In a fine little volume collecting his 2010 Ohlin lectures, Douglas Irwin examines how and why governments turned away from liberal trade policy during the Depression.
Although the U.S. Smoot-Hawley tariff is particularly infamous, Irwin assigns it a relatively small role. He notes that it originated in 1928 before the Depression began, and the impact of the tariff itself was relatively modest (though implementation coincided with a steep fall in trade due to the Depression). While Smoot-Hawley did lead to retaliation against the United States and gave momentum to discriminatory policies such as Britain's imperial preferences, it did not set off a worldwide trade war.
The real disaster, according to Irwin, began to unfold later, in 1931, as financial turmoil spread worldwide. The flawed attempt to restore the Gold Standard in the interwar period had created an environment where countries were vulnerable to deflationary shocks. The trade policy responses to the crisis, Irwin argues were motivated by “mercantilist” concerns about balances of payments rather than by “protectionism” of import-competing industries.
Irwin frames his analysis in terms of the open economy “trilemma” by which a country can have only two of: (i) independent monetary policy, (ii) a fixed exchange rate, and (iii) free capital mobility. Since the policies to defend the exchange rate involve preventing gold outflows, and doing so requires limiting imports, the trilemma in effect becomes a dilemma: either abandon the Gold Standard or restrict trade. Trade restrictions can occur through the traditional means of tariffs and quotas, or indirectly through exchange controls. Irwin uses this framework to interpret the experience of four types of countries.
The first group of countries, including Britain, Sweden, and Japan, abandoned the Gold Standard relatively quickly. Irwin focuses primarily on Britain, which was suffering in the 1920s from an overvalued pound. Although Keynes had notably opposed rejoining the Gold Standard at the prewar parity, even for him, abandoning it again was unacceptable, and he argued instead for a tariff during the 1920s. However, a run on the pound forced Britain to abandon gold in September 1931. Although a floating currency might have obviated the need for trade restrictions, a tariff increase, which was seen as a way of limiting the pound's depreciation, was implemented in 1932 following the election of a Conservative-led government.
The second category of countries, exemplified by Germany, imposed exchange controls. With the recent memory of hyperinflation, Germany was particularly reluctant to leave the Gold Standard. A run on the mark in 1931 motivated the implementation of quantitative limits on the amount of foreign currency available for imports. These were tightened as the mark became increasingly overvalued after Britain's devaluation later that year and again in 1933 when the United States left the Gold Standard. Although the exchange controls might have given it some breathing room to do otherwise, the Brüning government also pursued deflationary policies. After 1934, Germany imposed still tighter and more bureaucratic controls on the use of foreign exchange, and sought to shift its trade away from the Allies through the negotiation of bilateral clearing arrangements with countries mainly in Southern and Eastern Europe.
France was the most important economy of a “gold bloc” that also included Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Its large gold reserves meant that it did not face immediate pressure to float, but as other countries did so, its trade balance deteriorated. Because it had a number of commercial agreements in place that limited tariffs, it relied on quotas to limit imports. It also pursued deflationary policies to try to improve its competitiveness. After finally abandoning the gold standard in 1936, it dismantled its trade restrictions.
In the United States, the main political parties had opposite approaches to the trilemma. The Republicans favored high tariffs and gold, while the Democrats preferred lower tariffs and were more open to leaving the Gold Standard. Divided government following the 1930 election prevented a further increase in tariffs (though deflation raised effective rates). The United States left the Gold Standard after President Roosevelt's inauguration, and trade agreements following the Reciporical Trade Agreements Act of 1934 effectively reversed the Smoot-Hawley tariff.
After describing these experiences, Irwin discusses empirical evidence. Trade restrictions contributed significantly to the decline in world trade. Consistent with the trilemma, countries that allowed their currencies to devalue tended to impose fewer trade restrictions (Britain was a notable exception). Exchange controls significantly reduced trade. While both currency depreciation and trade barriers have expenditure-switching effects, to Irwin, this “beggar-thy-neighbor” effect of currency depreciation is secondary to its inflationary expenditure-increasing effect. Countries that devalued their currencies saw swifter rebounds in their import volumes.
In the concluding chapter, Irwin argues that the Bretton Woods arrangement reflected a failure to absorb the lessons of the 1930s experience, which, he believes, argue strongly against fixed exchange rates. Although the problems were understood, the fear of floating was too deeply entrenched. Because exchange rate adjustment was limited, the Bretton Woods period saw frequent imposition of temporary import surcharges by countries with balance of payments deficits.
Although the recent global recession echoed aspects of the Depression, including a significant fall in trade volumes, trade restrictions played a far smaller role in the policy responses of governments. In Irwin's interpretation, exchange rate flexibility is the main reason the world did not see a repeat of the trade policy disaster of the 1930s.
Irwin's analysis nicely bridges the gap between open-economy macroeconomics and international trade. Along the way, he also touches on the history of economic thought as he discusses how prominent economists of the time interpreted the same issues. The book is brief and nontechnical, but it comes with a thorough set of references—as such, it is an excellent overview and introduction as well as a point of entry to the scholarly literature.
