History evolves through alternating cycles of peace and war. In a sense, however, periods of peace merely serve as interludes during which international relations (IR) players get ready for the next round of war. Indeed, since the advent of nuclear weapons, the era of peace itself transformed into a war, i.e. the Cold War. While the termination of the first Cold War is certain, no one agrees about when it began and ended. It is beyond doubt that what Boris Yeltsin called “the cold peace” in 1994 – lasting from the 1990s to the 2010s – is now evolving into a second Cold War (Lind Reference Lind2018). Moreover, the world has now transitioned into a second Nuclear Age, characterized by a multipolar nuclear order where many sovereign nations emerge as significant nuclear actors (Bracken Reference Bracken2013).
In light of this, it is prudent to affirm that the Korean peninsula finds itself at the juncture of a dual second era – the second Cold War and the second Nuclear Age. However, in reality, the peninsula has already embodied this dual epoch since the 1990s. Concerning the former, it was often designated as the last vestige of the Cold War prior to the formal emergence of the Cold War II discourse. Regarding the latter, the Korean peninsula holds the distinction of being the only region globally to have conducted nuclear tests since 1998, imparting a distinctive character to the features of the second Nuclear Age. And more generally, it has long been a stubbornly sovereign “small” state with nuclear capacity.
The puzzle of the North Korean nuclear crisis originates here. North Korea, in the post-Cold War era, has consistently represented both the Cold War mentality for the survival of its regime and the pursuit of nuclear weapons as its sovereign right. Therefore, without a firm grasp of the dual second era that has shaped the Korean peninsula for the last thirty years, any attempts to resolve the nuclear crisis would be tentative. It is in this regard that Bong-Geun Jun's 30 Years of North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Records and Lessons of North Korean Nuclear Diplomacy is more than welcome. This is attributable not merely to Jun's wealth of experience in diverse arenas, spanning the policy realm, including in the Presidential Office of South Korea, the Ministry of Unification, and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in New York and North Korea, as well as in the academy. It is equally noteworthy because Jun's viewpoint illuminates South Korea's stance, a perspective that has been overshadowed by that of the United States in nuclear crisis discourse (Bolton Reference Bolton2020; Carpenter and Bandow Reference Carpenter and Bandow2004; Rumsfeld Reference Rumsfeld2012).
One of Jun's central arguments posits that the North Korean collapse scenario has impeded the formulation of a systematic and sustainable nuclear policy toward the nation. This intricately connects with the aforementioned phenomenon of the dual second era. Operating under the assumption that the North Korean regime is anachronistic in the post-Cold War era, both the United States and South Korea have tacitly assumed that regime change in Pyongyang is inexorable. However, this perspective stems from an underestimation of the resilience of the North Korean regime and its nuclear capabilities. The moral and diplomatic compass of autocratic regimes significantly differs from that of democracies, which is coupled with the fact that nuclear weapons have become more accessible and replicable in the second Nuclear Age. North Korea, in this regard, has adeptly navigated the realms of the first and second Cold War eras and the first and second Nuclear Age. Consequently, the strategies employed for denuclearizing North Korea over the past three decades have yielded little result.
30 Years of North Korean Nuclear Crisis is structured into three parts, progressing chronologically and highlighting elements of the first and second North Korean nuclear crises, as well as North Korea's evolving nuclear posture and strategies under the era of Kim Jong-un. Part One's five chapters explore the intricacies of the first North Korean nuclear crisis (1993–1994). They analyze the initial suspicions about nuclear North Korea, the violation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the subsequent Agreed Framework (AF), its collapse, and the developments leading to the second nuclear crisis.
The next seven chapters in part two extensively examine the second North Korean nuclear crisis (2002–2003) and the dynamics of the Six-Party Talks (2003–2007), emphasizing their inherent limitations. Following that, part three's six chapters provide a detailed review of North Korea's nuclear strategy during the Kim Jong-un era (2011–present). In the concluding chapter Jun derives six policy recommendations from the preceding sections: persistent pursuit of denuclearization efforts; fortified ownership of North Korean nuclear policy by South Korea; emphasis on a phased and long-term strategy; establishment of a peace regime involving the normalization of relations between the US, Japan, and North Korea; necessity for a sustainable North Korea policy grounded in political consensus to withstand shifts in governance in Seoul or Washington; and notably, avoidance of an ill-conceived North Korea collapse scenario that could obstruct nuclear policy toward North Korea (pp. 406–414).
In Jun's book, a standout feature is his comprehensive perspective, seamlessly integrating considerations of both nuclear security and nuclear safety within the framework of the North Korean nuclear crisis. This seems to have originated from Jun's experience at KEDO. This nuanced approach, often overlooked or intentionally sidelined by many in the field of IR, provides a fresh lens. While North Korea's nuclear weapons program has been readily identified as a grave security concern, there has been a notable reluctance to articulate the technical, financial or administrative considerations for establishing a diplomatic process to address this threat, and North Korea's potential capacities in this context.
For instance, the core of the AF that resolved the first nuclear crisis was to provide North Korea with two 1,000MWe light water reactor (LWR) power plants in exchange for freezing Pyongyang's nuclear program. However, during the conclusion of the AF, little attention was given to the fact that North Korea lacked the capacity to operate two LWRs. From a technical standpoint, to maintain a stable power generation system in an emergency, the electricity output of a single power plant should not surpass 10% of the total power generation connected by transmission and distribution networks (pp. 35–36). Nevertheless, when the AF essentially collapsed in 2002, the output of one LWR was estimated to exceed 20% of North Korea's total power generation (EPSIS 2023).
Relatedly, considering financial and administrative aspects, for North Korea to expand its key electric grid, it was essential to seek support from international financial organizations. This implies that North Korea needed to adhere to general guidelines encompassing mutually agreed monitoring, auditing, transparency measures, procedures, and the like. Moreover, sustaining the AF requires adherence to international procurement standards, robust liability protection for donors and contractors, privileges and immunities for donor representatives, and effective intellectual property protection (pp. 204–205). Nevertheless, viewed from various angles, and particularly considering its disinclination to open its political and administrative system, North Korea fell short of meeting the aforementioned standards. Thus, it became evident that Pyongyang lacked the capacity to host LWRs within its borders. In the course of LWR construction, certain suppliers of reactor components, requiring a compensation system for nuclear accidents, withdrew from the KEDO due to North Korea's inability to secure international insurance (p. 175).
Paradoxically, these cases underscore the international community's inability to denuclearize North Korea. First, the United States and South Korea, especially those anticipating the collapse of the North Korean regime, sought to handle the nuclear crisis through a post-Cold War lens, overlooking the resilience of the North Korean regime. Consequently, their approach to North Korea was passive, or at best lukewarm, leading to an improvised policy (pp. 92–93). Second, in its role as a conspicuous player in the second Nuclear Age, North Korea was well-prepared to pursue nuclear weapons in the event of failed negotiations. In essence, North Korea's nuclear program holds dual roles – serving as both bargaining chips and a tool for nuclear armament. Hence, the longstanding debate on whether Pyongyang's nuclear program is primarily aimed at negotiation proved futile (p. 244). The regime in Pyongyang, driven by a concern for its survival, is neither irrational nor inclined toward self-destruction. The point is that possessing nuclear program inherently opened up options and possibilities for North Korea that would be otherwise unavailable (Bracken Reference Bracken2013).
This brings us to the second strength of Jun's book: an insight into establishing a more concrete and phased approach to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula based on the dynamics between the South Korea–US alliance and inter-Korean relations. For Seoul, upholding a robust alliance with the United States and fostering peaceful inter-Korean relations are both pivotal national interests. However, the first-ever inter-Korean summit in 2000 and the September 11 attacks in 2001 served as turning points that revealed the strategic differences between Washington and Seoul toward Pyongyang (pp. 154–155). While the degree of the differences can fluctuate with the political landscape of each country, South Korea positions peaceful unification as a matter of constitutional importance, whereas, particularly for conservative hawks in the US, Seoul's attempts to correlate the nuclear issue with unification are viewed as unhelpful (Bolton Reference Bolton2020).
Twenty years on, South Korea is stuck in the same problem. North Korea resists any attempts from the South aimed at fostering peaceful inter-Korean relations – a pursuit that could instigate political and societal change in the North. Collaborating closely with the United States in support of Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy is essential to counteract North Korea's escalating nuclear threats. However, this alignment only serves to antagonize leaders in Beijing and Moscow, whose cooperation is also vital for achieving the denuclearization of the North, particularly as the specter of the second Cold War looms large.
Given these intricacies, there is a heightened need to embrace a phased approach. To prevent a repetition of the pitfalls seen in the 2019 Hanoi summit and the many failures of the past thirty years, Jun suggests steering clear of expecting “decisive concessions” from North Korea. What is required, then, is a blend of creativity and patience to formulate a realistic and phased approach to denuclearization (pp. 332–333). Designing a more transparent roadmap for measures aligned with Pyongyang's acceptance, implementing a meticulously phased verification of North Korea's nuclear arsenal in sync with North Korea–US relations progress, and announcing the “commencement of the North Korea–US diplomatic normalization process” rather than declaring the end of the Korean War – linked with matters like the US–South Korea alliance, United States Forces Korea, and the United Nations Command – are some of his recommendations (pp. 355–357).
Should South Korea seek nuclear weapons amid the increasing nuclear threat from the North? Jun's dispassionate analysis extends to the considerations regarding South Korea's nuclear options. Given South Korea's economic reliance on exports and significant energy imports, coupled with its alliance with the United States, Jun argues that a thorough and unbiased assessment of national interests stemming from such options should take precedence. Unless North Korea engages in a wholly irrational act, such as a suicidal nuclear attack, the existing strategic stability, anchored in nuclear deterrence against North Korea, is likely to endure for a considerable period (pp. 393–395).
Jun does not present a one-size-fits-all solution for the three-decade-long nuclear crisis. However, his consistent message throughout the book is clear: never dismiss possibilities. This mindset is crucial for those handling the Korean peninsula's nuclear crisis. He reiterates the pivotal role of denuclearization negotiations. From a military perspective, negotiations can, at the very least, prevent the escalation of skirmishes into a nuclear war. While reinforcing nuclear deterrence is important, negotiation is indispensable for ultimately solving the crisis (pp. 403–404). The regime in Pyongyang might (or might not) collapse. Even if it does, it would suffice for both Seoul and Washington to prepare contingency plans and periodically practice them discreetly. Nobody predicted the German unification and the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the North Korean collapse scenario does not help mitigate the “ongoing nuclear threat” from Pyongyang (p. 414).
If individuals no longer perceive the Korean nuclear crisis as alarming and grow indifferent to North Korea's nuclear threat, it is a consequence of the hastily exaggerated crisis discourse during the first and second crises. It is time to see North Korea realistically. Perhaps, in the second Nuclear Age and the second Cold War era, North Korea as a sovereign state implies that a genuine nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula has just begun. Jun's 30 Years of North Korean Nuclear Crisis may be the first comprehensive work revealing the inconvenient truth of our dual second era.
