I first heard the phrase ‘taking a break from feminism’ some years back, and thought, fine, academic feminists want to decentre gender to focus for a while on other inequalities. As Halley (p. 341) remarks, ‘there is the hunch that many of the most devastating problems in the world might not be about m/f, not even a little’. Certainly, from a UK perspective, many feminist activists and policy-makers have been pursuing a version of feminism, attuned to the equal significance of class, race and other indices of inequality, in both converging and diverging ways, for some decades. But this is not a book about feminism amongst activists or about feminism outside the US. So, bracketing both the troubling conclusion that feminism elsewhere brings nothing to Halley’s analysis, and the equally troubling empirical foundations of Halley’s claims about US feminism, to what extent is ‘taking a break’ oriented to forging a wider social justice politics? Or is something else, and I want to suggest something else is, at stake?
Split Decisions has its strengths. Rich, challenging and multifaceted, it demonstrates Halley’s signature virtuosity in crafting illuminating and original textual readings. Split Decisions also displays a tireless advocacy for ongoing reflexivity, interrogating and questioning political certainties. Yet, despite arguing for a more conditional, tentative style of argument, Halley’s book is definite, firm and uncompromising in its attack. Some of this provocative style – its charges, claims and challenges – is no doubt heuristically motivated and should not be taken too literally. However, since Halley’s book displays tendencies found also amongst other progressive post-modern US scholars, I want to take it at its word, and ask three questions: Why are we taking a break? What are we taking a break to do? And third, what political and epistemological work does the claim ‘taking a break’ perform?
I read Split Decisions as not just breaking from feminism, but from all social justice politics, or at least those organised around a model of structural inequality and the claims-making victim. ‘Would it possibly be a good idea’, Halley writes, ‘for people involved in justice-seeking intellectual/activist enterprises…to suspend antiracism, queer theory, trans theory, any theory – to interrupt it, to sustain its displacement by inconsistent theories about power, hierarchy, and progressive struggle?’ (p. 282).
Halley recommends a break from subordination politics for several reasons – the two most important for my discussion here are, first, because feminism (and, by implication, other analogous social justice politics) reinforces and capitalises upon women’s passive victim status, generating a moralising desire for revenge. Feminism, in this sense, is performative. By constructing rape as sexual violence, by telling women they have been injured and hurt, feminism risks erasing women’s agency, fixing and intensifying their distress (p. 346). Halley writes: ‘[the] discursive production of pain may also help to produce the subjects who experience it; feminism may be responsible for at least some of the trauma that real women really experience in their real lives’ (p. 324). Dovetailing this critique is Halley’s disavowal of social, symbolic and cultural conceptions of harm. She states: ‘With the rise of left multicultural identity politics came a sweeping and highly creative project of defining social disadvantage experienced by social groups as harm’ (p. 324).
So, we might read ‘taking a break’ as motivated by the drive to find a different political register. Loosely paralleling Arendt’s critique of welfare- and needs-based politics for a vision of politics based on something else, and with echoes of Berlant’s (Reference Berlant, Brown and Halley2002) and Brown’s (Reference Brown1995) critiques of identity-based pain, Halley rejects paradigms that have dominated progressive social justice politics in recent years. But what does she seek to put in their place? My argument is that Halley does not fundamentally reject pain, moralism and passivity so much as reconfigure them in a reading of political action that uneasily melds group interests with an exceptionalist account of sex2 (‘everything that turns us on’ (p. 24)). How, or more particularly in whom, do these two strands converge?
Given Halley’s focus on the erotic, and her desire to displace feminism’s apparent hegemony, one might expect Split Decisions to focus on troubling or marginal statuses and sexualities within both mainstream and feminist politics: children’s bodily pleasures, perhaps, or – even less intelligible to current political discourse – those of animals, including livestock, pets and zoo captives. But the main status identities or groups discussed are, in fact, those feminism ascribes with power. Halley’s primary (torqued and tortured) subjects are men. Her problematic: resurrecting the visibility and legitimacy of men’s interests, most particularly masculine, male desire for the sexy femininity of women (see pp. 114, 206), alongside feminine women’s desire for erotic subordination to erotically dominating men (see p. 335).
Taking a break from feminism and conventional justice politics to see, seemingly with ‘new eyes’, asymmetrical heterosexual desire, Halley goes further. Against feminism’s ‘infantile, lesbian, entirely feminine sexuality – a sexuality of mutuality, reciprocity, self-affirming integrity…empathy, and care’ (p. 335), Halley poses a desire liberated from consent – a desire that seeks, troubles or is produced by non-consensual sex, with its ‘loss of certainty about wantedness’ (p. 300). (Such a desire, unlike feminism, interestingly, seems to be non-performative – desiring and experiencing erotic subordination does not render you subordinate.) Nevertheless, Halley acknowledges its riskiness, ‘acting on it places one in the way of having some unwanted sex. Things can go wrong…But more profoundly, if things go right, the wantedness of the sex that happens will be unknowable’ (pp. 300–301). Halley is offering us here a reading (of the Oncale case she discusses), and a primary claim of Split Decisions is the reality and importance of seeing different (incommensurable) readings. Indeed, breaking with feminism is an essential step in recognising what alternative readings might look like. At the same time, as Halley says, in one of several ‘cards-on-the-table-moments’, she is one of many people ‘who think the problematic of wantedness isn’t just tolerable; we think it’s beautiful; it’s brave; it’s complicated and fleeting and elaborate and human’ (p. 301). I return to this claim in closing. But first I want to address its underpinnings by considering the intellectual and political work Halley’s account of feminism and the social perform. What understandings of political ideology, the social fabric and change aspirations gird Split Decisions’ desire to reclaim heterosexual interests and asymmetric erotic exchange?
At the forefront is, of course, Halley’s conception of feminism. Thus, the book can and has been criticised for exaggerating feminism’s power over women, and for a reductionism that, in narrowly reading feminism as m/f, m > f, and carrying a brief for f, disregards feminism’s wider contribution to philosophy and social practice (for useful critical discussion, see Hawkesworth, Reference Hawkesworth2007; Wiegman, Reference Wiegman2004). While domains such as the public/private, democracy, affectivity and organisational decision-making have been historically tied to gender formations – culturally, politically and epistemologically – they are not reducible to m > f. Gender processes are more complex, often working in unpredictable, unexpected ways. Much feminist work, and by this I mean work coming out of feminist debates, being informed by feminist scholarship or with a feminist sensibility, engages with this complexity. It also engages with practices that cannot be explained through the frame of gender or sex1. Split Decisions, by contrast, seems to anchor its criticism of feminism in tautology – failing to recognise as feminist that work which doesn’t correspond to its gender-binary mantra. Yet, while Halley’s book holds fast to a rigid reading of this mantra, it is slippery on the question of what feminism (and other social justice theories) actually is – (intellectual) weapons, tools, interests, colonisers, communities, governance projects, perspectives – a slipperiness that pervades the related question of how, and with what ease, such theories can be (temporarily) broken from.Footnote 2
Specifically, Halley oscillates between feminism as controlling motherFootnote 3 and feminism as pragmatic instrument, an oscillation which slides, or rather converges, in a third image, feminism as a combative side or team.Footnote 4 According to Halley, feminism as a governance project produces ‘prisoners of war, the interests that pay the taxes it has levied and owe the rents it has imposed’ (p. 33). Later, she writes: ‘women might win at the expense of gay men, or gay men who have assimilated their politics to cultural-feminist moralism might win at the expense of queers’ (pp. 302–303).Footnote 5 Consequently, much of the book is taken up with the challenge of balancing and deciding between different team interests (even as Halley acknowledges our inner selves may simultaneously desire or adopt multiple competing positions (pp. 12–13)).
Repeated discussion of winners and losers, costs and benefits, speaks to the juridical paradigm underpinning Split Decisions; it also, in more complex ways, structures Halley’s agonistic approach to interest-based theory. To believe that interests can coincide, Halley suggests, usually translates as one team’s reductionist, expansionist and deterministic perspective swallowing up another (p. 55). This is ‘convergentist’; in other words, morally, ethically, politically and intellectually bad. But what should teams and their frameworks do instead? Does Halley want social justice frameworks to self-consciously retract – establishing, with renewed vigour, outsides and a boundedness of interest, perspective and commitment? We are back to ontological slipperiness, this time routed through the ‘right thing’ for those of us hearing the take a break call to do: narrow the terms of our social justice framework to a clearly defined team, join a different team, detach ourselves from teams ranged before us to ‘fairly’ make law and policy, use the lens of another team to critique our own commitments, or build theories which take as a starting point the presence (or validity?) of incommensurable, competing worldviews. Split Decisions gives us little guidance as it slides between internal and external standpoints of adjudication, interest group membership and theoretical purpose (see pp. 273–74). I want to consider this difficulty of politics in Split Decisions further. But first, I turn to the problem of the social.
A major limitation of Split Decisions, as Wiegman (Reference Wiegman2004, p. 118) also remarks, although from a different perspective, is its thin elaboration of the social landscape. Absent a sociology of power, this world of taking a break is a world without edifice, shape or form, lacking institutionalised or dominant norms, logics, circuits and systems (or even the more contingent, unfolding frame of tendencies, biases and flows). The only systemic or structural approach repeatedly presented is the one Halley rejects. This is the structural power of reductionist oppressions: class, race, sexuality and gender. Instead, Halley poses two, analytically preferred, alternatives: a society organised around bargaining and conflicting agendas, in which costs and benefits are distributed between different projects and teams, and a place where power is ‘as complex and mobile as it is in really good sadomasochistic sex’ (p. 163). So this is a place, and one assumes not just any place, but some place, an American place, where we can have ‘queer exploded lists’. Here, elements, such as sex1, gender and masculinity/femininity not only have no necessary relationship, but also no likely (or hegemonic socially intelligible) relationship to each other or to other elements, such as identification, practice or desire. At the same time, Halley partially steps back from the ‘exploded list’ pedestal to suggest we mix ‘the sense of delicious wonder at the profound uncertainty of all our knowledge’ (p. 207) – a mix she, unexpectedly, remarks combines ‘the delirious complexity of sexuality as it is so variously lived’ with ‘structural feminist’ knowledge.
Halley, I think, is right to combine individual complexity and variation with more structural understandings. However, her book offers little sense of how to combine the two. Is it a question of scale: where local variation co-exists with more systemically patterned macro-level formations? Is it a matter of shifting lenses – from seeing routines and predictable outcomes to focusing on unexpected variations? Or is it about blending contingency, volatility and regimes of power – to recognise unfolding social patterns that manifest and enable change and the unpredictable without resorting to a hyper-accidentalism?
One work Halley might have found useful in thinking through a more complex understanding of social power is Avery Gordon’s Ghostly Matters (2008). I don’t know if Halley would include Ghostly Matters within her description of ‘paranoid structuralism’; nevertheless, what Gordon’s book effectively does is use the concept of haunting to explore and illuminate how past relations and practices of power continue to shade and affect the present, when ‘a repressed or unresolved social violence is making itself known’ (Gordon, Reference Gordon2008, p. xvi). For Gordon, the presence of past troubles through haunting renders contemporary power relations socially intelligible without having to pose a teleological, linear relationship running backwards from social gains, through power to interests. Resolving this teleological linearity is Halley’s difficulty. Without a developed conception of the social, she is left with this gains–power–interests triad. Thus, women’s victories in child custody or divorce disputes, or women lying about rape can only demonstrate men’s declining power. To say anything else, it would seem, is paranoid structuralism.
Alongside others, such as Conaghan (Reference Conaghan, Grabham, Cooper, Krishnadas and Herman2008), I have argued elsewhere against reducing gender formations to women’s and men’s interests (Cooper, Reference Cooper2004), and I’ve sought to explore different ways of thinking about the relationship of organising principles of inequality to different aspects of the social (Cooper, Reference Cooper, Grabham, Cooper, Krishnadas and Herman2008). Like Conaghan and Gordon, my understanding of the social is linked, though not derived from, a certain set of political commitments. This is also true for Halley’s Split Decisions – which I read as a highly political, even normative, book. Yet, despite its many references to its left-of-centre home, Split Decisions does not locate its analysis within wider social justice debates as, for instance, does Nancy Fraser (Reference Fraser1997) through her paradigm of recognition and redistribution. Indeed, given Halley’s ambivalence as to whether power structures or embedded, institutionalised inequalities exist, and given her critique of prescriptive theory, and theory collapsing into utopia, we are left with major questions as to what a left politics could ever be about or from what component elements or materials it should be formed.
On one level, social change politics seems almost entirely absent from Split Decisions. Yet, the book both expresses and is underpinned by a vision – even as this comes through opaquely and often implicitly – of the ‘preferable’. Here, I want to focus on two strands. The first is a call for left politics to demonstrate greater reflexivity; that we consider which ‘teams’ have been neglected. Thus, Halley (p. 33) suggests one of feminism’s major limitations is that it’s been unable to see injury to (heterosexual) men (see also pp. 287–89). We need to see, she argues, the costs or burdens imposed on others when we support our favourites: women, gay men, queers, etc. Consequently, Halley puts great stress on enumerating the implications for other interests of particular laws and policy decisions, such as improved employment conditions for pregnant women (pp. 287–90). But, of course, who would doubt policies, laws and rulings have multiple effects, direct and indirect; indeed, this has been a major focus for feminist socio-legal studies since the early 1990s.
Split Decisions’ problem is that it gives us no assistance in determining which effects matter. How do we ‘decide in the splits between theories and between the interests they make visible, produce, and narrate’ (p. 4)? This is particularly relevant to Halley’s critique of feminism for showing no interest in ‘women’s heterosexual desire for masculinity in men’ (p. 65). What makes affirming this desire progressive? Is it progressive simply by virtue of the fact some women experience it? Or is it a progressive desire because some strands of feminism have, seemingly, condemned or ignored it? Aside from the question of whom to support, the other problem with Halley’s interest-group focus comes in following the effects. Disarticulated from a more patterned analysis, we lose sight of outcomes and strategies that go beyond ‘differently interested players…bargaining in the shadow of law’ (p. 174). Yet, the dilemma of assisting pregnant women in the workplace, for instance, to take one of Halley’s examples, is not just a matter of noticing where the costs fall – who suffers as a result. It can also be addressed, as many feminists have advocated, through a spectrum of policies and politics ranging from better medical assistance, childcare support and non-gendered care leave to shorter working hours, deprivatised households, extended care networks and publicly owned workplaces. Again, Halley might argue, particularly in relation to more reformist proposals, these simply provide a second tier reallocation of costs and benefits. However, once more radical changes are considered, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine who wins and who loses, as the very social statuses and identities upon which such claims are grounded are themselves transformed in the process.
Team politics is a major dimension of Split Decisions, and I have focused on it here because its dominance pervades much progressive thinking. This thinking evacuates the social fabric and landscape as it also evacuates the social formation of interests and desires, to posit a series of articulations in which relations of power get read through identity politics as group interests. But, sitting at right angles to Halley’s contemplation of distributive costs is a second political strand – a sharply defiant sexual ‘moralism’. While a politics oriented to a feminised, sunny, pastoral, productive, symmetrical sexuality is derided and dismissed (pp. 66–67, 78), what keeps surfacing in Split Decisions is the repeat affirmation of a cherished ‘edgy experience of unwantedness in sex’ (p. 302). And popping up beside it as the new queer exchange: the gendered, heterosexualised sadomasochistic experience in which a good politics and good life get read through the subordination or dissolution of the, usually female, self. Thus, reading Bersani’s reading of MacKinnon, Halley writes, ‘in the eroticization of domination we experience the unspeakable thrill of encountering our own metaphysical and experiential dissolution’ (p. 154).
But if dismantling the self, experiencing unwanted acts, and humiliation are as thrilling as Halley suggests, does this constitute a general claim, or is it particular to sex2 – that is to erotic life? If the former, where beyond a kind of libertarianism can the left politics Halley avows go? If the latter, are we, as she discusses in relation to Bersani, at risk of a species of erotic exceptionalism, reversing but still mirroring the power Halley criticises feminists for giving to sex. In other words, sex gets produced as ‘a special domain of human experience’ (p. 153), one possessing an inner life that distinguishes it from those other social practices where ‘caring, respectful’ acts ‘alert to human dignity, human values, human sensibilities, human sensitivities’ (p. 77) seem rightfully to prevail? But what then constitutes sex-based political practice? Halley recognises the difficult place she has dug herself: ‘Once we really do admit masochism into our vocabulary of sexual pleasure,Footnote 6 we make it hard to know that any particular social outcome involving sexuality broadly conceived is a cost or a benefit, a good or a bad’ (p. 363).
Given Split Decisions’ focus on law and regulation, Halley’s concern seems to be how specific sex2 incidents are (and might be) read within wider governance structures. Thus, questions about when subordination and dissolution of the self are erotic (hence okay), and when they are not, are largely ignored (except for the repeated reminders that feminism’s psychic pain is on the wrong side of the divide). Yet, if the erotic is subject to different standards of evaluation or assessment from other social practices, questions of definition become important. Does the erotic depend on one or more parties experiencing it as such, or on a more detached set of determinations about particular kinds of activities, spaces, body parts? And what happens when the erotic and non-erotic co-mingle as they so often do; does one set of norms, one species of assessment, trump the other?
My guess is that Halley would prefer multiple readings than to advocate any particular sex2/non-erotic classificatory divide. She would want to notice how different configurations of the erotic and non-erotic challenge, override and diverge from each other – a viable move for a theorist, a much harder one for an activist, policy-maker or judge. Yet, one reason why convergence between erotic and other practices is so much harder here to imagine comes from Halley’s insistent advocacy of asymmetric heterosexual (genital) sex, and her repeated disavowal of a non-phallocentric lesbian one. In other words, different standards are rooted in (as well as working to justify) different paradigms of good practice.
Split Decisions does not need to retrieve cultural feminism in order to get some distance from normative sex2. Yet, as it stands, it is striking how different is its position to much Foucauldian inspired writing, which has sought to rethink sex and the erotic in a far more open, unbounded way, decentring, in the process, both fucking and its targeted body-parts. Split Decisions refers, in passing, to other approaches, recognising that it may be a vibrating car which turns us on (p. 24). Yet it remains, throughout, remarkably hung up on the eroticisation of male dominance and female subordination, reading this exchange through a positively inflected understanding of abjection, fear, disgust and surrender. Feminist and non-feminist critics may quibble over the conservatism or otherwise of this move; nevertheless, it’s one that seems to have developed its own contemporary hegemony in certain left/queer quarters. So, in closing, I’d like to ask Halley to take a break, but not from feminism. In Halley’s drive to develop a vertiginous critical left politics, which I applaud, I’d like to ask her to look again at sex – beyond, against and outside of the psychoanalytic and philosophical trajectories currently pervading critical work, with their often unmarked religious underpinnings, and recuperative dominance-based view of power (at least in relation to sex), to consider seriously Foucault’s (Reference Foucault, Rabinow and Hurley1997) suggestion that if we create new pleasures, desire might follow. What might our sexual politics seem like if we didn’t redeem sex, or if we really redeemed it differently, if we took a break from current sex2 thinking to give other, barely imaginable, new ways of thinking about bodies, pleasures, flows, places and freedoms a chance?
