Neoconservatives and others who cheer-led the disastrous US invasion of Iraq still believe that the Vietnam War was America's to win or lose—and that we chose to lose it because of presidentially adulterated military operations, media-poisoned public opinion, treasonous antiwar activists, and congressional faintheartedness. Ours was a noble cause subverted by our own timidity and errors. Never mind the awesome will and skill of the Vietnamese Communists and the corruption and incompetence of the US client regime in Saigon.
That the United States has had to rediscover the lessons of Vietnam forty years later in Iraq testifies to a persistent confidence in American military power as an agent of fundamental political change in foreign societies as well as a continuing White House unwillingness to recognize the American electorate's limited tolerance of protracted wars against irregular enemies on behalf of unconvincing objectives. The United States was no more in a position to transform the Middle East by creating a model democracy in Iraq than it was to mobilize a “South” Vietnamese nationalism capable of competing with the victors of Dien Bien Phu.
James Lebovic in his The Limits of U.S. Military Capabilities argues that “U.S. military capabilities are fundamentally limited and that U.S. costs rise and benefits diminish appreciably in wars in which U.S. stakes are low and its goals broad and ambitious” (2). He further contends that “the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts presented an especially difficult challenge … insofar as the host governments lacked effective institutions to support the U.S. effort and consistently undermined it” (3). America's efforts in both wars were plagued by unrealistic goals, flawed military strategies, feckless host governments (and even outright anarchy), enemies with a much greater stake in the fight (and therefore willingness to sacrifice), and declining domestic public support. In both wars, “the United States was unable to defeat an adversary that could exploit the U.S. weakness in countering a guerrilla war, that could spread U.S. forces thin, and that could capitalize on the failings of the host government and changes in the U.S. political mood” (41).
For Lebovic, a political science professor at George Washington University and author of several books on various defense topics, the Vietnam and Iraq Wars reveal the inherent disadvantages of military conventionality in an irregular insurgent warfare environment; the near certainty of weaker American resolve against an enemy waging total war; the difficulties of inducing host governments to do more politically and militarily than they are willing to do, to say nothing of building host government institutions; and the ability of global military obligations to subvert prosecution of “small” wars specific in time and place. Indeed, he concludes, the “question remains whether the United States, by virtue of its global interests, is positioned to excel in wars with limited stakes that require heavy, long-term U.S. investments in human and material resources” (207).
Enter Afghanistan: Lebovic persuasively argues that, notwithstanding the costly experience of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, which together have consumed a total of sixteen years, 63,000 American lives, and at least $3 trillion (in today's dollars, including indirect war costs), the United States is headed down the same road in Afghanistan, with President Obama's backing the Pentagon's demand for military escalation. “Once more,” the United States has been “drawn into a conflict with insurgents who knew the local terrain, shared identities with the indigenous population, chose the time and place of fighting, melted away when confronted, and capitalized on its military advantages” (214). Like the Johnson and George W. Bush administrations before it, the Obama administration has mired the United States in an unpopular, open-ended, no-win war on behalf of a venal and incapable client regime. (Bush grudgingly accepted, at Iraqi insistence, a certain date—December 31, 2011—for the departure of all US troops from Iraq; Obama has grudgingly accepted, at General David Petraeus's insistence, an unspecified “conditions-based” requirement for withdrawal from Afghanistan.)
All of which raises the question, What is the point of examining the lessons of Vietnam and Iraq if other than to improve strategic judgment? The Vietnam War should have deterred reckless intervention in Iraq, and the Iraq War should have deterred reckless escalation in Afghanistan. What is the point of reading a solid and insightful book like The Limits of U.S. Military Capability if in the next crisis we choose to act as if our power was militarily and politically irresistible? This is not a call for a return to isolationism, but the fact is, concludes Lebovic, that “the United States is likely poised for military action when relatively uninformed about the target country's governing institutions and unable to judge the full dimensions of the task at hand.” US decision makers must therefore “try hard … to understand the potential pitfalls ahead, to consider fallback options, to plan operations with a realistic sense of what can (and cannot) be achieved, and to mobilize the military, economic, and political resources that are needed to ensure mission success” (230).
This is a tall order, and past experience offers little ground for optimism. Perhaps the back-to-back wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, together with America's growing fiscal weakness and relative military decline, will exert a chilling effect on future presidents contemplating forcible intervention overseas. Sad to say, strategic exhaustion may be the only cure for a foreign policy too long diseased by excessive military activism. In circumstances where vital US interests (concretely defined) are not at stake, better the risks of military inaction than those of yet another costly and needless crusade abroad.
