Why do efforts at fiscal decentralization succeed in some countries but not in others? Why do some countries subsequently attempt to recentralize, and why do only some of these succeed in recentralization? J. Tyler Dickovick addresses these important questions in political economy in this comparative study of intergovernmental fiscal relations. He argues that the relative decline in the strength of executives' partisan support leads them to increase fiscal decentralization, whereas the successful resolution of a substantial economic crisis by executives enables them to subsequently recentralize fiscal powers. The author uses historical analysis of four country cases from the developing world—Brazil, South Africa, Peru and Senegal—to illustrate and contrast the political dynamics underlying these processes.
Scholars have typically analyzed decentralization primarily in terms of the decentralization of revenue. The author provides a much richer conceptualization by including the degree of autonomy granted to subnational governments (SNGs) over expenditures and over the ability to enter into labor and credit contracts in his definition. Dickovick argues that while all presidents would prefer to keep fiscal resources under central control and all SNGs would prefer to have these resources under their control, the realized locus of fiscal control depends on the political capacity of the executive relative to key sets of players. He identifies the distinct institutional arenas and political dynamics that drive each of these three aspects of decentralization.
First, he argues that revenue decentralization is driven by the partisan power of the president relative to the legislature. When presidents suffer partisan declines, they may decentralize revenues for two possible reasons: because they still enjoy political popularity in some regions and wish to invest in their political futures there or because presidents are pressured to do so by stronger subnational actors, especially copartisans who need to be placated. The author illustrates these dynamics by discussing how weak presidents in both Brazil and South Africa were forced to decentralize revenue by stronger subnational actors during their constitution drafting processes.
Second, the author argues that in addition to executive–legislative relations, decentralization in expenditure also depends on the control the president is able to exert over the entire executive branch. When presidents are forced to distribute portfolios to coalition partners with different ideological preferences or when they are unable to resist bureaucratic pressures, they may increase expenditure autonomy to subnational governments in order to maintain some influence over policy. Furthermore, delegating to SNGs can allow presidents to claim credit when the ruling party is in power at the regional level, whereas delegating unfunded mandates to SNGs can undermine opposition parties in power at the regional level. The author analyzes the formulation of financial, health, and education policy in the four cases to assess these arguments.
Finally, contractual autonomy, the ability of SNGs to set their own contracts in labor and capital markets, is influenced by both executive–legislative relations at the national level and intraexecutive relations between national and subnational executive actors such as governors and mayors. Decline in presidential political capital leads presidents to make more concessions to SNGs regarding their ability to raise money directly from capital markets including state banks, and in managing the terms and scope of labor contracts.
Importantly, the author extends the study of intergovernmental fiscal relations by addressing another emerging trend—the recentralization of fiscal resources following episodes of decentralization. He argues that successful recentralization is possible only if a country experiences a serious economic crisis and the president successfully resolves the crisis. In this case, he earns the political capital necessary to reverse any increases in revenue, expenditure, and contractual autonomy and recentralize fiscal resources. The author illustrates these dynamics at work by contrasting the successful recentralization realized by Fernando Cardoso in Brazil and Alberto Fujimori in Peru in the context of major episodes of hyperinflation with the attempts of Thabo Mbeki in South Africa and Abdou Diouf in Senegal, which failed in the absence of comparable economic crises.
This book contributes to the existing literature in several ways. As the author correctly points out, recentralization has been one of the less studied aspects of intergovernmental relations. This study therefore extends the extant literature on intergovernmental relations in important ways by explaining the politics behind both decentralization and recentralization. The historical analysis of each case allows for in-depth, within-case empirical analysis. The selection of federal (Brazil and South Africa) and unitary (Peru and Senegal) states enables the assessment of the author's arguments in states exhibiting various degrees of federalism.
The rich multidimensional conceptualization and measurement of decentralization allows for a more nuanced analysis of intergovernmental fiscal relations. It captures the key fact that decentralization and centralization across revenue, expenditure, and contracts provide executives seeking to optimize their political power with alternative tools, and hence, these policy decisions must be analyzed together. However, the case studies themselves do not always take this approach.
For example, the author argues that despite strongly desiring recentralization of the high existing levels of revenue autonomy, Mbeki failed to recentralize in the absence of a large-scale economic crisis in South Africa. At the same time, he points out that existing rules allowed the Mbeki government to easily constrain SNG behavior on expenditure and contracts. This suggests that this strategy allowed the government to successfully maintain the public appearance of supporting decentralization through revenue decentralization while effectively enjoying central control over policy by controlling expenditures. It is unclear from the current analysis how these three aspects of decentralization shaped Mbeki's view of the effective level of decentralization and, hence, his preference over recentralization, especially given the other valuable political benefits, such as political stability and legitimacy provided by this weak form of decentralization. A more integrated analysis of all three aspects of decentralization would have allowed readers to better understand the political conditions under which the various dimensions of decentralization are strongly or weakly correlated, thus influencing the overall perception of politically optimal decentralization and subsequently affecting recentralization preferences and decisions.
In addition, an analysis of the role of political legitimacy in influencing decisions regarding decentralization and further exposition of the microfoundations of individual-level decision making would also have greatly enhanced the contributions made by this book. In multiethnic societies such as South Africa, or in societies with strong regional identities such as Brazil, political legitimacy might rest to a large degree on public perceptions of presidential respect for subnational autonomy. This raises the question of how the need to raise or maintain political legitimacy affects political calculations to decentralize or recentralize, especially in times of partisan executive decline. While the author addresses this issue for Peru (pp. 157–58), he ignores it entirely in South Africa and Brazil where they could conceivably be important issues. A systematic treatment of this question would have clarified the microfoundations of the decisions made by national and subnational elites.
Furthermore, the author's decision not to focus on the microfoundations of the individual-level strategic calculations makes it unclear how to analyze the effects of political factors, such as electoral volatility, political value of party brands, and so on, that influence the executive's decisions, which affect the decisions of individual elites on the larger fiscal phenomena under discussion. Similarly, the discussions on intraexecutive relations in Chapter 4 could have built on the insights offered by the delegation literature to better explain why executives may be more or less able to influence bureaucratic behaviors in different settings. A better specified behavioral microfoundation would have helped clarify the causal mechanisms that drive presidential decisions, and enabled more direct comparison across the cases. Finally, cross-national and case data detailing the empirical trends in decentralization and recentralization would have helped put these trends in context for the readers.
