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2. Bahro, Rudolf, The Alternative in Eastern Europe (London: NLB, 1978), p. 237.Google Scholar

3. The term empire is used here, because the nature of Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe–that is, the primary motives behind Soviet control, the structure of the bloc, and the distribution of resources within the bloc–is in many (but hardly all) respects similar to the nature of empires. See, for example, Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 110–15, 139–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Chirot, Daniel and Hall, Thomas, “World-System Theory,” Annual Review of Sociology 8 (1982), pp. 81–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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5. The term fusion I use to emphasize how uniquely merged, concentrated, and interdependent resources are in a Stalinist political economy. The significance of fusion for the role of the state and the structure of conflict in Eastern Europe will be assessed below. For assessments of how the structure of the Stalinist political economy evolved and how fusion affects the distribution of power in these systems, see Konrad, George and Szelenyi, Ivan, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), especially pp. 147–48Google Scholar; Hohmann, Hans-Hermann, “The State and the Economy in Eastern Europe,” in Hayward, J. E. S. and Berki, R. N., eds., State and Society in Contemporary Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), pp. 141–57Google Scholar; Vajda, Mihaly, The State and Socialism (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), p. 135Google Scholar; and Nove, Alec, “Socialism, Centralized Planning and the One Party State,” in Rigby, T. H., Brown, Archie, and Reddaway, Peter, eds., Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR (New York: St. Martin's, 1980), pp. 77–97Google Scholar. Fusion should not be confused with corporatism, since the latter implies, particularly in its liberal variant, some separation of arenas and a state that has some autonomy. For further discussion of both terms and their application to the contemporary Soviet case, see Bunce, Valerie, “The Political Economy of the Brezhnev Era: The Rise and Fall of Corporatism,” British Journal of Political Science 13 (01 1983), pp. 129–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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7. Quoted in Jones, Christopher, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 7Google Scholar; see also pp. 2–23. For analyses that assert, in contrast to Jones, that the domestic structure of Eastern Europe and the structure of the bloc had less to do with pressures imposed by Soviet expansionism than with necessary actions arising from Soviet concerns with limiting the influence of capitalism and thereby preserving the Soviet state, see Chase-Dunn, Christopher, “Introduction,” in Chase-Dunn, , ed., Socialist States in the World System (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 9–18Google Scholar; Ost, David, “Socialist World Market as Strategy for Ascent?” in Friedman, Edward, ed., Ascent and Decline in the World System (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 229–54.Google Scholar

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9. See Brus, Wlodzimierz, “Stalinism and the ‘Peoples’ Democracies,” in Tucker, Robert, ed., Stalinism (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 239–56Google Scholar; Johnson, Paul, “Changing Social Structure and the Political Role of Manual Workers,” in Triska, Jan and Gati, Charles, eds., Blue Collar Workers in Eastern Europe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 29–42, especially pp. 34–36Google Scholar; Janos, Andrew C., “The One Party State and Social Mobilization: East Europe between the Wars,” in Huntington, Samuel and Moore, Clement, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 204–36Google Scholar; and Bahro, , The Alternative in Eastern Europe, pp. 117–19.Google Scholar

10. Konrad, and Szelenyi, , Intellectuals on the RoadGoogle Scholar. They note, among other things, the tremendous expansion, given centralized planning and authoritarian one-party rule, of managerial positions during Stalinism.

11. Connor, Walter, “Socialism, Work and Equality,” in Horowitz, Irving Louis, ed., Equity, Income and Policy (New York: Praeger, 1977).Google Scholar

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14. Compare, for example, Jones, , Soviet Influence, p. 8Google Scholar, with Azrael, Jeremy, “Varieties of De-Stalinization,” in Johnson, Chalmers, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 135–52Google Scholar; and with Breslauer, George, Kruschchev and Brezhnev as Leaders; Building Authority in Soviet Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 23–60.Google Scholar

15. See Triska, Jan, “Workers' Assertiveness and Soviet Policy Choices,” in Triska and Gati, Blue Collar Workers, pp. 268–69Google Scholar; Konrad, and Szelenyi, , Intellectuals on the Road, pp. 155–57.Google Scholar

16. See Bunce, Valerie, “Neither Equality nor Efficiency: International and Domestic Inequalities in the Soviet Bloc,” in Nelson, Daniel, ed., Communism and the Politics of Inequalities (Lexington: Heath, 1983), pp. 5–34Google Scholar; Gitelman, Zvi, “The Politics of Socialist Restoration in Hungary and Czechoslovakia,” Comparative Politics 13 (01 1981), pp. 187–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. For evidence on the linkages between the crises of 1956 and increases in public consumption in the bloc, see Pryor, Frederik, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1968).Google Scholar

18. Marer, , “Political Economy”Google Scholar; Triska, , “Workers' Assertiveness.”Google Scholar

19. Vanous, Jan, “East European Economic Slowdown,” Problems of Communism 31 (07–08 1982), pp. 1–19.Google Scholar

20. See Marer, , “Political Economy”Google Scholar; Marer, , “Has Eastern Europe.”Google Scholar For an assessment of Soviet costs and benefits at this time and the difficulties involved in making such assessments, see also Marer, Paul, “Prospects for Economic Assistance,” in Triska, Jan and Cocks, Paul, eds., Political Development in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 256–74.Google Scholar

21. Jones, , Soviet InfluenceGoogle Scholar; Zimmerman, William, “Soviet-East European Relations in the 1980's and the Changing International System,” in Bornstein, Morris, Gitelman, Zvi, and Zimmerman, , eds., East-West Relations and the Future of Eastern Europe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 87–104.Google Scholar

22. Flashkamp, Richard and Nelson, Daniel, “Détente and the Warsaw Pact: East European Military Expenditures in an Era of Decreased East-West Conflict” (paper delivered at the Western Social Science Association meeting,Denver,Colorado,12 November 1981)Google Scholar; Zimmerman, , “Soviet-East European Relations.”Google Scholar

23. See the data reported in Reisinger, William M., “East European Military Expenditures in the 1970s: Collective Good or Bargaining Offer?” International Organization 37 (Winter 1983), pp. 147–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For assessments of trends over time in the bloc's military outlays, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1982–1983 (London, 1982), pp. 124–46Google Scholar, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1983 (New York: Taylor & Frances, 1983), p. 162.Google Scholar

24. This is the CIA estimate. See U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (JEC), USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950–1980 (Washington, D.C., 8 12 1982), pp. 15–16Google Scholar. While Western estimates of Soviet GNP vary, the trends over time are similar from one study to the next.

25. Vanous, , “East European Economic Slowdown.”Google Scholar Also see JEC, USSR: Measures of Economic Growth, pp. 15–16Google Scholar. It is important to note that the Soviets were also ambivalent about specialization within the bloc, since such a policy would allow some states to gain added leverage through monopoly over vital products.

26. For evidence on this point, see Botsas, Eleftherios, “Trade Patterns,” in Fischer-Galati, Stephen, ed., Eastern Europe in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview, 1981), p. 98Google Scholar; United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Europe, vol. 33 (New York, 1981), pp. 1.6, 1.14–1.18.Google Scholar

27. Vanous, Jan and Marrese, Michael, “Soviet Subsidies to Eastern Economies,” Wall Street Journal, 15 01 1982Google Scholar; see also their Soviet Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe: A Soviet Perspective (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983).Google Scholar

28. See Marer, Paul, “The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: Integration or Domination?” in Terry, Sarah M., ed., Soviet Foreign Policy in Eastern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984)Google Scholar. The central problems addressed by Marer have to do with the degree to which the calculation of subsidies is inflated by assuming seller markets outside the bloc; by postulating too liberal an exchange rate; and by the skewed availability of data on what the Eastern Europeans send to the Soviet Union versus what the Soviets send to Eastern Europe.

29. See Lipsius, Frank, “Poland's Cost to the East,” New York Times, 7 02 1982Google Scholar; “Now Russia Asks for Time to Pay,” Economist, 6 Febuary 1982Google Scholar; Burns, John, “Poland an Increasing Economic Burden for Soviets,” New York Times, 23 12 1981Google Scholar; Lewis, Paul, “As Poland's Economy Slides, Comecon Feels the Backlash,” New York Times, 10 01 1982Google Scholar; and Portes, Richard, The Polish Crisis: Western Economic Options (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1981)Google Scholar. For a recent summary of the Polish crisis, see “Poland's Economy,” Economist, 12 February 1983, pp. 71–73.Google Scholar

30. In 1980, for example, Polish deficits in intrabloc trade reached $103 million and, for the first nine months of 1981, reached $122 million. See Lewis, Paul, “Poland's Slump: Endangering Economies of the Soviet Bloc,” New York Times, 8 01 1982.Google Scholar

31. See Rattner, Steven, “Impact of Soviet Gold Sales,” New York Times, 5 01 1982Google Scholar; James, Ellen L., “Is Moscow Reducing Assistance to Cuba?” New York Times, 7 04 1982Google Scholar; “Soviet Fails to Use Gas Pipeline Credit,” New York Times, 1 04 1982Google Scholar; “East Germany Tries to Cope,” New York Times, 19 July 1982Google Scholar; Vanous, , “East European Economic Slowdown.”Google Scholar

32. See Pravda, 21 July 1982Google Scholar, and the Yugoslav analysis of Soviet economic problems at the end of the Brezhnev era in “Odlazak velike lichnosti,” NIN (Belgrade), 14 November 1982, pp. 8–11.Google Scholar

33. In the face of hard-currency problems, two of the more “uppity” states in the region–Romania and Yugoslavia–turned more of their trade toward the Soviet Union. See Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije, 1981 (Belgrade: Central Statistical Office, 1981), p. 747Google Scholar, and Laux, Jeanne Kirk, “The Limits of Autonomy: Romania in the 1980s,” in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Eastern European Economic Assessment, Part II (Washington, D.C., 1981), pp. 107–27.Google Scholar

34. JEC, USSR: Measures of Economic Growth, p. 58.Google Scholar

35. For the figures on defense, see SIPRI, World Armaments, p. 162Google Scholar; JEC, USSR: Measures of Economic GrowthGoogle Scholar; Wolfe, Charles Jr., “Costs of the Soviet Empire,” Wall Street Journal, 30 01 1984Google Scholar; Bialer, Seweryn, “The Politics of Stringency,” Problems of Communism 29 (05–06 1980), pp. 19–33Google Scholar. It must be noted that defense outlays, while they cannot be termed “losses” to the same degree that nonrepayable subsidies can, are nonetheless a very inefficient form of economic investment.

36. See the exhortations directed to the party and the workers to tighten discipline and produce more with less in the November 1982 and the June 1983 Central Committee Plena, which are summarized in “Peredovaya: na vazhneishikh uchastkakh nashei raboty,” Kommunist 50 (July 1983), pp. 3–13Google Scholar, and prefigured in “Luchshe rabotat'–luchshe zhit',” Kommunist 49 (April 1982), pp. 3–12Google Scholar. Recent figures on the growth of labor productivity, investment in productive versus unproductive investment, consumption as a percentage of GNP, and economic growth all show the effects of austerity. See Bagdasarov, A. and Pervushin, S., “Proizvoditel'nost truda: teorizya, praktika, rezervy rosta,” Kommunist 50 (01 1983), pp. 14–23Google Scholar, and JEC, USSR: Measures of Economic Growth.Google Scholar

37. Consider the implications, for example, of the sharp growth in Soviet tourists visiting Eastern Europe, as noted by Bushnell, John, “The New Soviet Man Turns Pessimist,” in Cohen, Stephen et al., eds., The Soviet Union since Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 177–99Google Scholar. Consider as well the implications of higher levels of consumption among party members in consumer-deficit societies, as discussed by Matthews, Mervyn, Privilege in the Soviet Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978)Google Scholar, and the implications of polls citing resentment over inequalities in privilege cited in Paul, David and Simon, Maurice, “Poland Today and Czechoslovakia 1968,” Problems of Communism 30 (09–10 1981), pp. 25–39.Google Scholar

38. See the arguments by Gitelman, Zvi, “The World Economy and Elite Political Strategies in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland,” in Bornstein, et al., East-West Relations, pp. 127–61Google Scholar, and Connor, Walter, “Workers and Power,” in Triska and Gati, Blue Collar WorkersGoogle Scholar. It should be noted that the austerity measures imposed by Eastern European regimes of late are not as austere, insofar as one can gauge such things, as similar measures in nonsocialist Third World countries. The social wage, for example, has not been reduced much and is still substantial. This moderation reflects, among other things, Eastern European fears of austerity-measure “riots” similar to those occurring in Third World countries and seeming Soviet willingness to lessen the domestic costs of the debt crisis in the satellites.

39. See Laux, , “Limits of Autonomy,”Google Scholar and Abonyi, Arpad, “Eastern Europe's Reintegration,” in Chase-Dunn, Socialist States in the World System, pp. 181–202.Google Scholar

40. Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj, for example, have argued that a key factor influencing Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the feared effects of Slovak irredentism on the Ukrainians. See their The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra: Australian National University, 1972).Google Scholar

41. For relevant arguments focusing on the distribution of resources available to states for bargaining within the bloc, see Zimmerman, , “Regional Hierarchical Systems”Google Scholar; Zimmerman, , “Soviet-East European Relations”Google Scholar; Reisinger, , “East European Military Expenditures”Google Scholar; Jowitt, , “Romanian Communist Party”Google Scholar; Clark, , “Evolving Nature”Google Scholar; and Vanous, and Marrese, , Soviet Subsidization, chap. 8.Google Scholar

42. For similar arguments and suggestive evidence, see Chase-Dunn, , “Introduction”Google Scholar; Chase-Dunn, , “Socialist States”Google Scholar; Ost, David, “Socialist World Market as Strategy for Ascent,” in Friedman, Ascent and Decline, pp. 229–54Google Scholar; Jowitt, , Leninist ResponseGoogle Scholar; Gitelman, , “World Economy”Google Scholar; Abonyi, , “Eastern Europe's Reintegration”Google Scholar; Zimmerman, William, “Dependency Theory and the Soviet–East European Hierarchical Regional System: Initial Tests,” Slavic Review 37 (12 1978), pp. 604–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clark, and Bahry, , “Dependent Development.”Google Scholar

43. See Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

44. Gilpin, , War and Change, p. 167Google Scholar. See also Chirot, and Thomas, , “World System Theory”Google Scholar; Gilpin, , War and Change, pp. 110–16, 146–85Google Scholar; and Triska, , “Workers' Assertiveness,” especially p. 275.Google Scholar

45. See in particular Gitelman, Zvi, “Power and Authority in Eastern Europe,” in Johnson, , ed., Change in Communist Systems, pp. 235–64Google Scholar; Baumann, Zygmunt, “Twenty Years after: The Crisis in Soviet Type Systems,” Problems of Communism 20 (11–12 1971), pp. 45–53Google Scholar, Gitelman, , “World Economy”Google Scholar; Pravda, Alex, “East-West Interdependence and the Social Compact in Eastern Europe,” in Bornstein, et al., East-West RelationsGoogle Scholar; Triska, , “Workers' Assertiveness”Google Scholar; Bahro, , Alternative, p. 207Google Scholar; and Konrad, and Szelenyi, , Intellectuals on the Road.Google Scholar

46. Mieczkowski, Bogdan, “The Relationship between Changes in Consumption and Politics in Poland,” Soviet Studies 30 (1978), pp. 263–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Triska, and Gati, , Blue Collar WorkersGoogle Scholar; and Pastusiak, Longin, “Origins and Nature of the Polish Crisis, 1980–1981,” unpublished paper (Ohio State University, Mershon Center, 9 February 1984).Google Scholar

47. The limits of worker power are analyzed by Connor, , “Workers and Power”Google Scholar; Przeworski, Adam, “The ‘Man of Iron’ and Men of Power in Poland,” PS 15 (Winter 1982), pp. 18–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mason, David, “Policy Dilemmas and Political Unrest in Poland,” Journal of Politics 45 (1983), pp. 397–421CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Mason's analysis suggests that, in the Polish case at least, worker power is central and worker pressure on the regime's priorities is evident even prior to succession.

48. It was hoped, according to the arguments supporting the new stage of “Developed Socialism,” that greater equalization in income distribution by class during the 1960s would enhance productivity. See Bunce, , “Political Economy”Google Scholar; Connor, Walter, Socialism, Work, and Equality (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; and Mieczkowski, Bogdan, Personal and Social Consumption in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 149, 196–98, 225, 273, and 311Google Scholar. As Jozef Pajestka put it (quoted in Mieczkowski, p. 189), “a better satisfaction of human needs favors faster economic growth.”

49. For Soviet views of “razriadka,” see Rozanov, G. L., Politika sotrudnichyestva-veleniye vremeni SSSR i kapitalisticheskiye strany, 70-ye gody (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1977)Google Scholar; Shersnev, E. S., SSSR-SShA: ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya i problemyi vozmozhnosti (Moscow: Nauka, 1976)Google Scholar. Compare how similar these arguments are with those of Nixon, Richard, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Warner, 1978), pp. 89–105.Google Scholar

50. See, in particular, Pesci, Kalman, The Future of Socialist Economic Integration (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1981)Google Scholar; Levcik, Fredrich and Stankovsky, Jan, Industrial Cooperation between East and West (White Plains, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1979), pp. 41–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bornstein, , “East-West Economic Relations”Google Scholar; and Holzman, Franklyn D. and Levgold, Robert, “The Economics and Politics of East-West Relations,” in Hoffman, Erik and Fleron, Frederic, eds., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (New York: Aldine, 1980), pp. 428–78.Google Scholar

51. Pesci, , Future, p. 162Google Scholar; Levcik, Fredrich, “The Prospects for East-West Trade in the 1980s,” in Bornstein, et al. , East-West Relations, pp. 62–86.Google Scholar

52. On the U.S. misconstrual see in particular Radway, Lawrence, “The Curse of Free Elections,” Foreign Policy no. 40 (Fall 1980), pp. 61–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bell, Coral, “Soviet American Strategic Balance, the Western Alliance, and East-West Relations,” in Bornstein, et al. , East-West Relations, pp. 11–30.Google Scholar

53. Paul Marer, quoted in Lewis, Paul, “Role of Western Banks in Poland's Debt Crisis,” New York Times, 3 02 1982Google Scholar. For a Soviet view of these issues, see Bauman, L. and Grebnikov, B., “The Socialist Community: Economic Integration,” International Affairs (Moscow) 22 (1981), pp. 73–81.Google Scholar

54. Quoted in Sampson, Anthony, “So, Give Credit Where Credit Is Due (Poland),” New York Times, 10 01 1982Google Scholar. See also Eichler, Gabriel, “Country Risk Analysis and Bank Lending to Eastern Europe,” in JEC, Eastern European Economic Assessment, 2:759–75Google Scholar; “The Country Risk League Table,” Euromoney, February 1982, p. 46Google Scholar; and Holzman, Franklyn, “Credit Worthiness and Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Mechanisms of Centrally Planned Economies,” in Rosefielde, Steven, ed., Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 163–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

55. For example, it has been estimated that such trade furnishes 1% of the West German GNP, provides 92,000 jobs to West Germany (particularly in steel), and, with the pipeline deal, will provide some 20,000 more jobs to the seven European nations involved. Finally, there is energy dependence. In the early 1980s, 17% of West German domestic gas consumption is provided by the Soviets, a figure expected to rise to 30% by the 1990s and to 20% for other Western European countries. See Stent, Angela, “The USSR and Germany,” Problems of Communism 30 (11–10 1981), pp. 1–23Google Scholar; Tagliabuc, John, “Bonn Needs the Business Even More Than the Gas,” New York Times, 14 08 1981.Google Scholar

56. See Zoeter, Joan Parpart, “Eastern Europe: The Hard Currency Debt,” in JEC, Eastern Europe Economic Assessment, vol. 1 (1981), pp. 716–31.Google Scholar

57. By 1976–77, for example, Poland was borrowing for current consumption needs. See Lissakers, Karin, “The Polish Debt,” New York Times, 8 01 1982Google Scholar. For a discussion of the mechanics of the “debt regime,” see Lipson, Charles, “The International Organization of Third World Debt,” International Organization 34 (Autumn 1981), pp. 603–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ortmeyer, , “Poland's Foreign Debt”Google Scholar; Portes, , “The Polish Crisis”Google Scholar; Zoeter, , “Eastern Europe”Google Scholar; and Brainard, Lawrence, “Eastern Europe's Uncertain Future: The Outlook for East-West Trade and Finance,” in JEC, Eastern European Economic Assessment, 1:751–58.Google Scholar

58. In 1979 Eastern Europe's current-account balance was negative $5 billion. In 1980 the figure was –4.8, and in 1981 –5.5. The Soviet Union, by contrast, ran considerable trade surpluses in the bloc and in the world. See United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Europe vol. 33 (New York, 1981), p. 116.Google Scholar

59. The linkage between external dependence and patterns of income inequality in Eastern Europe is examined in Bunce, “Neither Equality Nor Efficiency.” For interesting insights into this linkage from an Eastern European perspective, see Ferge, Zsuzsa, A Society in the Making: Hungarian Social and Societal Policy, 1945–1975 (White Plans, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1979), pp. 159–91.Google Scholar

60. For example, while Poland traditionally has been a net food exporter, by the late 1970s Poland was a net food importer. This change reflected sharp declines in livestock beginning in 1977 and sharp declines in crop production beginning in 1978. See Lewis, Paul, “Economic Revival Called Polish Aim,” New York Times, 15 12 1981Google Scholar. Hungary, by contrast, has become a net food exporter, in part because the Hungarians have instituted significant organizational reforms in the countryside and have capitalized on Western technology and cooperative agreements to maximize output. See Theift, Sheila, “Hungary Harvesting the Fruit of U.S. Farming Know-How,” Chicago Tribune, 24 06 1982Google Scholar; Lewis, Paul, “What Poland Lacks, Hungary Has Aplenty,” New York Times, 16 12 1981Google Scholar. Indeed, by 1979 only Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania were net agricultural exporters.

61. See “Curtain Call,” Economist, 3 December 1983, p. 92Google Scholar; Binder, , “Czechs Are New Economic Casualties”Google Scholar; Neuberger, Egon, Portes, Richard, and Tyson, Laura D'Andrea, “The Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A Survey,” in JEC, Eastern Europe, vol. 2 (1981), pp. 128–47Google Scholar; articles by Cornelson, Doris, Hewett, Ed, and Levcik, Friedrich, in JEC, Eastern Europe, vol. 1 (1981)Google Scholar; Hare, Paul, “The Beginnings of Institutional Reform in Hungary,” Soviet Studies 35 (07 1983), pp. 313–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a general description of austerity measures as an economic tool, see Crockett, Andrew, “Stabilization Policies in Developing Countries,” IMF Staff Papers 28 (03 1981), pp. 54–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar. It must be noted that austerity measures in these countries differ from those imposed by the IMF on the Third World. First, these measures involve primarily a stabilization, not in most cases a decline in per capita income in the Eastern bloc. Second, the social wage is left intact, while pressures increase to work more for the same remuneration. In other words, austerity policy in these countries is not as austere as it has been elsewhere. This is because of Soviet aid, because of the ways in which fusion makes a tie between economic austerity and political protest highly likely, and, finally, because these countries, unlike the Third World periphery, are considerably less trade-dependent and much closer to an autarchic economic structure. All this explains, as well, why Eastern Europe could prune so much of the region's external debt—a reduction of $8 billion in 1982 and $6.6 billion in 1983—and could slash imports from the West by 16% in 1982. See “Curtain Call.”

62. For example, almost 90% of Soviet imports from West Germany–their largest trade partner in the West–are manufactured goods and high-technology items, most of which are unavailable in the East or of poorer quality. See Lewis, Flora, “Split among Allies Runs Deeper than Sanctions,” New York Times, 3 01 1982Google Scholar, and Rosefielde, Steven, “Comparative Advantage and the Evolving Pattern of Soviet International Commodity Specialization, 1950–1973,”Google Scholar in Rosefielde, , Economic Welfare, pp. 185–222.Google Scholar

63. Indeed, the Soviets were in early 1982 denied a loan by the West Germans that would normally have been routine. At the same time, of course, the Soviets had several sources of strength in bargaining as well, albeit weak ones. One is the necessity of the banks admitting overexposure, another is the dearth of assets available in the West for seizure if bankruptcy were to occur.

64. See Lipson, , “International Organization.”Google Scholar

65. The one constraint on Western banks was the difficulty, in lieu of any formal role for the IMF (except in the Romanian case), of forging cooperation. In the Polish case, the banks involved–over 500, and many of them small–had difficulty organizing and admitting their exposure. See Ortmeyer, , “Poland's Foreign Debt.”Google Scholar

66. Pravda, Alex, “East-West Interdependence and the Social Compact in Eastern Europe,”Google Scholar in Bornstein, et al. , East-West Relations, p. 184.Google Scholar

67. “Now Russia Asks for Time to Pay,” Economist, 6 February 1982, p. 81.Google Scholar

68. See Farnsworth, Clyde, “Poles Ask Admittance to IMF,” New York Times, 11 11 1981Google Scholar, and Farnsworth, , “Washington Watch: IMF Team Visits Poland,” New York Times, 21 12 1981.Google Scholar

69. Contrast these arguments with those emphasizing Eastern Europe's distortions. See Abonyi, Arpad and Sylvain, Ivan, “CMEA Integration and Policy Options for Eastern Europe: A Development Strategy for Dependent States,” Journal of Common Market Studies 16 (12 1977), pp. 132–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Jones, Christopher, “Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention,”Google Scholar in Hoffman, and Heron, , Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 559–82.Google Scholar

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71. Chase-Dunn, , “Socialist States,” p. 513.Google Scholar