“It is a truism,” observes Mary Beard in her Laughter in Ancient Rome, “that the practice of laughter is closely bound up with power and its differentials” (University of California Press, 2014, p. 129). John Lombardini's The Politics of Socratic Humor reflects on a specific anxiety surrounding Socratic intellectualism and the dangers it might have posed to the democratic operation of authority in classical Athens. Socrates's mockery in Aristophanes and his irony (narrowly understood as eironeia) in Plato appear ambivalent, at best, in their relation to the Athenian democracy. Xenophon, by contrast, defends Socrates's claims to superiority; mockery and irony in his account function as pedagogical techniques for guiding interlocutors to recognize that they lack knowledge. In the afterglow of the Athenian democracy's brilliance, Aristotle views eironeia as in tension with social virtues such as friendliness, truthfulness, and wittiness. This last—eutrapelia—offers a practice of virtuous laughing and joking that avoids the hierarchical implications of eironeia and instead fosters reciprocity. Later in antiquity, Socrates continued to figure in the imaginations of Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean philosophers. Although exempt from the anxieties of democracy, these philosophers still used humor in philosophical ways, making mockeries of themselves, as in the case of Diogenes, to call attention to the conventional and thus unnatural basis of collective judgment.
Lombardini eruditely demonstrates the function of Socratic mockery and irony in Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and others (and in this way the book makes a meaningful contribution to the literature on these authors), but the politics of this humor remain underdeveloped. Much depends on the assumption that a “democratic anxiety” prompted concern about Socratic humor. On what basis can we identify “democratic anxiety”? Given Lombardini's claims about the robustness of the Athenian democracy during the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, it seems strange to describe it as afflicted by anxiety, in particular an anxiety provoked by the sardonic (yet also playful) questioning of an ugly stonemason's son. What threat did Socrates really pose? And is a threat in the eyes of, say, Meletus really a threat to the Athenian democracy as a whole—and a threat that might provoke anxiety?
Lombardini's reading of Aristophanes's Clouds provides a useful focal point for elaborating his argument in response. For Lombardini, at the core of Aristophanes's critique stands an anxiety about the antidemocratic authority of Socrates's “intellectualism” (29). In a political community where judgments were reached by collective decision-making procedures, the implicit hierarchies and power differentials of Socrates's humor posed a threat: they called into question the democratic ideology of equality and cast doubt on the ability of the demos to reach collective decisions well. Lombardini's interpretation of Clouds turns away from the charges of impiety and corruption leveled against Socrates and their depiction in the play via Socrates's worshiping of the Clouds and deprecation of conventional deities. On Lombardini's reading, Strepsiades learns from Socrates to refuse calls for accountability by those he deems ignorant; this means he exempts himself from democratic practices and denies giving an account of his own activities. When his creditors cannot answer Strepsiades's grammatical quandaries, Strepsiades questions their fitness to perform their duties as citizens. This reflects, Lombardini concludes, “the attitude of intellectual superiority and arrogance that Strepsiades ultimately learns from Socrates” (37).
But who is to blame? Doesn't Strepsiades hold some responsibility? One could argue that the Athenian democracy's anxieties would be better placed on ordinary citizens who cannot wield rhetoric against the sophist-trained elites. On this argument, Strepsiades does not learn anything from Socrates; he merely takes the most sophistic rhetoric he can find and then bludgeons his creditors and runs them off with threats of violence. Democratic citizens then and now are right to worry about the capacities of ordinary people to use their power well—not to mention democracy's tendency toward tyranny when ordinary people fail to do so. Contrary to Lombardini's claims, laughter at Socrates and Strepsiades may have had different characters: Socrates is strange and ridiculous; Strepsiades, however, triggers a deep fear about democracy's real durability.
Lombardini tends to treat democracy and democratic ideology as a hegemonic entity, yet one oddly more terrified of “Socratic humor” than its own citizenry's inadequacies. Why should claims of superiority by one or a small group of unshod, unwashed inquirers appear so troubling? Part of the explanation for Lombardini's attribution of anxiety may lie in what he excludes from “Socratic humor.” His account does not treat playfulness, pun, innuendo, or flirtation. (“Humor” is all komisch as opposed to lustig.) I was left wondering if “Socratic humor” might actually contain two registers, one of potentially divisive mockery and another, more inviting elicitation of dialogue.
Much of the recent work in political theory on Socrates starts from the premise that critical engagements with democracy such as Socrates's humor were not troubling threats but essential parts of the agonistic and contestatory fabric of democratic life. As I and others have argued, Socrates's philosophical practices appropriated and transformed democratic practices of accountability and parrhēsia, institutions such as the symposium and the sunousia, and the psychological foundations of democratic citizenship. Seen from the vantage of this work, Lombardini's focus on “Socratic intellectualism” overlooks the ways in which Socrates's philosophical questioning unsettled democratic ideology by puncturing its pretenses of egalitarianism. Athens was not an inclusive democracy. Socrates not only spoke to citizens but drew foreigners, slaves, prostitutes, and women into conversations that threatened the constitutive myths of Athens. The implications of these conversations would not, however, have produced anxiety for those excluded from the democracy. Quite the contrary.
That Socrates was not only laughable but also put to death by a jury of his fellow Athenians underscores Beard's truism about power and the practices of laughter. Objects of laughter are often powerless. Did Socrates's mockery ever really threaten the Athenian democracy? It may have justified his execution in the eyes of some but nearly half of the jury voted the other way. Lombardini's concern for illuminating the potentially antidemocratic effects of this laughter in ancient authors does uncover moments in these texts worthy of comment and further study. But his attribution of anxiety to the often tyrannical and certainly pluripotent democrats of ancient Athens may say less about their situation than it does about ours.
