Case C-243/15 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Obvodný úrad Trenčín (Brown Bears II) EU:C:2016:838
Article 47 Charter, read in conjunction with Article 9(2) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention, precludes rules that allow an administrative authorisation procedure for a project likely to have a significant effect on the environment to be concluded if an environmental organisation’s request to participate in the proceedings is still pending.
I Facts
Access to justice in environmental matters is an area of law in Europe that has not always fully lived up to the aspirations of civil society and environmental organisations. Even though the EU and the Member States are party to the Aarhus Convention, access to justice in environmental matters remains a contentious area of law, not least because of the lack of a Directive in this area and the tight standing requirements in direct actions before the EU courts.
The groundbreaking judgment of the Grand Chamber in C-243/15, LZ (Brown Bears II) is, however, a significant positive step for fulfilling the EU’s commitments to access to justice in environmental matters.Footnote
1
In this preliminary ruling, the European Court of Justice found that Article 47 of the Charter (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial), in conjunction with Article 9(2) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention, precludes procedural rules that allow authorities from taking a final decision on a project under the Habitats Directive before proceedings on the status of an environmental organisation in the decision-making process have been concluded. The case not only ensures that environmental organisations are aided in avoiding a fait accompli in litigating decisions with an environmental impact, but also demonstrates the legal force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in this area. What is more, the ECJ significantly strengthened the legal force of the Aarhus Convention by interpreting the Habitats Directive in light of it.
The procedural aspects of this case are complex, even though the factual circumstances are relatively straightforward. In 2008 the district authority of Trenčín in Slovakia initiated an administrative procedure for authorisation of a project relating to the construction of an enclosure that would extend a deer reserve in an area in the Strážov Mountains, designated as a Natura 2000 site under the Habitats Directive.Footnote
2
LZ (forest protection association VLK), fearing the negative implications this would have for wild brown bears in the area, objected to the authorisation.
A dazzling number of court cases followed, including a preliminary reference to the ECJ (Brown Bears I).Footnote
3
Now, the Supreme Court of Slovakia referred the case once again to the ECJ. In essence, what happened was that LZ was precluded from participating in the authorisation process because it was not granted the status of ‘party to the proceedings’ (incorrectly, as the litigation in Brown Bears I would later clarify). However, in the meantime the decision to authorise the project had been taken. The question the Supreme Court of Slovakia was faced with was therefore whether EU law precluded Slovak procedural law from allowing such a decision to be taken when proceedings on the exact status of an environmental organisation in the authorisation process were still ongoing. The Supreme Court thus wanted to know from the ECJ whether Article 47 of the Charter, in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Aarhus Convention, precluded the application of such rules.
In effect, the ECJ was thus faced with a dilemma between, on the one hand, ensuring a high level of environmental protection and wide access to justice and, on the other, ensuring expediency of decision-making and autonomy of national procedural law. In light of Article 47 of the Charter, the ECJ opted for the former.
II Judgment
The Court first had to consider whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights was applicable in the first place before determining its effects in relation to Slovak procedural law.Footnote
4
This was a significant matter, as generally procedural law is a matter for the Member States.Footnote
5
In that sense, Article 51(1) of the Charter determines that it is only applicable to the Member States where they implement EU law. This means, in essence, that the Charter applies to all situations governed by EU law.Footnote
6
In this case, the Court found that the situation was governed by EU law when a Member State’s procedural rules apply to actions concerning the exercise of rights which an environmental organisation derives from Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive: ‘that Member State is implementing obligations stemming from those provisions and must therefore be regarded as implementing EU law’.Footnote
7
The Court established this connection between procedural law and the implementation of EU law by linking the rights granted to environmental organisations such as LZ under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive to the duty of sincere cooperation in Article 19(1) TEU, and Article 47 of the Charter. According to the Court, under the principle of sincere cooperation, the courts of the Member States are required to ensure judicial protection of a person’s rights under EU law. Moreover, Article 19(1) TEU requires Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law. The Court added that in the case of administrative decisions adopted in the framework of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive ‘that obligation also stems from Article 47 of the Charter’.Footnote
8
Thus, the Court found that where EU rights are at issue, the Charter applies to Member State procedural law.
An important underlying issue was whether Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive established any rights for LZ in the first place. Article 6(3) provides that the competent national authorities, before agreeing to a plan or project as referred to in that provision, must, if appropriate, obtain the opinion of the general public. After noting the binding effect of that provision, the ECJ stated that it ‘must be read in conjunction with Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention, an instrument which forms an integral part of the EU legal order.’Footnote
9
The ECJ then proceeded with reiterating the right to public participation in environmental matters under Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, and found that LZ derived a right from Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive to participate within the meaning of the Aarhus Convention in a procedure for authorisation of a project likely to have a significant effect on the environment.Footnote
10
Accordingly, the ECJ found it had jurisdiction to give a ruling on the question asked by the Slovak Supreme Court in relation to the Charter.
The Court then proceeded to investigate whether the Charter precluded the application of the Slovak procedural rules in question. It first set out the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter in light of Article 9(2) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention. The Court found that because Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive gives organisations such as LZ rights on which they must be able to rely before national courts,
such an organisation must be able to challenge, in such an action, not only a decision not to carry out an appropriate assessment of the implications for the site of the plan or project in question but also, as the case may be, the assessment carried out inasmuch as it is alleged to be vitiated by defects.Footnote
11
After noting that in principle Article 47 Charter gives individuals the right to challenge the assessment made by authorities on the basis of the Habitats Directive, the Court proceeded with recalling the principle of national procedural autonomy. Not insignificantly, the Court rephrased the more traditional language on the principle of national procedural autonomy by adding that the Member States are responsible for ensuring that EU rights are ‘effectively protected in each case and, in particular, for ensuring compliance with the right to an effective remedy and to a fair hearing enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter’.Footnote
12
In that context, the Court recalled the circumstances in which LZ had found itself, i.e. that it was not fully able to participate in the decision-making under the Habitats Directive. The Court then found that procedural rules that would allow the continuation of the decision-making process in a situation where LZ was challenging the decision that did not allow it to fully participate in that decision-making process:
does not enable an organisation such as LZ to be ensured effective judicial protection of the various specific rights inherent in the right of public participation, within the meaning of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention.Footnote
13
The Court concluded that as long as there is no definitive decision of a court on the legal status of a party, the authorisation decision cannot be taken. This meant that the procedural determination of who may take part in the decision-making process needs established during the procedure and not afterwards.
III Comment
The judgment sets an important precedent for access to justice in environmental matters and demonstrates the constitutional significance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights for access to justice in Europe. It also sets an important precedent in giving legal effect to the Aarhus Convention by interpreting EU law in light of that Convention.
In that sense, it is interesting to note the different path Advocate General Kokott took. She did not consider that LZ’s rights under Article 47 of the Charter were violated. However, before going down this more deferential path, the Advocate General proposed to grant direct effect to Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention, noting that the Convention was by its very nature and purpose intended to create rights for individuals and associations in the field of environmental protection.Footnote
14
This approach would have been a highly significant step in ensuring the effectiveness of the Aarhus Convention. The ECJ did not see the need to rule on this issue, as it was able to resolve the question by interpreting the Habitats Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights in light of the Aarhus Convention.Footnote
15
Therefore, while the ECJ might have stopped short of giving direct effect to those provisions here, the Court’s approach is significant given its willingness to read the rights contained in those articles of the Convention into other EU law.
On the actual effect of Article 47 of the Charter, the Advocate General’s approach was more deferential and less constitutional. In her Opinion, the Advocate General equates the principle of effectiveness with the level of protection given by Article 47 Charter. She states that her analysis is based on the principle of effectiveness ‘in so far as this gives effect to Article 47 of the Charter, and, if appropriate, the specific expression given to the latter by Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention.’Footnote
16
This presumes that Article 47 Charter does not add anything to litigants’ rights to an effective remedy predating the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The Advocate General subsequently proceeded by analysing whether the rules in question make it in practice ‘impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law’.Footnote
17
Since the Advocate General found that LZ at the time of the proceedings still had another remedy available, this high threshold was not met.
The Court, however, independently applied Article 47 Charter to national procedural law where EU rights are at issue. The Court thus effectively establishes an entirely new standard based on Article 47 Charter alone and no longer applies the high threshold set by the principle of effectiveness. The Court’s approach is subsequently based on how the Habitats Directive operates and the extent to which the applicant’s specific rights inherent in the right of public participation under EU law were effectively protected by Slovak procedural law. In that sense, the Court’s approach is grounded in its hallmark effet utile reasoning, by placing emphasis on the need for effectiveness of EU law rather than on deference to national procedural law.
One final question that arises from this case, is to what extent this new standard for the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 Charter might have implications for direct actions by individuals on the basis of Article 263(4) TFEU. Even in light of the modifications introduced under the Lisbon Treaty, the standing requirements under that article are notoriously hard to meet.Footnote
18
One may wonder, therefore, whether Article 47 Charter would permit the ECJ to loosen its standing requirements for direct actions in order to give greater access to justice before the EU courts as well.
Case C-243/15 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Obvodný úrad Trenčín (Brown Bears II) EU:C:2016:838
Article 47 Charter, read in conjunction with Article 9(2) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention, precludes rules that allow an administrative authorisation procedure for a project likely to have a significant effect on the environment to be concluded if an environmental organisation’s request to participate in the proceedings is still pending.
I Facts
Access to justice in environmental matters is an area of law in Europe that has not always fully lived up to the aspirations of civil society and environmental organisations. Even though the EU and the Member States are party to the Aarhus Convention, access to justice in environmental matters remains a contentious area of law, not least because of the lack of a Directive in this area and the tight standing requirements in direct actions before the EU courts.
The groundbreaking judgment of the Grand Chamber in C-243/15, LZ (Brown Bears II) is, however, a significant positive step for fulfilling the EU’s commitments to access to justice in environmental matters.Footnote 1 In this preliminary ruling, the European Court of Justice found that Article 47 of the Charter (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial), in conjunction with Article 9(2) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention, precludes procedural rules that allow authorities from taking a final decision on a project under the Habitats Directive before proceedings on the status of an environmental organisation in the decision-making process have been concluded. The case not only ensures that environmental organisations are aided in avoiding a fait accompli in litigating decisions with an environmental impact, but also demonstrates the legal force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in this area. What is more, the ECJ significantly strengthened the legal force of the Aarhus Convention by interpreting the Habitats Directive in light of it.
The procedural aspects of this case are complex, even though the factual circumstances are relatively straightforward. In 2008 the district authority of Trenčín in Slovakia initiated an administrative procedure for authorisation of a project relating to the construction of an enclosure that would extend a deer reserve in an area in the Strážov Mountains, designated as a Natura 2000 site under the Habitats Directive.Footnote 2 LZ (forest protection association VLK), fearing the negative implications this would have for wild brown bears in the area, objected to the authorisation.
A dazzling number of court cases followed, including a preliminary reference to the ECJ (Brown Bears I).Footnote 3 Now, the Supreme Court of Slovakia referred the case once again to the ECJ. In essence, what happened was that LZ was precluded from participating in the authorisation process because it was not granted the status of ‘party to the proceedings’ (incorrectly, as the litigation in Brown Bears I would later clarify). However, in the meantime the decision to authorise the project had been taken. The question the Supreme Court of Slovakia was faced with was therefore whether EU law precluded Slovak procedural law from allowing such a decision to be taken when proceedings on the exact status of an environmental organisation in the authorisation process were still ongoing. The Supreme Court thus wanted to know from the ECJ whether Article 47 of the Charter, in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Aarhus Convention, precluded the application of such rules.
In effect, the ECJ was thus faced with a dilemma between, on the one hand, ensuring a high level of environmental protection and wide access to justice and, on the other, ensuring expediency of decision-making and autonomy of national procedural law. In light of Article 47 of the Charter, the ECJ opted for the former.
II Judgment
The Court first had to consider whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights was applicable in the first place before determining its effects in relation to Slovak procedural law.Footnote 4 This was a significant matter, as generally procedural law is a matter for the Member States.Footnote 5 In that sense, Article 51(1) of the Charter determines that it is only applicable to the Member States where they implement EU law. This means, in essence, that the Charter applies to all situations governed by EU law.Footnote 6 In this case, the Court found that the situation was governed by EU law when a Member State’s procedural rules apply to actions concerning the exercise of rights which an environmental organisation derives from Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive: ‘that Member State is implementing obligations stemming from those provisions and must therefore be regarded as implementing EU law’.Footnote 7
The Court established this connection between procedural law and the implementation of EU law by linking the rights granted to environmental organisations such as LZ under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive to the duty of sincere cooperation in Article 19(1) TEU, and Article 47 of the Charter. According to the Court, under the principle of sincere cooperation, the courts of the Member States are required to ensure judicial protection of a person’s rights under EU law. Moreover, Article 19(1) TEU requires Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law. The Court added that in the case of administrative decisions adopted in the framework of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive ‘that obligation also stems from Article 47 of the Charter’.Footnote 8 Thus, the Court found that where EU rights are at issue, the Charter applies to Member State procedural law.
An important underlying issue was whether Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive established any rights for LZ in the first place. Article 6(3) provides that the competent national authorities, before agreeing to a plan or project as referred to in that provision, must, if appropriate, obtain the opinion of the general public. After noting the binding effect of that provision, the ECJ stated that it ‘must be read in conjunction with Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention, an instrument which forms an integral part of the EU legal order.’Footnote 9 The ECJ then proceeded with reiterating the right to public participation in environmental matters under Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, and found that LZ derived a right from Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive to participate within the meaning of the Aarhus Convention in a procedure for authorisation of a project likely to have a significant effect on the environment.Footnote 10
Accordingly, the ECJ found it had jurisdiction to give a ruling on the question asked by the Slovak Supreme Court in relation to the Charter.
The Court then proceeded to investigate whether the Charter precluded the application of the Slovak procedural rules in question. It first set out the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter in light of Article 9(2) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention. The Court found that because Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive gives organisations such as LZ rights on which they must be able to rely before national courts,
such an organisation must be able to challenge, in such an action, not only a decision not to carry out an appropriate assessment of the implications for the site of the plan or project in question but also, as the case may be, the assessment carried out inasmuch as it is alleged to be vitiated by defects.Footnote 11
After noting that in principle Article 47 Charter gives individuals the right to challenge the assessment made by authorities on the basis of the Habitats Directive, the Court proceeded with recalling the principle of national procedural autonomy. Not insignificantly, the Court rephrased the more traditional language on the principle of national procedural autonomy by adding that the Member States are responsible for ensuring that EU rights are ‘effectively protected in each case and, in particular, for ensuring compliance with the right to an effective remedy and to a fair hearing enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter’.Footnote 12 In that context, the Court recalled the circumstances in which LZ had found itself, i.e. that it was not fully able to participate in the decision-making under the Habitats Directive. The Court then found that procedural rules that would allow the continuation of the decision-making process in a situation where LZ was challenging the decision that did not allow it to fully participate in that decision-making process:
does not enable an organisation such as LZ to be ensured effective judicial protection of the various specific rights inherent in the right of public participation, within the meaning of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention.Footnote 13
The Court concluded that as long as there is no definitive decision of a court on the legal status of a party, the authorisation decision cannot be taken. This meant that the procedural determination of who may take part in the decision-making process needs established during the procedure and not afterwards.
III Comment
The judgment sets an important precedent for access to justice in environmental matters and demonstrates the constitutional significance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights for access to justice in Europe. It also sets an important precedent in giving legal effect to the Aarhus Convention by interpreting EU law in light of that Convention.
In that sense, it is interesting to note the different path Advocate General Kokott took. She did not consider that LZ’s rights under Article 47 of the Charter were violated. However, before going down this more deferential path, the Advocate General proposed to grant direct effect to Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention, noting that the Convention was by its very nature and purpose intended to create rights for individuals and associations in the field of environmental protection.Footnote 14
This approach would have been a highly significant step in ensuring the effectiveness of the Aarhus Convention. The ECJ did not see the need to rule on this issue, as it was able to resolve the question by interpreting the Habitats Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights in light of the Aarhus Convention.Footnote 15 Therefore, while the ECJ might have stopped short of giving direct effect to those provisions here, the Court’s approach is significant given its willingness to read the rights contained in those articles of the Convention into other EU law.
On the actual effect of Article 47 of the Charter, the Advocate General’s approach was more deferential and less constitutional. In her Opinion, the Advocate General equates the principle of effectiveness with the level of protection given by Article 47 Charter. She states that her analysis is based on the principle of effectiveness ‘in so far as this gives effect to Article 47 of the Charter, and, if appropriate, the specific expression given to the latter by Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention.’Footnote 16 This presumes that Article 47 Charter does not add anything to litigants’ rights to an effective remedy predating the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The Advocate General subsequently proceeded by analysing whether the rules in question make it in practice ‘impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law’.Footnote 17 Since the Advocate General found that LZ at the time of the proceedings still had another remedy available, this high threshold was not met.
The Court, however, independently applied Article 47 Charter to national procedural law where EU rights are at issue. The Court thus effectively establishes an entirely new standard based on Article 47 Charter alone and no longer applies the high threshold set by the principle of effectiveness. The Court’s approach is subsequently based on how the Habitats Directive operates and the extent to which the applicant’s specific rights inherent in the right of public participation under EU law were effectively protected by Slovak procedural law. In that sense, the Court’s approach is grounded in its hallmark effet utile reasoning, by placing emphasis on the need for effectiveness of EU law rather than on deference to national procedural law.
One final question that arises from this case, is to what extent this new standard for the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 Charter might have implications for direct actions by individuals on the basis of Article 263(4) TFEU. Even in light of the modifications introduced under the Lisbon Treaty, the standing requirements under that article are notoriously hard to meet.Footnote 18 One may wonder, therefore, whether Article 47 Charter would permit the ECJ to loosen its standing requirements for direct actions in order to give greater access to justice before the EU courts as well.