Conservative intellectual Charles Murray, after looking at the data for the past 50 years, argues that in order to avoid poverty in America, individuals have to accomplish three things: graduate high school, get married, and have kids. But they have to do it in that order. Murray's Losing Ground (1984) set off a debate in public policy toward poverty alleviation precisely because he demonstrated that the best of intentions was not enough to address the serious problem of poverty in America. In fact, many of the most well-meaning policies did not result in improvement but generated unintended and undesirable consequences that made many worse off. The analytical argument is an economic one that emphasizes the incentives that actors face in making decisions. Individuals respond “rationally” to the incentives they face in making decisions. So if we want to “fix” the problem of poverty, we have to focus our analytical attention on the incentives that individuals face in making their choices. Subsidizing unproductive behavior will result in more of it; taxing productive behavior will result in less of it. Determining how much in either direction requires a more nuanced empirical analysis and argument, but the general tendency and direction is established theoretically.
Disciplining the Poor raises a normative critique to this style of reasoning and its impact on public policy toward the poor. The authors provide a detailed discussion of how public policy toward the poor has been transformed over the past 40 years by market-oriented thinking. They examine welfare reform and public policy toward the poor more generally and claim that the neoliberal reforms that have been followed resulted in a system that is less responsive to the democratic polity and less effective in helping the poor find relief. The book deploys statistical analysis and comparative case studies to study what the authors call “poverty governance.”
In reading the book as an economist, one is first struck by the argument that simply stressing that incentives matter could somehow be construed as normative, and the policy advice of structuring incentives could somehow be construed as paternalistic. Consider work by economists and political economists on the problem of economic development and the role of foreign aid in poverty reduction. Is it normative when thinkers such as William Easterly document the failure of foreign-aid efforts to alleviate poverty due to perverse incentives? Is it paternalistic when a thinker such as Elinor Ostrom argues that in designing foreign aid programs, one must consider not only the nested nature of the game being played between donor and recipient countries but also the problems created by the Samaritan's Dilemma in poverty-reduction programs?
Identifying social dilemmas and distinguishing between productive and unproductive patterns of behavior is not inherently normative, let alone paternalistic. In fact, I think that the reader should contrast the basic thrust of explicit paternalistic efforts at poverty reduction in development economics (e.g., Esther Duflo) with the nonpaternalistic but structural incentive approach that I just described. Easterly and Ostrom do not assume that they can tell the poor how to live their lives better. In fact, both respectively stress in their work how on-the-ground individuals know much better how to solve the social dilemmas they face in their everyday lives than the technical experts who design from afar. Both reject any idea of a one-size-fits-all approach to poverty reduction.
Creating conditions for people to solve their own problems in their own way is not paternalistic. A policy is only paternalistic if the expert demands that he or she make choices for you because you are unable or unfit to make the choices for yourself. Protecting an individual from him/herself can be paternalistic, whereas allowing individuals to pay the full cost or reap the full benefit of his/her choices is the exact opposite, even though it may mean that some individuals who choose poorly suffer horrible personal consequences.
I have taken this detour into global poverty analysis only to highlight that a focus on incentives and institutional structures does not commit the analyst to anything like what the authors believe underlies poverty governance based on market principles, namely the belief that the technical expert (economist) knows better than the local community and people how to address social ills like poverty, ignorance, and squalor. For many years I taught a course at New York University that surveyed economic thought from the classics to contemporary thinkers, and we asked the question as to what the continuities and discontinuities were in the work of, say, Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall, and Joseph Stiglitz. What is relevant for the context of this discussion is that all three of these thinkers, and many in between, expressed a deep concern and compassion for the poor. The question is not whether poverty is a social ill but how best to address it. From a purely economic perspective, the analysis is one of means–ends. Poverty alleviation is a worthy end; to that all can agree.
In short, there is absolutely nothing in the consistent application of market principles that implies that those in charge of policy governance know better than the poor. The simple fact is that while there are many ways to live, there are few ways to live productive, healthy, and happy lives. Those trapped in poverty are there because of a series of choices made (assuming away children for this discussion). If the claim is made that people find themselves in poverty because of inequality in the endowments they inherit, then the debate shifts to another set of questions again concerning incentives. Inequality in endowment can be addressed through redistribution, but can endowments be addressed in a way that is neutral with respect to incentives?
Disciplining the Poor, despite its frustrating conflation of thinking in terms of incentives and paternalistic efforts at social control, raises some intriguing points that must be elevated in the public discourse about the plight of the poor. Once we move from the blackboard discussion of economic analysis to the reality of politics, many ideas are introduced not for scientific or purely ideological reasons but due to the machinations of politics, which follow the basic public-choice logic of interest groups. One of the most perverse policies currently enforced in the United States that adversely impacts minorities and the poor is the “war on drugs.” The incarceration rates and, worse yet, the recidivism rates are devastating. I do not think the authors make enough out of the negative consequences of this policy and, how by criminalizing behavior that is really a matter of personal choice, and at worst in cases of abuse a medical issue, the policy cuts off life opportunities for so many and so early in their lives. In the process of waging this war, local police has been militarized, and local populations have been terrorized by their own government, as basic rights are routinely violated (especially since 9/11).
So can a common ground be found for economists and the authors of this book? Of course, but each side would have to move significantly in the other's direction. Economists would have to admit, as Ruth Grant (Reference Grant2011) has recently argued, that incentive arguments are not always morally neutral. Incentivizing individuals does entail a moral judgment that the behavioral response sought is desirable. But admitting this does not necessarily entail a paternalistic turn, since you can imagine a situation where through various feedback channels, the ends sought are the result of a genuine democratic consensus. We want, for example, improvement in school performance by inner-city youth. How do we best achieve that result? Do we give bonuses to teachers for improved performance (an indirect incentive that systems adopted widely), or do we pay students directly for performance (as the experiments by Roland Fryer are attempting to do)? Wishing it so does not make it so! And incentivizing is not the same as controlling, let alone denying others the freedom to choose so that the superior chooser can choose.
Not only would our authors have to stop conflating incentive-oriented thinking with paternalism, but they, I would argue, have to be a bit more reserved in their claims about race and the driving role that race plays in modern politics. I am not denying that problems of racial discrimination still exist in the United States, nor would I deny that sexism still exists. But I am also not persuaded that public policies—for example, the war on drugs that so adversely impacts minority communities—were designed to do so. In the world of politics, you cannot always infer intentions from outcomes. And while I do not doubt the authors' conclusion that welfare reform has resulted in “programs that are less responsive to the needs of poor women and children,” I am not persuaded that their analysis justifies their conclusion that the plight of the poor suffers when conservatives are in office, or that policies are targeted to adversely impact African Americans (p. 272).
Race is an argument stopper. I understand that the authors want to see race as a critical causal element in their argument. But the consequences for the disciplinary discourse, as opposed to the political discourse, is that any alternative hypotheses are going to be dismissed, rather than engaged, as reflecting implicitly either an arrogant paternalism or an ignorant racism. What if, instead, discussions about incentives and decentralization were really motivated by an honest evaluation that aligning costs and benefits in decision making would result in more prudent decisions by individuals and thus help them to help themselves beyond their dire circumstances of poverty? And furthermore, it important to have discussions about how decentralized politics gives more decision power to citizens and entrusts them to utilize that power to engage in true self-governance and demand a more responsive democratic polity. Would this not be the sort of “progressive vision” of federalism that the authors hope might emerge (p. 306)?
The policy question in front of us is not disciplining the poor but creating conditions under which poverty alleviation follows as individuals strive to better their lives and those of their family members, as well as their community more generally. Market-oriented thinking is not a block to the realization of the institutions of human flourishing, but one vehicle through which we come to understand what those institutions are.
