Following a sustained and effective critique of 1960s and 70s liberalism by a rising cadre of public intellectuals housed in newly-created conservative “think tanks,” a new generation of academics emerged to launch a more systematic critique on the premise that the policy vulnerabilities and electoral weakness of liberalism from the 1960s expressed more fundamental shortcomings as voiced by Progressivism at the turn of the last century. This critique, represented by Jean Yarbrough (Theodore Roosevelt and the American Political Tradition, 2012) and Ronald Pestritto (Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of American Liberalism, 2005) is best summarized by Charles R. Kesler (I Am the Change: Barack Obama and the Crisis of Liberalism, 2014). Kesler, who wrote the epilogue in this collection, held that “liberalism is all about theory” and that theory is pragmatism as shaped by Progressive intellectuals and articulated in the Presidencies of Wilson, FDR, and Obama. As theory, liberalism-as-pragmatism/relativism is inherently hostile to “some of the main ideas of American constitutionalism” (pp. xiii–xiv).
Here a real difficulty presents itself: Isn’t progressivism, with its long history of intellectual, electoral and policy success, so deeply embedded in our minds, habits and institutions, that overturning it—and on all levels—would be quite revolutionary? Without a continuous conservative tradition of ideas and policies, these critics of liberal progressivism would substantially agree with James Kloppenberg (Reading Obama; Dreams, Hopes, and the American Political Tradition, 2011), who confirms this ascendency by grounding Obama’s historicist/pragmatism in more than a century of American cultural and intellectual life. Even granting that many progressive intellectuals rejected the “Founder’s Constitution,” the long success of that rejection only symbolizes the difficulty. Richard A. Epstein’s, How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution (2006) remains a libertarian cri de coeur absent a counter history and tradition of constitutional fidelity.
The collection under review is a first start at constructing a counter history of constitutional conservatism in the first half of the 20th century. Its nine chapters focus on the ways in which the permanent principles that underwrite the Constitution have been articulated by a succession of presidents (Taft, Coolidge, Hoover) and jurists (Taft again, Charles Evans Hughes, Elihu Root, and writers in Constitutional Review [1917–1929], a publication of The National Association for Constitutional Government). This succession is portrayed as both a philosophical defense of natural rights and a living tradition, one in which, as Jonathan O’Neill argues (pp. 13–14), today’s libertarians, unreconstructed Southern Agrarians, neo-conservative hawks, Burkean humanists, and family-values Christians can all, despite their differences, safely find a common home.
In the introduction, the editors draw three lessons that contemporary conservatives can take from earlier examples of constitutionalism: First, constitutional conservatives in the Progressive Era were firmly anchored in the Federalist, Whig and Lincoln Republican tradition of a positive federal government and, within constitutional bounds, favored regulation that respected natural rights. Second, these conservatives held that “the right policies would flow naturally from the right institutional principles” built into the original constitution. And, finally, they were “neither isolationists nor Wilsonian internationalists,” opposing only international institutions that sacrificed American sovereignty (pp. 8–9).
While not all of the chapters directly confirm this reading, they are consistent in showing that opposition to Progressive theories and practices tended to center on constitutional argument. Indeed, the chapters on Taft by Sidney Milkis, Charles Evans Hughes by James Stoner, Jr., and Herbert Hoover by Gordon Lloyd and David Davenport make convincing cases that the constitutional conservatism of these reform-minded Republicans both preserved constitutional principles and adapted them to respond to the modern industrial era.
Generally lacking in their writings and in those of the constitutional conservatives of the upper bar was a robust defense of natural rights. William Schambra’s discussion of the election of 1912 wants to show that, thanks to Republican loyalists such as Elihu Root and Henry Cabot Lodge, we have been bequeathed a constitution that “still comes to us today largely as it emerged from the pen of the Founders, summoning each new generation of Americans to seek anew it genuine meaning and to guide their political actions accordingly” (p. 96). While these Taft Republicans did staunchly oppose Theodore Roosevelt’s call for referenda to overturn (state) court decisions and for easier means to amend the U.S. Constitution, this opposition often rested more on Protestant Anglo-American heritage and common law pieties than on the philosophy of John Locke. Opposition to Roosevelt’s populism and to historians such as J. Allen Smith was as much their lack of filiopietism as their historicism. As Root put it: “We shall not apologize for American institutions…. We cherish with gratitude and reverence the memory of the great men who devised the American constitutional system … their wise avoidance of dangers which had wrecked all preceding attempts at popular government” (p. 109).
The constitutionalism celebrated in this collection was that informed by the principles of Hamiltonian Federalism and, later, Whig, and Republican nationalism. They, like Herbert Croly and James Beard (yes, Beard) had a barely disguised contempt for Antifederalism and for the Jeffersonian/Jacksonian celebration of “states’ rights” through the protection or imposition of culturally backward local customs (including slavery) and the vigorous and popular use of state police powers to favor parochial interests and norms regarding religion, the economy, and the family. This legacy is a decidedly mixed one for today’s Republican Party whose electoral base now resides in the South and Midwest, the earlier bastions of both states’ rights and radical populism.
What is offered here are some strong ligaments of a coherent “forensic history” of the kind defended by John Phillip Reid (The American Constitution and the Origins of Anglo-American Liberty, 2005). This history, long abandoned in England but still alive in America, is primarily shaped to combat unchecked centralized power, whether populist, parliamentary, military, executive, or administrative. Anchored in institutional memory and legal precedent, this history must be periodically rewritten to identify threats to and reaffirm the centrality of a nation of free citizens. Without the difficulties and embarrassments of philosophies of natural rights (e.g.: French Revolution, Antifederalists), constitutional conservatism honors both devolution of and separation of powers under the aegis of a strong and authoritative national state, but one not to be confused with big and intrusive government. Two recent books, Philip Hamburger's Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014), and Daniel R. Ernst's Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State Emerges in America, 1900–1940 (2014), could serve as major components in this tradition.
Ironically, it was none other than Roscoe Pound, doyen of Progressive jurisprudence, who termed administrative discretion “justice without law”—and by law he meant decisions premised on the assumption of pre-existent and stable rights. Rules issued as executive prerogative might temporarily serve prevailing needs but should never become permanently entrenched beyond legislative and judicial control. Writing in 1907 (46 American Law Register) in response to the explosion of electorally inspired exercises of state police powers through quasi-autonomous administrative bodies, Pound’s critique, like that of Taft, Root, Hughes, Coolidge and Hoover—and later echoed in President Eisenhower’s warning of an emerging military-industrial-scientific complex—demonstrated an almost instinctive fidelity to American constitutional memory and precedent.
