an opportunity to assess the ways in which the book contributes to the growing body of literature on what Odd Arne Westad has termed the “Global Cold War.” Alvandi departs in significant ways from Westad's analysis by focusing on diplomacy and personalities instead of interventions and ideology. While noting his indebtedness to Westad, Alvandi does not make the interpretive leap to demonstrate how his book is in conversation with the literature on the world's many regional cold wars. Alvandi's analysis of the Kurdish conflict does more than illustrate the shah's power; it demonstrates how the superpower conflict became part of a centuries-old regional conflict that has its origins in the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry of the 16th century. While Alvandi makes this point on multiple occasions (pp. 68, 82), the larger historical and historiographical significance is left for the reader to infer. Still, the Cold War that Alvandi describes is much different than Westad's “Global Cold War,” Gilbert Joseph's Cold War in Latin America, or, of course, the “Arab Cold War” about which Malcolm Kerr wrote years ago.
The third case study—the shah's nuclear program—provides another example of the author's intricate understanding of bureaucratic politics in Washington and sensitive international issues. After putting Iran on the road toward nuclearization in the late 1950s and 1960s, the US government balked at the opportunity to help the shah establish a self-sufficient nuclear program during the mid-1970s. Alvandi shows how the Ford administration abandoned the partnership that developed under the Nixon Doctrine for a patron--client relationship by demanding that the shah accept safeguards that were not expected of any other signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The shah's turn to West Germany and France for his nuclear needs signaled the end of the “special relationship” between Iran and the United States.
While the author gives the impression that “the absence of an intimate friendship between the president and the shah” (p. 129) explains the deterioration of US--Iran relations during the last half of the 1970s, one wonders whether Nixon's absence was as significant as the other factors that Alvandi identifies. On the one hand, there is the question of timing. Considering that the shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran the same year as India's nuclear explosion, it is quite possible that, even if Nixon had somehow managed to save his presidency, American-Iranian nuclear cooperation would have taken a similar path. On the other hand, there is the question of image. As Alvandi notes, the US Congress and public did not think highly of the imperious shah as oil prices skyrocketed and reports of SAVAK's torture chambers began to circulate. Could the personal relationships have weathered those storms?
In addition to timing and image is the question of the shah's personality. Given his reliance on the United States during the Mosaddeq years of the early 1950s and the revolutionary upsurge of the late 1970s, one wonders if the five years between 1969 and 1974 are the exception rather than the rule. By the early 1970s, not only did the shah seem to have a lid on dissent, but he had access to unlimited quantities of American-made arms and benefited from incredible oil wealth. It was an era of absolute monarchy and unlimited funds, a time when a cancer-free shah had a friend in the White House. While Alvandi's revisionist argument about the shah during this era is convincing, one wonders if the traditional narrative about the preponderance of American power and influence in Iran during the other thirty-three years of the shah's reign still holds true.
In the end, Alvandi has produced one of the most authoritative accounts of US--Iran relations during the Cold War by making use of newly available and underutilized primary sources in English and Persian. On the American side, references to US government documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the National Archives, and the relevant presidential libraries fill more than forty pages of endnotes and provide the empirical evidence to back most of the book's claims. On the Iranian side, Alvandi has analyzed several oral history collections, conducted interviews with Pahlavi-era diplomats such as Ardeshir Zahedi, and combed through the six-volume diary of Asadollah Alam, which Alvandi demonstrates reveals much more about life inside the Royal Court than the abridged English-language volume. Alvandi's deft analysis of an international source base and nuanced understanding of the era has allowed him to write a book that should find its way into the libraries of scholars of Iran, the modern Middle East, and the Cold War.
