Hegel's treatment of Arabic philosophyFootnote 1 is certainly not a central part of his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. He explicitly affirms that Arabic philosophy (together with medieval philosophy) is not particularly relevant from the point of view of the development of philosophy, is not linked to the elaboration of previous philosophies and is limited by religion, and he underestimates the importance of the great Islamic philosophers. Notably, however, beyond its evident shortcomings, this treatment can be of great interest, both as an aspect of Hegel's thought, which is connected to his views, and in reflecting his more general philosophical attitude.
Within this treatment are found the intertwining of elements that belong to the Western philosophical tradition (medieval and Scholastic philosophy), with new ideas and information reflecting the very recent interest of European culture in the ‘Oriental’ (and Islamic) world in general. Hegel shared this interest, particularly from the Berlin period.Footnote 2 Hegel's approach to Islam in its various manifestations is not simple and ‘obvious’ (Almond Reference Almond2010), and his interpretation of various aspects of Islam does not seem to be a question that has been closed once and for all (Ventura Reference Ventura2015). This is partly linked to the elaboration and broadening of his view of the ‘East’. Together, these elements make the treatment of Islamic philosophy a very particular field, with complexities that deserve to be highlighted and discussed.
In the following pages, I highlight these complexities by focusing on one aspect in particular: Hegel's characterization of Arabic philosophy as ‘Oriental’. This characterization immediately appears to be anything but obvious, both in itself and within the framework of Hegel's own thought. In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel's treatment of Arabic philosophy, which belongs to the medieval period, is completely detached from that of Oriental philosophy. Similarly, in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Islam as a historical civilization is treated as being in the Germanic world and not in the Oriental world. Furthermore, Hegel's view of Oriental philosophy is not simple and univocal but, as we will see, changes over time.
I propose a textual and conceptual analysis, keeping the consideration of world-historical and geographical issues, as well as Hegel's alleged ‘orientalism’, in the background, to privilege a more strictly philosophical and conceptual approach.Footnote 3
The role of the peculiar nature of the available texts must be taken into account. Hegel's Berlin Lectures, both in the ‘classical’ versions of the Werke (1833–36; 2nd edn. 1840–44) and in the critical edition, were compiled through transcripts and not written by Hegel himself. Nevertheless, the critical edition has the advantage of following Hegel's line of argument for each course, while the Werke, and other ‘traditional’ systematizations, aimed to collect and collate the transcripts of various years of courses (and sometimes Hegel's manuscripts). Although, at present, the critical edition of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy is limited to the course of 1825–26, various versions of the introduction, in which Hegel addresses the question of the nature of Oriental philosophy and its role in the history of philosophy, are available.
In this paper, I first address how Hegel describes the idea of Oriental philosophy to point out some key ideas (section I). I then analyse his consideration of Islamic philosophy to point out the reason why he considers it to be ‘Oriental’, to what extent he does so, and what he means by this characterization (sections II and III). Finally, I highlight and discuss the concept of ‘the East’ or the definition of ‘Oriental’ under which both philosophies meet, as well as the differences between them (section IV). Through this consideration, it will be possible to outline the more general framework of Hegel's characterization of Islamic philosophy as ‘Oriental’, which is connected not only to his view of the East and of Oriental philosophy but also to his view of Islam and, through the concept of Pantheism and Spinozism, to his more general view of the history of philosophy and the Absolute.
I. The Oriental character of Oriental philosophy
The general introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, ‘meant to theoretically justify the status of the new discipline’, provides reflections on ‘the specific method of the history of philosophy’ and the ‘specific nature of the object to be investigated’ (Nuzzo Reference Nuzzo and Duquette2003: 19) on which it depends. As is well known, Hegel proposes that his idea of the history of philosophy is completely new and different from previous ones. Philosophy is the highest form of the self-understanding of the Absolute. It is concerned not with opinions but with the truth, which is expressed in the different philosophical systems that comprise the history of philosophy. Truth is also expressed in art and religion, with which philosophy shares content but differs in form. In fact, philosophy has the transparency of thought. In this context, Hegel gives an account of the meaning of Oriental ‘philosophy’ and its status with respect to the history of philosophy. This is a necessary theoretical requirement, not only in consideration of the vivid debate in Hegel's period on the East and its wisdom,Footnote 4 with important works such as Friedrich Schlegel's, Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier (Schlegel Reference Schlegel1808), but also because it reflects Hegel's increasing interest in Oriental culture.
The aim of philosophy in its development is the self-knowledge of the Absolute, as ‘spirit’ (Geist), which determines and knows itself. This means both recognizing that the Absolute is not to be thought of as substance but as subject and, in parallel, recognizing the value of the single individual. Individuality, both of the divine and of the single individual, is central. From another point of view, this means that the Absolute is not abstract but determined. On these fundamental points, the difference between Oriental philosophy and ‘proper’ philosophy is articulated. Hegel's main arguments are that (1) Oriental ‘philosophy’ is not really a philosophy but a (philosophical) religion; and (2) in the East, there is no conscience of individual freedom, and for this reason, there is no space for ‘proper’ philosophy. This, however, does not mean that Oriental philosophy is to be excluded from the path of the history of philosophy. In fact, the recent critical edition provides the various versions of the general introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy,Footnote 5 from which emerges ‘the growing attention Hegel pays to what he terms “Oriental philosophy”’ (Brown Reference Brown, Hegel and Brown2009: 9)Footnote 6 and the fact that Hegel changed his position with regard to the status of Oriental philosophy as well as the meaning of ‘the East’ in general.
In the first course of 1819, Hegel includes Chinese, Egyptian, Indian and Persian religion within Oriental philosophy. In the course of 1820–21 (and manuscript 1820), Hegel considers Indian mythology and the religion of Zoroaster, and in 1823–24, he talks about Iranian and Chinese religions very briefly within his discussion of mythology.
Only in the 1825-6 lectures does the treatment of Oriental philosophy find the place that it occupies thereafter … There it no longer serves as a mere excursus within the introduction but instead becomes, in a meaningful sense, the ‘pre-history’ to the history of philosophy. (Brown Reference Brown, Hegel and Brown2009: 10)Footnote 7
This is a very important change (see Bernasconi Reference Bernasconi and Duquette2003). Hegel himself admits that the different approach to Indian (and Chinese) philosophy is due to the new information he acquired, in particular through the work of Thomas Henry Colebrooke (Reference Colebrooke1824–1829; Reference Colebrooke1805): ‘On earlier occasions I have passed over this topic, for we have only recently been in a position to form a judgement about it’ (HP 1: 91/268).Footnote 8
Here, Hegel begins more decisively to refer to ‘substance’ and to Pantheism and Spinozism. This can be seen as the result of an interpretation of Oriental thought that could be described as more decidedly ‘philosophical’. However, he states that one cannot speak of ‘philosophy in the proper sense’ with regard to the Oriental world (HP 1: 89/266).
To the general characteristics pointed out above, Hegel adds a more precise description of the ‘Oriental character’. The features that he points out are important for a comparison with those that define Islam and Islamic philosophy. For this reason, I follow Hegel's text as much as possible. The key ideas are (A) the ‘submersion’-‘immersion’ of the individual in substance and the nullity of the individual; and (B) ‘annihilation’ as the ‘bliss’ and the aim of the individual. On the other hand, (C) there is the idea that nothing is fixed, which entails that (D) the individual is separated from substance and is ‘independent’, which is understood as arbitrariness and contingency.
The character of this world is, in short, such that while spirit does arise in the Orient, nevertheless in this relationship the subject, or individuality (my I on its own account), is not a person but is simply submerged, is determined only as negative, as submerged in the objective domain as such. In the Oriental character the substantial relationship prevails; substance is represented as supersensible, as thought, or even in a more sensuous way. The individual, what is particular, is then only negatively related to what is substantial, and the highest state to which individuality can attain is eternal bliss as an immersion in this substance and a passing away of consciousness, thus a passing away of the distinction between substance and individuality—submergence in substance, and thus annihilation. (HP 1: 89/266)
The consequence for individuals who ‘have not achieved this bliss but are still individuals’ is very important because, as such, they have no worth: ‘subsisting by themselves, they exist as devoid of substance, as accidental, and with regard to political freedom they are defined [as] without rights’ (HP 1: 89–90/267). If the individual is separate from substance, ‘will is not substantial will but caprice or contingency, and people find themselves defined by nature, for instance, placed in castes’ (HP 1: 90/267). For Hegel, this is a basic peculiarity of what he terms the Oriental character. The Oriental subject can be ‘noble, great, and sublime’, but ‘whatever one makes of oneself is either determined by nature or is one's own caprice’ (HP 1: 90/267). The subject is ‘free’, having a freedom that in fact is caprice; he is independent, because ‘nothing there is fixed and nothing is definite’ (HP 1: 90/268), and indeterminate, just like its substance. However, like substance, the subject lacks objectivity, legitimacy and universal validity for all.
In the course of 1825–26 and thereafter, when Hegel dedicates a specific treatment to Oriental philosophy (Chinese and Indian), he also adds a brief introduction, in which he focuses on subjectivity and individuality as a clear distinction between philosophy and Oriental philosophy. This introduction is also present in the Werke edition, with very few variations. ‘Oriental philosophy’ (HP 1: 103/365) or, as in the Werke, the ‘so-called Oriental [philosophy]’ (WHP 1: 117/138), which is not a proper philosophy, is presented as ‘only preliminary’ because it is ‘not an integral part of the presentation as a whole’ and ‘we speak about it only in order to provide the justification for not occupying ourselves with it more extensively, and to explain the relationship in which it stands to thought, to authentic philosophy’ (HP 1: 103/365).
Because of the lack of subjectivity that characterizes the East, religious representations ‘are not individualized; instead they still have the character of general representations, which appear therefore more precisely as philosophical representations or philosophical thoughts’ (HP 1: 103/366). This extreme abstractness is the reason for the consideration of Oriental religions as ‘philosophies’. We do not need to interpret them, as in the representations of Christianity and Greek mythology, but ‘we are much more directly reminded of a philosophical representation; they come closer to it’ (HP 1: 103/366). On the other hand, Hegel points out that in the Oriental religions, there are also ‘individual shapes, such as Brahmā, Vishnu, Shiva’, but this ‘individuality is only something much superficial’, not of definite persons, and it ‘fades away and expands into something boundless’ (HP 1: 103/366). Hegel distinguishes ‘the Greek and Roman deities’, as well as ‘Christ and the God of the Jews’ (HP 1: 103/366), from the Oriental representations, which do not directly appear as philosophical representations.
In his article on the Bhagavad-Gītā, Hegel points out that the characteristic of ‘personality’ depends on internal determination and on content. Thus, Brahma appears to be a mere personification due to the emptiness of content: he remains ‘substance without subjectivity and is therefore not the concrete, not the spirit’, and he is not an individual subject, ‘its personality being empty form, mere personification’ (B-G: 126/137).
In the Orient, God ‘is grasped for the most part as having the character of universal substance’ (HP 1: 105/367). ‘Only the one substance as such is what truly is’ (HP 1: 105/367); separate from substance, the individual has no value and can have value only by unification with substance, thus ceasing to be a subject and vanishing ‘into what is unconscious’ (HP 1: 105/368). In the Greek and Germanic spirit, the subject knows itself as free, and ‘it is also supposed to be maintained, not simply to annul itself’ (HP 1: 105/368).
If from 1825–26 there is a modification in the consideration of the ‘philosophical depth’ of Oriental philosophy, the idea that in the East there is no place for philosophy, based on the lack of freedom, remains almost unchanged. The freedom of substance, which is indeterminate, and of the single individual is arbitrariness. In this context, there may be independence but not justice or ethical life; thus, ‘here there can be no philosophical knowing, for that involves knowing substance and the universal, what is objective and remains so’ (HP 1: 90/268).
For Hegel, proper philosophy ‘first emerges in the West’, where the spirit ‘goes down within itself and plumbs its own depths, posits itself as free, and is on its own account’ (HP 1: 91/269). Moreover, relatedly, there are ‘free political institutions’ in the West, which ‘go hand-in-hand with philosophy, with the subject persevering in what is substantial and not devaluing itself’ (HP 1: 91/269). Hegel's position with regard to the connection between freedom and philosophy can also be found in the subsequent courses of 1827–28 and 1828–29.
Finally, it can be noted that the only reference to Islam within the treatment of Oriental philosophy is in the course of 1820–21, where Hegel states, ‘God is One—this is an immense foundation that belongs primarily to Arabia’ (GPh 1: 94).Footnote 9
II. Islamic philosophy and the history of philosophy
When dealing with the Hegelian treatment of Islamic philosophy, some remarks regarding his sources are necessary. Arabic philosophy was (partly) known from the Middle Ages and, therefore, had a peculiar status in European philosophy, although in the modern period, it tended to be devalued, together with medieval philosophy as a whole (as shown in Hegel's lectures). At the same time, however, new knowledge, translations, and information about Arabic philosophy and about Islamic culture in general were being acquired. Hegel could base his consideration on previous works on the history of philosophy: among his sources are the works of Brucker (Reference Brucker1742–44), Buhle (Reference Buhle1800–04), Tennemann (Reference Tennemann1798–1819), and Tiedemann (Reference Tiedemann1791–97). With the exception of Buhle, who focuses on modern philosophy and devotes only a few pages to Arabic philosophy, they refer in turn to many sources (for example, Brucker's history of philosophy is very rich in references). One of the sources to which all these authors, including Hegel, refer is The Guide of the Perplexed by Maimonides, a work from the 12th century, originally written in Arabic and then translated into Hebrew with the approval of the author. Moreover, in a cultural context in which in various aspects and for various reasons (including colonialism) interest in the Muslim world and in the East was increasing (Schwab Reference Schwab, Patterson-King and Reinking1984), Hegel could rely on an increasing amount of sources, news and information to develop his view of Islam in its various aspects (including translations of works, travel reports, and literary and historical works).
Hegel deals with Arabic philosophy in the first section of the part dedicated to the philosophy of the Middle Ages. In the general introduction to medieval philosophy, Hegel speaks of the emergence of the new religion in the East, owing to which it ‘purified itself of all that was individual and defined’ (WHP 3: 26/2, 514), unlike the West. The break between the East in general and that part of the East that is represented by Islamic civilization is to be found in ‘fanaticism’ and appears to be even more accentuated in the course of 1825–26, where we find the term ‘revolution’ (Revolution) (HP 3: 35/16), which recalls the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, where Islam is the ‘Revolution of the East’ (WPH 372/428).
Islamic civilization is a bridge between East and West: philosophy, the sciences, and the arts ‘took refuge with the Arabians, and there attained a wonderful development’ (WHP 3: 25/2, 513). ‘Philosophy was fostered and cherished among the Arabians’; thus, it is necessary to mention the Arabs in the history of philosophy but only for ‘the external preservation and propagation of Philosophy’ (WHP 3: 26/2, 514). It cannot be said that Arabic philosophy ‘involves its own proper principle and stage in the development of philosophy’ (HP 3: 37/17). The lack of originality and the role of the intermediary are the starting points and the framework of Hegel's treatment. Similarly, Buhle (Reference Buhle1800–04: 1, 810–13) gives a very brief treatment of Arabic philosophy at the beginning of the section dedicated to Scholasticism, and he considers it interesting only for its transmission role.
In the Werke edition, the treatment of Arabic philosophy is broader and involves some meaningful aspects; however, in the critical edition, these aspects play a very marginal role or no role at all.
The first aspect pointed out by Hegel is the link to revelation and apologetics, which indicates the lack of independence. ‘Christians and Ishmaelites felt the same need for Philosophy’ to defend their principles; ‘the Ishmaelites, moreover, strove all the more eagerly after knowledge of this kind, because their first desire was to defend Mohameddanism against Christianity’ (WHP 3: 28/2, 516), which was the religion of most of the conquered populations. Islamic philosophy ‘shows a free, brilliant, and profound power of imagination (Einbildungskraft)’ (WHP 3: 29/2, 517) but remained closed within the sphere of Muslim doctrines, and it was bound to and defended the principle of revelation. For Hegel, ‘the Arabians, like the Christians of the West, were restricted by the dogmas of their Church, few though these dogmas were; this last circumstance of the dogmas certainly gave them greater liberty’ (WHP 3: 30/2, 518). However, they ‘established no principle of self-conscious reason that was truly higher, and thus brought philosophy no further’ (WHP 3: 30/2, 518), having instead followed the external principle of revelation.
The second aspect is that it has shared the conceptual framework of previous philosophies, such as the ‘Alexandrian or Neo-Platonic Idea’ (WHP 3: 29/2, 517), and has remained at that stage of the development of the Idea, similar to Christian philosophy. Hegel points out that ‘the main dogmas of this philosophy have much in common with those of the Scholastic’ and states that a detailed discussion of this philosophy holds ‘but little interest’ (WHP 3: 29/2, 517).
The third aspect is the elaboration and transmission of Aristotelian philosophy by the Arabs, about which Hegel gives a brief treatment. The greatest Islamic thinkers are taken into consideration above all (if not exclusively) in their role as interpreters of Greek thought and as intermediaries for its transmission to European thought. In the approach to Aristotle, the Arabs have produced comments, ‘developing further the abstract logical element’; however, from these commentaries, also translated into Latin, ‘much good is not to be got’ (WHP 3: 34/2, 522). Once again, the idea here is that of the purely historical interest of Arabic philosophy, and above all, Hegel makes reference to the formalism of Aristotelian logic, with a hint to Scholasticism.
These three characteristics reflect the idea that the Arabs had a very important role in the elaboration and transmission of philosophy, rather than in its further development in a ‘modern’ direction: a historical role more than a philosophical role. This is similar to Scholasticism, which for Hegel is very high thought but not a meaningful stage in the development of the Idea because, similar to Islamic thought, it is also linked to ‘presupposition’.
This evaluation actually concerns medieval philosophy in general and is already expressed in the division of the history of philosophy, in the different versions of the general introduction, where Hegel notes that there are only two great philosophies and a middle period.Footnote 10 In Hegel's view, Islamic philosophy (together with Jewish philosophy, about which a very short treatment is given) and Scholasticism are part of a common ‘medieval’ philosophical perspective that does not (yet) entail the autonomy of reason. The properly ‘Oriental’ character of Islamic philosophy is highlighted by Hegel in the consideration of the philosophy of the ‘medabberim’, a Hebrew term that is the translation of the Arabic term mutakallimūn, which literally means ‘Speakers’ (in Latin loquentes) and defines the representatives of the ‘ilm al-kalām (science of discourse), which is Islamic speculative theology. The kalām elaborated a speculation on God and His relationship with creation based on reason and theoretical argumentation, and this speculation can be seen as philosophical knowledge, although it has not always been recognized as such (Sabra Reference Sabra1994; see also van Ess Reference van Ess and von Grunebaum1970). However, it is only one part of Islamic philosophical and religious thought. The other great protagonist was ‘philosophy’ (falsafa, in Arabic), which was opposed to the kalām in the debate of the time; in addition, there were other relevant philosophical and theological issues, such as mysticism and theology, connected to jurisprudence (fiqh). The term falsafa is the translation of the Greek term for ‘philosophy’ and refers not to Islamic thought in general but to that part that is directly connected to Greek-Hellenistic thought. Most of the consideration in the course of 1825–26, which is much more concise than that of the Werke, corresponds to that which in the Werke is dedicated to the philosophy of the ‘Speakers’, which therefore has much greater weight here.
Hegel's treatment is taken almost literally from The Guide of the Perplexed by Maimonides, which, as mentioned above, had also been used as a source by his predecessors. Because its connection to Hegel's definition of Arabic philosophy as ‘Oriental’, which is based exactly on this consideration, it is important here to briefly analyse Hegel's approach to this text before addressing the individual points that he considers ‘Oriental’ and why.
III. The Oriental character of Islamic philosophy
Maimonides, somewhat reductively defined by Hegel as ‘a learned Jew’ (WHP 3: 27/2, 515) or ‘a Jew’ (HP 3: 37/17),Footnote 11 even though he mentions him among other Jewish philosophers (HP 3: 39/20), was immersed in the philosophical-theological debate of his time in the Arabic language (like other members of his religion).Footnote 12
In chapter 71 of the first part of The Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides speaks of the rise of the kalām. His description of the predominantly apologetic function of the kalām and of its having drawn from the books of Christian, Greek and Syrian scholars, can be traced back to the ‘philosopher’ al-Farabi (Pines Reference Pines1973, cxxxvi). Maimonides speaks of both Christian and Muslim mutakallimūn-medabberim-Speakers, which indicates that his criticism concerning their purely apologetic purpose and their method is addressed to theology in general, which arises as an alternative philosophical reflection. In fact, he speaks of ‘all the first Mutakallimūn from among the Greeks who had adopted Christianity and from among the Moslems’ (Maimonides Reference Maimonides and Pines1973: 1, 78).Footnote 13 Moreover, it is clear that the description of the rise of Islamic speculative theology from Christian scholars and its apologetic purpose does not concern Arabic philosophy as a whole but only the kalām. Indeed, Maimonides speaks only of speculative theology and, in particular, of two schools that belong to it and of their opposition to ‘philosophers’: ‘all the statements that the men of Islam—both the Muʾtazila and the Ashʿariyya—have made concerning these notions [the theological notions] are all of them opinions founded upon premises that are taken over from the books of the Greeks and the Syrians who wished to disagree with the opinions of the philosophers and to reject their statements’ (Maimonides Reference Maimonides and Pines1973: 1, 177).Footnote 14
In the Werke version, some of these remarks are mentioned by Hegel (with some textual differences), and the clear distinction between philosophy and theology, falsafa and kalām, highlighted by Maimonides is clearly visible. However, this is not the case in the version of 1825–26, where everything is entrusted to a few remarks (also here with reference to Maimonides) and where the rise of the kalām appears as the rise of Islamic philosophy in general, which, with mainly apologetic purposes and with obvious shortcomings in method, takes possession of the intellectual tools of Greek philosophy (HP 3: 36/17).Footnote 15 Hegel uncritically reports the negative observations of Maimonides, for example, that ‘they were not, however, guided by the nature of this material itself but only looked to how it had to be deployed in order to support their assertions’ (HP 3: 36/17). However, while Maimonides refers to the Speakers, in the text of Hegel's Lectures (the course of 1825–26), ‘they’ (sie) refers to the ‘Arabs’ in general. This difference is very important because it can distort Hegel's interpretation of Islamic philosophy or how Hegel's interpretation of Islamic philosophy is conveyed and because it can lead to the underestimation of the philosophers-falāsifa and their theoretical positions, also partly represented by Maimonides himself, as well as the intense debate of his time. On the other hand, Hegel speaks of the medabberim as ‘one outstanding philosophical school or sect among the Arabs’ (HP 3: 37/18) or as ‘a widely extended philosophic school or sect of considerable eminence’ (WHP 3: 30/2, 518), and in this sense, he at least highlights the fact that it is one among other schools of thought. However, he does not contextualize Maimonides' account, and he does not seem cautious in considering him a source of knowledge about speculative theology (in either of the two versions), not even by showing that he had his own ideas to express and defend (as, for example, Tennemann does).
When considering previous histories of philosophy, Hegel's positions seem to be due to a sort of ‘distraction’ when not a proper choice. The histories of philosophy by Brucker, Tiedemann and Tennemann, in the context of their extensive treatments of Islamic philosophy, deal with the Speakers as one of the philosophical ‘sects’ among the Arabs (Brucker Reference Brucker1742–44: 3, 53 ff.; Tennemann Reference Tennemann1798–1819: 8, I, 441 ff.; Tiedemann Reference Tennemann1791–97: 4, 149 ff.), which was also known in Western medieval philosophy and had exerted an influence on Scholasticism. Brucker's account, older and in Latin, relies on many sources, including Maimonides. He reports Maimonides' remark about the theologians, seen above, and unlike Hegel, he points out that they were both Christian and Muslim.Footnote 16 Tennemann and Tiedemann's treatments are similar to Hegel's in that they discuss the ‘premises’ of the kalām from Maimonides' text and introduce the treatment of the medabberim at the end of their long consideration of Islamic philosophy (which in Hegel's history of philosophy is missing). They both highlight that there were several philosophical schools among the Arabs, which shows that the knowledge of Arabic philosophy is incomplete and lacking.Footnote 17 They then illustrate the contrast between the ‘philosophers’ and the Speakers concerning the different role that they assign to reason with respect to revealed religion.Footnote 18 Another relevant difference is in the ‘direction’ of the discussion, which in Hegel's work entails the link to the East, Spinozism and Pantheism.
For Hegel's discussion of the concepts expressed by the ‘Speakers’, he particularly refers to most of chapter 73 of The Guide of the Perplexed, in which Maimonides illustrates and criticizes the twelve ‘premises’ of the theologians of the kalām and highlights what he considers to be their weaknesses regarding their arguments and method. Here, I will mainly follow the treatment in the course of 1825–26, which reflects Hegel's line of argument, even if restricted to a single course.
Hegel considered the kalām to be ‘Oriental’ because it was Spinozist and Pantheist. Hegel states that the Speakers ‘(through a more developed thought-structure)’ brought ‘the standpoint of the Orient, the basic standpoint of the one substance, to [the level of] determinate consciousness for thought too’ (HP 3: 37/18).Footnote 19 The arguments enabling Hegel to speak of the ‘one substance’ are not bound to Maimonides' statements about atoms-substances;Footnote 20 rather, they are based on what he considers to be the basic thought behind it, namely, the power of God in relation to ‘substances’/atoms/individuals, which He makes what they are and can also very easily destroy. His argument for speaking of the ‘Orient’ and substance appears to be particularly bound to the ideas of contingency and necessity. This emerges in a clearer way in the Werke version, where he affirms that in the atomistic view, adopted by the medabberim, ‘every connection appears as something contingent’ (WHP 3: 31/2, 519) and only atoms exist.
Through Maimonides' account, Hegel observes that for the Speakers, in the world, there is nothing that can be what it is or act without the continuous intervention of God, which creates accidents (among which are also movement and knowledge) at every moment. What appears to be regular, constant, and stable is as such only owing to habit, which God Himself decides to follow, but nothing prevents Him from deciding the opposite. ‘All we can discern here is the complete dissolution of all interdependence, of everything that pertains to rationality’ (HP 3: 38/19). In fact, God is ‘inwardly (in sich)’ substance, ‘completely indetermined’, and His activity is the creation of accidents that disappear and are replaced by others (HP 3: 38/19).
This activity is wholly abstract, and that is why the differentiating (das Unterscheiden) that has been posited by means of it is totally contingent. Or it is ‘necessary’, but then that is an empty word. Why substance posits what it does is said to be in no way conceived, nor must any attempt be made to conceive it. (HP 3: 38/19)
The activity of God is said to be ‘necessary’, but in fact, it appears to be totally accidental in setting accidents, and one cannot (for religious reasons, due to the very conception of God) investigate further and seek necessity, regularity, or predictability in it. ‘Thus God is the substance of the activity, but portrayed as wholly irrational’ (HP 3: 38/19).Footnote 21 The term ‘irrational’ has a very specific meaning here. In the theology of the kalām, God is thought in His activity, which cannot be comprehended by man, just as it is not possible to find anything stable and an order, a necessity in nature and in the world, that would limit the freedom of God and reduce His distance from man. This also means that ‘The Arabs developed the sciences and philosophy in this way, without defining the concrete idea as anything more than caprice (Willkür)’ (HP 3: 39/19). Everything depends on the will of God, before which the individual is only finite. Hegel speaks of ‘the dissolution of everything concrete, or of determinacy, in substance’ (HP 3: 39/19), a ‘changeableness (Veränderlichkeit)’ that depends on the abstract negativity of substance. Everything is unstable, every worldly thing is questioned and shaken in its apparent stability, including knowledge and science.
This abstract negativity and complete dissolution, coupled with the abiding of the one [substance], is the basic characteristic of the Oriental mode of representation. Oriental writers are, above all, pantheists. Spinozism is their most general and most customary mode of intuition. (HP 3: 38–39/19)Footnote 22
The Werke version includes the consideration up to the tenth premise, in which Maimonides (Maimonides Reference Maimonides and Pines1973: 1, 207; see also Pines Reference Pines1973: lxxxiii) criticizes what he sees as the exchange between intellect and imagination (and refers explicitly to al-Farabi) in the idea that it cannot be known with certainty that things are in one way or another because the opposite can always be or be thought of. Everything could be different from what it is because all that can be imagined is possible and there is no reason why something is in one way instead of another.
For Hegel, in the philosophy of the Speakers, the principle is expressed that is peculiar to the Oriental spirit, that is, ‘the dissolution of definite thought in all its consequences as the dissolution of all connection and relation’ (WHP 3: 31/2, 519). We see ‘an utter inconstancy (Unbestand) of everything’, and ‘this whirl (Taumel) of all things’ is ‘essentially Oriental’ (WHP 3: 33/2, 521). In fact, for Hegel, this ‘complete dissolution of all that pertains to reasonableness (Vernünftigkeit)’ is ‘in harmony’ ‘with Eastern sublimity (Erhabenheit), which allows of nothing definite’ (WHP 3: 33/2, 521).Footnote 23
IV. Oriental philosophy and Islamic philosophy
After this brief survey of the ‘Oriental’ characteristics of the kalām, it is clear that Hegel believes that Islamic philosophy is Spinozist, Pantheist and Oriental. These definitions meet in Hegel's interpretation of Maimonides' treatment of the ‘premises’ of the kalām, which for him express views similar to Spinoza's substance and Pantheism. For Hegel, Spinoza's (and Parmenides') Pantheism is the idea that only God exists, that the only reality is God (substance, Being) and that the finite is only null. Hegel uses the term ‘acosmical’ to describe the relation between substance and the finite, which is meant as both the world and the individual subject.
This view corresponds to two of the key concepts highlighted above in the discussion of Oriental philosophy, namely, (C) continual change, in which nothing is fixed, which corresponds to (D) the freedom of the individual and of the Absolute, thought as arbitrariness. These two aspects (‘changeableness’ and ‘arbitrariness’ or ‘caprice’) are linked and depend on the fact that the Absolute is thought of as an abstract identity, as substance. In his discussion of Spinoza's philosophy in the Science of Logic, at the end of the chapter about ‘The Absolute’ (in the Doctrine of the Essence, 1813), Hegel explains that Spinoza's exposition of the Absolute is complete, as it includes substance, attributes and modes. However, because it is an ‘enumeration’, it is lacking ‘the necessity of the progression of the Absolute to inessentiality, as well as the dissolution in and for itself of the latter into identity’ (SL: 474/2, 172). Hegel compares it to the Oriental representation of emanation, of light, in which ‘the night, the negative, which is the final term in the progression, does not revert back to the original light’ (SL: 474/2, 172). He calls it a ‘lack of immanent reflection’ (SL: 474/2, 172).
The ‘Oriental’ characteristics of Islamic philosophy, however, do not coincide with their being ‘Oriental’ as in Oriental philosophy. Within the Oriental view of God as abstract substance, there are some distinctions, and Islam represents one of them. This can be shown by considering the other two key concepts highlighted above. In fact, (due to the indeterminacy of the Absolute) in Oriental philosophy, (A) the finite and the individual are only negative and null, and in parallel, (B) the sole purpose and function of the individual is to vanish in substance, to lose its consciousness and subjectivity. On these points, Islamic philosophy, Islam in general and what for Hegel is the ‘Pantheism’ of modern Persian Muslims in particular are to be distinguished from Oriental philosophy. It can be observed that ‘the dissolution of everything concrete’ (HP 3: 39/19) in substance, seen above, of which Hegel speaks in relation to Islamic philosophy, is different from Oriental (in particular Indian) ‘annihilation’: not the finite subject destined only to vanish, only to be cancelled in substance, but a different intellectual construction, in which the individual with his activity (which is positive, not a self-annulment) is an instrument to realize the goal of the Absolute. For Hegel (as seen above), the Speakers have taken up the one Oriental substance but through a more developed thought-structure (see HP 3: 37/18). In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel says that God is thought of as the abstract One. ‘This One has indeed, the quality of Spirit’; however, as the One ‘is deprived of every concrete predicate’, ‘neither does subjectivity become on its part spiritually free, nor on the other hand is the object of its veneration concrete’ (WPH: 373/429). Hegel points out, however, that
Mahometanism is not the Hindoo, not the Monastic immersion in the Absolute. Subjectivity is here living and unlimited—an energy which enters into secular life with a purely negative purpose, and busies itself and interferes with the world, only in such a way as shall promote the pure adoration of the One. (WPH: 373/429)
The purpose of the individual is not to disappear but to realize the One in the world. Every determination is inadequate with respect to the abstraction of the One and is brought back to the One, causing destruction and changeableness.
In this One, all the particularity of the Orient drops away, all caste differences, all birthrights. No positive right exists, no political circumscription of individuals. Property and possessions, all particular purposes, are null and void. There is no establishment of cause and effect, and when this nullity is realized it becomes destructive and devastating. That is why Islam devastates, converts, and conquers all. (PH 22–23: 475/459)
It is interesting that, here, he points out the lack of the cause-effect relationship, the lack of necessity, which is the focus of his consideration of Islamic philosophy.
Furthermore, with regard to the relationship between determinateness and the Absolute, Hegel (in the well-known remark on Pantheism of 1827 in the Encyclopaedia) distinguishes Oriental Pantheism from that of Spinoza and Parmenides; on the other hand, within Oriental Pantheism in general, he distinguishes the Indian from the Muslim. In general, he affirms that the Oriental poets can show the ‘so-called Pantheism in its most poetical, most sublime, or if you will, its grossest shape’ (E: §573R, 305). As seen above, Spinoza's and Parmenides' Pantheism should be better called ‘monotheistic, or, in relation to the popular idea of the world, acosmical. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute only as substance’ (E: §573R, 307–8). In Hinduism, in spite of the representation of Brahma, ‘the pure unity of thought in itself’, the point is that ‘if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself’, it is ‘intrinsically abstract and therefore empty, tends of itself to let whatever is concrete, outside it’ (E: §573R, 310). For Hegel,
to see the consciousness of the One—not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abstract thought, on one hand, and on the other, the long-winded weary story of its particular detail, but—in its finest purity and sublimity, we must consult the Mohammedans. (E: §573R, 308)
He refers in particular to Rumi's poetry, where
we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth, and that unity described as love, this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar, a transfiguration of the natural and the spiritual, in which the externalism and transitoriness of immediate nature, and of empirical secular spirit, is discarded and absorbed. (E: §573R, 308)
Here, he speaks of a ‘transfiguration of the natural and the spiritual’, which is not the annihilation of the finite and the individual in substance found in Oriental philosophy; however, the Absolute is not (yet) thought of as spirit, that is, as differentiating in itself and returning in itself. It is more than the ‘mere personification’ of Brahma seen above but still less than self-differentiating, concrete spirit.Footnote 24
Of the Oriental, especially the Mohammedan, modes of envisaging God, we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universal genus which dwells (einwohnt) in the species or existences, but dwells so potently that these existences have no actual reality. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems [Eleatic, Spinozist, and Mohammedan] is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind (Geist). (E: §573R, 310)
There are further important distinctions between Islamic and ‘Oriental’ philosophy and culture. First, with regard to Hegel's assertion that Oriental philosophy is not a ‘proper’ philosophy (1), it should be noted that in the discussion of Arabic philosophy, there is no shift in the territory of religion or mythology, no doubt that it is a real ‘philosophy’, even if it is limited by revelation and ‘Oriental’. There is no mention of a lack of thought. The use of the term ‘irrational’, as seen above, has a very specific meaning that is linked to the ‘freedom’ (for Hegel, the arbitrariness) and inscrutability of God.
Furthermore, with regard to individual and institutional freedom (2), one can think of the statements in the Encyclopaedia, where Hegel claims that in Islam, God ‘is apprehended as the one infinite sublime Power beyond all the multiplicity of the world’ and that ‘every Mohammedan is free; despotism in the strict meaning of the word does not exist among them’ (E: §393A, 44). However, the spirit of the ‘western Asiatics’, which holds to the abstract One, does not lead to the constitution of ‘a rationally organized whole’ (E: §393A, 44). Individuals, ‘on the one hand, certainly hold themselves sublimely aloof from subjective, finite aims, but again, on the other hand, they also hurl themselves with unbridled instincts into the pursuit of such aims’ (E: §393A, 44). These aims ‘lack all trace of the universal, because here the universal has so far not an immanent self-differentiation’ (E: §393A, 44). This is unlike the Europeans, who have ‘for their principle and character the concrete universal, self-determining Thought’ (E: §393A, 44).
The relationship with the Absolute makes Muslims free, even if this does not come to permanently influence their ethical-political life, because the Absolute is thought of as an abstract One, with respect to which any realization is insufficient. Thus, the ‘whirl of all things’ (WHP 3: 33/2, 521) is not like vanishing: this is a different pattern, where negation does not mean annihilation and where the individual is seen as part of the inscrutable design of God, of His own activity, an instrument aimed at its realization, which is mainly negative and destructive and produces nothing stable.
V. Conclusion
Through this brief survey, it emerges that Hegel's characterization of Islamic medieval philosophy as ‘Oriental’ is linked to the fact that the Absolute is thought of as ‘substance’, and, accordingly, is linked to his interpretation of Pantheism and Spinozism. It also emerges that all these concepts have internal distinctions of different levels of importance. Furthermore, Hegel does not think of Oriental and Islamic philosophies as coincident in their being ‘Oriental’; rather, they have some elements in common and some aspects that distinguish them. The being ‘Oriental’ of Islamic philosophy is not the same as that of Oriental philosophy, just as Islam and the East are partially similar phenomena but are also profoundly different. The East seems to be the common background, in which the individual, before ‘substance’, is worthless and without rights. The relationship between substance and the individual is not the same: in the Hegelian view of Oriental philosophy, the individual can only aspire to vanish, while in Islamic philosophy, he is worthless without God, but at the same time, he finds in God his subsistence and meaning.
A further element that emerges from this consideration is that Hegel derives the definition of ‘Oriental’ for Islamic philosophy from his interpretation of the characteristics of a particular stream, that is, Islamic speculative theology (kalām-medabberim). Medieval Islamic philosophy was traditionally present and known in European culture, albeit with some shortcomings. Hegel relies on previous sources and treatments, impressing his interpretation on this material, which, as seen above, is in accordance with his interpretation of other aspects of Islam, such as Rumi's poetry or the idea of Islam as the religion of the abstract One (Muslim ‘fanaticism’). From this point of view, Hegel's ‘distraction’ regarding the text of Maimonides can also appear as a conscious interpretative choice, although one that is problematic from a philological point of view.
Moreover, the analysis of his elaboration does not reflect a univocal image but aspects of a multifaceted and complex phenomenon that only partially correspond to each other. This seems to indicate that the search for one or more interpretative keys is not yet complete; there is an effort to interpret and elaborate new information and materials about Islam and the ‘Oriental’ world, which should also be considered within the more general context of Hegel's philosophical reflection. From the point of view of his general philosophical position, an elaboration can be recognized in Hegel's treatment of Islamic philosophy. This elaboration aims to understand the theoretical core and, accordingly, the philosophical role of Islamic philosophy with respect to his view of Islam and the Orient in general and of the history of philosophy and the Absolute. Considering this, it can be observed that the ‘Oriental’ character of Islamic philosophy in the framework outlined by Hegel can be seen, because of its link with Spinozism and Pantheism, as highlighting its peculiar philosophical value. This value is certainly distant from modern thought, where the individual is central, but it is also distant from the annihilation of the individual in Oriental philosophy. For Hegel, it seems to be a sublime expression (or very close to it) of that unity that is a fundamental aspect (though not the only one) of the Absolute.
