1 Introduction.
Peirce’s study of Kant, and later of Hegel, together with Dewey’s retention of much of Hegel’s social philosophy, are recognised idealist sources of pragmatism. However, the transition from idealism to pragmatic realism was already achieved by Hegel. Hegel’s “Objective Logic” corresponds in part to Kant’s “Transcendental Logic” (WdL, GW 21:47.1–3). Hegel faults Kant for relegating concepts of reflection to an Appendix to his Transcendental Logic (WdL, GW 12:19.34–38), and for treating reason as “only dialectical” and as “merely regulative” (WdL, GW 12:23.12, 16–17). The present paper is the second of two. The first examines three important, neglected features of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason which are key enthymemes undergirding Hegel’s critical reconstruction of Kant’s Critical philosophy, and summarises some features of the philosophical context within which Hegel began to re-assess and reconstruct Kant’s Transcendental Logic. That examination reveals several key steps towards pragmatic realism Hegel took in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit. Building on those findings,Footnote 1 this paper identifies several significant features of Hegel’s pragmatic reconstruction of Kant’s Critical philosophy in the Science of Logic, which corroborate and integrate the previous findings, including: Hegel’s transcendental logic in the Science of Logic and Philosophy of Nature (§2), Hegel’s pragmatic account of the a priori (§3) and a key feature of Hegel’s use of the verb “realisieren” in connection with concepts (§4). These three points are central to Hegel’s specifically cognitive semantics, which—building upon Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference—Hegel developed into a systematic, pragmatic realism. Hegel’s re-analysis of Kant’s System of Principles, in “Of the Transcendental Power of Judgment as Such” (KdrV B171–5), is thus the first and still one of the most sophisticated and adequate pragmatic—specifically pragmatic realist—accounts of the a priori.
The pragmatic principle is a rule for clarifying terms, conceptions or principles, not only by interdefining them with others, but also by linking them in experience to their proper domains. Christopher Hookway states the pragmatic principle in these terms: “we provide a complete clarification of a conception by listing experiential consequences we would expect actions to have if the concept applies to some specified object.”Footnote 2 Such lists may be long, complex, conditional and incomplete. If we take this pragmatic principle as paradigmatic of pragmatism, and distinguish it from verificationism (about conceptual content or about linguistic meaning), we can acknowledge that Hegel did not state, and so did not affirm, the pragmatic principle as such. However, the conjoint implications of several of Hegel’s central doctrines and analyses suffice to show that Hegel espoused and defended pragmatic realism, including a close cousin to the pragmatic maxim. Specifically these include: Hegel’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference (§2.4); his rejection of transcendent metaphysics (§2.9); his concern with the “realisation” of conceptions and principles (§4); his (moderate) mental content, semantic and justificatory externalisms (§3.2); his social and historical analyses of the rational assessment and justification of our categories, principles and claims, both theoretical and practical (§§3.1, 3.5); his rooting theoretical reason in practical reason, and practical reason in our corporeal behaviour within our worldly and social context (§3.5); and his rooting of philosophy deeply within the natural and social sciences and cultural history (§§3.5, 3.6). These specifics of Hegel’s pragmatic realism are examined in three main stages: §2 examines Hegel’s critique of Kant’s “Analytic of Principles”; §3 examines Hegel’s pragmatic account of a priori conceptions; §4 undergirds the findings of both sections by examining Hegel’s concern with the “realisation” of our concepts and principles.Footnote 3
2 Transcendental Logic in Hegel’s Science of Logic and Philosophy of Nature.
2.1. If Transcendental Idealism is unjustified for strictly internal reasons,Footnote 4 as Hegel recognised by 1802,Footnote 5 then Hegel’s successor to Kant’s Transcendental Logic, his Science of Logic, must address the question, whether, how or to what extent can Kant’s Principles of cognitive judgment be revamped, augmented and justified?
2.2. Hegel’s answer to this question is not the purely a priori exercise for which it is still too often mistaken. Taking Hegel’s Science of Logic to be purely a priori requires neglecting its relations to the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit and its many links to historically contingent and natural-scientific conceptions and issues,Footnote 6 and overlooking the important differences between Hegel’s own use of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernables and Leibniz’s.Footnote 7 The notion that Hegel’s Science of Logic must somehow be purely a priori is itself one of the host of presuppositions we are not to make when reading his book (WdL, GW 21:27, 56). That notion precludes doing what Hegel insists we must do, which is to come to understand the character, aims, methods and findings of his Science of Logic as he develops them in the course of his analysis.
The Hegel mythology feeds upon four related shortcomings: (1) mistaking Hegel’s views for what results from reading his texts through the lenses of traditional philosophical dichotomies and typologies which Hegel himself had, for considered and considerable reasons, assessed, criticised and rejected;Footnote 8 (2) giving priority to (purported) exegesis over critical assessment, an approach which insures the longevity of hear-say and guarantees neglect an author’s concern to justify the views s/he espouses; (3) neglecting Hegel’s interest and expertise in epistemology, mathematics and the natural sciences; (4) neglecting issues of whether or how Hegel justified his purported views: recapitulating what Hegel purportedly argues or says dodges rather than addresses this critical issue. These errors are illustrated (all too often) by mistaking Hegel for a mad rationalist who sought to relaunch comprehensive metaphysics by deriving it unilaterally from, well, absolutely nothing. The attribution to Hegel of unbridled metaphysical speculation can be traced, e.g., from Trendelenburg, McTaggart and Stace to Klaus Hartmann and Frederick Beiser.Footnote 9 That Beiser disagrees sharply with Hartmann about the character of Hegel’s (purported) metaphysics is secondary to their equally unCritical approach to their favoured metaphysical misconstrual.Footnote 10 Perhaps Beiser is correct that Schelling was “the most inventive, brilliant and productive of all the absolute idealists, and indeed the most fertile.”Footnote 11 Schelling’s affirmation of objective, organic teleology was important to the development of biology.Footnote 12 However, it takes more than fancy to philosophise: Hegel dug into the details and understood the requirements and responsibilities of critical assessment and justification in ways Schelling never fathomed. E.g., Schelling responded to G. E. Schulze’s (Reference Schulze and Bouterwek1803) brilliant, anonymous reductio of intellectual intuitionism by appealing to Hegel’s 1802 essay on scepticism,Footnote 13 whereas Hegel realised that Schulze had scuttled intellectual intuitionism once and for all, so that the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion must be solved, which Hegel did.Footnote 14 Exposition or recapitulation alone cannot reply cogently to Peirce’s early summary dismissal of Hegel’s procedure: “… Hegel … reaches each category from the last preceding by virtually calling ‘next!’” (CP 1.453).
2.3. Deeply entrenched legend to the contrary not withstanding, much of the content, analysis and justification of Hegel’s Science of Logic—both in its original publication and within his Philosophical Encyclopaedia—is interconnected with his Realphilosophie, that is, with Hegel’s philosophies of nature and of spirit.Footnote 15 Long before Alston made the point in such terms as these,Footnote 16 and in sharp contrast to both his expositors and critics, Hegel recognised that not all forms of epistemic circularity are justificatorily vicious, thank goodness! This is one result of his analysis of the possibility of constructive self-criticism and mutual critical assessment.Footnote 17
Hegel develops a moderate form of conceptual holism by articulating the ways in which and the extent to which the content of our conceptions is defined by contrast and by reciprocal presupposition. Specifying and assessing such conceptual content is central to Hegel’s Science of Logic (WdL, GW 12:27–28), which examines concepts as classificatory and judgmental forms, and hence is not a ‘formal logic’ in any strictly deductive sense.Footnote 18
2.4. Central and basic to Hegel’s Science of Logic is the Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference, which Hegel restates in these terms:
… it is an essential proposition of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, that concepts without intuition are empty, and only have validity as connections of the manifold given through intuition. (WdL, GW 12:19.15–18)Footnote 19
When Hegel calls this proposition “essential” (wesentlich), he refers not only to its centrality within Kant’s philosophy, but to its philosophical centrality as such. Indeed, Hegel links the Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference (I:2.1) to the synthetic propositions Kant sought to justify a priori, and to the transcendental unity of apperception.Footnote 20 We can now understand several reasons that Hegel’s so closely linking these three doctrines—and so doing without appeal to Transcendental Idealism (nor to any related view)—exhibits a crucial epistemological, semantic and ontological insight.Footnote 21
The objective reference of our conceptions to objects occurs in and is constituted through the original, a priori synthetic unity of apperception: if we were incapable of using any of our conceptual classifications in correct and justifiable cognitive judgments about particular objects or events surrounding us, we could not identify ourselves in our awareness of them as being distinct from, and aware of, them, and so would fail to be self-conscious in the ways we typically are.Footnote 22 This cognitive-semantic thesis holds from the micro level of integrating the sensed characteristics of any one perceived item (KdrV B137, quoted by Hegel: WdL, GW 12:18) to the macro level of integrating the observed positions of astronomical bodies into one comprehensive theory of our solar system; Hegel would have welcomed the subsequent extension of astronomy via astrophysics into physical cosmology.
One aspect of Hegel’s opening analysis in the Science of Logic, from “being” up through “Dasein” (existence or “being-there”), is that there is and can be no determinate thought without a determinate object of thought, one sufficiently structured so as to exist, to be somewhere at some time as something determinate, and to be identifiable as such (da sein zu können, seines daß-seins wegen Footnote 23). In this regard, Hegel’s opening analysis in the Science of Logic corroborates and reconfirms his semantics of singular cognitive reference from the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit.Footnote 24
Indeed, this semantics of singular cognitive reference is crucial to Hegel’s aim to specify conceptual categories and principles which “can be true” (WdL, GW 12:27.17–20, 28.8–18). In this regard, Hegel’s Science of Logic contributes centrally to meeting the requirement from Tetens and Kant of demonstrating that our fundamental categories can be “realised” (realisiert), insofar as we can identify and localise objects, events, structures or phenomena which instantiate them (see §4). This is Hegel’s central reason for critically examining the content of our conceptions and principles, starting already in the 1807 Phenomenology,Footnote 25 and continuing in much greater detail in the Science of Logic.
2.5. One of Hegel’s key points, elaborately revised in the second edition of Book 1 of the Science of Logic,Footnote 26 is that Kant’s conception of the distinctive character of the categories of modality—namely, that they add nothing to the conception of the (putatively known) object, but express only its relation to our cognitive capacity (KdrV B266)—does not hold of the categories ‘possible’, ‘actual’ or ‘necessary’, nor of any of Kant’s Categories or Principles.Footnote 27 The closest any cognitive category comes to satisfying Kant’s characterisation of modality, as specifying merely the relation of a known particular to the knowing subject, is ‘measure’, though even measure concerns the quantitative specification of one or more characteristics of some object or phenomenon. This point bears stressing because, in the first edition of the Doctrine of Being (1812), Hegel allows that measure can be regarded as a modality (WdL 1, GW 11:20), a conciliatory remark conspicuous by its absence from Hegel’s thoroughly revised second edition of the Doctrine of Being (1831).Footnote 28
The proper measure (Maß) of something specifies numerically one or more of its qualities, including variable qualities. Only because constitutive qualities of things or events can be measured appropriately rather than arbitrarily—e.g., by naturally occurring rates, ratios or periods—is quantified natural science possible. Indeed, natural philosophy becomes quantified exact science as the sciences of measure, which discern appropriate measures of natural events and phenomena.Footnote 29 Such measures intimate conditions under which (or according to which) the variable quantities of any natural quality occur. In this regard, measure anticipates more robust modal categories by anticipating the identification of conditional necessities, and the constitutive dispositions—causal powers—of entities which manifest these conditional necessities. Hegel expressly criticises Kant’s account of modality in just this connection at the beginning of his chapter on measure (WdL, 11:189.16–24, 21:323.13–324.10.)
Hegel further argues in the Doctrine of Essence that a complete conception of any kind of thing (Sache) includes its constitutive causal characteristics, whereas a complete conception of any specific thing (Ding) would further include its specific causal history (cf. WdL, GW 11:344–7). Accordingly, Kant is mistaken to hold that a complete conception of any (spatio-temporal) thing prescinds from the questions whether it is possible, actual or necessary (KdrV B266), and Hegel is right to remove these categories from Kant’s classification of merely “modal” (merely epistemic) conceptions. Indeed, only by comprehending the proper conception of something can we forge any properly cognitive relation to it and thus cognise—comprehend, know—it.
Furthermore, Kant’s four kinds of Principles are insufficiently integrated, and three of these sets (Kant’s Axioms, Anticipations and Postulates) are too glibly ‘justified’ in terms of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and its consequent constructivism; “systematic” Kant’s presentation is not, nor is it complete, for developments in the natural sciences during Kant’s lifetime—especially in chemistry and biology—outstripped his focus in the Critique of Pure Reason upon narrowly mechanical forms of causation and explanation, a restriction unresolved by the Critique of Judgment, according to which biological life cannot be objectively cognised because in principle mechanical explanations are insufficient whilst teleological judgments are merely heuristic.Footnote 30 Three further shortcomings of Kant’s System of Principles can be detailed concisely (§§2.6–2.8). Kant’s Principles, Hegel realised, require further and more systematic development, including complementary causal modalities to make any determinate, cognitively legitimate use of Kant’s epistemic modalities.
2.6. These issues are, Hegel realised, closely connected with Kant’s subsequent realisation that the Categories require spatial as well as temporal schemata (I:2.2). Whilst correct, providing spatial schemata would still not specify “general though sufficient marks” for “the conditions under which objects corresponding to” the categories “can be given” (KdrV A136/B175). One reason for this is the following.
The only causal principle Kant states in the Critique of Pure Reason is unrestricted: ‘Every event has a cause’. However, the principle required for Kant’s Principles of causal judgment in the Analogies of Experience is more specific and restricted: Every spatio-temporal event has a distinct, external spatio-temporal cause (or causes). Kant first states this specific causal principle in The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, where he recognised that it cannot be justified on transcendental grounds alone, but also requires Critical metaphysics. However, not even Kant’s Critical metaphysics suffices to justify this specific causal principle, because Kant ultimately presupposes—rather than demonstrates on Critical metaphysical grounds—that hylozoism is false.Footnote 31 By 1801 Hegel knew that Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations fails to justify dynamic, causal interaction between distinct physical events.Footnote 32
2.7. This failure is closely linked to a second reason why adding spatial schemata is insufficient for specifying “general though sufficient marks” for “the conditions under which objects corresponding to” the Categories “can be given”: any spatio-temporal particular or phenomenon we can identify, we cannot identify simply as instantiating any or all of Kant’s Categories as such. Instead, recognising any spatio-temporal particular as instantiating any of the Categories requires identifying and individuating it by recognising a variety of its manifest non-categorial characteristics, foremost among these: its occurrent sensed (or measured) qualities. Such identification is also required to solve the (sensory and intellectual) binding problems (I:4.3) in each and every case in which we successfully identify and individuate any spatio-temporal particular of whatever kind or scale.
Kant of course recognised that we use the Categories in conjunction with whatever empirical conceptions we have which pertain to the individual in question, but did not regard this ubiquitous—indeed crucial—aspect of our competent use of the Categories to be a specifically transcendental issue, even if it be (as it is) a task assigned to Kant’s Transcendental Power of Imagination.
Hegel is right that this issue is transcendental, although it is not “pure” a priori in the ways Kant claims for the Critique of Pure Reason (B3).Footnote 33 The issue is transcendental because competent conjoint use of the Categories and relevant empirical conceptions is required to identify any particular whatever, and so is required for us to distinguish ourselves from at least some particulars of which we are aware, etc. In exactly this connection Hegel is correct (I:1), that the Concepts of Reflection—identity and difference, agreement and opposition (or: compatibility and incompatibility), inner and outer—have crucial constitutive roles to play in our identifying and individuating any and all individuals of which we can be self-consciously aware: They are required to use the conceptions ‘cause’ and ‘particular’ in differentiating amongst the various objects, events, processes and phenomena surrounding us, filling our sensory-perceptual field, to identify any of their constitutive characteristics and relations and to distinguish these from other incidental characteristics or relations.
Kant touches on this crucial point only in passing in the Transcendental Deduction:
If for example through apprehension of its manifold I thus make the empirical intuition of a house into a perception, this I do on the basis of the necessary unity of space and the outer sensory intuition as such, and as it were I draw its form in accord with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. (KdrV §26, B162)
By showing that and how perceptual judgments and causal judgments are discriminatory, Kant implicitly (though correctly) showed that any causal judgment about the character of the causal relation now observed involves two—in his terms (KdrV B97–8)—infinite (negative) judgments that the present case is neither of the other two kinds of causal scenario. Likewise, the discriminatory character of perceptual judgment involves negative infinite judgments whereby we distinguish any particular we perceive from other perceptible particulars both spatio-temporally and by their contrasting manifest (sensed, occurrent) characteristics. These contrastive, discriminatory judgments require constitutive use of the Concepts of Reflection, foremost those of ‘identity’ and ‘difference’ and of ‘unity’ and ‘plurality’, to perceive and to self-consciously identify any spatio-temporal particular(s) of which we are aware. Only successful, conjoint, constitutive use of the conceptions ‘space’, ‘spaces’, ‘time’, ‘times’, ‘individual’, ‘individuation’, ‘identity’, ‘diversity’, ‘unity’, ‘plurality’, ‘spatio-temporal cause’ and ‘I’, together with conceptions of relevant sensed qualities, affords us any “realisation”—any demonstrable and demonstrated instantiation—of any of these conceptions. Only when used conjointly are these conceptions able to be true, however minimal or maximal may be this particular truth on this particular occasion regarding this or these perceived, discriminated, individuated particular(s).
In these fundamental regards, Hegel’s analysis of our basic conceptions and principles and their humanly possible, legitimate cognitive use is far more systematic and integrated than Kant’s, for it tightly integrates these several points (I:1–4), and indeed: in strong support of realism about the objects of human knowledge.
2.8. In all of these regards, Hegel profoundly reconstructs Kant’s System of Principles, and does so pragmatically, precisely because he realised, not only that sound transcendental analysis and proof can dispense with Kant’s official restriction to “pure” a priori transcendental conditions of human experience, cognition and agency, but because sound transcendental analysis and proof must dispense with Kant’s official restriction. A further, very basic reason for this conclusion lies in the fallacy of Kant’s purported proof, in the Anticipations of Perception, that because everything real in appearance has an intensity, that intensity has a continuous magnitude (KdrV A166–7/B207–8). This is a non sequitur: In this significant regard Kant oversimplified the quantifiability of natural phenomena. This is one reason Hegel discusses discontinuous functions with such avidity and in such detail in Book I of the Science of Logic (GW 11:121–2, 21:275.31–276.22). This point reflects Hegel’s life-long awareness of the empirical bases for the correct formulation, use and assessment of categorial conceptions and principles (including mathematical quantification), a theme highlighted by his physics instructor Pfleiderer (I:3.1).
2.9. In significant contrast to Kant, Hegel recognised that the Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference (I:2.1, 4.1, 4.2) suffices to reject all transcendent metaphysics—whether pre-Critical or contemporary, or any ontological (mis-)interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealist concept of Dinge an sich—so that Transcendental Idealism is required not at all to combat metaphysical excesses (including purported determinism about human actionFootnote 34). In this basic regard, too, Hegel’s views are profoundly, pragmatically realist.
As with pragmatism, Hegel’s rejection of transcendent metaphysics is not verificationist. Hegel’s rejection turns not on a thesis about conceptual content (intension) or linguistic meaning, but on a basic referential requirement of any candidate cognitive claim, that to have a determinate truth value (or value as an approximation), for this value to be determinable (specifiable), for this claim to have a justificatory status and for this status to be determinable (specifiable), all require locating and individuating the particular(s) about which that claim purports to be a claim. This thesis holds independently of whether knowledge is cast in terms of sentences, statements or judgments, and of whether it involves a priori, empirical, hybrid or intermediate conceptions.
2.10. Central to Hegel’s issues in the Science of Logic are two key features of quantitative natural science. First, quantitative laws of nature cannot be justified simply by mathematics (WdL, GW 21:272)—pace Galileo’s kinematics and Newton’s statics of fluids.Footnote 35 Second, the natural sciences use conceptions and principles which they do not fully articulate and assess. Such conceptions and principles are open invitations to a priorist philosophers, such as Descartes and Kant, who insisted that physical science requires prior and independent metaphysical foundations.Footnote 36 Hegel foreclosed on such metaphysical speculations through philosophical analysis of basic scientific conceptions and principles within their explanatory domain(s), to show how they are closely inter-defined in ways which anticipate and found their quantitative as well as their qualitative relations, and which resolve what (e.g.,) Descartes and Kant mistook for open metaphysical questions.Footnote 37
2.11. A further central aim of Hegel’s Science of Logic is to show the ways in which and the extent to which mechanical systems can be self-regulating (as mechanical oscillators) in order to differentiate properly between mechanical, chemical, functional or teleological and properly organic functions, and in order to outline the basic ways in which organic life is possible only through interaction with its organised environment, in which organisms intervene.Footnote 38 Hegel’s analysis of the conception of life is explicative, not explanatory. Accordingly, Hegel’s view is independent of scientific issues about the truth of natural selection. Hegel rejected natural selection because at that time it lacked sufficient empirical evidence. His philosophical system, however, can readily incorporate natural selection; he would agree with the Classical Pragmatists in taking biological evolution very seriously. Already in the Introduction to “Self-Consciousness” and in “Lord and Bondsman” Hegel argued cogently that our conceptual, classificatory thought is rooted in our biological needs and capacities, and in our labouring—at first altogether manually—upon the materials we need and want.Footnote 39
2.12. In all of these fundamental regards, Hegel’s model of philosophical science revamps Aristotle’s meta ta physica on the basis of modern natural sciences. In effect, Hegel agrees with Galileo that, if he had fuller observational information about nature, Aristotle would have revised his first principles.Footnote 40
3 Hegel’s Pragmatic A Priori.
3.1 Another major achievement of Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology is to further develop Kant’s constructive method for identifying and justifying his inventory of our basic cognitive capacities, discussed in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method,Footnote 41 and central also to Kant’s moral philosophy, including his universalisation tests.Footnote 42 Hegel developed Kant’s constructive method into a sound social and historical account of rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains. Hegel achieved this result by linking his account of the possibility of constructive self-criticism in the Introduction (not the Preface) to the Phenomenology of Spirit Footnote 43 with his sustained and thorough criticisms of individualism about the mental throughout “Self-Consciousness,” “Reason” and “Spirit” and with his ultimate analysis of mutual recognition and its fundamental role in constructive mutual, critical assessment in “Evil and Forgiveness.”Footnote 44 Hegel demonstrates that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains—i.e., in empirical knowledge or in morals (both ethics and justice)—is in fundamental part socially and historically based, although these social and historical aspects of rational justification are consistent with realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and with strict objectivity about basic moral principles.Footnote 45 Hegel’s central thesis is that, to judge fully rationally that one judges—in ways which provide rational justification of one’s judgment about any substantive matter—requires recognising one’s inherent fallibility and consequently also recognising our mutual interdependence for assessing our own and each others’ judgments and their justification. This explication provides a pragmatic account of rational justification in substantive domains which puts paid to the traditional distinction, still influential today, between ‘rational’ and ‘historical’ knowledge, as also to the bogey of historicist relativism.Footnote 46
Many pragmatists understandably share Peirce’s deep suspicion of a priori methods,Footnote 47 and hence reject transcendental analysis and proof. However, carefully crafted transcendental analysis and proof are consistent with pragmatic fallibilism,Footnote 48 as C. I. Lewis demonstrated—like Hegel—in direct connection with the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold.Footnote 49 Indeed, Hegel’s attention to the a priori transcendentally necessary use of impurely a priori conceptions and principles recounted above (§§2.7, 2.8) directly extends his early critical probing of Kant’s transcendental power of imagination and the transcendental affinity of sensory manifold.Footnote 50 His early rejection of Hegel’s views not withstanding, Peirce later came to admire Hegel’s radical re-analysis of logical categories, especially those concerning essence (Wesen),Footnote 51 which is reflected in the correspondences between Kant’s Principles and Hegel’s Science of Logic with which this study began (I:1). Peirce appears to have realised that Hegel’s Science of Logic does not use “the a priori method” of fixing belief Peirce had discredited earlier.
3.2 Though the designations are recent, Kant had already argued, soundly on transcendental grounds, for mental content externalism and for justificatory externalism:
Mental Content Externalism: In at least some significant cases, specifying the content of some mental state(s) requires specifying features of the subject’s environment, or of their own somatic states.
Justificatory Externalism: In at least some significant cases, the justificatory status of a person’s belief, claim or judgment depends upon (some) factor(s) of which s/he need not be (readily) aware simply by introspection or reflection.
Both theses belong to Kant’s profound anti-Cartesian revolt,Footnote 52 a revolt Hegel carried forward, indeed so boldly that we are still trying to bring his insights and contributions into proper focus. Hegel adopted and further developed both of these externalist theses. To these Hegel added:
Semantic Externalism: In at least some significant cases, the content of conceptions or the meaning of terms or phrases is in part a function of those aspects of the (natural or social) world to which their use pertains.
Semantic externalism is expressed in Hegel’s treatment, in the Science of Logic, of the tight interconnections between the Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference, the transcendental unity of apperception, synthetic a priori judgments, and Kant’s Refutation of Idealism (I:5.2; cf. above §2). Semantic externalism is central to Hegel’s grounding theoretical reason in practical reason, and practical reason in our bodily actions in their worldly context, in his critique of the alleged Self-Sufficiency of Self-Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit (I:4.5). Semantic externalism is also central to Hegel’s analysis of the self-critical structure of consciousness,Footnote 53 which further supports his justificatory externalism.
3.3 Having recognised that categorial and empirical conceptions are mutually interdependent for their use, and that their use requires discriminatory judgments by which we individuate particulars by locating them amongst other particulars within our surroundings (however locally or globally specified; §2), Hegel also advanced a moderate semantic holism and a moderate justificatory holism. In both cases I say ‘moderate’ to indicate Hegel’s stress upon the interdependence of particular, general and universal conceptions, judgments, principles and cognitive claims. Like C. I. Lewis,Footnote 54 and as Carnap ultimately admitted,Footnote 55 Hegel realised that our conceptions and categories are mutually interdefined. Their (respective) understandings of these mutual interdefinitions must be distinguished from Quine’s. Quine occluded these significant relations in two basic regards: first, his unarticulated and inarticulate contrast between the “periphery” and the “interior” of our purported “system[s] of statements,”Footnote 56 a radical holism not improved upon in principle when later Quine adopted the equally unarticulated, equally inarticulate notion of “semantic mass”;Footnote 57 second, Quine’s neglect of the many cognitive and semantic differences between the “interpretation” of a logical calculus and the use of any scientific theory in the actual investigation of its natural or social domain. Quine’s notion of ontological commitment concerns ‘theories’ interpreted as having some model or other.Footnote 58 Scientific theories, however, are not by themselves any guide to what exists; that guidance they provide only in connection with experimental and observational procedures, including the evidence collected and assessed as (interim) results of actual scientific investigations, none of which is visible from Quine’s lofty “logical point of view.”Footnote 59
In contrast to Quine’s extentionalist logical point of view, though much like Peirce, Hegel valiantly sought to articulate the fundamental structure and sub-structures of our conceptual systems, because he realised that only by specifying, differentiating and interrelating our conceptions, principles and judgments as thoroughly as we can, can we properly assess their adequacy and their proper scope, domain(s) and use.Footnote 60 Both assessments are central to Hegel’s lead question of whether or to what extent our fundamental categories, principles and judgments “can be true” (WdL, GW 12:27.17–20, 28,8–18).
3.4 All of these considerations are brought to bear, e.g., in Hegel’s analysis of perceptual judgment in the Science of Logic, as nicely re-examined by Paul Redding.Footnote 61 To Redding’s critique of BrandomFootnote 62 I add Hegel’s manifold, sophisticated forms of externalism and the Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference. Brandom’s “strong inferentialism” remains committed to semantics as first philosophy, and to a sophisticated form of semantic internalism, insofar as inferentially articulated propositional contents are his philosophical arche for all else, including epistemology and ontology. Brandom adopts Hegel’s phrase “determinate negation” and continues to presume it means the kinds of sentential negations basic to his own strong inferentialism.Footnote 63 Brandom’s incompatibility semantics is based upon propositional negations,Footnote 64 but if his semantics is not to be an exercise in pure axiomatics, those negations must be rooted in and reflect material incompatibilities of de facto, ultimately natural occurrences and their characteristics.Footnote 65 Hence his incompatibility semantics can at best explicate these material phenomena, but cannot constitute them. This requires a realism and a naturalism which Brandom, loyally following Rorty, rejects and seeks to avoid.Footnote 66
Hegel himself means something quite different by “determinate negation”; he introduced the phrase and used the methods so designated in connection with assessing forms of consciousness or philosophical views through strictly internal critique.Footnote 67
Furthermore, sentential negation cannot do the job Brandom assigns to it. Sentential negation only generates content if the sentence negated has some (antecedent) semantic content or other.Footnote 68 Simply negating uninterpreted sentential variables is semantically vacuous. Semantically interpreted sentential variables, however, have their semantic content prior to and independent of their negation—for any case whatever, however elementary, simple or basic. To obtain any semantic content via sentential negation, at least one semantically interpreted, semantically significant sentence must be presupposed, rather than explicated, by Brandom’s inferentialist semantics. This problem has been at the core of Brandom’s semantics since 1983; others, too, noticed it then. Brandom’s recent reworking of his view has not addressed that problem.Footnote 69 By treating our differential corporeal responses to worldly circumstances strictly “naturalistically” (i.e., causally), Brandom inherits a weakness of Sellars’ treatment of sensations as only belonging to the causal order—a weakness central to Rorty’s dismissal of realismFootnote 70—and misses Dretske’s insights into the semantic character of information states and their transmissibility, which accords very well with Kant’s, Hegel’s and Sellars’ sensationist account of sensations.Footnote 71 Tracking, articulating or expressing content which is (at least in part) sensory is not the same as constituting that content merely inferentially. Brandom’s strong inferentialism exhibits the pervasive neo-pragmatist tendency to hold any first- or lower-order language and its (purported) objects hostage to his preferred (strong inferentialist) meta-language. This is why “experience” is not amongst Brandom’s “words,”Footnote 72 and why the “analytic pragmatism” “toward” which Brandom is working is decidedly neo-pragmatist rather than pragmatist.Footnote 73 Brandom is working entirely within that mainstream of analytic philosophy which sought, and still seeks, to supplant epistemology with philosophy of language. In just this regard Brandom is “still rewriting [his] dissertation” for Richard Rorty.Footnote 74
3.5 The priority within analytic philosophy of meta-languages over first-order languages was undermined by 1950 when Carnap explicated his method of conceptual explication,Footnote 75 which he had implicitly used from at least 1928. Within any non-formal domain—i.e., outside pure axiomatics—recourse to meta-languages can only be fruitful and informative, and can only be assessed, by examining all the more closely the original—antecedent or current—contexts of use in which the explicated terms or phrases have sense, meaning and point. Unlike conceptual analysis, and however unwelcome these implications would have been to Carnap, conceptual explication involves fundamental aspects of semantic externalism: that linguistic meaning and conceptual content are rooted in our corporeal and social practices, which themselves are rooted in our natural and social world. These features of linguistic meaning and conceptual content can be explicated, articulated and with discernment refined by philosophical reflection, i.e., conceptual explication, perhaps using formalised techniques, though only insofar as these fundamental aspects of semantic externalism are acknowledged in practice—and all the better in theory too.Footnote 76 Philosophy of language—and likewise philosophy of mind—can augment epistemology, but they cannot supplant it, because (at the very least) neither the phenomena of cognitive justification nor the relevant concepts of cognitive justification are reducible to those of philosophy of language or philosophy of mind.Footnote 77 Matters can appear otherwise within Brandom’s strong inferentialism only because, and to the extent, that his inferentialist meta-language successfully tracks—that is, follows, reiterates but does not account for—first-order cognitive phenomena, including our justified and justifiable cognitive judgments and our sapient, sensory discrimination of informative natural states of affairs.
Hegel already understood these points very well, having recognised the failures of Kant’s attempt to ground physics a priori in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, which in turn was to be grounded by the transcendental Critique of Pure Reason. The minimal semantic content presupposed by any sentential negation, is, in Hegel’s view, in part a function of our sensory experience of the world and what it makes manifest to us. This thesis, however, does not require aconceptual experience, nor any recourse to mythical givenness; this is one direct, important implication of Hegel’s analysis of the self-critical structure of our consciousness of objects, and also of the Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference. Brandom’s strong inferentialism may have been in part inspired by Hegel, but most definitely it is not Hegel’s view.
Hegel’s genetic method (WdL, GW 11:8.4–9, 21:8:16–21) is, like Hume’s, also an analytical method, because it incrementally identifies the proper scope, limits and conditions for the proper use of our conceptions, principles and judgments. Developing, assessing and revising our conceptions, principles and judgments is an historical and social process. For this reason Hegel elevated the history of philosophy to a specifically philosophical discipline, because he realised that only by comprehending the insights and the oversights of our predecessors can we identify the character, content and suitability of our current terms, analyses and views.Footnote 78 Amongst pragmatists, Peirce and Wilfrid Sellars recognised the philosophical significance of the history of philosophy, in marked contrast to its cavalier mishandling by neo-pragmatists.Footnote 79
3.6 Conceptual analysis classically aspired to providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper use of some problematic concept, term, phrase or principle. It is significant that Kant recognised that conceptual analysis is insufficient for addressing substantive philosophical issues (KdrV B264, 408), and that the a priori concepts of concern to him—the Categories—cannot be defined or analysed, but only explicated, that is: partially expounded for the purposes of a particular inquiry and use (KdrV B25–8, 108–9). It is significant that Kant (KdrV B755–8) and Carnap (above, §3.5) drew very much the same distinction between conceptual analysis and conceptual explication, and for very nearly the same reasons, despite their disagreement about a priori concepts and their significance. Kant regretted lacking a German counterpart to “explicatio” (KdrV, B758); Hegel adopted and employed the Germanisms “Explikation” and “explizieren,” adding them to the second edition of Book I of the Logic (WdL, GW 21:127.7, 157.3; cf. Enz. §§10, 84, 280Z, 334Anm., 464Anm., 573Anm.). Hegel’s use of the terms “Explikation,” “explizieren” and their cognates clearly indicates that he regards this as central to his methods.Footnote 80 Hegel agreed with Kant that many fundamental concepts are a priori, insofar as they cannot be defined or acquired in accord with concept empiricism,Footnote 81 though unlike Kant yet very much in accord with Carnap’s explication and use of “explication,” Hegel recognised that the adequacy of any conceptual explication can only be assessed within possible contexts of its actual use (and not within merely imagined contexts of its possible use). This holds for individual concepts, terms, phrases or principles, and for any fragments of languages to which they are central (or even relevant). Due to moderate semantic holism (§2.2), the more general is the meaning or significance of concepts, terms, phrases or principles, the more broad-scale must be the context within which they are explicated, and within which their explications are assessed. Consequently, informed, careful history of philosophy—and intellectual history more broadly—is required for informed, insightful philosophical explication and assessment of broad, general concepts and principles—as distinct to conceptual analysis.Footnote 82 The significance of Hegel’s use of conceptual explication is reinforced by some important, neglected points about his account of “the realisation of the concept.” Examining these points further corroborates, reinforces and integrates the finding of the preceding two sections (§§2, 3).
4 Hegel’s Ontology and the Realisation of the Concept.
4.1 I have argued that in central regards Hegel developed a sophisticated pragmatic realism, and that his pragmatic realism is in several important regards sound, whilst hardly mentioning a key term in these issues: idealism, other than to indicate Hegel’s rejection of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. Typically, the ontological sense of ‘idealism’ is taken to connote the dependence of some particular’s existence or characteristics (or both) upon some numerically distinct mind. Hegel deliberately and expressly used the term ‘idealism’ in a broader sense, indicating ontological dependence, not specifically upon minds, but upon anything else. Hegel’s idealism is a moderate ontological holism (not a block universe), deliberately consistent with realism about the objects of empirical knowledge.Footnote 83
Nevertheless, myths die hard, especially amongst their proponents, and the notion that, somehow, Hegel’s fully fledged Weltgeist is supposed to generate itself ex nihilo through the self-realisation of the concept, dies especially hard, especially amongst Hegel’s detractors. A few sensible words here about Hegel’s uses of the term ‘realise’ (and its cognates) serve to corroborate the preceding interpretation and to disarm some habitual objections. (For brevity I set aside Hegel’s social ontology and philosophy of history; these I have discussed elsewhere.)
4.2 Hegel uses the term ‘realise’ in three basic, related ways. One concerns the “realisation” of an aim or goal through action, by achieving that aim or goal (e.g., Enz. §204).
4.3 A second is Tetens’ and Kant’s sense of the term, i.e., demonstrating that a conception or principle has instances by locating relevant instances.Footnote 84 As Redding rightly notes,Footnote 85 Hegel’s treatment of judgment in the Science of Logic is concerned with judgments about particulars, such as perceptual judgments. In contrast to considering relevant classifications (intension, as »Begriffsbestimmungen«, eine »gesetzte Bestimmtheit« eines Begiffs, or »die bestimmten Begriffe«; WdL 12:53.3–6Footnote 86), judgments specify which of these specific or determinate conceptions are instantiated:
What determinate concepts there are, and how these determinations are necessary, must be shown in judgment. (WdL 12:53.12–14)Footnote 87
Judgment is “the other” function of the concept, complementing (provisional, presumptive) classification. Hegel states:
Hence the judgment can be called the next realisation of the concept, insofar as reality designates as such the entering into existence as determinate being. (WdL 12:53.15–17)Footnote 88
“Determinate being,” “Daseyn als bestimmtes Seyn,” recalls Hegel’s analysis in the second chapter of the doctrine of being, Das Daseyn, in which (as noted above, §2.4) Hegel argues that any extant object must be sufficiently structured so as to exist, to be somewhere at some time as something determinate, and to be identifiable as such. That corroborates and reconfirms Hegel’s semantics of singular cognitive reference from the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, which is further developed and corroborated in his account of judgment, which centrally concerns specific judgments about extant particulars and their characteristics. ‘Subject’ and ‘predicate’ are names of logical place holders; only in specific judgments about specific particulars are ‘subject’ terms and ‘predicate’ terms specified in any determinate way (WdL 12:53.17–54.34). Only by specifying our conceptions in determinate judgments about identified particulars do we “realise” our conceptions, without which they remain subjective representations (“Vorstellungen”; WdL 12:55.10–22). Hegel states this as directly and concretely as could be wished:
Hence bound up with judging is the reflection, whether this or that predicate in the head, could or should be ascribed to the object, which is out there unto itself; judging itself consists in first combining a predicate with the subject, so that if this connection did not occur, subject and predicate, each of them would remain what it is, the former an extant object, the latter a representation in the head. (WdL, 12:55.17–22)Footnote 89
This point is developed in detail in Hegel’s account of the syllogistic figures,Footnote 90 which taken together provide for the “realisation” of the concept.Footnote 91
4.4 A third sense of “Realisieren” concerns structures fully articulating or manifesting themselves. These three uses of “realise” are related. Achieving one’s aim “realises” one’s preconceived aim by producing its instantiation; this links the first and second senses. I have throughout spoken of ‘conceptions’, whereas Hegel uses either “Vorstellung” or “Begriff”: “representation” or “concept.” In Hegel’s usage, a “Vorstellung” is in some significant way merely a subjective representation, because it is not properly instantiated by the world or by some aspect(s) of it, whereas “Begriffe” (he contends) are actual structures of the world, which we comprehend when thinking and judging adequately and properly about the world. For this latter case I use the term ‘conception’, to grant Hegel his decidedly ontological sense of “concept.” Why does he cast his ontology in terms of structures—concepts—articulating or manifesting themselves? Because whatever exists, exists now, and exists as something in some or another definite way(s), which persists only so long and to the extent that it maintains its constitutive integrity.
The persistence of the constitutive integrity of spatio-temporal material particulars is, Hegel realised, a function of their causal integrity, which is a function of the cohesion of its material constituents and whatever connects its constituents together, whether mechanically, magnetically, chemically or electrically (Enz. §309). Consequently, it is misleading or even confused to say that causal relations and structures persist because material particulars persist. Conversely, material particulars do not persist because causal relations and structures persist. Rather, the persistence of any material particular is the persistence of its causal structures and relations over some period of time within some region of space. To represent such continuants as four-dimensional space-time worms is our representation, and we must be very careful, Hegel argues in detail, not to mistakenly reify our manners of representing—things as four-dimensional objects. I have cast Hegel’s view in terms of material particulars to accord with his view that the distinction between any ‘substance’ and its ‘accidents’ or ‘properties’ is only our own analytical distinction, which if reified thwarts knowledge and comprehension, in any particular case or in general.Footnote 92 Comprehending a material particular requires discriminating, identifying and comprehending its persisting, constitutive structures and relations, and determining—that is: discovering and specifying—as well as we can which of these structures and relations are fundamental to the particular in question, which are less fundamental and which are merely incidental to it. Hegel’s holistic analysis repeatedly stresses that what anything is, exists only in its various internal structure(s) and its relations, it is manifest only in its various internal structure(s) and its relations, and its cognisable and comprehensible only in its various internal structure(s) and its relations.Footnote 93
4.5 Accordingly, to realise any of our conceptions in the second sense (per Tetens and Kant), requires us to comprehend how our true and justified judgments about any known particular differentiate and integrate our recognition of its constitutive structures and relations, and any relevant incidental structures and relations. What we “posit” or affirm in our cognitive judgments must track what these causal structures “posit” or produce as they continue to work themselves out.Footnote 94 These themes are fundamental to Hegel’s analysis (inter alia) of “absolute knowing” in the 1807 Phenomenology Footnote 95 and to both “Subjectivity” and “Objectivity” in the second part of his Science of Logic.Footnote 96
Hegel’s ontology is more holistic or organic than those of the Classical Pragmatists, but he agrees with them about one important point: that our conceptual classifications are intellectual, practical coping devices for grappling with and—with care, diligence and due attention—classifying, characterising and comprehending the world we inhabit, including its history, which includes us and our history—for however long we may manage to continue, individually and collectively.
If this sounds too sober and sound to be ‘Hegel’, recall that Theunissen argued in detail that all of the conceptual mediations examined by Hegel in his Science of Logic aim inter alia to reconfirm that those conceptual mediations only are and only are true insofar as they are instantiated by actual, extant, determinate beings which we correctly judge to be as they are.Footnote 97 Lau, too, details how Hegel’s Science of Logic is primarily a critical theory of forms of judgment and of our proper understanding of such judgments—all stated, of course, as propositions.Footnote 98 Though he does not mention Tetens (neither does Theunissen), Lau recognises and documents Hegel’s use of the term ‘realisieren’ in just the sense Tetens first established.Footnote 99 Accordingly, Hegel’s Logic is a theory of categories, standing squarely in the tradition marked by Aristotle and Kant.Footnote 100 This is made especially plain by important commonalities in Kant’s, Hegel’s and Peirce’s analyses of ampliative syllogisms.Footnote 101
5 Conclusion.
Hegel did not state, and so did not affirm, the pragmatic principle as such. However, the conjoint implications of his several epistemic and logical doctrines examined herein provide excellent grounds for classifying Hegel’s philosophy as pragmatic realism, and as involving a very close cousin (at the very least) to the pragmatic maxim.
To these considerations we may add Hegel’s non-reductive naturalism, or more specifically, his commitment to emergence and to understanding the organisation and behaviour of complex systems,Footnote 102 themes which only recently have finally been allowed an airing within analytic philosophy.Footnote 103
We may also add that Hegel’s social ontology, according to which individual human beings are fundamentally social practitioners, and that social practices and social practitioners are mutually interdependent for their existence and their characteristics,Footnote 104 was adopted and further elaborated by both Dewey and Mead.Footnote 105 Finally, Hegel’s interests in intellectual, cultural and political history, and in the philosophical understanding and cultural significance of the natural and social sciences exhibit a central interest shared by Peirce and designated by Dewey as “Reconstruction in Philosophy.”Footnote 106
Hegel’s views are thus squarely within the pragmatist fold, more specifically: within the unjustly neglected pragmatic realist fold.Footnote 107 Hegel’s ontological holism, together with his incisive account of the social and historical aspects of rational justification, form a sophisticated basis for the comprehensive, holistic thinking required today, both in theory and in practice. When it comes to pragmatism, settle for nothing less than the genuine original. Yes, everything must be made as simple as possible, but as Einstein adroitly noted: no simpler!Footnote 108
Acknowledgements:
This paper benefited from presentation to the conference, “Idealism and Pragmatism: Convergence or Contestation?” (Sheffield, October 2013), and—in honour of Rein Vihalemm’s contributions to history and philosophy of science—to the Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu (December 2013). I am grateful to the organisers of both events for their kind invitations, and to the audiences for their stimulating discussion. I am also grateful to Dialogue’s anonymous referees for their helpful advice, and yet again to Dialogue’s excellent editorial and production staff for their expert advice and assistance.
