1. BOĒTHEIA IN PLATO'S GORGIAS AND IN CONTEMPORARY FORENSIC DISCOURSE

The Gorgias may conveniently be divided into three parts. In the first part (447a1–461b2), Socrates discusses the nature of rhetoric with Gorgias, who also intervenes briefly in the following two parts. In the second part (461b3–481b5), Socrates debates with Polus whether it is a greater evil to suffer unjustly than to act unjustly. In the third part (481b6–527e7), Socrates carries out a complex discussion with Callicles about the best way of living. Briefly stated, Callicles charges Socrates, personifying the philosopher, for not being able to protect his self-interest in a law court, because he, being a philosopher, is denuded the oratorical skills needed (484c–486d). This charge sparks a prolonged discussion in the remaining part of the dialogue. It is in this third part, and only here, that the notion of protection (βοήθεια) features in various inflections in eight passages, which I label T1–8 (please see the Appendix for the full passages):

Plato uses the term βοήθεια in two separate contexts in the Gorgias: the law court and the political assembly. The theme of βοήθεια thus links the two contexts on a linguistic level, but Plato elaborates the first context as paradigmatic. At this point we should recall that both forensic and political rhetoric in fifth-century and to some extent fourth-century Athens were embedded within Athenian democracy, where decision-makers at law courts and political assemblies were by and large recruited on a democratic basis, namely by lot, and where decisions were influenced by the persuasiveness of the respective speakers.Footnote ³ This meant that the clear separation among forensic, political and epideictic rhetoric, which we find in Aristotle and the later tradition of rhetoric, was less clear at the time of Socrates; forensic and political rhetoric were regarded as closely connected, and this is conspicuous in the Gorgias.Footnote ⁴

In the following I distinguish between the literary character Gorgias in Plato's dialogue bearing this name, on the one hand, and the historical Gorgias of Leontini (480–380), on the other hand. Unless I write ‘Gorgias of Leontini’, I refer to the literary character Gorgias. In Plato's Gorgias, Gorgias identifies four areas of rhetoric, where the persuasive power of speech affects: (1) judges in a law court (δικαστήριον); (2) councillors in a council (βουλευτήριον); (3) assemblymen in an assembly (ἐκκλησία); or (4) participants in any other political gathering (πολιτικὸς σύλλογος). The skill of the rhetorician is to speak and to persuade the crowds (τὰ πλήθη), Gorgias concludes (Grg. 452e1–8).Footnote ⁵ In this list, forensic (1) and political (2–4) rhetoric feature on a par, and what came to be known as epideictic rhetoric is left out. The paradox is, of course, that the style of Gorgias’ speeches was epideictic: they were, according to Socrates, rhetorical displays (447a6, 447b8) made up to impress and baffle the listeners, hence unsuitable to discuss the issues and arguments pertinent to political and forensic discussions.Footnote ⁶

When Socrates returns to this four-fold list in his discussion with Gorgias, he picks up on (1), the persuasion produced in a law court (δικαστήριον) and in other ‘crowds’ (ὄχλοι) (454e5–7; he refers once again to the law court and to other gatherings in 455a3–4). When Callicles enters the discussion in the third part of the dialogue, he challenges Socrates’ ability to protect himself in general, probably alluding to all four areas (484c–d), and he adds that Socrates would be unable to deliver a persuasive speech for himself, or for anyone else, at any of the councils of justice (486a1). If Socrates were indicted at a law court (δικαστήριον, 486b4), Callicles continues, he would end up being condemned to death, if anyone wished so. Callicles repeats this claim later on (521c5), referring explicitly to the δικαστήριον in a passage where Socrates defends himself against this personal allegation, and Socrates is quick to address precisely this situation (521c9, 521e2, 522b4).Footnote ⁷ So even though the Gorgias starts out with a rather broad, four-fold list of areas in which rhetoric can be used, it narrows down to forensic rhetoric in the course of the dialogue. To note in passing, in the Apology the term δικαστήριον is used for the law court to which Socrates is indicted (Ap. 17a2, 29a3, 40b3).

So much for the overall use of βοήθεια in the Gorgias. Now let me turn to the use of the term in ancient Greek forensic discourse. This term and its cognates had very different uses in classical Greek literature, but the political and the forensic uses were common. It is said about Gorgias of Leontini that he was sent to Athens as an ambassador on behalf of the people of Leontini in Sicily, who had been pressed in war against the Syracusans; he was sent to Athens in order to ask the Athenians to come to their aid as quickly as possible. Having arrived in Athens, he addressed the Athenians with a style that amazed them because of his unusual figures of speech. After he had gained support from the Athenians to help the people of Leontini and won admiration in Athens for his rhetorical art, he returned to Sicily (fr. A 4 DK). This is the historical Gorgias of Leontini to whom we find allusions in the first part of Plato's Gorgias. In this dialogue Gorgias claims, among other things, that the aim of rhetoric is to produce persuasion and thereby freedom and influence in one's own city (Grg. 452e1–453a7); the historical Gorgias of Leontini's visit to Athens was one case in point.

If we turn to Gorgias of Leontini and his own speeches, we find the term βοήθεια occurring in a forensic context, used of the protection or help that a litigant may obtain in a law court. He explains that, when a trial takes place in front of a mob, it is right to accept the help (βοήθεια) of friends (in the form of their intercession), but when the trial takes place before noble persons, only truth (ἀλήθεια) should assist the litigant (fr. B 11a.33 DK).Footnote ⁸

We also see this use of βοήθεια among near-contemporary Athenian orators. Demosthenes frequently employed the term in speeches where he discussed military operations; here the term would typically refer to some sort of military force or expedition that comes to help someone out or to attack an enemy.Footnote ⁹ He also used the term in a forensic context, and here the term is typically applied in connection with individuals involved in an indictment at a law court. In this context Demosthenes speaks of the protection, aid or relief (βοήθεια) of one individual unjustly treated.Footnote ¹⁰ This forensic use resembles the forensic use we find in the discussion between Socrates and Callicles in the Gorgias.

To a thinker like Plato, the advantage of the term βοήθεια may have been that it was known by his readers in its most obvious meaning—protection on a physical, military and forensic level—and that, at the same time, it was open to philosophical reinterpretation and subversion. It was, I argue below, at the core of the rhetoric and the way of living that Plato confronted in Socrates’ discussion with Callicles.

2. EARLIER STUDIES OF THE SOCRATES-CALLICLES DEBATE

Many studies could be discussed in relation to the Callicles-Socrates debate in the Gorgias, but I shall confine myself to two views that are relevant to the present discussion of βοήθεια. The first view regards the argumentative structure of the dialogue and its key themes. To the best of my knowledge, Plato scholars have not yet examined the notion of βοήθεια thoroughly in their respective readings of the third part of the work—it has been dealt with in passing by some scholars, but never seen as an overarching notion. The second view on βοήθεια in the Gorgias has been advanced by Thomas Szlezák. According to him, this notion is important to the oral teaching of Plato. I shall present and discuss Szlezák's view below.

Now let me deal with the first view. The influential nineteenth-century Plato scholar George Grote gave an account of the Gorgias in his Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, published in 1865.Footnote ¹¹ In his exposition of the second part of the dialogue, he stressed Socrates’ argument, that it is worse to do evil than to suffer evil; ‘worse’ to the agent himself or herself.Footnote ¹² In relation to the third part of the dialogue, Grote reported Callicles’ theory of natural law (481b–484c, 488b–491c),Footnote ¹³ whereas he did not pay much attention to Callicles’ allegation against Socrates—that he, a philosopher, is unable to protect himself (484c–486d). (However, this passage is important in the argumentative structure laid down by the notion of βοήθεια, as I argue in section three.) Instead, Grote focussed on the discussion of hedonism in the third part of the Gorgias (491d–506c).Footnote ¹⁴ Given this focus on the thesis about acting and suffering unjustly, and on Callicles’ theory of hedonism, Grote ignored the notion of βοήθεια and its argumentative role in the third part of the dialogue. Subsequent commentators have occasionally made isolated observations on this theme, but they have not yet identified the argumentative role of the concept of βοήθεια in the third part of the dialogue.Footnote ¹⁵ This tendency, to stress the discussion of Callicles’ theory of hedonism and to ignore the discussion of βοήθεια, we also find in several other studies.Footnote ¹⁶

There is no doubt that Callicles’ theory of hedonism is important, and it is also understandable that Grote and later Plato scholars have paid little attention to Callicles’ allegation against contemplative men's inability to protect themselves (that is, 484c–486d), since they are presented in the form of Callicles’ macho propaganda, which seems to contain little of philosophical significance. However, two observations should be made. First, Socrates does not return to Callicles’ initial allegation about protection in his rejection of Callicles’ theory of hedonism (503d–506c), but only after this rejection has been presented, namely in 508c–509d (T3–5); this strongly suggests that Socrates regards the issue of protection as a separate issue that could not be reduced to the discussion about hedonism. Second, Socrates refers to his determination of true protection (508c–509d) in his final self-defence and in relation to the after-life myth (521a–527e, that is, including T6–8), suggesting that this concept is part of an extended argument in the third part of the Gorgias, and that it is not reducible to the discussion of Callicles’ theory of hedonism. In section three I argue that, even though Callicles’ hedonistic theory and his natural law theory may be consistent with his understanding of ‘protection’, it is not entailed in either of these two theories but in an additional theory that had tangible implications.

Gregory Vlastos's work on the Gorgias follows Grote's view. In 1983 he published an article, ‘The Socratic elenchus’, which was, in fact, on elenchus in the Gorgias.Footnote ¹⁷ On one occasion Vlastos formulated his approach in the following manner: ‘Socratic elenchus is a search for moral truth by adversary argument in which a thesis is debated only if asserted as the answerer's own belief, who is regarded as refuted if and only if the negation of his thesis is deduced from his own beliefs.’Footnote ¹⁸ Vlastos's identification of the ‘thesis’ debated in the Gorgias was indebted to Grote's Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, praised by Vlastos in his 1983 article.Footnote ¹⁹ To be more precise, Grote had claimed that Socrates’ alleged thesis—that it is worse to act unjustly than to suffer unjustly—was central to the Gorgias;Footnote ²⁰ it was this ‘thesis’ that Vlastos privileged and tested for elenctic elements in his 1983 article.Footnote ²¹ As we shall see in section three, when dealing with T1, Callicles connects this ‘thesis’ with the notion of βοήθεια. Moreover, in T5, also to be discussed in that section, this thesis is directly related to the notion of βοήθεια, which provides a ‘power’ and ‘craft’ to avoid acting unjustly and to avoid suffering unjustly (509d–510a). Unfortunately, Vlastos, following Grote, ignored this connection, for which reason he bypassed the notion of βοήθεια in his analysis of Socrates’ discussion with Callicles.Footnote ²²

The second view on βοήθεια in Plato's Gorgias was presented in 1985 by Thomas Szlezák in his two-volume work dedicated to the theme of oral vs written doctrine in Plato's philosophy, Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie. In the first volume, Szlezák examined Plato's uses of βοήθεια in the Gorgias from this viewpoint.

In his analysis of the Gorgias, Szlezák asserted that βοηθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ is synonymous with ἐπανορθώσασθαι τὸν λόγον, that is, ‘to restore the [earlier] discussion’, found in Grg. 462a2. Szlezák claimed that we do find a ‘βοήθεια-Struktur’ in the Gorgias: both Polus’ and Callicles’ discussions with Socrates are characterized by their endeavours to go back to earlier parts of their respective oral discourses and to ‘straighten them up’ or ‘restore their arguments’.Footnote ²³ Within this reading, Szlezák glossed over some of the occurrences of βοηθέω and βοήθεια in the Gorgias listed above (483b4, 486b6, 508c6, 509b4, 509b7, 509c3, 522c8, 522d4), arguing that here we do find instances of βοηθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, always closely connected with the skill of the dialectician.Footnote ²⁴ The upshot of Szlezák's reading was that the dialectician—that is, the ‘Ideenphilosoph’—is the one who provides true protection by means of his skill in oral discourse.

This analysis is unsatisfying for several reasons. First, if βοηθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ is synonymous with ἐπανορθώσασθαι τὸν λόγον, as Szlezák contended, then one would expect Szlezák to identify and explain the occurrences of this synonym in order to make his case, that we do find βοηθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ in the Gorgias. However, he did not discuss other examples of ἐπανορθώσασθαι τὸν λόγον from the Gorgias than the example found at 462a2. Second, and rather surprisingly, he did refer to several occurrences of βοηθέω and βοήθεια in the Gorgias that are used in the sense of ἐπανορθώσασθαι τὸν λόγον, leaving the reader wondering how one can make a claim about synonymity. Third, Szlezák did not explain in detail the many explicit occurrences of βοήθεια and βοηθέω in Socrates’ discussion with Callicles, nor the argumentative structure to which these terms belong, nor their historical context, for example forensic rhetoric and sophistry. Fourth, the identification in the Gorgias of βοηθέω and βοήθεια with βοηθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ appears reductionist and philologically difficult to maintain—as if designed in order to safeguard Szlezák's preconceived scheme of interpretation, that the core of Plato's philosophy was transmitted orally and esoterically; the written dialogues, to which we have access, should be understood as secondary to Plato's oral and esoteric teaching. Fifth, if the dialectician, the ‘Ideenphilosoph’, is the one who provides true protection by means of his skill in oral discourse, why is the doctrine of ideas absent from the dialogue?Footnote ²⁵

3. BOĒTHEIA AND THE ARGUMENTATIVE STRUCTURE IN THE THIRD PART OF THE GORGIAS

According to Callicles’ understanding of natural law, as we call it now, the stronger has a right to dominate the weaker and to take advantage of his position. This is the justice of nature. Unfortunately, the many have perverted this natural justice and imposed customs and conventions that hinder the stronger from obtaining his legitimate right, thus turning the stronger into a slave of conventions (483e–484a). Callicles’ view implies that the stronger is entitled to rule over the weaker and to have a greater share. He thus rejects the common conception of justice, which refuses this idea of a legitimate, greater share for the stronger. Strong human beings, Callicles points out, are able to protect themselves and their friends against suffering what is unjust; only weak ones are unable to do so (481b–484c). Callicles thus says (T1):

A few words about the argumentative context of this quote. Its first line refers to Socrates’ earlier thesis that it is more shameful to act unjustly than to suffer unjustly, argued against Polus in 468e–475e. In 476a–479d Socrates had added that it is best (for oneself) to be punished, if one acts unjustly. In 482d–e Callicles had protested against Polus’ admission to this thesis of Socrates, and in 483a–b (from which the quote in T1 is taken) Callicles shifts focus to natural law, thereby connecting the thesis with βοήθεια. Socrates’ thesis is further developed after T1. In 508e Socrates reminds Callicles about his argument stated in 468e–475e, and in 509b–d he argues that to commit injustice is the greatest evil against which one should protect oneself, thus linking the thesis to T4 and T5, as we shall see shortly. Finally, the thesis reoccurs in Socrates’ self-defence in 522c (T7), and it resurfaces a final time in his interpretation of the after-life myth (527b).Footnote ²⁷

Now let me return to T1. It is not just a slave (δοῦλος) who would accept such a situation, but a slave taken in war and sold as a slave (ἀνδράποδον), that is, a captive. Adult and robust males, Callicles continues, should not persist in their interest in philosophy, but pursue an active life. In particular, they should acquire the rhetorical skills that can be used to protect their property and civic rights and interests, if taken to a law court. A person who continues to engage in philosophy well into adulthood, and who is unable to protect himself in this Calliclean sense, is a shameful, unmanly and immature person—a person that is ridiculous and in need of a good flogging, Callicles says (485a–e).Footnote ²⁸

Socrates is targeted by this criticism of the contemplative life (484c–486d). In fact, if Socrates were charged for doing something unjust and taken to prison, his accuser could put him to death if he wished so; Socrates would be oratorically paralysed and helpless in a law court.Footnote ²⁹ On this background, Callicles raises an allegation against Socrates and the way of living that he personifies (T2):

The last phrase, ‘to live a life with absolutely no rights in his city’, is rooted in the noun ἄτιμος, which is a negation of the noun τιμή, ‘honour’. This terminology (ἄτιμος) had a forensic pretext. According to Mogens Herman Hansen, an Athenian citizen living between 420 and 320 could suffer full or partial ἀτιμία. The former implied that the citizen lost a series of civic rights: the right to propose a decree to the assembly or to participate in or speak at the assembly; the right to act as a judge at the law courts, the right to indict someone at the public and private law courts, and the right to act as a witness; the right to hold a public office; the right to enter public sanctuaries; the right to enter the Agora. Since civic institutions were located on the Agora, ἀτιμία was very serious for the person in question.Footnote ³¹

Given the Athenian legal system, ἀτιμία had important consequences not only for the person disfranchised but also to the persons in his care, that is, his wife, female relatives and children, because these persons’ rights could only be exercised through the male of the house to which they belonged, typically its κύριος.Footnote ³² This corollary explains a crucial detail in T1 and T2, namely that βοήθεια concerns the protection of an individual person himself as well as the protection of other persons (relatives and friends) whom the person in question intends to protect.Footnote ³³ This double aspect of βοήθεια in the Gorgias (protecting oneself and others) is repeated in T3, T4 and T7, and it is worth keeping in mind, because we easily forget that in classical Athens civic rights were managed by an adult male citizen. Hence the stakes in Callicles’ allegation in T2 are quite high; his allegation not only regards the protection of one's self-interest but also one's ability to protect the interests of relatives, such as wife and children, and friends.Footnote ³⁴

Although Socrates is not prohibited from attending law courts, he resembles such an ἄτιμος, Callicles explains, because he lacks the rhetorical skills needed to protect, or defend, himself or anyone else at a law court, even when facing death. Socrates returns to this allegation in 508c–d (T3), 521b, 522d (T7), in order to turn the allegation against Callicles himself at the very end of the dialogue; facing the tribunal of more insightful judges after death, it is Callicles who will be oratorically paralysed and defenceless (526e–527a, T8). Socrates returns explicitly to the ἄτιμοι in 508c8, comparing himself with such people; like them, he is defenceless when assaulted or indicted at a law court. At the after-life tribunal, when judged by the more insightful judges, however, the soul that has not been nourished by truth will be dismissed to the guardhouse ‘in dishonour’ (ἀτίμως) (525a6; for the context, see 524d3–525a7). At the very end of the dialogue, Socrates warns Callicles that at the same after-life tribunal ‘somebody will give you a demeaning (ἀτίμως) knock on the jaw’ (527a3–4). He declares himself willing to accept the dire conditions of an ἄτιμος (527d1) (in the worldly and legal sense of the word), if only he has lived virtuously, since nothing terrible will happen to such a person (527c6–527d2). In a moment, in T3, we shall return to the famous ‘knock on the jaw’, which epitomizes Callicles’ notion of self-protection.

Socrates does not address Callicles’ theory of natural law and his allegation against the contemplative life immediately after Callicles has presented all this in 481b–486d. Instead, over the following pages, 486e to 508a, Socrates clarifies another component in Callicles’ position, namely his hedonistic conception of happiness, including its idea of desire (ἐπιθυμία), self-control (σωφροσύνη) and lack of discipline (ἀκολασία). Callicles holds that, according to nature, happiness is the capacity to satisfy one's desire (ἐπιθυμία); self-control (σωφροσύνη) is a hindrance to this. So-called lack of discipline (ἀκολασία) is thus a natural ideal, Callicles declares provocatively (491d–494a). Socrates advances two arguments against this hedonistic theory (494a–503d) and ends up rejecting it; as a result, the sulky Callicles breaks up the ongoing interrogation of his views (503d–506c; surprisingly, he returns to the discussion in 509c). At this point Socrates proposes an alternative theory about ἐπιθυμία, ἀκολασία and σωφροσύνη. Contrary to Callicles, Socrates holds that σωφροσύνη is a prerequisite for happiness, and that the order of the universe and its so-called σωφροσύνη must be emulated by human beings in order to become happy (506c–508a).

It is only after Socrates’ rejection of Callicles’ theory of hedonism and his presentation of his alternative theory about ἐπιθυμία, ἀκολασία and σωφροσύνη that he returns to Callicles’ allegation concerning protection, initially stated in 481b to 486d (that is, T1 and T2). From 508b to 510a, Socrates replies to Callicles’ allegation about not being able to provide protection, and he does so by redefining the concept of protection. He first reiterates Callicles’ allegation: Socrates is unable to protect himself, his friends or his relatives against dangers, and this is, still according to Callicles, most shameful (T3) (508c–d). Thereafter, he redefines the notion of shame, which is vital to the kind of protection to procure (T4). Let me first present T3:

As we can see, Socrates refers explicitly to the two key terms applied in Callicles’ allegation in T2 (486b4–c2), namely βοηθεῖν, to protect, and ἄτιμος, one without civic rights. Confiscation of property and exile were both forms of penalties according to Athenian law.Footnote ³⁶

After these words, Socrates repeats his earlier conclusion, that it is more shameful to act unjustly than to suffer unjustly, argued by Socrates against Polus in 468e–475e, as explained above in connection with T1.Footnote ³⁷ The concept of protection should be defined accordingly, Socrates argues immediately after T3:Footnote ³⁸ the most shameful thing to do is not to be able to provide protection against the greatest evils, whereas it is less shameful not to be able to provide protection against the lesser evils. He puts it like this in T4 (509b–c):

What is the greatest evil, according to Socrates? He offers two answers. On some occasions he explains that to commit unjust actions is the greatest evil (for example 509b1–2). On other occasions he explains that the greatest evil is the loss of self-control (σωφροσύνη) (506c–508a). These two patterns of behaviour may coexist. Self-control implies bravery, the urge to act appropriately, both in the context of one's own pleasure and pain, and in the context of one's social relations (507b4–8). Hence, the greatest shame should be attached to these two phenomena—acting unjustly and loss of self-control. To note in passing, Socrates’ subversion of the notion of shame in the Gorgias has some parallels in the Apology.Footnote ⁴⁰

As regards the social aspect, still in the Gorgias, Socrates declares his disinterest in a dialogue with the many (474a7–b1). Instead, he prefers to discuss with a friend (for example Polus, 473a3). Likewise, Socrates does not care about his standing among the many (for example 475e7–476a3). Contrary to Callicles, Socrates’ ἔρως is not directed towards the Athenian dēmos but towards philosophy (481d1–5). If pressed, Socrates prefers to go against the opinion of the many than to violate his own beliefs (482b–c). In other words, Socrates’ personal integrity and autonomy, as formulated in his understanding of ἔρως and βοήθεια, exempt him from the chaotic and relativistic individuation to which the politically engaged person is subjected.

Having redefined the notion of protection according to his notion of shame, Socrates stipulates the following: an ideal form of protection should enable one (a) not to act unjustly and (b) not to suffer unjustly (509c–d). This is stated in T5:

The upshot of all this is that we ought to acquire a power (δύναμις) and a craft (τέχνη) that provides protection against (a) and (b) (509d–510a). This is, in Socrates’ view, true protection.

This reinterpretation of the concept of protection leads Socrates to reflect on the power (δύναμις) and the craft (τέχνη) that may bring about the kind of protection that Socrates regards as ideal: what kind of power and craft should guide someone seeking this true form of protection in the context of tyranny or democracy? (510a–515c) Moreover, his reinterpreted notion of protection provides the criterion according to which Socrates evaluates past and present politicians (515c–520e).

Finally, in 521a–522e Socrates turns against Callicles’ somewhat prophetic allegation that Socrates himself will be unable to provide protection for himself or for others in a law court. Socrates replies that human beings—including himself, accused of corrupting the young and facing execution—may still deserve admiration, as long as they have not acted unjustly towards gods or men.Footnote ⁴² This, Socrates concludes, is true self-protection. It is in Socrates’ brief self-defence that we find two passages concerned with ‘protection’ (T6–7), which are, in fact, one continuous passage:

Is it really true, as Socrates claims, that he and Callicles have ‘often agreed’ on this? In T7 Socrates introduces a subtle but important change of the meaning of ‘protection’ compared with its use in Callicles’ first allegations: in the first half of T7, Socrates does not speak of an agent's ability to protect self-interests in a law court but about not saying or acting unjustly towards men or gods. In contrast, Callicles had not spoken about how to avoid acting unjustly against gods but only about protecting self-interest in a material and civic context.

Socrates’ understanding of protection in T7, not to act unjustly, is in agreement with the benefits that derive from true protection, as explained in T5 (509c6–d2), namely not to do what is unjust (a). Hence, T7 seems to conclude what Socrates has developed about true protection during his protracted discussion with Callicles: the power and the craft pertinent to avoid committing unjust actions consists in exercising σωφροσύνη. However, in T7 Socrates does not speak of (b), how to avoid suffering unjustly.

Let me summarize Socrates’ argument. In T7 Socrates refers back to Callicles’ allegation against the person taken in war and sold as a slave, and to his allegation against the philosophers (Socrates in particular), who are not able ‘to protect’ themselves—‘protect’ in the sense of protecting the property and the civic rights of themselves or of their friends or relatives in a law court (T1 483a8–b4; T2 486b4–c2). This interpretation of ‘protection’ is rejected by Socrates and reinterpreted in agreement with his notion of true protection against what he regards as the most shameful things (T3 508c4–d6; T4 509b1–c3; T5 509c6–d2). Accordingly, Socrates is not ashamed of being unable to display the ‘flattering oratory’ that would protect him at a law court; instead, he does master something far more important, true protection.

The final myth of the after-life (523a–527e) contains the last explicit references to βοήθεια. I refer to it as a ‘myth’, but it should be mentioned that Socrates insists that he regards it not as a myth (μῦθος), as Callicles does, but as a true account (λόγος) (523a1–3). Immediately after the myth has been presented, Socrates refers to his earlier discussion with Callicles, pointing out, against Callicles, that, in the after-life, souls will be judged naked, that is, denuded the outward appearance and social status that so often perverts judgments in this world; in the after world, other and better informed judges will judge these naked souls and reward the good ones, punish the bad ones, thus rectifying the imperfect judgments passed in this life. Hence, the myth, if read literally, connects with the topos of a court, though not a law court in classical Athens but the court after death that provides the final verdict, and it connects with the theme of βοήθεια; in this trial, Socrates states, Callicles will not be able to protect himself. Socrates explains (T8):

The Calliclean understanding of βοήθεια, as pursuit of worldly self-interest, is thus short-sighted and leaves one without the kind of protection that matters most of all, namely the protection that follows from a good inner condition of the soul, its σωφροσύνη (506c–508a). The lack of this mental ‘health’ will be punished at the after-life tribunal, even though a person with such an inner condition may have been judged in favourable manners at civic law courts. In other words, Socratic protection is a means against suffering unjustly, that is, the power and the craft called for in 509c–d (b).Footnote ⁴⁶

The reference to protection in a court in T8 may not only target Callicles, it may also target the historical Gorgias of Leontini. As mentioned earlier, he had stated in one of his speeches, The Defence of Palamedes, that one may accept the help (βοήθεια) of friends (in the form of their intercession) when the trial takes place in front of a mob, but not when the trial takes place in front of noble persons; here one should only rely on truth (ἀλήθεια) (fr. B 11a.33 DK). Socrates’ final words in the Gorgias subvert this view, because he dissociates true βοήθεια from the petty intervention of friends at law courts in front of juries, or crowds, called for in self-interest; Socrates repeatedly expresses his disregard for the opinion of the many, he repeatedly insists on discoursing with friends, and is adamant that he seek truth. Contrary to Gorgias of Leontini's view, βοήθεια is not divorced from truth, according to Socrates’ final words; if βοήθεια is properly understood, he claims, it is associated with truth—in his own life, he relates, it simply means ‘practising truth’ (526d6).