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This dissertation is a critical and constructive interpretation of Karl Rahner's theology of freedom in light of postcolonial theory. The thesis contends that deepening and intensifying the categorical and historical moments in Rahner's theology of freedom has much relevance for a postcolonial theological project. The method takes the form of a conversation that results in a braiding of theological and theoretical insights. To this end, the constructive proposal for Rahner's theology of freedom in the postcolonial context is presented in a tripartite division of the transcendental-existential, existential-ethical, and mystical-political to underscore its categorical aspects. The first part of this division dialogues with Homi Bhabha's theory of hybridity of identity in which subtle themes of transcendence can nurture a theological imagination. Here, the “hearer of the Word” in Rahner, together with the idea of the Supernatural Existential, emphasizes the cultural and historical context of the colonial encounter with Christianity in India. The second part of the tripartite division is exemplified in the ethical agenda of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose call for one-on-one-ethical-relation in love is compared and contrasted with the idea of the Fundamental Option. Here, Rahner's program for the “doer of the Word” is thoroughly radicalized with the inclusion of the embodied lover of people whose caress gives birth to mysterious spaces of connection. Finally, the mystical-political idea of freedom, illustrated in Rahner as Indifferent Freedom, is critiqued and reinterpreted as Ahimsa, or nonviolence. In this chapter, the greatest contrast is to be seen with regard to Rahner and a postcolonial agenda, especially in the mystical-political ideas of M. K. Gandhi. “Being in union with the Word,” the mystical-ethical practice of the central notion undergirding the idea of Indifferent Freedom, is actualized in Ahimsa. In intensifying the historical, social, and political moments in Rahner's theology, the dissertation contributes to the urgent need to conceptualize subjectivity, ethics, and love of God in relation to justice and peace. Catholic theology that emphasizes the communal, sacramental, and incarnational is therefore both relevant and useful.
In this study, I have compared Avicenna's position concerning the nature of creative action and the beginning of the universe to that of Aquinas. As a preliminary to this comparison, I discussed whether their theories can be examined according to the same criteria, and I affirmed that they can be because they maintain similar positions concerning the source of our knowledge of God and its expression. Subsequently, I discussed whether they share a similar conception of God, on the basis of which their positions regarding the nature of creative action and the beginning of the universe can be assessed. I argued that Aquinas and Avicenna agree on es-sentials concerning human knowledge and talk about God. They also have similar conceptions of divine simplicity, necessity, immutability, eternity, and knowledge. Contrary to what is commonly accepted, their conceptions of divine creative action are not fundamentally different. They do argue for different positions concerning the beginning of the universe; however, this difference between their positions does not have much to do with their conceptions of God, or of divine perfections. Thus, their positions may be evaluated not on the basis of their conception of God, but rather on the basis of their common Neoplatonic heritage.
Can human rights be defended against the persistent charges that they are culturally relative or ethnocentrically bound to the philosophical commitments of the modern West alone? This thesis considers how human rights might be justified in light of the growing acceptance of multiculturalism and the suspicion directed at universalist approaches in ethics. In particular, it examines the increasingly popular strategy of defending human rights on the least controversial premises possible, thereby revealing the extent to which human rights rely on any particular metaphysics, set of religious tenets, account of human nature, or other partisan view. I offer a sympathetic but critical engagement with three such “minimalist strategies of justification,” and suggest a fourth alternative that is informed by, but stands apart from, these three positions.
Chapter 1 demonstrates how two common objections against the universality of human rights—the cultural relativist and ethnocentric theses—do not philosophically devastate this position. Chapter 2 considers John Rawls's political constructivist account of “human rights proper,” and acknowledges both its inadequacies when compared to international law and its betrayal of some basic liberal convictions for which he is best known. Chapter 3 assesses several consensus-based approaches to human rights. It concludes that cross-cultural convergence on their norms may be necessary to and important for other purposes, but cannot exhaust the issue of justification on its own. More promising is Martha Nussbaum's universalistic “capabilities approach” to human rights. Chapter 4 finds her neo-Aristotelian defense of universal norms applied with sensitivity to difference to be generally workable, but notes some internal tensions to which she must attend. It is affirmed in chapter 5 that these and other strategies of minimalism positively contribute to our understanding of what justifying the universality of human rights must entail, although they fail to avoid controversy. I conclude that belief in human rights requires certain substantive assumptions to which minimalists are already committed, but which they often seek to marginalize.
The fourth-century Christian text known as the Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions has traditionally been regarded as a haphazard collection of source materials. Rather than being considered an important historical document in its own right, it has been mined for materials that shed light on earlier stages of Christianity. I argue that the source-critical divisions established by previous scholarship actu-ally work to obscure the Recognitions's rhetorical aims. My dissertation uses the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to show how philosophical and astrological materials, which have been separated from other parts of the text by source-critical considerations, are used to advance the Recognitions's agenda about true knowledge.
The Recognitions comprises a series of debates about knowledge waged by two opposing groups: those who have prophetic knowledge (i.e., Peter, Clement, Niceta, and Aquila) and those who do not (philosophers and astrologers, among others). These debates demonstrate the protagonists' skill in astrology and philosophy: they are masters of every possible form of knowledge. The text also suggests, however, that philosophy and astrology do not really lead to true knowledge. Such “knowledge” is mere conjecture and opinion, which is the product of fallible human reason or demonic powers. Prophetic knowledge is the only true knowledge, and it comes only through a direct relationship with Jesus himself. Peter and his followers possess this prophetic knowledge because Peter knew Jesus personally and accurately transmitted his message to others.
My reading of the Recognitions suggests that the text's interest in knowl-edge—and the transmission of that knowledge from Jesus to Peter and then to Clement—is an argument about its own authority. Because Peter reproduced Jesus' words exactly, and because Clement writes a verbatim account of Peter's words, the Recognitions purports to be a complete and reliable collection of the words of the true prophet himself. When read in this light, the Recognitions is an elabo-rate defense of its own prophetic knowledge against the other major claimants to knowledge in antiquity.
This dissertation explores the concept of “at-one-ment” as found in the work of Josiah Royce (1855–1916) in relation to a pragmatic theory of meaning. Late in his career, Royce examines in The Problem of Christianity (1913) what he calls the three leading ideas of Christianity: the moral burden, atonement, and the community of interpreters. In that text, traditional atonement theories are criticized as inadequate for understanding the real meaning of at-one-ment. Instead, Royce argues that at-one-ment is the creative and effective work of the Beloved Com-munity as it strives toward greater union. This dissertation aims to use Royce as a heuristic for applying pragmatic criteria to theological concepts, specifically the concept of at-one-ment.
This dissertation makes historical and systematic contributions to the study of Royce and to the theology of atonement. First, the historical study of Royce's early and middle career does not appear to support a theory of meaning as revealed in conduct alone. Rather, Royce uses theoretical deductions to argue that the universe is always and already at-one in the life of universal consciousness. Systematic idealism effectively obviates any real need for at-one-ment, since any separation is only apparent rather than actual. In 1912, Royce decisively turns to the pragmaticism of Charles Sanders Peirce. A major portion of this thesis is devoted to tracing the trajectory away from his early position of idealism and towards pragmatic realism in his final years.
The systematic argument turns on the pragmatic maxim of Peirce: the whole intention of a theory of at-one-ment is to produce modes of conduct that would follow upon acceptance of this theological idea. Theological theories such as penal satisfaction or sacrifice focus on the efficacious work of Jesus on the cross rather than the actual reconciling practices of the community that follow upon professed belief in at-one-ment. I argue that the meaning of Christian at-one-ment must be understood pragmatically, that is, as effected through reconciling practices within and on behalf of the faith community. Conversely, an absence of observable, effective reconciling practices renders belief in at-one-ment meaningless. A pragmatic theology of at-one-ment explicitly requires a re-examination and reformulation of a Christian theology of reconciliation.
It has long been established that the text of the Hebrew Bible developed gradually over time. I contend that the very concept of Scripture as an authoritative text emerged through a protracted process, alongside connected concepts of authorship, readership, and interpretation. In this dissertation, I contribute to the understanding of the prehistory of Scripture by tracing some ways in which selected biblical and Second Temple texts conceive of the authority of sacred writings and of the inherited interpretations of those writings. Previous approaches to scriptural and interpretive authority have tended to employ conceptions drawn from later cultures in which Scripture has already taken on its familiar form through Judaism's interactions with other (notably Hellenistic) religious and literary practices. My goal is, instead, to induce the texts to speak for themselves by examining the ways in which the authority of sacred writing and of interpretation are imagined in these texts.
Although various Second Temple groups share the authoritative Torah of Moses and many inherited interpretations, they disagreed about who had the authority to interpret, and about how to implement laws. I investigate various strategies that they employed to demonstrate their interpretive authority. Since they did not share our contemporary conception of texts as fixed entities over which authors exercise property rights, modern readers may misconstrue these strategies as textual tampering or even forgery. Following an initial discussion of conceptions of sacred writing in the pre-exilic and exilic biblical traditions, I focus on three strategies for claiming interpretive authority and on the associated conceptions of the authority of sacred writing: Ezra's pseudonymous attribution of post-exilic legislation to Moses; Jubilees' preoccupation with sacred writing and its rewriting of pentateuchal passages in light of a pre-Sinaitic tradition of heavenly writing; and Philo of Alexandria's recasting of the written Mosaic Law as the perfect embodiment of universal Natural Law. These interpreters shared inherited interpretations, while differing significantly about how these shared traditions were authorized. I explore these differences against the background of specific conceptions of textuality, authorship, reading, and interpretation.
This study is a reassessment of an important biblical idiom, lešakkēn šemô šām, and its synonymous biblical reflexes, lāś

m šemô šām and lihyô

šemô šām, in the Deuteronomistic History (DH). The use of this particular idiom in Deuteronomy and the DH has long been understood by biblical scholarship as evidence of a paradigm shift within the Israelite theology of divine presence. This paradigm shift, known as the “Name Theology,” involves a supposed evolution in Israelite religion away from the anthropomorphic and immanent images of the deity in the JE sources, toward the more abstract, demythologized, and transcendent image of the deity in the P source. The catalyst for this supposed transition is the “deuteronomistic correction.” Its identifying feature is the use of “name” as a theologeumenon to identify the abstracted presence of YHWH in the Temple.
This study proposes a loan-hypothesis for lešakkēn šemô šām which transforms the translation and interpretation of this phrase. The method is a comparative study of the idiom in its biblical, Mesopotamian, and Levantine contexts. By means of the data gathered in this study, I demonstrate that this phrase has been borrowed into the Hebrew Bible from the Mesopotamian royal monumental corpus, specifically from the literary typology of victory and votive monuments. I also demonstrate that this same idiom, in the form of a Northwest Semitic loan-translation, migrated into monumental typologies of the Levant. The resulting retranslation of lešakkēn šemô šām reveals that the classic formulation of the Name Theology is foreign to the biblical writers. Moreover, the corrected interpretation of this critical formula contributes to a better understanding of the theology of Deuteronomy and the DH.
This dissertation studies a portion of the Commentary on the Psalms by the Syrian author Dionysius bar Salibi (d. 1171). Bar Salibi was a bishop of the Syrian Orthodox Church who played an important role in the final flowering of the Syriac literary and theological tradition known as the Syrian Renaissance of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. His Commentary on the Old Testament is of interest as an example of Christian reception of the Bible in the Syrian Orient and as a source for recovering patristic interpretation. The commentary is also of interest because it is the only known example of a commentary in which the literal and spiritual senses of scripture have been treated separately, in parallel synoptic columns. An earlier dissertation by Marjorie Helen Simpkin (Melbourne, 1974) studied the commentary on Psalms 1–72. The present study establishes the text for the commentary on Psalms 73–82, using nine manuscripts, and provides an annotated translation.
After reviewing bar Salibi's life and works, the dissertation surveys previous studies of his biblical commentaries, analyzes his literal and spiritual exegesis, traces his use of Greek and Syriac sources, and discusses his use of the Greek and Syriac biblical versions. Among the most important of bar Salibi's sources are Athanasius of Alexandria, Daniel of Salah, Moshe bar Kepha, and Isho

dad of Merv. The critical Syriac text and English translation of the commentary on Psalms 73–82 form the heart of this study. The final section of the dissertation places bar Salibi's work in a wider, comparative context by comparing bar Salibi with ancient and medieval commentators on four selected verses: Ps 78:25a (“the bread of angels”), Ps 82:1 (“in the midst of the angels”), Ps 82:6 (“you are gods”), and Ps 82:7 (“you shall die like men”).
How do we make sense of suffering and illness? How can renunciation be understood in the midst of illness in the Tibetan Buddhist context? This thesis argues that according to the hagiographies and ritual texts of the Nun Palmo tradition, written and compiled by the inheritors of the practices and canonical texts attributed to a tenth- or early-eleventh-century Kashmirian or Indian Buddhist nun who contracted leprosy, struggle is necessary for liberation. Struggle in the form of illness results in renunciation and a reconceptualization of worldly identity, setting a course of healing and teaching within the world through an ascetic-devotional practice of fasting associated with the bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara. Findings from ethnographic work in Nepal and Tibet and works by Simone Weil, Ariel Glucklick, David Bakan, and others supplement textual analyses.
The introduction discusses how the texts aid us in understanding some of the patterns of doctrinal concerns and practices, especially in terms of illness, ritual, and gender, from the late eleventh century to the present day. Chapter 1 discusses the possible identity of Nun Palmo, and the historiographic value of the texts attributed to her, and provides a synopsis of the hagiographies. Chapter 2 examines the language of illness in the texts, which present it as a religious experience and a metaphorical tool for transmitting Buddhist teachings about impermanence and renunciation. Leprosy revealed its rootedness in karma, the sexual connotation of the condition, the connection between the body and societal ideas of purity, gender biases, and perhaps pre-Buddhist concerns about “demons.” Through fragmentation, leprosy violated several boundaries with its excrescences as well as its degenderizing and dehumanizing effects—and yet in the texts, it was a step forward in the direction of purification and redemption. It acted as a catalyst for transformation of old ways of thinking and being, a deconstruction of the conception of a permanent self and attachment to samsara.
Chapter 3 examines the structure of the rituals in the texts and in contemporary practices in Nepal and Tibet. Chapter 4 discusses the goal of the texts as aversion (nges ‘byung) or renunciation, an ascetic process. Asceticism is conceived of as both denial, in relation to old ways of thinking, and affirmation, in relation to re-embodiment. The re-embodiment of Nun Palmo (shedding her leprosy) as a bodhisattva and other figures also reinforces a positive view of the female body. This idea is valued in modern practices in Nepal and Tibet, with the majority of Tibetan women performing and organizing this ritual and retelling Nun Palmo's story. Hymns of praise and visualizations directed to Avalokiteshvara draw attention to the process of transformation, healing, and compassion.
On the whole, rituals and the experience of illness act together to complete the process of transformation. When transformation and the resulting stigma are so graphic and extreme, illness becomes a medicine. In an image that is reminiscent of tantric ideas of transformation, poison is transformed into a nectar.