“We live in a denial of justice age when it comes to the individual pursuit of justice against [international organizations].” It is on this bold note that Rishi Gulati commences his evaluation of existing dispute resolution mechanisms (DRMs) involving international organizations in his recent book, Access to Justice and International Organisations.

Taking as examples prominent existing DRMs, such as the United Nations (UN) Administrative Tribunal and International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal, Gulati argues that prevailing mechanisms to resolve disputes involving international organizations (IOs) fail to discharge the standard of “good administration of justice” (p. 35). Gulati develops a detailed framework for what comprises “good administration of justice” by referencing institutional, decisional, personal independence, impartiality, and fairness (pp. 42–66), and drawing on principles of private international law to fill what he identifies as the “denial of justice” gap faced by entities that interact with IOs. Gulati then considers that DRMs and national courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over disputes involving IOs and that private international law techniques should be used to determine which forum should exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction in any particular case (p. 199). Gulati proposes that national courts should exercise jurisdiction over a dispute where the IO's impugned action falls outside its functional immunities and a DRM has failed to take jurisdiction over a matter or where a DRM may have taken jurisdiction over the matter but fails to meet the “good administration of justice” standard. In doing so, national courts may use principles of private international law to determine what law to apply to the dispute (which may include international law or transnational law) (p. 217).

Gulati's work progresses the substantial, growing scholarship about the responsibilities of IOs. Section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN explicitly requires the UN to “make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement” for certain disputes and Gulati asks for the meaningful implementation of this obligation. Gulati's framework, which relies heavily on the intervention of national courts, raises interesting points for discussion. Would national courts, in practice, be willing to examine and pass judgment over the robustness of DRMs that have been established based on the common views of governments across the world with the frequency and using the level of analytical rigour that Gulati suggests? Is there a notion of “good administration of justice” that could be synthesized and universally applied to the global operation of IOs? What happens if a DRM and a national court (considering the DRM to have fallen short of the “good administration of justice” standard) both decide to take adjudicatory jurisdiction over a particular dispute?

This work explores key questions in the context of prevailing discussions about the expanding activities, authority, and influence of IOs. The interest in this topic is borne out by the International Law Commission's decision at its 73rd session in 2022, to include the “settlement of international disputes to which international organisations are parties” as part of its programme. Gulati's book could be a useful resource for the Commission's work and scholars studying DRMs and the responsibility of IOs going forward.