In the aftermath of 9/11, increasing numbers of scholars have contributed to the discussion on democracy and authoritarianism in the Middle East. Michele Angrist participates in this debate with a theoretically well-defined book. She discredits explanations based on Islamic culture and modernization. She also criticizes the rentier-state theory. For her, the rentier state can explain only the consolidation of an already established authoritarian state rather than its origin. Angrist's own approach is institutional. She attaches importance to party systems while explaining authoritarianism in the region.
In addition to being theoretically intriguing, Party Building in the Modern Middle East is empirically rich. It explores three categories of cases. In Tunisia, South Yemen, and Algeria “immediate authoritarianism” emerged with independence, whereas in Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, a period (eleven to thirty-six years) of multiple parties existed between independence and “delayed authoritarianism.” The book focuses mainly on Turkey, the only case of the third category, where there was a period of authoritarianism between the brief two-party system experience in 1923 and the “delayed competitive” regime started in 1950.
The causal argument about the three groups is based on the colonial legacy and initial party system. In the first category, colonial rule eliminated the existing sociopolitical structure, which led the “second generation” to take over the nationalist movement and to found a single, preponderant, and mass-mobilizing party. That resulted in immediate authoritarianism. In the second category, colonial rule allowed the “traditional elite” to represent the nation in parliament and to preserve patron–client relations. The division within the elite caused various political factions during colonization and multiple parties following independence. During the multiparty period, there emerged a polarization between power holders (“conservatives”) and the “challengers.” Because the conservatives did not have sufficient mobilization capacity, they did not trust democratic institutions as a means of preserving their status. That radicalized both sides. As a result, democracy did not emerge in either case—where conservatives managed to hold power or where the challengers defeated them. Finally, in Turkey, the two-party system based on historical center–periphery relations helped depolarize this dynamic. Moreover, since the ruling Republican People's Party had mobilization capacity, it allowed the transformation from authoritarianism to a competitive regime.
I have three main reservations on this significant and thought-provoking book. First, the book gives too much credit to the number of political parties as an explanatory variable. That should not be the central argument because the causal relationship between a single-party system and an authoritarian regime is circular because they are almost identical phenomena, and there is no determinative causal difference between two-party and multiparty systems in terms of leading either to polarization or depolarization. What ought to be a central argument is, in fact, the colonial legacy. In the first category, the colonizers, France and Britain, did not allow indigenous preindependence parliaments and stayed longer (76–129 years). The nationalist leaders could immediately establish an authoritarian rule over a country that lost its sociopolitical complexity due to colonial cleansing. In the second group, the colonizers allowed preindependence parliaments to remain intact and stayed for shorter periods (12–55 years). It took time for authoritarian leaders to assert control over relatively more complex societies following independence. Turkey, in contrast, was never colonized and largely preserved a complex Ottoman sociopolitical heritage, which eventually led to a competitive regime (p. 24).
Second, the author makes a convincing argument about democratic transformation and contingent democrats: “democracy survived in . . . interwar European countries where the status-quo parties felt secure in their ability to muster enough electoral support to maintain a parliamentary presence sufficient for defending their interests” (pp. 200–201). Yet, the concept of “second generation” used frequently by the author does not contribute much to this argument. Instead, it creates several questions, such as why there were political divisions among the traditional elite but not among the second generation, and whether the second generation can always be politically unified.
My final concern is about the time scale of the book. It examines the formation of three types of founding stable regimes in the 1950s and 1960s. By focusing on this historical question, the book avoids criticisms about its explanatory power for the dynamics of contemporary authoritarianism. However, such a historical concentration begs the question of relevancy. If there was a path dependence between founding and current regimes, then the historical analysis would be very important. However, the book does not tell us whether there is such a connection. Table 1 argues that in six of nine cases, founding regimes still continue (p. 15). Yet, Turkey has faced several back and forths between competitive party regimes and military interventions since 1960, while it has kept its multiple parties and political polarization. The execution of Adnan Menderes, the first democratically elected prime minister, showed that such polarization existed even during the two-party era. In a similar vein, it is not clear when the distinction between the two groups of authoritarian cases was an important analytical factor and when it ceased to be relevant. Today, Syria and Egypt look more like Tunisia and Algeria than Iran and Jordan in terms of single-party government and military rule.
It is normal to have some criticisms for such a theoretically and empirically ambitious book. Party Building in the Modern Middle East is a timely and important contribution to a recently developing research agenda. I recommend it to those who study comparative democratization and Middle East politics. You can disagree with this book, but you cannot ignore it.
