A close consideration of the domestic politics of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa brings into focus a dynamic picture of change. Citizens devise new forms of governance against the wishes of politicians in capital cities. Once-cozy elite coalitions break down over struggles for access to power and the resources of the state. Civil wars upend political relationships and bring into question fundamental definitions of old and emerging political communities. The map of Africa, on the other hand, tells a different story, one of remarkable stability as colonies turned into independent states. Somalia's survival as a sovereign state in international politics more than two decades after the collapse of an effective central government highlights this remarkable permanence.
These three books tackle different aspects of this puzzling dichotomy. Each provides an important statement about the nature of political change in Africa. When read together, they generate a set of questions that suggest productive avenues for further academic research and that could lead to wiser policy deliberations. In his Africa, Pierre Englebert asks why it is so rare for people on the continent to contemplate, much less join, serious movements for secession from poorly performing states. The scarcity of secession is about something much larger: Why does Africa see so little in the way of mass movements to change the political architecture of states that have so obviously failed their citizens? In his War and Conflict in Africa, Paul Williams explains how the dynamics of conflict have changed. This book is a story about a remarkable status quo, too, where war is divorced from its historic role in state building. In contemporary Africa, Williams discovers that conflict is most often associated with fighting for position in political hierarchies in existing states. How can the contributors to Tobias Hagmann and Didier Péclard's edited volume, Negotiating Statehood, see in many of the same countries such a wealth of dynamic renegotiations of statehood, of new modes of governance in the making?
These books complement one another so well because of their able and perceptive inquiries into the phenomenon of political change on such different plateaus. In a very general sense, looking at Africa today is not dissimilar to looking at China in the 1930s. One standing at that vantage point would have seen that over the previous century, China had become progressively more marginal in terms of its international relations, rigidly bound in a state system not of its creation that was ill-suited to the way in which authority historically was exercised in East Asia. Like Africa's conflicts decades later, the turmoil of China's domestic politics, even from the most radical quarters, only reinforced trends of internal decline. The various civil wars ultimately reflected elite scrambles for position in the decaying political hierarchy. Meanwhile, changes in daily social practices and new political experiments in cities and throughout China's periphery laid the basis for an alternative to existing patterns of power and domination. The more things changed, the more they seemed to be the same—but not really. With hindsight, we can identify these different plateaus of political change and synthesize them into a picture of punctuated dynamism.
The big challenge in understanding contemporary African politics is to identify where change will occur. Perhaps like China in the 1930s, Africa stands on the brink. Revolution and rage sweep the Middle East. Yet six of Africa's “presidents-for-life” have been in office for more than a quarter century. Hundreds of millions are lifted out of poverty in India, Brazil, and elsewhere that now experience East Asian–style tiger economies. Yet despite a recent commodities boom, most Africans see little improvement in their living standards or any meaningful attempt on the parts of their governments to change this situation. Elections bring new governments in many parts of the world. But in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Congo, and Nigeria they bring violence.
Englebert explains why sub-Saharan Africa's political systems seem to be so durable and why those who are left out of them appear to be unable to organize to change these systems.. The culprit is found in the contemporary application of the norm of sovereignty. Legal presence rather than actual effectiveness is the defining attribute of contemporary states. This gives whoever occupies the statehouse what Englebert calls “legal command,” the capacity to use the prerogatives of sovereignty to attract external resources from businesses, creditors, and donors, and to use laws to shield regime friends and to target enemies. Legal command, he argues, is ultimately indivisible in contemporary practice. This explains why rebels fight to seize control of already-sovereign states, since they know that trying to set up a new state or conquer the territory of a neighboring state will bring no end to diplomatic condemnation and the shutoff of resources to which sovereigns are entitled.
Others have argued that juridical sovereignty shields poorly performing regimes from consequences of failure. Thus, the main threats to these regimes are internal, against which the most effective short-term measure is the construction of patronage-based political networks that lead to the long-term corrosion of administrative capacities. Englebert's real innovation is in linking this argument to the dynamics of opposition. As opposition develops on the local scene, leaders face overwhelming incentives to make deals with the existing political network. The good news is that would-be ethnic and sectarian conflicts do not emerge because struggles focus on gaining more favorable access to the benefits of legal command. Sovereignty is a resource in the hands of a patrimonial ruler who uses access to the benefits of power to co-opt opponents.
The system of political domination that Englebert describes atomizes societies. The political systems created behind the shield of sovereignty force individuals to negotiate with their superiors in the political hierarchy for relief from the harsh consequences of misrule. This is a competitive process that brings struggle and strife, outcomes that rulers can use to punish the most recalcitrant while offering relief to the pliable, a process that understandably intensifies one's personal alienation from the political system. The originality of Englebert's argument emerges in his explanation concerning how personal estrangement is compatible with surprising levels of national unity in Africa's “artificial” colonial-turned-independent states. This “solitary nationalism,” as he calls it, follows from the urge to get access to the benefits of legal command. The only way to do this is to subscribe to the official national identity that is the basis for one's capacity to gain access to political networks that represent one of the few reservoirs of opportunity. Some politicians declare various communities to be “strangers” in populist moves to garner support of others. Ironically, this forces those facing exclusion to fight even more vigorously for inclusion.
Englebert offers a remarkable theory of citizenship and identity in sub-Saharan Africa. He shows how global sovereignty norms and state-based patronage politics preserve the status quo. Africa's “weak” states are surprisingly strong in terms of undermining any meaningful efforts to organize collective action, a convincing explanation for the failure, to this point, of events in the Middle East to spark significant challenges to governments that would appear, at least, to have far lower capacities to defend against angry citizens. Beautifully written, his book provides the reader with a theory-driven analysis of Africa's contemporary politics at its best.
In his survey of the dynamics of Africa's conflicts over the past half century, Williams picks up on similar elements of the relation between regime politics and the opposition when groups actually wield arms against regimes. He identifies the prominence of “dynamics associated with the politics of regime survival in weak states” (p. 226), even in situations of armed opposition. Sovereignty and “neopatrimonial” regimes are at the center of his analysis of conflict. Regimes that use disorder to divide communities and impose their authority when they lack formal institutional means to do so lay the foundations of conflict. Most armed groups that emerge in these situations fight for better positions in existing patronage-based political systems, or to grab outright the source of patronage resources. This almost always requires seizing control of the state. Again, global norms governing the distribution of sovereignty play a critical role in fostering outward stability and inner turmoil in so many African states.
One of the most striking features of these two books is the extent to which ethnic and sectarian divides play background roles in explanations of the underlying logic of political struggle. While so many political scientists pondering large data sets find strong associations between these identities and conflict, Englebert and Williams declare their skepticism about the causal power of these identities to spark conflict. Englebert goes to lengths to show how these identities are subsumed in struggles for inclusion in official national identities. Both point to roles that ethnic and sectarian identities can play in the processes of conflict, but these roles are endogenous to the politics of patronage-based regimes that use the shield of global recognition of sovereignty to dominate their societies, a recognition that does not appear in the bulk of studies that deal with large numbers of cases of conflict across time. Taken in a broader context, the sub-Saharan African cases exhibit distinct dynamics and are not easily comparable with conflicts across different norms of sovereignty and different regime types.
How can this image of conflict and the paucity of societal collective action to generate alternative political communities be squared with the observations of vigorous change in the Hagmann and Péclard volume? Among the contributors to this volume, the product of a special issue of Development and Change, one counts some of the best field researchers of African politics across the social sciences. Among these contributors, the editors manage the difficult feat of producing a volume that maintains consistently high standards and focus. Till Förster's chapter on rebel governance in northern Côte d'Ivoire, for example, stands as one of the best analyses that this reviewer has read of the ways in which the interface between daily social practices and a new set of authorities generates an alternative to the weak postcolonial state and its patrimonial basis of power.
The authors are to be lauded for investigating statehood in its empirical and not juridical form, to investigating governance as it is carried out on the ground. In their chapter, Ulf Terlinden and Marleen Renders present a convincing argument that the still-unrecognized Republic of Somaliland presents a pragmatic case of hybrid governance, with shifting negotiations among customary authorities in communities, a former rebel group, professional politicians, and an array of other actors. As in so many of the other cases considered in this volume, the boundaries between state authority and societies are elusive. Various groups negotiate the exercise of coercion, the relationships between centers and peripheries of power, and the memory, identity, and politics of belonging. These accounts are filled with agentive actors that are able to craft solutions to their problems, dragging “the state” with them in their own processes of governance.
Is this dual image of Africa's overall political situation really comparable to China's in the 1930s? Are the local mice in the Hagmann and Péclard volume nibbling away at the domestic and global architecture of stasis that is so central to Englebert's and Williams's accounts of political change? Several questions arise. Are local actions to create alternative structures of governance sustainable? If Englebert and Williams are right, there are very few social enclaves in which political actors can experiment with new forms of governance without hearing the powerful siren song to reposition in the existing political system. The firm and committed activists might resist this lure, but they will have to fight constant rear-guard battles to keep supporters from defecting or trying to steer the group from within. To what extent can political innovators call the bluff of the international community that prefers the existing configurations of sovereign states to be maintained? Are the otherwise globally marginalized able to exercise meaningful agency to manipulate or convince the powerful?
The independence of South Sudan on July 9, 2011, is important in this light. It stands as Africa's first widely recognized state that had no prior legal existence as a colony. This recognition comes on the heels of the independence of Kosovo in 2008, and the de facto separation of Kurdistan from Iraqi administration since the early 1990s. In all three cases, the U.S. government reacted against a “parent” government's abuse of its own populations, and provided diplomatic and military support (or threats) that played a role in breaking apart these states. Here appear the glimmers of decertification of existing sovereigns and the recognition of secession that Englebert found to be absent when he wrote his book and that he could only ponder in the abstract in the final chapter. Williams points in a more concrete direction, to the creation of what he calls the African peace-and-security architecture that includes provisions for imposing performance criteria in exchange for sovereign status, another step in this direction of weakening the structural factors underpinning stasis.
Critics might aver that the independence of two states that just become two new dependencies on international aid and protection, and the de facto autonomy of several provinces in Iraq, change little. But deviations are starting to pile up. International—including significant African—pressure on coup leaders in Guinea in 2008 for staging an “unconstitutional change of government” forced them to depart and hand power to civilians who then held a democratic election. The regime's massacre of about 150 protestors and the systematic rape of others sharpened the international hostility to this regime. Only 30 years earlier, Idi Amin's government could kill a quarter of a million Ugandans while seated on the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Such behavior then was simply “an internal matter.” This change, along with the very real threat that a sitting leader of an African country can face prosecution for human rights abuses as has already happened with Liberia's former president, Charles Taylor, are radical departures from an old order.
If Englebert and Williams are right that the international system of states and norms of sovereignty sustain the politics of patrimonial states, and if the contributors to the Hagmann and Péclard volume are right that numerous actors struggle to create alternative governance structures, then recent shifts in global structures should produce a dramatic turn in politics in sub-Saharan Africa. Africa is different from 1930s China in this degree of extraversion, both in terms of regime protection and in the strategies of patronage-based regimes. But when read together, these three books equip the scholar to think more broadly about a great wave of change that should be coming, to reflect on the meaning of contemporary events in which the foundations of an old order are weakening, and to peer over the horizon to see how and when these foundations will give way.
