There is no doubt that the permissive consensus days of European integration are over. While until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, Euroscepticism was mostly confined to the margins, it has since then become increasingly mainstreamed, especially in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis and the migration crisis. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the body of academic research on Euroscepticism has been growing.
Most of what we know about Euroscepticism today comes from the field of political science, where researchers often rely on comparative designs and measure party positions and citizen attitudes to European integration from the late 1990s and onward. However, contemporary Euroscepticism did not materialize overnight, and we still know little about its origins. It is precisely here that Euroscepticisms: The Historical Roots of a Political Challenge, edited by Mark Gilbert and Daniele Pasquinucci, comes as a most welcome contribution. This well-thought-out and well-executed collection provides a thorough historical analysis of Euroscepticism in a diverse range of European countries. Together, the contributions convincingly demonstrate that opposition to Europe has long historical roots, and they shed light on the different ways in which Europe has been contested in different countries. Further, the volume as a whole makes a compelling case showing that there is not just one, but many Euroscepticisms, and these are deeply rooted in the national context and have “always been shaped by and developed within national boundaries” (8).
The volume opens with Gilbert and Pasquinucci's rationale for investigating and understanding opposition to Europe as a multifaceted phenomenon and “a historical occurrence, not only attributable to current events” (3). Next, Antonio Varsori provides a succinct yet comprehensive historical overview of opposition to European integration. The book then turns to case studies. These cover a wide range of European countries, from the original founding members to those who joined the European Union relatively recently, in the 2004 enlargement. Gilbert and Pasquinucci point out that they have asked the contributors to write about what they regard as distinctive about opposition to European integration in their country of reference (6). Consequently, the individual case studies do not follow the same pattern, which in my opinion brilliantly reflects one of the main arguments of the book, namely that Euroscepticism is not a universal concept, and opposition to Europe is deeply rooted in national contexts.
The first four country chapters cover four of the EU founding members: France, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. Emmanuelle Reungoat takes a socio-historical perspective, and shows that European integration has always been contested in France. Daniele Pasquinucci convincingly presents how specific criticisms of European integration in Italy, that at first were a minority view, have been transformed into a widespread sentiment on which much of the current opposition to European integration in the country is based. The reader learns from Gabriele D'Ottavio that while Euroscepticism in Germany is generally considered a new phenomenon, that is not the case. On the contrary, criticism of European integration in Germany has long historical roots and has been “bound up with the central issue of the German national question” (93). Conversely, Hans Vollaard helpfully explains how Dutch Euroscepticism actually does not have long historical roots, but is a rather new, “variegated and contingent” (117) phenomenon.
The following two case studies deal with Denmark and Britain. Thorsten Borring Olesen examines the evolution of opposition to Europe in Denmark and argues that while Euroscepticism has become increasingly salient in Danish politics, the Danes are not as Eurosceptic as their reputation indicates. In his chapter on Britain, Mark Gilbert shows how the main ideas behind anti-EU arguments that emerged in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, and that were championed during the Brexit referendum campaign, can be traced to the arguments Enoch Powell and Douglas Jay advanced against Britain's membership in the European Economic Community. The chapter convincingly demonstrates that Eurosceptic thought has had powerful thinkers not only on the right, but also on the left of the political spectrum. However, it is a shame that the historical analysis here does not trace the historical roots of criticisms of Europe even further. While it is true that, as the editors rightly point out, giving an overview of British Euroscepticism would “take a volume to itself” (7) (at least), not bringing up the legacy of empire seems like a missed opportunity to make an even more powerful case for why both national contexts and history matter for understanding contemporary opposition to Europe.
The last three case studies cover Greece, Poland, and Czech Republic. Kira Gartzou-Katsouyanni's chapter on Greece is a wonderful example of how important and useful history is to understanding contemporary opposition to Europe. Gartzou-Katsouyanni persuasively demonstrates that contrary to popular belief, Greece did not just recently turn Eurosceptic. The Greek left in particular has a long history of opposition to European integration, and to understand Greek Euroscepticism, we must understand the historical connection between the narrative of the embattled nation and left-wing political rhetoric. Next, Simona Guerra focuses on more contemporary history and examines why public opinion in Poland has been among the most positive towards the European Union. Tracing the historical roots of opposition to Europe, the author also assesses the role of Catholicism in Polish Euroscepticism. In the last case study, Adéla Gjuričová explores how Europe has been constructed in the public discourse in Czech Republic since the nineteenth century, painting a thorough picture of Czech Euroscepticism having deep cultural roots.
In the concluding chapter, Paul Taggart reaffirms the need to consider Euroscepticism as a plural phenomenon with long roots in specific national contexts. He also points out that historical examination of opposition to European integration in different countries not only shows the varieties of Euroscepticism but it can “just as easily illuminate key changes in the nature of European integration” (229). Both these important points have been explored, and convincingly proven, throughout the many impressive contributions in this volume. Overall, Euroscepticisms is an original and important contribution to the state of knowledge on Euroscepticism. It makes a compelling case showing that opposition to Europe has long historical roots, and certainly has not been confined to a relatively small number of the usual suspects. Further, it also shows that opposition to Europe is not only related to the developments in the European Union, but it is strongly shaped by national context. Euroscepticisms left me fully convinced that to truly understand the Euroscepticism of today, we must understand where it comes from.