Historical political relationships

Understanding the dynamics of the conflict requires a historical review of events that took place during the three political regimes: imperial, socialist and post-socialist. To put it chronologically, during the imperial regime in the early 1970s, the commander of the armed forces in eastern Ethiopia encouraged the Afar and Oromo to attack the Issa, and the livestock raided were redistributed to the group members who conducted raids. Subsequently, Issa youngsters left the country and migrated to Somalia and Djibouti, but those Issa clan members who continued to reside on their land suffered from the drought and famine without assistance from the Ethiopian government. A number of Issa wells were deliberately poisoned, resulting in the loss of livestock and human deaths under the imperial regime (Khalif & Doornbos Reference Khalif and Doornbos2002). Since then, the Issa and the Oromo (to which the Ittu clan belongs) have become enemies.

Under the socialist regime (1974–91), Issa who had fled the country and migrated to Somalia in 1972 were organised under the leadership of an educated Issa clan member (Hamud Farrah), who escaped from the attacks of the Afar and Oromo. Hamud Farrah also cooperated with the Siad Barre government of Somalia to fight against Ethiopia.Footnote ³ In 1977, the young Issa migrants participated in the war launched by the Somali government, and rejoined their clan members to fight against the Oromo. They re-established themselves in Dewele and Mulu (small towns of the Issa Somali), while cooperating with those Somalis who were fighting for the liberation of Ogaden.

However, the objectives of the Issa and Somali fighters were different. Issa elders disclose that the Issa were taking retaliatory action, whereas the other Somalis were targeting the liberation of Ogaden, in order to form ‘Greater Somalia’. The Oromo have a different understanding that the intention of the Issa coincides with that of the other Somalis, claiming that the Ethiopian territory up to Awash Valley should be a part of Somalia. After the end of Ethio-Somali war, the Marxist government had an ambivalent position towards the Issa, sometimes providing support and at other times undertaking massive killings.Footnote ⁴ Since these events took place, neighbouring states such as Somalia and Djibouti invested in the informal supply of automatic weapons to the Issa, to fight against other ethnic groups including Oromo and Afar.

The new political and administrative structure introduced in the early 1990s (after removal of the Marxist regime) along ethnic lines has partly shifted the context.Footnote ⁵ This new system has brought its own challenges and opportunities (although it hardly worked in Mieso district due to its mixed ethnic composition).Footnote ⁶ As a result, the national government gave exclusive administrative responsibility to neither of the two ethnic groups. Instead, the two regional states, Somali and Oromia, continued to jointly administer the district. However, a dispute emerged between the two regional administrations over the control of Bordede town, which is a customs point. Controlling this town has huge economic benefit attached to the revenue generated from tax collection.Footnote ⁷ Though the claim over the strategic town took the form of an administrative dispute, the confrontation between the Issa and Ittu over resource access remained violent. There is a direct link between the two levels of conflict. In some cases, this regional-level dispute has exacerbated violent attacks between pastoral and agropastoral groups over the struggle in resource use. Thus, a wider regional economic interest has made the conflict more complicated. As this continued, the Somali region claimed that twenty-one peasant associations should be administered under its purview including Bordede.

To find a political solution to this complicated problem, the Ethiopian government conducted a referendum in November 2004, while the fieldwork for this study was going on. The results were disappointing for the Somali region, which lost twenty out of the twenty-one peasant associations contested. Consequently, the Issa undertook indiscriminate retaliation against non-Somalis, to punish other ethnic groups that favoured Mieso's administration under Oromia. Many were displaced, lost their lives or assets, and had to be supported by relief agencies. According to the report of the Mieso District Neighbouring Regions Affairs office, a violent Issa attack on 20 July 2005 caused looting of assets estimated at 2,489,141 Ethiopian Birr (US $252,550). Fifty-five people were killed and many others wounded, including the district administrator.

Finally, the conflict has intensified under the post-socialist regime. At present, frequent incidences of conflict and indiscriminate killings are common whenever the federal army is not in the district (Shide Reference Shide2005). Although it might be expected that the Ittu would have a stronger power position than the Issa, since the political party representing them (the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation, OPDO) is a member of the ruling coalition, the reality has turned out to be different. OPDO does not have an influential position in the prevailing political system, despite being co-opted and remaining loyal to the ruling party to assist the domination of the TPLF in the new political order (Joireman Reference Joireman1997).Footnote ⁸ A wide range of literature discloses the complexity of such a seemingly decentralised system of governance and the consequences associated with it, particularly in the Somali region, where political order is highly centralised to exercise control, despite the constitutional provisions for regional autonomy (Hagmann Reference Hagmann2005; Samatar Reference Samatar2005), and where ‘people who are elected or appointed to positions of power tend to exercise that power to benefit the interests of the group that installed them in their post rather than representing the interests of Somali Region as a whole (Devereux Reference Devereux2006: 115).

Change in land use

Historic information from elders indicates that the settlement of Ittu clan members in Mieso dates back to the early 1900s. They migrated from the western Hararghe highlands because the grassland in the district formed the basis for livestock production. During this period, livestock were their main source of livelihood and they were pastoralists. In the early 1930s, the imperial government of Ethiopia allocated land (about 500 ha) for two private investors to cultivate maize, sorghum and beans, as well as to produce livestock, by fencing large pasture-lands. These two activities competed with the pastoral communal grazing land. Investors employed armed guards to protect access to the enclosed land. Ittu and Issa collaborated in destroying the investors’ farms and raided their animals in order to discourage them and block further encroachment of highlanders into their grazing area. The collaboration was strong and successful.

However, cooperation in sharing grazing resources has disappeared through time, due first to a decline in the resource base and demographic change, and second to the impact of land reform subsequent to political and ideological change in 1974. The reform brought a dramatic change in land rights, as all land came under state ownership. As a result, those landlords who were allocated land during the imperial regime were dispossessed and forced to leave the area. This change in formal institutions resulted in the allocation of the enclosed land to Ittu clan members who were previously expropriated and marginalised. Since then, private land use for cultivation has become common. Many Ittu clan members started to till the land, though livestock remained the basic source of their livelihood. This became a source of conflict, as the Issa increasingly resisted expansion of cultivation. Field inquiry shows that Issa have never been involved in crop-farming activity. One mechanism of resistance to land use change was to organise attacks during the planting and harvesting seasons. This has been designed to secure extensive communal grazing land.

Since the mid 1990s, following the formation of regionalism along ethnic lines, attacks have become even more frequent.Footnote ⁹ At present, frequent attacks are resulting in reduced benefits for Ittu from communal grazing land. Many clan members fear that this may cause displacement from their settlement area in the long term. As the Issa resistance increased over time, by restricting access to communal grazing area to discourage crop farming, Ittu elders started to negotiate for access to the land they once enjoyed as common property with the Issa. Among those agropastoralists who combine cultivation and herding, the claim to presently contested grazing area is based on the claim that it was common property. To sum up, changes in land use by some users of common property, as an income diversification strategy, have become a threat to others who wish to sustain pastoralism as a livelihood, leading to distributional conflict that is transformed into violence.

The basic problem here is not the evolution of co-users of the grazing commons into ‘disputants’ by virtue of pursuing different production systems. Rather, it is the lack of a legal institutional framework through which claims for access can be negotiated, settled and sustained. In Ethiopia, the existing land tenure policy supports private use of land for cultivation as stated in the 2005 land use and administration proclamation (FDRE 2005).Footnote ¹⁰ At a local level, the allocation of land for cultivation favoured by this policy environment contributes to the shrinkage of the grazing area, putting the pastoral Issa at the losing end.

Furthermore, while state policies support crop production via the supply of agricultural technologies, extension services and training for agropastoralists, there is little or no legal backing to alleviate insecure property rights to the communal grazing land. As demographic change in agropastoral systems results in large tract of land coming under cultivation, tension arises when pastoralists practice mobility. This tension will intensify as agropastoralists increasingly hold land in private, while also claiming access to communal land for livestock production. This can be conceived as a struggle between diversification and specialisation. Interviews with Issa elders suggest that large areas of grazing land have been lost due to cultivation practiced by agropastoralists and farmers who have been allocated land by state functionaries.

Group identity, cooperation and resource mobilisation

Property rights literature indicates that the state is the ultimate supplier of security to fruits of one's investment. Where no one has invested but claims to be the right holder, as in the case of natural rangelands, who should give protection to claimants? Various forms of cooperation prevail in the case study district. In this section, emphasis is given to the influence of two major factors: (1) the link between group identity and cooperation as access strategy, and (2) the effect of mobilising resources in conflict prevention and the challenge faced in doing so.

Breaching of customary institutions

This section first describes the effectiveness of customary institutions when conflict occurs within an ethnic group, and then shows why such institutions have become ineffective. Both the Oromo and the Somali have their own customary institutions. Discussions with key Oromo informants show the existence of institutions embedded in the belief system called Abarsa and Kakku, which in turn emanates from the long-established constitution of the Oromo known as the Gada system. Both are used as tools in conflict management. Abarsa of elders and religious leaders is a statement or saying that God hears and acts. Abarsa and Kakku, literally translated as a curse and swear respectively, are the two most important institutions regulating conflict-triggering behaviour. Gada is a system of social organisation among the Oromo where laws governing access to resources and conflict resolution are established (Desalegn et al. Reference Desalegn, Seleshi, Regassa, Mukand, Ashim, van Koppen, Giordano and Butterworth2007).

Among the Somalis, one can find a well-structured conflict management system involving an inter-clan council (Guurti) consisting of elders who apply the Xeer as an institutional framework. It is through the Xeer that relations between clans are governed not only in conflict management but also in sharing pastoral grazing resources (Beyene Reference Beyene2008). For example, CHF International (2006: 13) states:

When it comes to conflict management between the two ethnic groups, it has been a tradition that the group that provoked conflict sacrifices bulls. Recently, however, the nature of the conflict in relation to socio-economic and political factors has changed, as a result of ethnic-based federalism.Footnote ¹¹ As the basis of the conflict has expanded from resource access and use to territorial expansion in connection with the formation of regional states and ethnic-based federalism, the capacity of elders to manage the conflict has deteriorated. This shows the close link between change in political system and the declining capacity of elders to overcome conflict. A related work shows that the decentralisation of governance has introduced new forms of resource competition and struggle between pastoral and agropastoral groups, undermining ‘traditional reconciliatory mechanisms’ (Shide Reference Shide2005). Traditional norms are most effective in resolving resource-based conflicts occurring within clans of specific ethnic groups or at village level under conditions of social proximity and cultural homogeneity that make communication faster and sanctioning easier. As widely discussed in the literature, customary institutions with conflict management functions are deeply embedded in social and cultural norms (Watson Reference Watson2001; Sanginga et al. Reference Sanginga, Kamugisha and Martin2007; Unruh Reference Unruh2006). However, the mechanisms for negotiating agreements between ethnic groups are less successful when there are unequal power relations, and conflict of interest is defined along identity lines (such as ethnicity) rather than simple resource needs (Cousins Reference Cousins1996).

These weaknesses of the customary authorities in resolving conflicts have increased participation of state representatives, though their task is limited to facilitation of elders' meetings. They simply play a mediating role. In those meetings, elders from the two ethnic groups investigate the reasons for conflict and identify the group who initiated the conflict; they then determine the compensation for property and livestock lost during conflict, and make the parties agree to avoid further attacks. Payment of compensation is actually very unusual. Important questions including how grazing resources should be used, who has the right to graze where and under what conditions remain marginal. Most interviewees felt that such questions were unimportant, as the grazing area has been communally used.

Passive state involvement has undermined the ability of local efforts to produce positive outcomes in reducing the incidence of conflict. Negotiations usually lead to promises to refrain from further raids and killings. However, the effect is usually short-lived. The actual practice often turns out to be the other way round. An outbreak of livestock raid-related violence is observed shortly after mediation and negotiations. Such violation of commitment is one of the reasons for the recurrence of the conflict. For the Issa, the opportunity cost of not raiding is high, even though this creates insecurity for the Ittu. An alternative choice for the Ittu is to shift to confrontation as already described, rather than going for another round of negotiation. This experience augments the extensively documented evidence on the limited capacity of customary institutions in managing resource conflict between pastoral and agropastoral groups (Ocan Reference Ocan1994; Kratli & Swift Reference Kratli and Swift1999: 30–5; Vedeld Reference Vedeld1994).Footnote ¹²

The key lesson to be learnt from this analysis is that conflict resolution efforts concentrate more on compensation and punishments of the wrongdoer, rather than developing clear rules of resource access. The victim of the conflict attaches more value to the compensation to be made for the lives and livestock lost. But this has a temporary remedial effect. Some authors argue that such ‘palliative processes’, by attempting to promote interaction between conflicting parties, divert attention from the underlying structural causes of protracted conflict (Cousins Reference Cousins1996; Shide Reference Shide2005). One of these structural causes is the difference in power and unclear property rights arrangements for the different land use systems evolved over time.

Benefits from livestock raids

Livestock raids produce a threat to the weaker actor using communal grazing land. There is a direct link between fear of raids and avoidance of the grazing area. The gradual increase in the scale and severity of conflict is partly associated with ever-worsening livestock raiding. Results of the household survey show that over the last five years, the three Oromo clans have lost 446 animals, with an average of 11 animals per household. Raiding has been organised on a commercial basis, involving accumulation of wealth by one group at the cost of impoverishing the other. As there is retribution, this practice is expected to be reciprocal among different resource-users. However, the benefit that the Issa gain from raids is different from that expected. The robbed animals can be instantly sold at local markets or trekked for export to neighbouring Djibouti. Moreover, informal export arrangement ahead of raiding is another reason for engagement in raids, which shows the trans-boundary flow of benefits from raids. Meanwhile, such arrangements help the Issa to evade repossession efforts by the Ittu.

Raids stimulate conflict since part of the revenue generated from them is invested in conflict technology. Access to better conflict technology generates an incentive to perpetrate further raids. There is always a temptation to violate customary institutions. Hence, the higher the benefits from raids, the more frequent the violence will be. This poses a challenge to the transformation of conflict and emergence of customary arrangements improving access. Some speculate that when property rights are unassigned, power asymmetry compounded over time encourages actors to invest in coercive activities in order to gain an advantage over their opponents (Skaperdas Reference Skaperdas1992). Though livestock raiding is often high when the Ittu are grazing on the contested land, in exceptional cases it occurs at grazing places close to the villages. This warns the agropastoralists that more losses could occur if they are away for any time from their permanent settlement. While underlining the severity of raids and loss of lives, a religious leader and PA council member of Annanno peasant association in Mieso district states:

Issa's gains from raids are closely associated with their strategic location. They are ethnically affiliated with political power holders in Djibouti, and inhabit the main trade route connecting Addis Ababa to the major port. This route has become vital for the national economy since the outbreak of Ethio-Eritrean war in May 1998, and has in turn resulted in a shift in the Ethiopian state's position against taking any measures to control Issa engagement in local conflicts. There is also open cross-border movement and uncontrollable import of firearms. From the Ittu perspective, all these factors are important in creating an environment that perpetuates violence. Some interviewees suggested that the reason for the conflict goes beyond questions of grazing land and raids. They perceive these as short-term economic gains with the long-term goal of expelling agropastoralists from their permanent settlement. However, this paper emphasises the short-term interest, which is clearer, and largely sensible, given the opinion of district experts. In situations of on-going food insecurity, socio-political volatility and ecological variability, raiding between herding groups is practiced as a strategy to defend and acquire access to vital resources (Hendrickson et al. Reference Hendrickson, Mearns and Armon1998).

A quest for solutions

This section discusses state interventions in 2005 and afterwards to prevent the conflict between the two ethnic groups. Discussions with the various district administrators and elders indicate that there has been a search for further political measures to calm down the situation through the formation of a peace committee consisting of ten elders from both groups. The committee was set up through the facilitation of the federal government in an attempt to revitalise the limited role of customary leaders to manage conflict. This has been in effect since March 2006. It was a scheme with new ambition to end the violence. The elders swore on behalf of the group they represent in a customary fashion to perform their duties in conflict management that involve monitoring conflict-inducing actions and reporting to the district authority. Meeting people from various villages on market days is the major means by which the elders become aware of the symptoms predating any conflict. This enables elders to collect information to take immediate proactive measures before conflict gets out of control. Meanwhile, the district authorities have given a few of these elders training and a permanent office in Mieso town. Due to the short time interval between this important move and the fieldwork period, it was not possible to observe how effective this has been.

However, a comprehensive assessment of the role of customary institutions in pastoral regions of Ethiopia indicates the diverse experiences (success and failure) and variable judgement of stakeholders about state intervention in backing elders to resolve or manage conflicts (Unruh Reference Unruh2006: 229). Although customary institutions are legally recognised with respect to conflict resolution, the assessment indicates that a lack of capacity at a very local level limits the amount that they can do in practice (ibid.).

The perpetuation of conflict also serves as a means to generate funding for conflict prevention. The allocation of budgets to mitigate conflicts in the marginal areas of the country by federal and regional governments provides local actors with an opportunity to increase their earnings (Warsame Reference Warsame2005).Footnote ¹³ In addition, one study shows that government-appointed elders collect bribes from the guilty side by sharing the cash from the sale of livestock raided. Such corruption and distortion may make customary conflict management efforts unreliable, and lead to the emergence of rent-seeking behaviour (Gebre Reference Gebre2001). In short, a wide range of literature on eastern Ethiopia emphasises that the political instability arising from the introduction of ethnic-based federalism has increased uncertainty at the local level, as the federal government continues to manipulate elections and political elites. This political process has gradually put a limit to the customary procedures to manage the conflict, due to a deterioration of public trust in elected local officials, who often intervene in the traditional conflict management process (Hagmann Reference Hagmann2005; Lister Reference Lister2004; Markakis Reference Markakis1996).