Erving Goffman was one of the most influential social scientists of the twentieth century, yet up until now there existed not a single work that ties the intellectual oeuvre of this many-faceted scholar to its historical context. Gary Jaworski’s Erving Goffman and the Cold War takes us where previous introductions to Goffman’s work have left off. Rather than portraying Goffman as an academic outsider, as often done, Jaworski presents him as a Cold War insider. Those who simply compare Goffman’s work with the ideas of other grand sociological theorists and attest it to be unique on this account miss how common Goffman’s research topics were in the popular discourse of the time. Jaworski successfully demonstrates that the Cold War provided the background, topic, and resource for Goffman’s work. What emerges from this analysis is not only a biographical account of the Goffman whom we already know but an entirely new Goffman.
The seven substantive chapters of the book are arranged around core topics of Goffman’s work. Chapter 1 deals with loyalty and betrayal; chapter 2, with secrecy; chapter 3, with strategy and strategic interaction; chapter 4, with spies and espionage; chapter 5, with interrogation; chapter 6, with provocation; and chapter 7, with aggression. Each chapter follows the same research style and is partly analytical and partially historical. The aim is to show how each of these Cold War topics informed Goffman’s work, beginning with his dissertation research that culminated in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, up to later works such as Strategic Interaction or Frame Analysis. In full accord with the claim that the Cold War provided Goffman with a background, topic, or resource, Jaworski provides different kinds of evidence. In some cases, Goffman is shown to pick up on specific topics that had high currency in popular culture at the time, as for instance espionage and secrecy. Sources do not only include academic works but also novels, radio programs, and TV shows. In other cases, Goffman, like many other Cold War scholars, is shown to have benefitted from research programs funded by the government, military, or intelligence agencies that also provided for an interchange with some of the leading defense intellectuals of the era. The analysis of the close ties between Goffman and the game theorist Thomas Schelling, forged at a conference on “Strategic Interaction and Conflict” at Berkeley in 1964, is a highlight of the book. Schelling had a high appreciation for Goffman and mused that if there were a Nobel Prize for sociology, Goffman deserved to be the first one considered. Several of Goffman’s writings were required reading in Schelling’s courses. The close personal connection between the two scholars is at odds with the usual depiction of Goffman as an academic outsider. By broadening the view beyond sociology, Jaworski convincingly shows that Goffman was well connected and his work very much en vogue with the academic establishment at the time.
Yet despite these very successful efforts to brush the received image of Goffman against the grain, this book, like any other account of Goffman, cannot escape the fact that he was a reclusive scholar who guarded his own privacy. Except for a few statements, like Goffman’s assertion in his dissertation that social interaction, arguably the central topic of his entire work, can be perceived as “an arrangement for pursuing a cold war” (p. 111), there is little evidence that Goffman himself viewed his work as an engagement with the Cold War. Jaworski readily admits that conclusive evidence on this point is often missing, regardless of how strong the affinity of Goffman’s ideas with the central themes of the Cold War appears. This cautionary approach that tries to avoid an overinterpretation of the available sources is, however, a strong point of the book, no matter how frustrating it may be for readers who would prefer clear-cut answers.
While such caution is rather common for the work of the historian of science, Jaworski is not a historian but a sociologist, and does not fully leave the opportunity laps to use his analysis for an intervention into sociological debates. Sociologists often describe Goffman as a micro-analyst of social life who provided readers with few clues about how to link his fine-grained analyses of face-to-face interactions to the macro level of social life. For Jaworski, the historical analysis of the Cold War context of Goffman’s work provides this missing macro linkage, as he states early in the introduction. “In contrast, then, to the view of Goffman as a master of mundane matters, the view advanced here is that Goffman was one of the Cold War’s most perceptive and profound social theorists” (pp. 7–8). Whether or not readers are willing to follow this specific argument, they are in any case provided with a first-rate historical analysis of a scholar whose career was shaped by the Cold War. The way in which Goffman was not first and foremost a sociological outsider but a Cold War insider very much deserves emphasis and is destined to lastingly alter our image of this seminal scholar.
