In this book on Islamic radicalism and terrorism, sociologist Charles Kurzman boldly makes a point that very few policymakers and scholars are willing to claim: Islamic terrorism is relatively less of a national security threat than mainstream American perceptions suggest. According to the media and policymakers in the United States, the threat of Islamic terrorism is significant and therefore worthy of tremendous counterterrorism funding. Kurzman shatters this popular myth with an abundance of evidence contradicting commonly held assumptions about Islamic radicalism and terrorism. Despite the occurrence of atrocious attacks by Muslim terrorists worldwide in the past few decades, he points out that “terrorism is not a leading cause of death in the world” (p. 14), and that Muslim terrorists in particular have been declining in number in relative terms, not increasing. According to public opinion polls conducted globally, there are millions of Muslims who may support radical ideas about Islam, but very few who actually engage in violence.

Kurzman attempts to explain why with more than a billion Muslims in the world, and a variety of terrorist methods widely available, there are so few radical Islamic terrorists. In a series of chapters that each have a different focus, Kurzman describes a number of factors that contribute to their relatively small number. In one chapter, he discusses the problems of recruitment for these terrorist groups: how they are typically in hiding, isolated from society, and so rarely have sufficient relations with potential recruits; how it is difficult for prospective terrorists to leave their families; how terrorist groups are skeptical of recruits because they have to be especially careful of infiltration by intelligence agencies; and how very few radical Muslims who even attempt to join a terrorist group like Al Qaeda succeed in joining because of the rigorous standards of acceptance. These explanations are practical and logical, making it more likely that the reader will agree with the author's assertions.

In another chapter, Kurzman makes a key distinction between globalist and localist Muslim terrorist groups, arguing that they should not all be lumped into one category. Globalists tend to be well educated in secular schools and universities, more worldly, and more willing to use modern technology; they also have a broader objective of a pan-Islamic government. Localists tend to have little education, and the education they do have is generally from Islamic seminary schools; they are less worldly, rarely traveling outside their local regions, and their focus is on local Islamic issues within one state, not the attainment of a universal Islamic state. One key point made about this distinction is that counterterrorism policy targeting madrasas, Islamic seminary schools, is likely counterproductive; globalist terrorists like those in Al Qaeda were much more likely trained in Western-type secular schools and universities. Therefore, the threat is not the madrasas, which “educate a tiny proportion of the world's young Muslims” (p. 64), and particularly Muslim terrorists. This distinction between globalist and localist terrorist groups is not a new argument in the literature on terrorism, unacknowledged by Kurzman. More important is to note that after describing their differences, he stops short of taking the distinction further to its logical lessons and implications. How does this apparently key distinction better inform us about the reality of Islamic terrorism in the world today?

In his most academic chapter, Kurzman outlines the distinction between radical and liberal Islam, emphasizing that “[g]iven a choice between Islamist revolution and democratic elections, Muslims overwhelmingly prefer democracy” (p. 111). In this section especially, the author demonstrates his trademark depth of knowledge about Islamic thought, both historically and in the present. In a chapter on Muslim views toward the United States, and particularly US foreign policy, he provides a significant amount of information based on public opinion polls, yet there is little argument or analysis of what all this information means. Besides a few comments about the inelasticity of Muslim views of the United States regardless of shifts in foreign policy—Muslim views of the United States are indeed fairly negative—there is little reference to how this translates to the likelihood of Islamic terrorism, something readers would likely want to see. With such mixed results of public diplomacy and positive engagement reported, Kurzman leaves the reader wondering how such strategies really influence the prevention of recruitment of Islamic terrorists and actual terrorist events.

The author concludes by discussing the difficulties of predicting the future of Islamic terrorism in the United States and describing the battles among government, right-wing think tanks, and scholars about appropriate or acceptable views in Middle East and Islamic studies. In the context of such debates, which include a broad range of views regarding the threat of radical Islam or Islamic terrorism, Kurzman emphasizes that terrorism is “a serious subject, too serious for name-calling and partisan exaggeration,” recommending that “the threat of Islamist terrorism [be put] in perspective” (p. 203). By avoiding the prediction game, the United States could instead focus on how the Islamic world itself should be allied with the United States against terrorism.

The methodology used in the book is both a strength and a weakness. Kurzman shares dozens of stories and interviews with Muslims worldwide, providing personal stories to illustrate his points. This approach means that the book is at an easily accessible level for a mainstream audience, and readers will enjoy the informative, personal, and provocative approach. This approach is also a weakness in that the research design is not solidly organized, nor is it discussed; the writing is more casual and less formal, and the typical rigor of testing a theory in social science research is only loosely achieved through illustrations, anecdotes, readings of news stories and Websites, public opinion polls, and interviews. Some readers may be disappointed that there is no review of previous literature discussing the subject, no causal story or theory per se, and no rigorous testing of assertions made throughout the book. At the same time, this approach is much more appealing to a mainstream audience, and so The Missing Martyrs will have a broader readership than only among academics and students.

In sum, Kurzman delivers a provocative and engaging piece of writing about Islamic terrorism, Muslim perceptions of the United States and its foreign policy, and the role of liberal Muslim political movements. Although some policymakers, scholars, or journalists may critique the author as a sympathizer for radical Muslims, or one who tolerates negative Muslim views of the United States, his treatment of this sensitive and controversial issue is professional, highly informative, and well framed. His evidence indicating that there really are relatively few Muslim terrorists, in contrast to the impression given by the US government and media, and his reasons for this scenario are solid, full of breadth, and logical. The book is a worthy source for those wanting to understand the world of Islamic politics, radicalism, and terrorism, and not just take common assumptions about these issues at face value.