I. Introduction
Susette Kelo, maybe one of America’s most famous property owners, had become a symbol representing the struggles property owners encounter with municipalities’ use of eminent domain power. Footnote 1 While Kelo v. New London was determined by the Supreme Court in favor of the municipality, the decision flamed public as well as legal backlash across the United States. Footnote 2 The results in Kelo inspired states to amend their constitutions and takings laws in regard to the compensation requirement in eminent domain. Footnote 3 It seems that Kelo had exhausted every stage of procedure and available venue to fight against the expropriation of her home. Footnote 4 However, though Kelo fought hard on the legal field, her case raises questions about what she really needed, and the ability of current takings law to provide owners with just compensation.
In his book, Little Pink House, Jeff Benedict describes when Kelo met with Justice Richard N. Palmer. Footnote 5 Justice Palmer was one of the four Connecticut Supreme Court Justices who voted with the majority against Kelo and her neighbors. Footnote 6 Benedict describes how Justice Palmer approached Kelo years later to offer his condolences over the matter. Footnote 7 Benedict describes Kelo as speechless. Footnote 8 Then, according to Benedict, the most surprising moment in Kelo’s journey for justice came: “Justice Palmer turned to Susette, took her hand, and offered a heartfelt apology. Tears trickled down her red cheeks. It was the first time in the twelve-year saga that anyone had said the words ‘I’m sorry’ to her.” Footnote 9
That moment was the first time that Susette Kelo received recognition of her suffering throughout the harrowing experience. Which raises the question, would the long legal and public journey that she initiated against the municipality decision have been different if such recognition had been offered to her sooner? That is, would it have been different if someone, say, the New London municipality, would have apologized within the process? Would it make any difference in the courts’ determination of remedies, or in Kelo’s view on remedies, if an apology had been offered some time during the process? Current law would have no other answer to these questions than, “No!” despite the obvious benefits to the contrary. This article challenges this answer by suggesting that a new emphasis needs to be made on takings law by re-thinking the underlying quest for justice.
Most Western jurisdictions require authorities executing their eminent domain power to compensate owners for the taken property. Footnote 10 In most cases, the compensation requirement is used as a measurement to provide justice in expropriation processes. Footnote 11 But while multiple Western constitutions and expropriation laws specifically require that the compensation be “just,” they nevertheless say little, if any, about the underlying conception of justice or how justice should be pursued. Footnote 12
Courts’ quest for justice in expropriation is characterized by a conceptual muddle. While the courts speak in a corrective justice language, their determination of compensation for expropriation involve other, external considerations, including efficiency and fairness. Footnote 13 These multiple considerations contradict one another and often pull to different theoretical and practical implications. This article suggests that these contradictions led the courts to set a universal monetary compensation standard based on the fair market value of the property as a compromise.
The compromise, in the form of a universal monetary compensation standard, is questionable both normatively and positively. The universal compensation standard is questionable normatively, as it fails to fulfill either of its justifications. A universal compensation standard cannot be regarded as a proper remedy in a corrective model of justice if it aims to simultaneously achieve additional purposes (such as overall efficiency) that exceed the bipolar relationship of the parties.
At the same time, this standard’s efficiency is also questionable. This compromise is questionable positively as it fails to provide compensation that distinguishes between different expropriations circumstances. To demonstrate an example of compensation standard failure, this article presents five prominent challenges that question the American legal system’s current ability to provide justice. These challenges include: (1) current compensation standard’s inefficiency; (2) its partiality; (3) its failure to address owners’ harm to autonomy; (4) its disregard of distributive considerations; and (5) its focus on outcomes alone, rather than on processes.
As an alternative to the current conceptual muddle of justice in expropriation, this article suggests that a different conception of justice will provide a more coherent understanding of just compensation in expropriations. Considering all of the challenges that current law faces, this article suggests that expropriation law should embrace a restorative conception of justice as its underlying basis. While the doctrine of restorative justice is rooted in criminal law, this article contends that its main features provide a normative foundation for the law of expropriation. These features include: a collaborative relationship with the community (rather than a combative one); the consideration of external and internal values; and an equally important focus on both processes and outcomes. Working together, these characteristics turn the restorative conception of justice into a wide enough normative framework for expropriation law.
The fact that the restorative conception of justice has been developed and has flourished in criminal law should not prevent its implementation in other legal fields. This concept is a pillar of my argument and will become one of this article’s prominent contributions to the discourse about legal justice. This call to establish expropriation law on a restorative conception of justice should be regarded as an opportunity to expand the application of restorative justice beyond the limited boundaries of criminal law. Although literature makes a few attempts to argue for restorative justice application beyond the boundaries of criminal law, this article offers a coherent normative framework that examines the application of restorative justice in one of the most complex branches of property law. Footnote 14 This framework will serve as a starting point for a more thorough examination regarding the application of restorative justice’s ideas and values in other legal fields beyond the criminal law in general, and in private law in particular.
This article proceeds in four parts: Part II addresses current law’s muddled perception of justice in expropriations. It will discuss the contradictions present in courts’ use of corrective justice language with different justifications as to compensation in expropriation, and concludes that these contradictions lead courts to compromise justice in expropriation. It argues that this compromise, in the guise of the universal compensation standard set by the courts, is questionable both normatively and positively by presenting five prominent challenges that question its ability to provide justice in expropriations. Part III argues that restorative justice should be embraced as the underlying basis of justice in expropriation law. This part discusses the unique features of restorative justice and the potential limitations involved with importing this concept of justice from criminal law to the law of expropriations. Part IV demonstrates how replacing the current system with restorative justice as the framework for providing justice in expropriation law can overcome the current law’s failure to provide justice by revisiting the five challenges presented above. Part V discusses the implications on the rule of law that basing expropriation law around a restorative concept of justice would have. This part suggests that a cautious application of restorative justice in expropriation law would not only be in accord with the rule of law, but would even enhance it.
II. Just Enough? Challenges for Current Compensation for Expropriation
A. The Conceptual Muddle of Just Compensation
When Western authorities execute their eminent domain power, most jurisdictions require that the owners be compensated for their lost property. Footnote 15 The compensation requirement is generally meant as a means of enforcing a sense of fairness to eminent domain proceedings. Footnote 16 However, despite the frequent inclusion of these compensation requirements in both constitutions and expropriation laws, there are little to no guidelines set out about the goals of justice or how exactly it is to be administered. Footnote 17 A closer examination of courts’ judgments and academic discourse regarding the pursuit of justice in expropriations law demonstrates that there is a fundamental confusion about how to achieve the goals of fairness and justice. Differing justifications for current expropriation doctrines point towards various normative and positive conclusions.
Courts often regard the just compensation requirement, on its face, as established on a corrective conception of justice. Footnote 18 Accordingly, courts constantly view expropriations as governmental interference with individual property rights, while the compensation is an attempt to restore the owner to the previous position. Footnote 19 Supreme Court jurisprudence on compensation for expropriation supports this assumption. Footnote 20 The Court repeatedly states that just compensation would be achieved when the owner is put in the same monetary position “as [he] would have occupied if [his] property had not been taken.” Footnote 21
In the case of case of Armstrong v. United States, Justice Black describes the purpose of compensation as “bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Footnote 22 According to this vision, expropriation is a wrong done by the government to owners, as it requires them to bear public burdens beyond their equal share in the community. Understanding expropriation as a wrong, the concept of compensation as suggested by the Supreme Court is based on the duty of the government to repair its wrongdoing. Footnote 23
In other words, to achieve justice in cases of expropriation, the government must cure the harm caused to the owners and shift the owners back to their former position. The Court does not question the process in which the expropriation is being executed, nor does it question the social implications of this reparation. Footnote 24 It overlooks the characteristics of property and of owners, refrains from questioning the pre-expropriation position’s social desirability, and denies any distinctions in treatment as a result of the owners’ economic or political strength. Footnote 25 By focusing only on restoring the owner to their prior monetary position, the Court limits its view to the specific case, trying to restore the financial equilibrium to its original position as before the expropriation occurred. This reinforces the understanding that current compensation for expropriation standards not only rely on corrective conception of justice, but they rely on it exclusively.
However, the scholarly discourse on justice in expropriations suggests a significantly different understanding. The two core justifications for the compensation requirement offered in the literature, efficiency and fairness, exceed the vision of compensation as a measurement for curing a wrong in a sharply bipolar division between the government and the owner. Instead, each of these justifications considers other parties as a measurement to determine whether the compensation provides justice.
Consider, for example, the efficiency justification for compensation in expropriation. This key branch of reasoning considers whether the use of the property will increase the net pay-off of goods to society “as a whole.” Footnote 26 Compensation requirements promote economic efficiency because they require both the government and landowners to consider all the costs and benefits involved in the project. They prevent the government from falling into a fiscal illusion about the costs of the project, Footnote 27 and deter it from abusing its eminent domain power. Footnote 28 Owners, on the other hand, internalize the risk of expropriation in their investment policy. Footnote 29 While these assumptions regarding the effect of compensation on both authorities and owners have been challenged in the literature, economic considerations still have impact on the compensation determination process. Yet, more important is the fact that the efficient quest for justice in expropriation significantly exceeds the features of a corrective conception of justice.
Though a corrective conception of justice denies any consideration of values and needs that go beyond the mere relationship between the wrongdoer and the harmed person, efficiency considerations do just that. According to the efficiency justification for compensation, authorities should not ignore the overall economic balance of their actions, including incentives that they might have on owners in general. Footnote 30 Moreover, scholars within the law and economics school of thought view efficiency as the core justification for compensation and struggle to strike the balance between the efficient compensation standard while still sharing the understanding that it should incentivize owners’ investment policies. By trying to affect owners’ investment policies before the occurrence of expropriation, proponents of the efficiency justification for compensation reject the need for the government to compensate owners fully, regardless of their investment policies. Instead, the efficiency justification for compensation determines the just standard based on the socially desired economic balance, which involves not only the government and the owner, but also others in the community. Recognizing just compensation as a method that incentivizes all parties—the government, expropriated owners, and the general public—to act efficiently, denies the conceptual zero-sum game offered by a corrective conception of justice. Footnote 31
The second justification for compensation in expropriation discussed in the literature suggests that compensation is due because of fairness concerns. The fairness justification for compensation generally suggests that it is inequitable to “forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Footnote 32 Fairness-based concerns focus on how the burdens of government action are distributed among the public. Some suggest that the fairness justification for compensation embodies the Kantian imperative that individuals be treated as ends and not as means. Footnote 33 Others suggest a Rawlsian fairness approach to compensation, which argues that compensation is designed to equalize inequalities resulted from expropriation. Footnote 34 The common ground between these approaches lies in their reasoning: they both require compensation to assure that private property is not sacrificed for the greater good. Footnote 35
This justification, just like the efficiency one described above, depends largely on relational examination of burdens. To figure out what would be just compensation to the owner, the court must examine the overall burdens imposed on the community. The relational feature of the fairness justification for compensation rejects the bipolar relationship between government and owner, as well as the zero-sum game of this specific interaction. Instead, it offers a comprehensive examination of burden imposition in society, aiming to deny non-proportional sacrifices on behalf of individuals.
Therefore, these two justifications question the prominent features of a corrective conception of justice. Specifically, they challenge the focus on the relationship between property owners and the government as the exclusive source of values and needs to be considered when determining compensation for expropriation. Equally important, they also maintain contradictions amongst themselves. Taken to the extreme, a utilitarian efficiency justification for compensation may contradict the fair view of the owner as an end. These contradictions affect expropriation law’s ability to provide a coherent conceptual understanding of justice in expropriations. Expropriation laws’ use of mixed perceptions of justice and justifications for compensation brings their quest for justice to a muddle.
B. The Fair Market Value Standard: Courts’ Compromise on Justice in Compensation
The conceptual muddle of justice in expropriation law places significant challenges on the law’s ability to provide justice in expropriations. The conflicting justifications for compensation, as well as the different values and needs they aim to promote, blur the law’s quest to restore justice and question its aims. In this Part, I discuss some criticisms stressed in the literature on current compensation in expropriation. I argue that, while these criticisms involve different lines of arguments, they all result from the cluttered doctrine surrounding justice in expropriation law. This Part concludes that the current disorder of expropriation discourse calls for rethinking a unified conception of justice in expropriation law.
Surprisingly, while the conceptual framework underlying current expropriation law’s quest for justice is in disarray, its remedial scheme is quite clear. Current compensation laws in most western jurisdictions create a universal standard for compensation, according to which owners are entitled to receive monetary compensation equal to the fair market value of their property. Footnote 36 Although the incongruity between the conceptual muddle and the clear compensation standard in the laws of expropriation seems difficult to understand at first glance, it can be understood if we examine the way in which the courts apply this standard.
When courts are required to apply the fair market value compensation standard, they recognize its problematic nature—especially as it excludes certain values related to the circumstances of the expropriation. Footnote 37 One such example is the courts’ recognition of the injustice entailed in disregarding subjective values. Footnote 38 However, courts refuse to apply alternative compensation standards, such as restitution (value to the taker) or indemnification (value to the owner). Instead, courts declare that the fair market value standard is the best means of determining compensation in expropriations because it is objective and workable. Footnote 39
These objectives set by the courts as justifications for applying a universal compensation standard in expropriations have been interpreted as suggestions that if subjective values are incommensurable, then the courts have no alternative than to turn to an objective standard. However, such an interpretation could have been considered legitimate (meaning, as one that provides the best just solution available) if courts would not act otherwise in other jurisdictions. For example, in several states courts that must determine damages for lost or destroyed personal property would consider the sentimental value of the property. Footnote 40 Alternatively, even if the court does not recognize sentimental value as compensable, they will recognize the ‘value to the owner’ standard. Footnote 41 This understanding gained recognition in the Restatement (Second) Torts, which recognizes owners’ special values as compensable. Footnote 42
The courts’ determination of a universal fair market value standard for compensation in expropriation law was not an inevitable outcome. Values, including subjective values, can be addressed in courts’ determination of compensation, which raises the question: What led courts to compromise justice in expropriation? The answer lies in the conceptual muddle that characterizes compensation for expropriation determination. If expropriation laws would have embraced a corrective conception of justice as their underlying basis, they would not have settled on a universal compensation standard based on a measurement that is objective, yet detached from the circumstances. A corrective conception of justice asserts a connection between the remedy and the wrong. Footnote 43 The remedy should correspond to the injustice being rectified. Footnote 44
Therefore, by settling on a universal standard, regardless of its scope and scale, courts cannot be expected to provide justice in all cases. This is why the courts’ decision to turn to workability and objectivity should not be interpreted as practical estimation difficulties or problems that arise out of these values incommensurability. Instead, they should be interpreted as an incorporation of efficiency considerations. Indeed, values that exceed the bipolar relationship of the parties would be encompassed by the determination process. When the courts strive to enforce a workable and objective standard for compensation, they do not implement corrective justice, but rather limit it with efficiency considerations both in regard to the estimation of these values Footnote 45 and in regard to the costs of the legal proceedings. By setting a universal compensation standard, the aim of compensation is not only to cure current harm but also to incentivize other owners’ investment policies. This mixture led the courts to speak in a corrective justice language while applying a utilitarian compensation policy. But the compromise goes both ways. As the criticisms below reveal, setting a uniform compensation standard, basically as a conceptual compromise, is questionable regarding its ability to lead to efficient results. Therefore, lack of a clear conceptual understanding of justice in expropriations led the court to compromise on the law’s ability to provide justice.
Before turning to the challenges that emerged out of the courts’ compromise on justice in expropriation law, it is necessary to address an alternative argument wherein the courts’ determination of a universal compensation standard in expropriation law is a result of its will to preserve the rule of law. Scholars in different fields of law and political philosophy have emphasized the importance of the rule of law for both its intrinsic and extrinsic contributions to human autonomy and community flourishing. Footnote 46 While there are several different accounts of rule of law and the criteria required to its realization, most of these accounts share the understanding that to preserve authorities’ commitment to the rule of law, they should generate generally applicable rules and avoid ad hoc decision making. Footnote 47 Whether by governments or courts, ad hoc decision making raises the concern that the determination would not be impartial; a phenomenon usually conceived as a threat to weak individuals and groups in society. Footnote 48 The universality of the fair market value standard may be considered as a means to ensure the rule of law in expropriation law. Restricting the courts’ discretion about compensation in expropriation prevents ad-hoc determination of remedies and therefore allegedly provides equal outcomes to all owners, regardless of their position in society. Yet, viewing the setting of a universal compensation standard as a result of courts’ commitment to the rule of law would be misleading for several reasons.
First, the courts have not established their determination of the fair market value standard as the universal compensation standard in expropriation law as a result of their commitment to the rule of law. Alternatively, the courts specifically argue that this standard was a result of their quest for a workable and objective standard, suggesting that practical problems of assessment underlie their determination. Footnote 49 Second, as many scholars have already demonstrated, a universal compensation standard does not lead to equal outcomes for different property owners. Footnote 50 Finally and perhaps most importantly, a commitment to the rule of law does not require and, in some cases, even rejects the application of a universal compensation standard. Footnote 51 While binding courts’ unlimited discretion and preventing ad-hoc determination of remedies may be required as part of the commitment to the rule of law, nothing suggests that a pre-determined range of remedies would not suffice to fulfil this commitment. Footnote 52 Against this background, an attempt to justify remedial universality in expropriation law in commitment to the rule of law is quite unrooted in the courts’ practice and is also questionable normatively. This conclusion strengthens the understanding of current compensation standard as a result of a muddled concept of justice in expropriation law.
Part V of this article will demonstrate how the application of restorative justice in expropriation not only fails to violate the rule of law, but if implemented properly and carefully, might be able to enhance it. Understanding that a commitment to the rule of law does not require uniformity of compensation, I would now turn to present five prominent arguments against current compensation standard, all of which result out of the unnecessary compromise made by courts in determining compensation for expropriation.
Current fair market value compensation standard was criticized by courts and scholars on multiple different grounds. One prominent criticism stressed on current compensation for expropriation standard deals with the inefficiency of the fair market value compensation standard. Footnote 53 This line of criticism raises the question of whether a set and universal compensation standard may provide a distinct enough incentive to lead efficient investment policies of owners. Footnote 54 While some scholars focus on the inefficiency of the current fair market value standard, Footnote 55 others deny the ability of any universal undistinctive standard to provide such incentives. Footnote 56
A second argument against current compensation standard focuses on the partiality of this standard. Footnote 57 According to this line of arguments, current expropriation law waives the possibility to provide justice to owners because it sets an objective standard that does not even aim to estimate subjective values. Footnote 58 The literature identifies multiple subjective values that owners attribute to their property (including the loss of sentimental attachment and communality) Footnote 59 that don’t find expression within current compensation for expropriation standard.
A third line of argument criticizes current law’s disregard of the harm caused to owners’ autonomy as a result of the forced act of expropriation. Footnote 60 This vein of thought asserts that owners’ autonomy is always harmed when the government expropriates their property. Footnote 61 Nevertheless, current law both explicitly and implicitly disregards this harm while still purporting to provide owners with the fair market value of their property. Footnote 62
The fourth line of criticism stemming from the fair market value standard compromise suggests that expropriation cannot be detached from the overall proprietary situation in a current jurisdiction. Footnote 63 Such arguments suggest that the government would not ignore proprietary injustices that occurred prior to the current expropriation, and would not perpetuate inequality in society as a result. A fifth line of argument demands that expropriation law not focus solely on outcomes but also on the process. This line of argument suggests that disregarding the processes in expropriation may be wrong for itself but also has an effect on the outcomes. Footnote 64
These multiple arguments against current compensation for expropriation standard differ from one another and call for different accommodations of the current law’s remedial scheme. However, they all share a prominent feature: they all stem from the conceptual muddle of justice in current law. The lack of a uniform conception of justice, according to which expropriation law would be normatively and positively determined, triggered the compromise set by the courts. According to that compromise, all owners should be entitled only to the monetary fair market value of their property. As the multiple aforementioned arguments reveal, this lack of conceptual uniformity makes current law compensation standard an arbitrary one; one that waives the possibility of achieving justice in expropriations.
A compromise, in itself, is not necessarily a bad legal determination mechanism. Footnote 65 But it may be considered as one in two cases: first, if it fails to achieve any of its goals and, second, if there is an alternative that fulfils them in a better manner. As the previous arguments reveal, the courts’ compromise in compensation for expropriation fails to meet both justice and efficiency. The next part will suggest an alternative that fulfils them both.
III. Restoring Justice in Expropriation
A. The Idea of Restorative justice
A growing thread of literature recognizes the unique and important role of restorative justice. Restorative justice is rooted in the criminal law, where it focuses on the needs of victims, offenders, and the community. Footnote 66 In criminal law, restorative justice is considered as contrasting punitive approaches, where the main aim is to rehabilitate the offender and reconcile with the victims and the community, or satisfy abstract legal principles. Footnote 67 Restorative justice is based on a theory that considers crime and wrongdoing to be an offence against an individual or community, rather than the State. Footnote 68
This article argues that while this theory was developed primarily within the boundaries of criminal law, its features are applicable to other branches of law, as well. Such understanding was proposed by Declan Roche, who discussed the existence of restorative processes and values in different regulatory fields. Footnote 69 Yet it has not gained a comprehensive examination regarding the ability to apply the same values in private law. Howard Zehr argues that a restorative conception of justice is concerned about needs and roles. Footnote 70 Opposed to the corrective conception of justice, which focuses on two parties’ relationship, a restorative conception of justice also includes the community as an inherent part of the quest for justice. Footnote 71 In a restorative justice framework, all parties have a significant and essential role to play in achieving justice. Zehr explains that individuals who conceive themselves as harmed by others do not only need punishment and revenge. Footnote 72 Instead, Zehr suggests that harmed individuals may need to be informed about the considerations and the needs of others as part of their self-empowerment. Footnote 73 As for the wrongdoers, Zehr argues that in a restorative conception of justice, they become accountable and aware of the implications and ramifications of their actions. Footnote 74 The same is true for the community. Footnote 75 In a restorative justice framework, the community at large gains the ability to discuss the values and needs it has as a community, the social costs of these needs’ execution, and the ability to continue to live together despite the interference in one’s rights. Footnote 76
Another feature of the restorative conception of justice lies in its twofold focus on both procedures and outcomes. Footnote 77 In opposition to the corrective conception of justice, which is outcome-oriented, the restorative conception of justice grants significance to procedures as well. The basic understanding in a restorative conception of justice is that procedures are not just instruments, but may also become part of the substantive remedial scheme. Footnote 78
A restorative model of justice maintains important differences from a corrective model of justice but there are some important similarities between them: mainly their shared goal to restore the harmed party. Both concepts of justice also call for a remedial scheme that is attentive to circumstances, meaning that it will recognize the need to provide the harmed party with a remedy that will actually cure the loss or damage suffered. This rules out any standardization or uniformity of remedies.
B. Restorative Justice and Expropriation Law: A New Vision about Expropriations
While restorative justice indeed maintains similarities and differences with a corrective conception of justice, the question still remains: could such a conception of justice be accommodated to provide a coherent framework for expropriation law? The ability to cross over the boundaries of criminal law, where restorative justice is rooted, to civil law is essential to answer this question.
One objection to shifting restorative justice doctrine from criminal into private law focuses on the proclivity of restorative justice to deviate from the state-individual relationship; characterizing criminal law cases while regarding the offence as a direct harm caused by the offender to the victim and the community. The State in restorative justice, although not completely privatizing its functions, endows these functions to individuals and communities, which are then required to take responsibility and accountability for their actions. Footnote 79 In attempting to cross this feature over to expropriation law, we might encounter a conceptual problem as the government (considered as the wrongdoer in expropriation) plays a significant part in this interaction.
Another potential challenge that the application of restorative justice in expropriation may face is the conception of expropriation as a wrong. While the application of restorative justice in criminal law requires the identification of the wrong, and equally important that the wrongdoer will reclaim accountability for the wrongdoing, Footnote 80 it is unclear whether it would be right to view expropriation as a wrong. Expropriation of private property for public use should not be considered as a wrong, for it seeks to promote the community and to fulfil its crucial needs. The restorative justice call for the wrongdoer’s accountability is therefore questionable when applied in the context of expropriation.
In this Part, I argue that not only do these conceptual challenges fail to deny the application of restorative justice in expropriation law, but that they also carry the chance for a conceptual change of our view about expropriation, its implications on society, and the role of the parties. This change urges us to view expropriation as an event that brings together the community to rethink and re-prioritize its needs and interests. This view of expropriation denies current law’s vision of a bipolar relationship between the government and the individual owner. The government in expropriation cases is not an abstract player who aims to maximize its interests or needs on the individual owner’s account. Instead, the government should be seen as a representative of the community. This representative should determine the need in expropriation after an in-depth thought process about the needs and interests of the community. Footnote 81
The aim of this decision should be to promote the community and lead to its prosperity. This understanding also carries a revised view of the public use requirement in expropriation. While current literature and courts fluctuate between two interpretations—whether expropriation should be “used by the public” or “beneficial for the public” Footnote 82 —this new understanding of the government’s role supports the latter. While suggesting that this requirement seeks to ensure that the goal of the project intends to lead the community to progress, such an understanding denies the limited view of public use as one that legitimizes only projects that would ensure that the property would be used by the public as a whole. Viewing expropriation as an event in which the community determine its priorities and needs cannot support such limitation.
The government would also benefit from the proposed conceptual change in expropriation laws. According to the courts’ current corrective justice terminology, the government is currently perceived as a wrongdoer and its forced actions reduce its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Footnote 83 While part of this delegitimizing process might be cured with the payment of compensation, as demonstrated above, the current fair market value standard fails to provide such a result. Footnote 84 On the other hand, establishing expropriation law on a restorative conception of justice may not only prevent undermining of the government but, in some instances, even increase governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the community.
Governments that would absorb restorative processes into their expropriation law are expected to provide more open, sharing and transparent decision making processes. Footnote 85 By doing so, governments may gain both intrinsically and instrumentally while benefitting from transparent and sharing procedures by gaining information and knowledge about the failures inherent to current proceedings. Using the information gathered by both citizens and stakeholders during these procedures, the government would be able to internalize the criticism and enhance its functioning in the future. Yet governments may also instrumentally benefit from enacting restorative procedures, as such transparent and sharing procedures are expected to increase the credibility of the government in its citizens’ eyes and therefore increase its legitimacy. Footnote 86
This view of expropriation as a town hall meeting, in which all members of the community are involved in determining the future of their community, complies with the restorative justice understanding that the triggering event is not one that involves just two parties. It also complies with restorative justice’s broader understanding about the involvement of the community at large as an inherent player in the process. Footnote 87 Its inclusiveness fosters the fundamental notion underlying restorative justice: all parties should find an expression and remedy in the process.
But could such a vision of expropriation also face the challenge about restorative justice’s insistence about identification of the wrong and the accountability reclaiming by the wrongdoer? If we view expropriation as a legitimate town hall meeting in which the community rethinks its interests and values, how can such a view accommodate the quest for wrong and wrongdoer’s accountability? This challenge cannot be ignored, as it is a significant feature in restorative justice. Footnote 88 While such a scheme of justice calls for using harmful events as a source for progress and empowerment, it nevertheless requires all parties to be cognizant of the wrong itself and its implications on all parties, including the community.
Yet, I believe that this challenge does not deny the application of restorative justice as the underlying framework in expropriation law. That is primarily because this view of expropriation does not and should not disregard the owner. Indeed, while the determination of expropriation should be considered a community right, it nevertheless should not ignore that for the one from who the property is taken, this event will be considered a wrong. Recognizing that would not eliminate the importance of the expropriation for the community; rather that realization would impose on the community to take into account the feelings of the owner.
This ambiguous notion of expropriation does not relieve the community from the need to accept responsibility and accountability for its determination. The community should be allowed to expropriate private property to promote a community’s interests and needs, while being aware that these actions, though justified, impose burdens on individuals. As I will demonstrate below, the accountability of communities should not rest on symbolic recognition of the owners’ suffering. Instead it should become an important instrument that would in time come to justify the governmental need to address past wrongs, social inequalities, and expropriation’s unique circumstances. As discussed below, it would also justify the expansion of the range of remedies in expropriation and affect their allocation.
IV. How Restorative Justice Faces the Challenges
Could a restorative concept of justice serve as a normative framework for expropriation law’s quest for justice? In this Part I argue that the answer is, “yes.” Embracing a restorative conception of justice as the normative framework for expropriation law may provide a uniform conceptual understanding of justice in these laws, while still avoiding the need to compromise. This conceptual coherence overcomes most, if not all, of the challenges current law is facing.
While a restorative concept of justice offers a more complex understanding of justice than a corrective one, it still shares the same underlying principle that the quest for justice should be focused on restoring the victim. Footnote 89 This basic understanding conditions the reach of justice in two ways: first, through an examination of the specific harms; and second, through a distinct and attentive remedial scheme to repair it. Footnote 90 As Weinrib suggests, this also characterizes a corrective conception of justice. Footnote 91 However, there are three prominent distinctions between these two conception of justice, and these distinctions go to the roots of their implementation.
First, while a corrective concept of justice focuses only on the wrongdoer and the victim, a restorative concept of justice also considers the community and its interests. Moreover, implementing restorative justice also takes into account the interests and needs of the wrongdoer. This leads to the second distinction, according to which a proper implementation of restorative justice requires consideration of values which are external to the specific relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim. Footnote 92 Corrective justice aims to avoid such consideration of external values, while weighing only those values that are directly relevant to the involved parties. Footnote 93 The third distinction lies in the focus on outcomes and procedures. A corrective concept of justice is mostly concerned about the outcomes of the process. Footnote 94 Indeed, corrective justice is focused on the law’s ability to restore the harmed party to a previous condition, that being the just result of a dispute being decided. Footnote 95 Restorative justice, however, places equal weight on both procedures and outcomes. Footnote 96 The basic understanding of a restorative conception of justice is that the procedure is important both intrinsically (as it is a significant part of providing justice) and extrinsically (as it often leads to just outcomes). Footnote 97
These differences are significant when considering restorative justice as the unifying conceptual understanding of justice in expropriation laws. As demonstrated above, the constant tension between differing justifications for compensation led to a conceptual muddle of justice in expropriation. This theoretical chaos stems out of the failure of the doctrine of corrective justice allegedly applied by the courts in expropriation law to: accommodate the role of the community; consider the impact of values that are external to the bipolar relationship of the parties (such as efficiency); and place weight on the processes rather than just on outcomes. These internal limitations of the corrective model of justice led courts to compromising justice in expropriation laws. The different features of a restorative theory of justice satisfy these deficiencies. The next Part demonstrates how embracing a restorative justice as expropriation laws’ conceptual basis may overcome most, if not all, of the challenges that current expropriation law is facing.
A. Addressing Efficiency Considerations
A corrective concept of justice might be in tension with an attempt to consider general efficiency considerations because it aims to limit the quest for justice to the bipolar relationship of the parties. While most of the scholarly arguments for considering efficiency in expropriation law allegedly deal with the incentives given to the parties (overcoming fiscal illusion on behalf of the government or efficient investment incentives to owners) they nevertheless include consideration of other factors that exceed this relationship. For instance, the attempt to strike an efficient investment policy considers all owners, not only the specific expropriatee. By considering the interests of others that are outside of the bipolar expropriation relationship as well as values that are external to the relationship, these arguments conflict with a scheme of corrective justice. The compromise held by American courts, which addresses efficiency considerations in expropriation compensation, led them to set a universal standard based on the fair market value of the property. Footnote 98 Yet, several scholars criticize this standard for its inefficiency. Footnote 99 These arguments are mostly targeting the uniformity of the compensation standard, suggesting that such uniformity cannot provide a just result in all expropriations.
A restorative model of justice, on the other hand, is much more capable of considering efficiency; not externally, but rather internally. A restorative conception of justice requires the process to consider not only the direct parties, but also the community as a whole. Footnote 100 In addition, restorative justice requires a consideration of multiple values and interests as part of the quest for a comprehensive just solution. This feature of restorative justice allows it to consider efficiency considerations, not because they are an external burden imposed for extraneous considerations, but because they are an inherent part of the quest for justice. According to a restorative model of justice, one cannot regard any result as just if it ignores the values and interests of all parties, including the surrounding community. Footnote 101
According to this understanding, establishing expropriation law on the basis of restorative justice overcomes the currently chaotic perception of justice. Instead, it would allow courts to explicitly consider efficiency considerations as part of their quest for justice. Therefore, the practical implications of embracing this model of justice should be a more attentive and distinctive treatment and determination of compensation. If we accept that setting a current universal standard is mostly because of the courts’ compromise on justice in expropriation law, such a compromise is no longer justified. Accordingly, courts should be invested in determining the distinctive scope and scale of compensation and should not be limited to monetary compensation alone.
However, embracing a restorative conception of justice should not be viewed as a call for irresponsibly increasing the costs of compensation in expropriations for three reasons. First, the application of restorative justice should lead to a careful examination of the relevant remedy. In every case there will be an aim to restore justice and a sense of fairness among all parties, including the community. While occasionally this understanding may lead to compensation that exceeds the fair market value of the property, at other times it may conclude with compensation that is lower Footnote 102 or with an alternative remedy that would impose a lower economic burden on the government. Footnote 103
Second, a restorative model of justice should also consider the investigation, negotiation, and all other costs involved in the process while determining remedies to owners. Its inherent consideration of the community and its interests may serve as an internal limitation from an irresponsible remedies determination. Third, restorative justice attributes significance to the process as well as to the outcomes which may reduce significantly some of the costs and losses suffered by owners because of the deficiencies present in the process.
As I will demonstrate below in regard to the harm caused to autonomy, focusing on a transparent and informed process would prevent the need to address these losses monetarily. Therefore, while the application of restorative justice may involve costs that currently are denied by the fair market value standard, it nevertheless reduces other costs that currently are wrongly unconsidered.
B. Harm to Autonomy
The argument that current expropriation law fails to compensate owners for the harm caused to them because of the violation of autonomy suggests that owners suffer not only the economic loss of their property, but also an infringement to their autonomous decision-making ability. Since current law’s fair market value standard is determined by what a willing buyer must pay to a willing seller, it does not include the special costs of an unwilling sale. Footnote 104 This harm should be recognized as compensable by both corrective and restorative conceptions of justice. Corrective and restorative justice both aim to repair all losses caused to the harmed party and therefore, as long as we recognize the violation of autonomy as a result of the forced taking of property, such a loss should be compensated in order to achieve justice. Yet, current law refrains from compensating owners for this loss.
While the literature suggests several proposals to address this loss, Footnote 105 they all focus on the monetary premium that should be added to the fair market value standard to cover this loss. Footnote 106 Such a monetary premium represents current laws’ compromise between a corrective conception of justice language and utilitarian considerations. Footnote 107 Adding a monetary premium to the fair market value standard does not address the harm caused to the owners. If it does anything at all, it provides them with an expressive recognition on behalf of the government about the nature of the “sale.” It fails to address the essence of this loss.
When trying to find a proper remedy to cover the loss of autonomy suffered by owners when their property has been taken in expropriation, one must first determine what this loss includes and why owners suffer it when their property is expropriated by force. Autonomy has multiple explanations and definitions in the moral, legal, and political philosophy literature that go far beyond the scope of this article. For the purpose of this article, I suggest regarding autonomy as the ability of the individual to become the author of one’s own life plan. Footnote 108 In the moral sense, autonomy means for a person to maintain one’s vision as an end, not as a means. Footnote 109 According to this understanding, it is unclear how an additional monetary premium would even begin to address this loss.
A restorative brand of justice provides an alternative view of the law’s ability to repair at least part of the harm to autonomy. As discussed above, one of the main aims of restorative justice is to overcome the harm done to one’s autonomy. Footnote 110 This form of justice regards empowerment as one of its main goals and advantages. Footnote 111 The alternative view focuses on both the process and the outcomes. It suggests that a significant part of the harm caused to owners’ autonomy is not a result of the expropriation, but rather the process by which it is carried out.
For example, consider a property owner who receives notification from the government that one’s property is about to be expropriated. In most American jurisdictions this notification is accompanied with a dialog in which the government attempts to purchase the property with owner’s consent. Footnote 112 However, the governmental attempt is not mandatory in most jurisdictions, where owners are almost entirely excluded from the process of expropriation. Footnote 113 The government’s basic assumption is that using its expropriation powers exempts it from sharing with the owners the purpose of the expropriation, the extent of the social necessity in its implementation, and the consequences of non-implementation.
In most jurisdictions, owners are left out of the process. In Professor Hirschman’s terminology, owners not only lose their property, but also their voice. Footnote 114 If we consider a person’s right to autonomy as a right to be perceived as an end rather than a mere means, then we should recognize that most of the loss of autonomy suffered by owners as a result of expropriation is not the forced taking of their property, but the ongoing disregard of them as autonomous agents during the expropriation process.
According to this argument, if the government enacts a sharing procedure in which owners may be entitled to receive information about the public project for which the expropriation occurs, then the harm to autonomy would be significantly reduced. The needs of community and the potential implications of preventing the expropriation can be fulfilled by offering the chance to be heard in mandatory hearing as well as to be notified properly about the dates of expropriation. Strengthening the role of the owner as an inherent part of the procedure would not only reduce costs in expropriations (as it makes the additional payment unnecessary) but more importantly would provide owners with a remedy that will directly correlate to the loss. Focusing on process therefore provides the government the ability to maintain its eminent domain powers without turning owners to just another tool used to satisfy community needs.
C. Sentimental or Subjective Losses
Another challenge that current compensation standard is facing is its disregard for subjective values. Current compensation standard excludes subjective values not because its denial of their existence, but because the costs entailed in investigating and estimating them turn it either impossible or non-workable for the courts. Footnote 115 The exclusion of subjective values from the compensation for expropriation is explained by courts for workability reasons, meaning that investigation and estimation of subjective values in each expropriation may be either exhausting, too expensive, or impossible. Yet, such a result is also justified under a corrective concept of justice, which rejects subjective valuation of one party to the bipolar relationship as a measurement of liability of the other. Footnote 116 According to this view, it is not only difficult or too expensive to compensate owners for their subjective losses, but it is also normatively undesired. Still, we see that the courts rejected this principle denial of subjective losses Footnote 117 and that multiple scholars argue for their inclusion in the compensation. Footnote 118
The restorative justice model provides both a theoretical basis for including subjective values within the compensation framework and instruments to do so practically. The theoretical aspect consists of restorative justice’s focus on identifying the specific harm caused to the owner. Restorative justice seeks to repair the harm as much as possible, both concretely and symbolically. Footnote 119 Therefore, this feature cannot ignore owners’ subjective losses. Yet, restorative justice is also concerned with the practical implementation of the theoretical recognition. By demanding that losses and harms be cured by remedies that address the specific needs of the harmed party, restorative justice requires the wrongdoer (or in our case, the government) to assess these losses as they are perceived by the owners.
This understanding calls for a wider range of remedies in expropriation law, including remedies that would be tailor-made for owners in unique circumstances. Footnote 120 Such an expansion of expropriation laws’ remedial scheme might involve additional costs, yet, as already explained above, it might also reduce others. Footnote 121 An attentive remedial scheme, one that also addresses owners’ subjective values, must implement restorative justice. It also provides the government with the possibility to face current criticisms on its disregarding these values.
D. Disregard of Overall Proprietary Condition
Current expropriation laws have been criticized for isolating themselves from the overall proprietary condition in a given jurisdiction. Footnote 122 This criticism goes to the root of expropriation as a governmental instrument to fulfil public needs, as it questions viewing expropriation as an isolated event that should be treated while disregarding the overall proprietary condition. This argument requires the government to be aware of both the distortions of the past and the inequalities still in existence in the time of the execution of the expropriation. The laws’ need to address past wrongs is raised mostly in cases where the expropriation was just another stone in the wall of discrimination against marginalized populations, weak communities, and especially populations that suffer proprietary past wrongs. Footnote 123 I argue that applying restorative justice offers both normative and practical instruments to handle such claims in expropriation.
As mentioned, the vision of expropriation through a restorative justice lens is of an event in which the community rethinks and re-prioritizes its goals, interests, and needs. However, this vision should not be regarded as one that exempts the government or the community from claiming accountability [accepting responsibility] for its actions. On the contrary, embracing a restorative model of justice as expropriation laws’ underlying framework requires the government to be accountable for its actions, including addressing the harm caused to the individual owner. Footnote 124 This accountability cannot be regarded seriously unless the government considers the overall implications that its actions have on the owner. When owners have already suffered past wrongs from the community because, for example, they belong to a minority group or because of their economic status, those wrongs become pertinent when determining accountability.
Accountability, one of restorative justice’s prominent features, should not be viewed as an empty word. Instead it should be claimed by the government while taking into account all the variables that affected, or still affect, the owners’ sense of harm. This calls not only for serious considerations about the execution of specific expropriation, but also for an inclusive and attentive remedial determination. The government, by sincerely and seriously claiming accountability, should at times lead to reparation; reparation which relies either on denying the expropriation or by offering the allocation of in-kind remedies. In other times, and sometimes in addition to the above mentioned remedies, the government should consider another strong, though symbolic, restorative remedy: apology.
While cynics might wonder about the role of apology in expropriations, it nevertheless becomes the first step of avoiding additional wrongdoing in the future. Footnote 125 Apology provides those who suffered in the past recognition of their suffering. Equally important is that it comforts those who suffered as ends by reminding them that their needs should be considered. Recall Susette Kelo’s response to Justice Palmer’s apology. Footnote 126 While such an apology may not diminish all of Kelo’s anger and frustration, it was nevertheless something she was looking for during her entire legal battle. Footnote 127 Justice Palmer’s response reflects not only his sorrow about the past, but also the fact that perhaps for the first time, he knew Suzette not only as a claimant but as a person. Understanding that owners should not be regarded as means, even if the expropriation cannot be waived for the sake of community needs, plays a significant step toward reconciliation and harm reparation.
Understanding that government accountability for expropriation requires the government to consider not only current situations but also past wrongs, may lead to a conclusion about expropriation laws’ commitment to consider distributive considerations. Footnote 128 While this is beyond the scope of this article, it is nevertheless important to recognize that taking governmental accountability seriously, may become a normative justification for the government’s obligation to consider whether the owners’ condition should be taken into account when expropriation is considered or when remedies are determined. If the government should take responsibility for past wrongs, it may also be required to take the same responsibility for the distortions in current proprietary situations. This, however, should be left to future research.
E. Is it All about Outcomes?
One of the prominent features of restorative justice is its focus on both process and outcomes. This feature distinguishes this theory of justice from the corrective justice, which focuses only on outcomes. Similarly, restorative justice differs from other conceptions of justice. For instance, distributive justice which also focuses on outcomes, and procedural justice which focuses mainly on process. The distinctive focus on both process and outcomes turns restorative justice into a broad enough understanding of justice that will be able to handle with distinction the elements that characterize expropriation’s circumstances. Current law is focused on outcomes, as it aims to restore the owner to one’s previous monetary position as the measurement to determining justice.
This view is limited and as discussed above, fails to succeed in addressing all expropriation differences. On the other hand, a restorative model of justice may overcome these criticisms as it addresses both processes and outcomes. In this Part I argue that addressing processes alongside outcomes is important both intrinsically and instrumentally. Intrinsically, processes are often a key part of any governmental action. This argument may explain the constitutional rights of the individual in due process. Footnote 129 Individuals’ right to due process is not merely a precaution against harming their basic rights, such as the right to property, liberty, and so forth. Instead, this right stands by itself as an individual right in a liberal society. Footnote 130 The individual is not only entitled to enjoy a property right, but also to enjoy the government’s proper treatment of each as an individual.
This explains why restorative justice’s focus on processes alongside outcomes is intrinsically important. A restorative model of justice recognizes the role of proper, transparent, and shared processes as an important feature of promoting justice. Yet, focusing on processes may become important not only because of their intrinsic value but also because of their instrumental value. This vision views adherence to proper and just processes as instruments that ensure just outcomes. Footnote 131 Indeed, as the restorative concept of justice views processes as important for ensuring just results. Consider once again the ability of a proper and transparent process to reduce the harm suffered by owners due to their loss of autonomy in expropriations. Therefore, maintaining an appropriate process in expropriation serves as part of the remedy by providing governments with the ability to use the process to reduce harms and to increase justice in the outcomes.
V. Restorative Justice and the Rule of Law
Restorative justice is often considered a threat to a legal system that aims to follow the rule of law. Footnote 132 The main reason for this potential conflict is that restorative justice favors attentiveness to all parties’ interests and needs. Since the interests and needs of different people and communities vary, an application of a restorative model justice may be prone to ad-hoc decision making; trying to respond and contain the specific interests and needs relevant to each case. Taking it into the expropriation context, the rule of law denial of ad-hoc decision making may conflict with the application of restorative justice in expropriation law because of two features of such application. First, the desire to treat each case in accordance to its unique circumstances, and second, leaving an extensive set of remedies ranging from expressive remedies (such as apologies), to in-kind resettlement solutions, to courts’ discretion. Yet, this potential conflict is not inevitable.
In this Part, I argue that while the commitment to the rule of law should be taken seriously, nevertheless it does not imply that we should abandon restorative justice as expropriation law’s underlying basis for justice. The rule of law’s call to maintain generally applicable rules and avoid ad-hoc decision making does not negate the application of restorative justice in expropriations, but rather requires that such an application would be cautious and predetermined.
By predetermination, I mean that legislators and courts should aim to predetermine the potential treatments that would be given to property owners in expropriation. Such a predetermination process is often suggested by other voices in the current literature that reject the universality of the fair market value standard. The calls to amend the fair market value standard so that the compensation can address additional losses, such as sentimental attachment (in constitutive properties such as the home), Footnote 133 the loss of communality, Footnote 134 or the harm caused to the owners’ autonomy, Footnote 135 are based on pre-identification of values that owners might lose as a result of expropriation. Footnote 136 To avoid violation of the rule of law, those who call to amend the fair market value standard suggest that the courts’ determination of compensation be conducted in accordance to some predetermined proxies. Footnote 137 Proxy-based remedies’ allocation determination will provide generality and prevent an unlimited court’s discretion. It is important to avoid ad-hoc decision making by courts and to preserve the rule of law. The predetermination process suggested here aims to achieve the same result, but by incorporating restorative justice ideas and values.
The predetermination process suggested in this article should be attentive to the needs and interests of all parties involved in the expropriation, including the government, the owners, and the community. Therefore it should consider how each party may overcome the harm, receive a response and treatment that would correlate its interests and needs, and how all of the parties’ considerations may be balanced. Conducting such a predetermination process in accordance with restorative justice doctrine requires that the process be inclusive and attentive to all parties. Footnote 138 The inclusiveness of the predetermination process is important as it guarantees that all parties’ interests and needs would be identified. Such an inclusive process requires the legislature to ensure that all parties would maintain their voice within the process.
In this sense, the predetermination process could be described as enhancing restorative justice values in two ways. First, by insisting on preserving the voice of all parts of the community (including the government, the owners and the community) it fosters restorative justice’s recognition that all parties should be involved to provide a comprehensive solution. Second, and equally important, such a process allows decision makers (mainly the legislators) to become aware of interests and needs of all parts of the population subjected to their authority. Even if we set aside arguments regarding decision-makers’ deliberate targeting of the weak segments in society, we must recognize that occasionally harmful decisions may be taken because of decision makers’ ignorance about what is important for different groups in the community (and, in the case of expropriation, to different property owners) to which they do not belong. The pre-determinative process suggested here may introduce decision makers, in the pre-expropriation stage, with the values, interests, and needs that they are not aware of in regards to both mere existence and intensity. The process of revealing values, interests, and needs has high restorative justice value because it provides the required infrastructure for a constructive and fruitful process.
Such a predetermination process may provide the courts with a set of instruments to use in accommodating the cases brought in before them. It would expand their discretion about the implementation of these instruments, requiring them to address the specific circumstances of the expropriation. Yet such a distinctive allocation of remedies should not be considered as a violation of the rule of law. Indeed, as Andrew Ashworth argues, “There is an important distinction between courts responding in a principled manner to relevant factual differences between cases, and responding on the basis of their own views or preferences.” Footnote 139 Only the latter, according to Ashworth is “contrary to the rule of law.” Footnote 140
Another feature of restorative justice application in expropriation law that reduces concerns about violation of rule of law, lies in such application focus on processes. One of the most troubling features of current expropriation law is the little attention it pays to processes in general, and to owners’ participation in such processes in particular. One of the most promising benefits of applying restorative justice in expropriation law is that it requires legislators and courts to further consider the owners’ role in the process of expropriation. A restorative concept of justice mandates that owners should not be disregarded during the processes. On the contrary, owners should become more involved and informed about both the reason for the expropriation and the progression of its realization. Bringing the owners back to the process does not only not violate the rule of law, but enhances it. Providing a more transparent, attentive, and informed process increases the awareness of the owners, as well of the community at large, to the expropriation and therefore turn it more available to public and legal scrutiny. Such an expansion of public and legal scrutiny of the expropriation strengthens the rule of law, as it prevents discrimination and inappropriate allocation of remedies.
To conclude, establishing expropriation law on a restorative model of justice need not be perceived as harmful to the rule of law. Maintaining a serious and inclusive predetermination process, in which all parts of the community would maintain their voice, would not only be essential for reaching just results but would also enhance the rule of law in expropriation cases.
VI. Conclusion
This article contends that current conceptual muddle of justice in expropriation paralyzes the laws’ actual ability to provide justice. It demonstrates how current laws, which set a universal compensation standard based on the fair market value of the property, cannot face challenges raised both by courts and literature. This failure of current law should be attributed to its division between different theories of justice, each pulling to different normative and positive directions.
This article argues for a conceptual change in expropriation laws’ [law’s] remedial scheme by embracing restorative justice as the underlying concept of justice in expropriation law. Establishing expropriation law’s quest for justice on a restorative basis provides a coherent and circumstances-attentive normative framework, as well as practical instruments, to overcome some of current law’s most significant challenges.
