Introduction
Cross-border healthcare is an increasing international phenomenon in England and Wales. Individuals may seek treatment abroad for a range of reasons. One reason may be to facilitate speedier treatment and to bypass waiting lists. Across the European Union, patients have been able to utilize rights of free movement in EU law to facilitate the provision of treatment by claiming reimbursement of treatment when they argued that the waiting times for particular treatment subjected them to undue delay.Footnote 1 Some may travel with the aim of seeking low-cost private dentistry or cosmetic surgery. In other instances the aim may be to avoid statutory or regulatory prohibitions in relation to certain procedures in England and Wales. Similarly, for many years individuals traveled to Italy to seek IVF treatment unavailable to them in the UK, until the regulatory regimes in that jurisdiction tightened.Footnote 2 In recent years there have been a steady number of persons traveling to Switzerland to end their lives, in an attempt to bypass the statutory prohibition on assisted suicide in England and Wales,Footnote 3 although whether this would fall under the heading of healthcare is contestable notwithstanding the fact that it has been the subject of academic attention.Footnote 4
The focus in this article is on one particular form of cross-border treatment: patients who travel from England and Wales to obtain organ transplants through paid donations, payment that, were it to take place within England and Wales, would be prohibited under the Human Tissue Act 2004 through the operation of the criminal law. Although the Human Tissue Act 2004 criminalizes trafficking in material for the purposes of transplantation in England and Wales, what it does not do is to make specific provision for its application outside the jurisdiction. This may have been because paid cross-border transplantation was not thought to be a problem at the time of its enactment. Certainly this issue does not seem to have been the subject of parliamentary consideration during the passage of the legislation. To some extent, this is perhaps not surprising, given that the trigger for the legislation was the major scandal concerning the widespread national unauthorized retention of human material in hospitals and medical schools all over England and Wales.Footnote 5 Instead, much of the debate focused on whether the law was unduly restrictive in its provisions with its focus on consent and thus could be seen as an inhibitor to research. Despite this, only a short time after the act came into force, the potential problems of medical tourism were highlighted in the media.Footnote 6 Adrian McNeil, the chief executive of the Human Tissue Authority, commented: “It is not an offence for a person in the UK to seek medical treatment abroad, but patients seeking this route might find it difficult to assure themselves both of the quality and safety of the transplant and whether the donor has given fully informed consent.”Footnote 7
There have been estimates that, annually, between 30 and 50 British citizens travel abroad for commercial organ transplants, although this number may in fact be higher.Footnote 8 Individuals may seek to buy an organ for transplantation in one of two situations: first, in those nations where there is a state-sanctioned market in organs for transplantation and, second, in locations where there is no state-sanctioned market in organs but where a black market operates. There are several nation-states where, although there is a statutory prohibition on commercial dealing in organs, clear documented evidence exists of a black market in operation. In India, although organ selling has been banned since the Human Organ Transplantation Act of 1994, commentators suggest that there is still a large black market in organ trading. The Voluntary Health Association of India has estimated that about 2,000 Indians sell a kidney every year.Footnote 9 There are concerns that UK citizens are traveling to the Indian subcontinent to receive paid organ transplants.Footnote 10 In China the law adopted in 2007 prohibits commercial transplantation, although there remains a trade in providing organs for payment to noncitizens.Footnote 11 Particular concerns relate to this jurisdiction, given the alleged practice of using organs for transplant from executed prisoners.Footnote 12
This serves to highlight that although many jurisdictions operate statutory prohibitions on commercial dealing—only Iran has a state-sanctioned market in organs—there is evidence of a black market in organ selling across jurisdictions. The question of the validity of a market in organs relates to perceptions of the status of the human body, questions of fundamental dignity, and ideas on human rights, autonomy, and exploitation. It is something that has been the subject of considerable engagement by ethicists, lawyers, policymakers, and clinicians over many years.Footnote 13 Some argue that a ban on commercial organ selling can be seen as an interference with personal autonomy and thus as unjustifiable, regardless of whether a market in organs will increase the overall supply.Footnote 14 Deontological concerns such as respect for individual decisionmaking and autonomy concerning healthcare decisions is reflected in UK jurisprudenceFootnote 15 and indeed has also been reinforced through application of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights—the right to privacy of home and family life—a provision that today underpins English law through the medium of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Utilitarian analysis may also justify a market in commercial dealing in human material. It has been suggested that lifting the statutory prohibitions on organ sales would radically enhance the supply of organs for transplantation.Footnote 16
In contrast, the international, medical, and political community has come out very strongly against commercial dealing in human materials. This is notably illustrated by Article 21 of the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. This article provides that “[t]he human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain.” The Council of Europe’s approach, echoed in their subsequent Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin,Footnote 17 has been reflected elsewhere in Europe and indeed across the broader international community.Footnote 18 The World Health Organization Assembly has consistently condemned the trade in human organs as inconsistent with basic values and as being in contravention of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.Footnote 19 In 2004 a resolution of the World Health Assembly, while noting concern for the shortage of organs for transplantation, went on to urge that governments “take measures to protect the poorest and most vulnerable groups from transplant tourism and the same of tissues and organs including attention to the wider problem of international trafficking in human tissues and organs.”Footnote 20
One concern is that those who may be motivated to sell their human material are generally unlikely to be in a position to effectively bargain in the marketplace, and thus they may be at considerable risk of coercion and exploitation.Footnote 21 International reviews of this area highlight such concerns regarding organ selling.Footnote 22 The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant, which was published in 2008,Footnote 23 noted that although organ brokers charged some £50,000–100,000 to facilitate a transplant, the donors could receive sums as little as £500 for donating kidneys. The document stated that “[o]rgan trafficking and transplant tourism violate the principles of equity, justice and respect for human dignity and should be prohibited.”Footnote 24 It can be argued that this is no more exploitative than many other practices that are sanctioned, such as low-paid work.Footnote 25 Moreover it might be justifiable as a practice if it has the effect of alleviating individuals from acute poverty.Footnote 26 This justification is often disputed, as there is some evidence from India to suggest that such alleviation is likely to be only temporary.Footnote 27 Others question the efficacy of a general market in organs while suggesting that a market could operate effectively if it were regulated, for example, with individuals selling their organs directly to the National Health Service (NHS).Footnote 28 Although such an approach has the potential to provide a controlled framework that enables attention to the health and safety concerns of paid donors, it does not however address the broader issue as to how to ensure effective regulation in a global community. It is also suggested that organ selling may result in the vendor being degraded, although others in turn have repudiated this argument.Footnote 29
The EU has been consistent in its opposition to commercial dealing in human material in general and in relation to organ transplantation in particular, as recent EU legislative statements illustrate.Footnote 30 In Article 3, which concerns the integrity of the person, the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights echoes the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine by similarly providing the following: “2. In the fields of medicine/biology the following must be respected: — . . . The prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain.” This document, which was originally a nonbinding soft law, is of increased importance in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty, which made it a binding part of EU law.Footnote 31 Although certain member states, including the UK, have opted out of the charter, nonetheless it is the case that they will not be immune from its influence, as broad EU health policy will be critically influenced by the provisions of the charter in the future.
This reflects two aspects of the debate: first the argument that in itself trading in human material is inherently wrong and an infringement on the dignity of the individual and second the issue of absence of autonomous choice in those deciding to sell organs and the risk of exploitation. This article does not attempt to resolve these debates. Its aims are much more modest. It asks the following: In an era of cross-border health tourism, if criminal legislative prohibitions by individual states in relation to areas of healthcare provision are to be effective, then is extraterritorial jurisdiction over organ selling and related crimes a necessary corollary? Moreover, if we are prepared to recognize such extraterritorial enforcement, what might be the practical challenges of implementing such legislation? It is suggested that the law of England and Wales concerning organ trafficking may provide a useful case study for an initial foray into this debate. This article first considers the provisions contained in the Human Tissue Act 2004 that relate to organ trafficking and the rationale for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Second, it considers the issue of the jurisdiction of the courts over such offenses when they are committed outside England and Wales. Third, the article explores some of the practical consequences that may result from criminalization. Finally, the article suggests that, if organ trafficking is considered undesirable, the preferable alternative is to take a consistent, global approach to this issue. In the absence of this, the prospect of extraterritorial jurisdiction over transplantation and indeed over other health crimes may need to be actively considered by policymakers in the future.
English Law and Commercial Dealing in Human Organs: A Case of Fundamental Prohibition
Commercial dealing in organs for transplantation first became an issue of controversy in the UK following the Crockett case in the late 1980s.Footnote 32 Doctors who had been involved in bringing donors over from Turkey and paying them for transplantation were subject to disciplinary proceedings before the General Medical Council. The concerns of the medical community and the uproar over this incident provided the trigger for the UK government to introduce legislation—the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989. This legislation introduced a statutory ban on organ selling. It criminalized both the donors and the recipients who were involved in buying and selling organs for transplantation.
The law regulating transplantation and use of tissue for research purposes in England and Wales was subject to a major overhaul in 2004 with the passage of the Human Tissue Act. The origins of this legislation were rooted in the scandals concerning unauthorized retention of human material highlighted in the Bristol Interim and Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital inquiry reports.Footnote 33 These inquiries and a subsequent census by the chief medical officer, Professor Liam Donaldson, revealed massive levels of unauthorized retention of material in hospitals and medical schools around the country.Footnote 34 The ultimate reform of the legislation went much further than might have been envisaged from the original proposals.Footnote 35 The Human Tissue Act 2004 provided a major reform of the law concerning not simply the postmortem use of tissue but much more broadly the use of tissue and of cadavers for transplantation and research.Footnote 36 It is predicated on the concept of appropriate consent, a concept that, although introduced in section 1 of the legislation, remains undefined. For the purposes of this article, the key provisions in the act are those concerning commercial dealing in human material.
The prohibition on commercial dealing in transplantation was included in the reformed Human Tissue Act, which was passed in 2004. The original bill, when introduced into Parliament, contained a total prohibition on commercial dealing in human materials that very much followed the approach that was taken in Article 21 of the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine. However the legislation was subject to intensive lobbying during its passage from the scientific community, and one of the consequent amendments was related to commercial dealing in human material.Footnote 37 During the debates the government minister Rosie Winterton stated that it was “never our intention to interfere with commercial activities that had been lawfully and ethically carried on for many years. We therefore propose to amend the Bill to confine the offenses connected with advertising and supply of human tissue for reward to transplantable tissue only.”Footnote 38 The amended legislation was thus limited to simply focus on commercial dealing in human material for the purposes of transplantation. Section 32 of the Human Tissue Act 2004 now regulates the use of “controlled material.”Footnote 39 Controlled material is defined under the act as material consisting of human cells that is intended to be or has been removed from the human body and for the purposes of transplantation.Footnote 40 It excludes gametes, embryos and also “material which is the subject of property because of an application of human skill.”Footnote 41 This is much broader than the provisions of the 1989 act and extends to cover all cellular material for transplantation. Section 32(1) provides that
(1) A person commits an offense if he:
(a) gives or receives a reward for the supply of, or for an offer to supply, any controlled material;
(b) seeks to find a person willing to supply any controlled material for reward;
(c) offers to supply any controlled material for reward;
(d) initiates or negotiates any arrangement involving the giving of a reward for the supply of or for an offer to supply any controlled material;
(e) takes part in the management or control of a body of persons corporate or unincorporated whose activities consist of or include the initiation of negotiation of such arrangements.
Advertising is also prohibited by the legislation. Section 32(2) makes it an offense to publish or to cause to be published advertisements inviting persons to supply or offer to supply controlled material for transplantation. It should be also noted that there are exceptions under the section. Thus the Human Tissue Authority, the regulatory body for human material established under the 2004 act, has the power to designate individuals to exercise powers that would be otherwise prohibited under section 32. In addition, special provisions are made in relation to certain activities concerning museum acquisitions.Footnote 42 Finally, section 32(6) states that it is not a reward if payment “is in consideration for transporting, removing, preparing, preserving or storing controlled material” and section 32(7) states that the provision of expenses and recompense for loss of earnings to a person who has supplied transplantable material is not an offense. As Hardcastle states: “The practical effects of sections 32(6) and 32(7) are to allow controlled material to be bought and sold by license holders under certain conditions.”Footnote 43
License holders therefore have permission by the Human Tissue Authority to receive payment other than expenses “where it relates to transporting, removing, preparing, preserving or storing controlled material.”Footnote 44 During the debates Rosie Winterton commented that “[we] understand that payments are not being made in respect of human tissue itself.” Such an approach differentiating between the service provided and the material itself is also controversial and has been criticized as being “an artificial distinction.”Footnote 45 Furthermore, what the legislation does not resolve is the law concerning property in human materials.Footnote 46 This area of law remains uncertain. Although the courts have clearly stated that there is no property in a dead body, human material has been recognized as property by the courts.Footnote 47 The first prosecution under the section occurred in 2007. Daniel Tuck was successfully prosecuted for offering to sell a kidney for transplantation on an Internet chat room and was given a 12-month suspended jail sentence.Footnote 48
The extraterritorial impact of the legislation was not the subject of consideration when the legislation was enacted but, as suggested previously, has now become a matter of concern. Does this mean that we should look to the issue of utilizing the criminal law where payment for organs has happened outside England and Wales? It can be argued that it would be contrary to public policy to confine jurisdiction to England and Wales and to condone conduct undertaken abroad and that the courts should be able to deal with cases wherever the offense was committed. In addition it can be suggested that it is unjust for some individuals to be able to escape a fundamental criminal prohibition by undertaking the offense abroad. If there were agreement that policy arguments did militate in favor of extending the applicability of such offenses where they are committed outside the jurisdiction, in principle, is it possible for them to be effectively justiciable?
Enforcing Prohibitions on Commercial Dealing in Transplantable Material outside the Jurisdiction
There appear to be a steady stream of patients who are seeking to avoid the prohibition on commercial dealing in organs by traveling to another jurisdiction for treatment and paying a donor in that jurisdiction or a broker to obtain an organ. If this activity took place in England and Wales, then they would be at risk of prosecution under the Human Tissue Act 2004. Therefore, could these individuals be liable for prosecution for the same offense under the Human Tissue Act 2004 if the act took place outside England and Wales?
One obvious difficulty here is that there is no express provision within the legislation at present that states that the offense is capable of extraterritorial enforcement. Can the courts’ jurisdiction in relation to such offenses extend outside England and Wales? International law provides that all states have the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over events and persons (whether they are nationals or residents) under the principle of territoriality.Footnote 49 States are also entitled under international law to exercise criminal law jurisdiction in respect of events and persons outside their territory.Footnote 50 The active personality principle/active nationality principle enables states to prosecute nationals for crimes that were committed elsewhere in the world where they were not nationals.
But although international law would sanction extraterritorial enforcement, currently English criminal law does not usually extend to cover the behavior of British citizens outside its jurisdiction.Footnote 51 As was stated in Cox v. Army Council by Viscount Simmonds, “apart from those exceptional cases in which specific provision is made in respect of acts committed abroad the whole body of the criminal law of England deals only with acts committed in England.”Footnote 52 In Board of Trade v. Owen, per Lord Tucker, the court held that the criminal law and English criminal courts are only concerned with the preservation of the queen’s peace and the maintenance of law and order.Footnote 53 This was further expanded on by Lord Morris of Borth y Guest in Treacy v. DPP:
In general acts committed out of England even though they are committed by British subjects are not punishable under the criminal law of this country. But as Parliament is supreme it is open to Parliament to pass an enactment in relation to such acts. It is however a general rule of construction that unless there is something which points to a contrary intention a statute will be taken to apply only to the UK. It would be open to Parliament to enact that if a British subject committed anywhere an act designated as blackmail he would commit an offense punishable in England. Such an enactment would however have to be in clear and express terms; specific provision would have to be made with regard to acts committed abroad.Footnote 54
Hirst has commented:
Until well into the twentieth century, things done abroad were most unlikely to come to the attention of the relevant authorities in England and even if they did so they would rarely have been considered the concern of any jurisdiction other than that of the state in which they occurred. Crime, in other words was generally considered to be entirely a local or territorial concern.Footnote 55
Although there are certain specific instances in which criminal offenses apply outside the jurisdiction, none of these are health crimes.Footnote 56 Other offenses explicitly apply wherever they take place, for example, murder by a British subjectFootnote 57 and conspiracy to commit murder.Footnote 58 There are also provisions under the Bribery Act 2010,Footnote 59 and the Sexual Offences Act 2003 contains provisions enabling the prosecution of nationals/residents who commit certain types of sexual offenses concerning children outside the jurisdiction.
In a situation in which some elements or consequences of the offense have occurred abroad but the last part of the offense occurs in the UK, the courts have stated that the offense is within the UK as long as the offense is completed in the UK.Footnote 60 When some elements of the crime are undertaken in the UK but when the offense is completed abroad, then the situation is less certain. The “terminatory” or last-act requirement states that a crime is deemed to be committed only where it is completed.Footnote 61 It has been suggested that this is amenable to exceptions and that crimes could be committed within the jurisdiction in a situation in which the last consistent element takes place abroad.Footnote 62 Were this approach to be taken, it could be argued that, for example, if a donor from another jurisdiction were paid in cash by a recipient from England while in that other jurisdiction, then the recipient could be prosecuted on his return to the UK under the Human Tissue Act 2004. However, in R v. Manning Footnote 63 the court of appeal took a different approach and followed the earlier case of R v. Harden;Footnote 64 that is, the court held that the terminatory jurisdictional approach was that which should be followed. In R v. Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No. 4), a more flexible approach was taken by the court of appeal.Footnote 65 Lord Woolf CJ suggested that to take the approach of the terminatory requirement “leads to a wholly unsatisfactory situation in contemporary circumstances.”Footnote 66 He went on to state that “questions of jurisdiction, although they involve substantive law have a strong procedural element and are less immutable than issues of pure substantive law.”Footnote 67 A leading legal practitioner’s work, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice, contains criticism of this approach. In it, we read that “with respect questions concerning the ambit of the criminal law are not in any real sense procedural but concern the most fundamental of issues. Where (and to whom) does the criminal law apply?”Footnote 68 The text notes that, although Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No. 4) is binding on trial courts in view of its conflict with earlier authorities, it could be open to challenge on appeal. It also notes that if the decision of the court of appeal in that case was correct on that point, then, as a consequence, subsequent legislation, for example, making specific provision in relation to cross-frontier fraud and dishonesty, was unnecessary. The issue of cross-border commission of an offense was discussed in DPP v Purdy in the context of the criminal prohibition on assisted suicide under S 2 of the Sucide Act 1961.Footnote 69 Lord Phillips left open whether the offense applied outside the jurisdiction; Lord Hope took the view that the Act applied where the final act of suicide was performed outside the jurisdiction; Lord Neuberger took the view that the fact that it did not explicitly apply abroad did not mean that the provisions were not applicable. Overall, given the uncertainty of case law in the area, it is suggested that it would be unwise to rely on existing common law principles; instead, specific legislative provisions would need to be put in place to enable extraterritorial enforcement of the criminal law in this area.
The Consequences of Criminalization
If it could be agreed that it was inappropriate and inconsistent to penalize organ selling in England and Wales while not penalizing others who engage in cross-border trafficking in transplantation and thus that the criminal law in this area should extend to apply to offenses committed outside the jurisdiction, a number of issues would still need to be addressed. First, could such offenses be effectively brought to trial? When crimes are committed extraterritorially, this will necessarily involve practical problems regarding investigation of such crimes outside the jurisdiction. Investigation of such crimes outside the jurisdiction would require the cooperation of the law enforcement agencies of the country where the offense was alleged to have been committed by a UK national. The investigation itself would require employing consequent new resources. Second, how would knowledge that the crimes had been committed be evidenced in the first place—how would the prosecuting authorities discover that a crime had been committed? In the case of assisted suicide or murder outside the jurisdiction, there is likely to be a major piece of relevant evidence: the dead body. Transplantation however is self-evidently not obvious in that way. The low visibility of such crimes could become a real practical problem in relation to enforcement. The person who would be best placed to reveal the existence of the crime would of course be the health professional. But to suggest that professional responsibility includes in effect acting as part of the criminal justice process is a matter that would very likely be the subject of heated discussion. In both healthcare professional ethical codes and English law it has long been recognized that healthcare professionals owe a duty of confidentiality to their patients.Footnote 70 Today the obligation of confidentiality under the equitable remedy of breach of confidence is underpinned by the right to privacy, which is safeguarded under Article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights.Footnote 71 This duty is, however, not absolute in its nature. Both professional codes and existing law make provision for exceptions. It has long been held that confidentiality can be overridden by the public interest.Footnote 72 The precise scope of this exception in law remains uncertain. However, it is the case that a health professional who discloses the existence of a crime or anticipated crime is unlikely to be the subject of successful litigation for breach of confidence or indeed under professional disciplinary proceedings in most cases.
One possibility would be to place a specific statutory responsibility for enforcement on health and social care professionals. A statutory duty could be imposed to require persons to report to the police instances in which they had knowledge or reasonable suspicion that a person had contravened the prohibition—for example, by buying an organ in another jurisdiction and consequently needing remedial surgery when the transplant was rejected. This by itself would not be a total aberration, given that there are already situations in which patient confidentiality is compromised by statutes requiring disclosure of crimes or attempted crimes.Footnote 73 Nonetheless it is likely that the imposition of any such statutory duty to assist/facilitate the investigation of a crime in this context will be exceedingly controversial given the ethical and policy debates around the legitimacy of the use of criminal sanctions in this area in the first place.
There would thus be notable practical problems in a criminalization strategy. This raises a further issue: should other strategies short of extending the criminal law to facilitate extraterritorial enforcement be employed to highlight state disapproval of such activities? One possible approach, rather than that of criminalization, may be imposition of some limitations on access to services. There is no right to demand access to NHS resources; rather, this is a question of clinical judgment on the basis of need and is informed by broader policy issues in relation to priority setting.Footnote 74 Although initially it would appear that seeking a paid transplant in another jurisdiction might reduce the strain on NHS resources, this may not in fact be the case. It has been suggested that there is evidence indicating a correlation between patients receiving illicit paid organs and a high level of organ rejection as a result of fungal infections.Footnote 75 This would lead to resultant costs to the NHS in remedial surgery for those patients who have received paid organ transplants abroad and for whom the surgery led to adverse clinical consequences. It also appears that some patients have received transplants abroad when they would not have been eligible under the NHS waiting list at that time.Footnote 76 Instead of criminalizing the patient, the NHS could put the transplant patient who has gone abroad to the back of the waiting list if the organ he or she has received elsewhere fails. A related approach would be to bill a patient for the costs of any resultant NHS treatment that they may subsequently require. Analogous approaches have in the past been suggested in relation to persons who, for example, participate in dangerous sports.Footnote 77 Furthermore the principle of top-up payments is already recognized in various areas of healthcare such as maternity and cancer care.Footnote 78
Nonetheless this type of response is likely to be equally controversial. General Medical Council guidelines have in the past stated that “you must not refuse or delay treatment because you believe that patients’ actions have contributed to their condition.”Footnote 79 Here the waters are muddied still further. Take, for example, a patient who needs NHS care as the result of a botched commercial transplant procedure abroad; this patient may not have been high on the NHS waiting list in the first place, and thus remedial emergency surgery in this case may have the effect of denying other patients resources for someone who under a medical need-based model would not have necessarily been prioritized at that time. Given the complexities involved, these issues of priority setting in relation to situations in which patients are incurring costs as a result of procedures that would themselves have attracted criminal prosecutions had the conduct taken place in the UK may warrant further consideration. Space constraints preclude further consideration in this article.
Conclusions
At present it appears that the international community is fundamentally opposed to a market in organs. This is reflected in international guidance and also domestically in the current statutory prohibition in the Human Tissue Act 2004. Although the legitimacy of this current statutory provision has been the subject of very heated debate, and although opinion among commentators is divided on the issue of the introduction of a market in organs, it is unlikely that the current legal position in England and Wales will be altered in the near future, particularly given the strong condemnation of the practice internationally. But without the prospect of criminal enforcement of such a prohibition, there is the danger that the prohibition itself could increasingly be simply ignored, at least by those who have the financial means to travel and pay for treatment outside the jurisdiction.
If it is agreed that the disadvantages, both ethical and practical, of a commercial market in organs outweigh any perceived advantages, then one approach would be to try and ensure that the international community presents a consistent policy on commercial dealing in organs. As noted previously, there has been consistent international condemnation of organ selling and numerous statements over the years, and the EU itself has come down in uniform opposition to the practice. If all countries put legislation in place and then effectively regulated it, it could be hoped that the problem would disappear—a global solution to a global problem. This option would present the ideal solution, but the reality is likely to be somewhat different; indeed, it is possible to have considerable disparity between law and practice on this issue. Perhaps, then, the time has come for policymakers within the jurisdiction to actively debate whether the question of extrajurisdictional applicability should be taken forward as an option. As noted previously, this is a highly controversial question, and there will inevitably be major practical challenges that would arise in relation to the enforcement of the law in this area. Nonetheless it is submitted that rather than dismissing this issue out of hand, perhaps it is time for a broader dialogue between healthcare lawyers, criminal lawyers, and policymakers as to not only the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to organ trafficking but also perhaps, more broadly, the issue of jurisdiction over and indeed enforcement of health crimes in the future.
