In an important new contribution to the fields of Islamic law and gender studies, Susan Spectorsky reviews the work of the early Muslim jurists in order to acquaint us with their process for defining key legal rules and doctrines concerning women, the sources and methods they employed, and the extent to which their scholarship set the stage for later legal developments in the classical period, from the 10th to the 13th centuries. Along the way she touches upon a number of critical issues in the history of Islamic law, including the relationship between Islamic law and social realities, the extent to which the Islamic legal system adapted to changes in those realities, the underlying reasons for the divergent opinions we encounter among Muslim jurists, and what may be the most pressing question of the day, namely, the underlying message about women and gender embedded in Islamic law.
Spectorsky has chosen her jurists with care and lays out the rationale for her inclusion of each work of fiqh in the study. For the early jurists, she surveys foundational texts for what became the four major Sunni legal schools, the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafiʿi, and Hanbali. For the classical period, she selects two texts for each school, choosing them on the basis of “clarity and accessibility, as well as the importance of each author within the tradition of his school” (p. 146). Spectorsky is forthcoming about the jurists’ methods for working with their sources and, indeed, provides a useful survey of the Qurʾanic verses that the jurists found most relevant to their development of legal rules for women. She also includes a number of the Prophetic Traditions most often deployed by the jurists in their shaping of the law: each discussion of a specific legal issue is prefaced by several Traditions that the jurists viewed as key sources for their positions. The presentation of this source material helps us grasp the methods of the jurists as they drew conclusions about legal rules from the Qurʾanic verses that they emphasized and the Traditions that they privileged. But, as Spectorsky is careful to note, some juristic discussions are more grounded in the sources than others, and the formulation of rules could float free from both logic and text in ways that can puzzle the reader. In brief, one strength of this book is the close attention it pays to the sources and methods of the early and classical jurists. We can follow the formation of laws affecting women.
In her discussion of the substance of the law, Spectorsky hews to the texts. For most of the book, she limits herself to addressing the issues as the jurists posed them, organizing her narrative around a large set of rules and doctrines concerning marriage and divorce, just as Muslim jurists did. These are standard issues as far as the legal tradition is concerned: the marriage contract, the suitable marriage partner, the dower, the types and processes of divorce, and so forth, all routinely found in the marriage and divorce sections of works of fiqh. A final chapter adds brief discussion of a number of additional issues found in other sections of these works, arguably every bit as important to women, including required maintenance, obedience in marriage, child custody, required dress, and sexual crime. Her presentation of the material has the great virtue of allowing us to experience the texture of these legal discussions, as well as the differences of opinion that might arise among jurists.
The major organizing theme of the book is that of continuity and change. Spectorsky aims to understand the extent to which jurists of the more mature classical period followed carefully in the footsteps of the founding fathers and whether they were able to respond to social developments that called for some rethinking or at least expansion of legal interpretations. She finds that the jurists of the classical period rarely struck out in novel directions but rather tended to add details and clarify issues. The very act of clarification could, however, lead to subtle change in the substance of the law, as Spectorsky argues it did in the case of new limitations that the Hanafis placed on a woman's ability to conclude her own marriage contract. Much of Spectorsky's case for meaningful change rests on two other developments, both of which she characterizes as reflecting “sharp difference” between the formative and classical period doctrines (p. 178). The first is the reworking of the concept of kafāʾa (suitability in marriage) to take into consideration social distinctions that arose in Muslim society: a focus on the status markers of Arab versus non-Arab gave way to more complex considerations of social class such as profession and wealth. The second is the injection of a new person, an officially appointed reconciler, into the prescribed process for khulʿ (divorce for compensation).
Are these examples sufficient to make the case for change and even more so for a reciprocal relationship between fiqh and real life? They are, on balance, fairly modest developments in the larger context of the thick layers of legal rules and doctrines. It is not surprising, therefore, that Spectorsky is in the end rather equivocal about her findings, and she suggests that the answers to our questions about the evolution of Islamic legal doctrine in response to social development might be better sought in other types of legal sources, such as fatwa collections.
As Spectorsky presents the jurists’ discussions of issues, she also attends to one of the most intriguing aspects of the Islamic legal tradition: the existence of ikhtilāf (disagreement) among the jurists on many points of substantive law. She documents such disagreement as it surfaces both among and within the schools of law, and she traces how these differences arise methodologically through the privileging of certain Traditions over others and the degree of emphasis placed on relevant Qurʾanic verses. These differences can be far from inconsequential, as illustrated by the disparate positions found concerning the ability of women to make their own marriage contracts: some Hanafi jurists allowed a woman to make such a contract for herself, while others restrict that right or, in the case of jurists from other legal schools, hold that only a male guardian can arrange a woman's marriage. Spectorsky's discussion of this and other instances of ikhtilāf provides concrete information on how, exactly, such differences can emerge from the jurists’ ongoing and equally valid efforts to interpret the sources.
The final contribution of the book lies in its conclusions about the woman of Islamic law, and how the jurists constructed this woman as married, affluent, and urban, and located her as a dependent in a patriarchal household. Of course, as Spectorsky notes, there were other women living at the time of the classical jurists, no doubt the majority, who were widowed, poor, rural, or working in a variety of urban occupations. The peculiar blindness of the fiqh when it comes to all these other women, who exist on the pages only in mere passing, calls for explanation. Spectorsky seems to suggest that it is the foci of the sources, the Qurʾan and the Traditions, that limit the scope of the jurists’ inquiry, a logical outcome of her chosen focus on the sources and approaches that these jurists employed. Ultimately this is an extremely valuable study, then, of the sources and methodologies that lie at the heart of the classical Islamic laws pertaining to women and gender issues. It is not, and does not pretend to be, a study of Islamic law and society, so that some of the pressing questions in the field about the ways in which the law was shaped by social and political developments and its responsiveness to social change are not to be answered here.
