The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an international organization which comprises ten Member States located in Southeast Asia. It was established on 8 August 1967 when the five ASEAN founding states, namely Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, signed the ASEAN Declaration.Footnote 1 In some ways, ASEAN is different from other international organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU). In the words of the former ASEAN Secretary-General, Mr Rodolfo C. Severino:
It is not and was not meant to be a supranational entity acting independently of its members. It has no regional parliament or council of ministers with law-making powers, no power of enforcement, no judicial system. Much less is it like NATO, with armed forces at its command, or the [United Nations] Security Council, which can authorize military action by its members under one flag.Footnote 2
This view is not uncommon. In fact, the leaders of the ASEAN Member States share the same vision for ASEAN. According to the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, Mr George Yeo:
Europe is built on a common value system which has its roots in Rome, Greece, and Judeo-Christianity … We do not have that same common history, and in fact ASEAN is marked by its diversity. The fact that we have such an admixture of religions and political systems, and historical connections, indicate that the founding basis of ASEAN cannot be the same as that of Europe … Many of us in ASEAN do not see us ever becoming like the Europe of today, but we can certainly become the Europe of the Common Market, the Europe of the Economic Community.Footnote 3
The common theme in the perception of ASEAN seems to be an international organization with a rather limited role and even less power. The lack of “power” or “competence” vested in ASEAN in the light of its perceived role, coupled with the desire for consensus amongst Member States, has resulted in some people criticizing ASEAN as being a “talk shop”,Footnote 4 which is unable to get things done. Nevertheless, this impression of ASEAN may have somewhat improved since 15 December 2008, when the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Charter) entered into force. The ASEAN Charter not only “conferred legal personality” on ASEAN,Footnote 5 it also expressly permitted ASEAN to conclude treaties.Footnote 6 As a significant shift from the usual preference for “soft” obligations, Member States are now obliged under the ASEAN Charter to “take all necessary measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to … comply with all obligations of membership”.Footnote 7
Yet, this might not mean much to a non-Member State or international organization that is concluding a treaty with ASEAN. Such a clause in the ASEAN Charter would, at best, impose obligations on the Member States vis-à-vis ASEAN.Footnote 8 It would not entitle the other party that is concluding a treaty with ASEAN to enforce the treaty obligations directly against the Member States, even if ASEAN purports to conclude the treaty on behalf of its Member States. Indeed, an examination of the ASEAN treaties would reveal that ASEAN has, on various occasions, concluded treaties on behalf of its Member States.
In order to ascertain the treaty-making practice of ASEAN, the treaties concluded by ASEAN were reviewed in search for the explicit and implicit elements which might indicate that ASEAN was purporting to act on behalf of its Member States. The results, which are summarized below,Footnote 9 suggest that ASEAN has purported to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States on various occasions.
This raises some interesting questions: is ASEAN entitled to enter into treaties on behalf of its Member States; and if so, what should be the status of ASEAN and its Member States vis-à-vis the other party to the treaty? The issue is not one of whether the ASEAN Member States have consented to such a practice—it must be assumed that they have.Footnote 10 Instead, the real issue is whether such treaty-making practice can and should be valid under international law, even if the Member States have consented for ASEAN to conclude these treaties on their behalf.
This paper will argue that, under international law, ASEAN can and should be entitled to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States.
Part I of the paper will consider the treaty-making power and practice of ASEAN in greater detail. It will be shown that while treaty-making power has been vested in ASEAN by virtue of the ASEAN Charter, it is unclear if this includes the power to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States. Nonetheless, an examination of ASEAN treaty-making practice will reveal that ASEAN has, on various occasions, concluded treaties on behalf of its Member States. Accordingly, this motivates the search for a legitimate basis under international law upon which this may be done. Part II of the paper will explore the bases upon which international organizations can conclude treaties on behalf of their Member States. This part of the paper is divided into two sections. The first section will examine the position under the law of treaties. The second section will review the concept of agency under international law. It will be shown that while the law of treaties does not explicitly permit international organizations to conclude treaties on behalf of their Member States, it might be possible to consider that the international organizations were acting as the agents of their Member States when they purport to conclude treaties on behalf of their Member States. It follows that the Member States, as principals, would be parties to the treaties with rights and obligations as such. Part III of the paper will comment on the existing law on treaty-making and propose some possible improvements that can be made to the ASEAN treaty-making practice. Part IV of the paper will conclude that under international law, ASEAN would be entitled to act as an agent of its Member States and conclude treaties on their behalf.
I. ASEAN AND ITS TREATY-MAKING POWER AND PRACTICE
A. The Treaty-Making Power of ASEAN
ASEAN, as an international organization, is capable of concluding treaties with other states and international organizations. This has been clarified by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations (VCLTIO).Footnote 11 However, there is uncertainty as to the extent of ASEAN's treaty-making power, and in particular, whether ASEAN can conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States.
According to Article 6 of the VCLTIO, the capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties is governed by the “rules of that organization”. The expression “rules of the organization” has been defined in the VCLTIO as “the constituent instruments, decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with them, and established practice of the organization”.Footnote 12
The ASEAN Charter, as the constituent instrument of ASEAN, would be a relevant starting point to ascertain if ASEAN has the capacity to conclude treaties, and if so, whether ASEAN can conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States or only in its own capacity as an international organization.Footnote 13 Unfortunately, the ASEAN Charter offers limited assistance on this matter. While Article 41(7) of the ASEAN Charter expressly vests the power to “conclude agreements with countries or sub-regional, regional, and international organizations and institutions” in ASEAN, it also provides that “[t]he procedures for concluding such agreements shall be prescribed by the ASEAN Coordinating Council in consultation with the ASEAN Community Councils”.Footnote 14 This led to the creation of the Rules of Procedure for Conclusion of International Agreements by ASEANFootnote 15 (Rules). Nonetheless, the Rules only cover treaties “governed by international law which creates rights and obligations for ASEAN as a distinct entity from its Member States”.Footnote 16 Simply put, the Rules do not apply to treaties concluded by ASEAN on behalf of its Member States. Yet, the Rules, which are merely procedural in nature, do not have the effect of precluding ASEAN from concluding treaties on behalf of its Member States. In the same vein, there are no “decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance” with the ASEAN Charter that would provide clarity on the issue.
As discussed, the ASEAN Charter does not address whether ASEAN is capable of entering into treaties on behalf of its Member States. This omission is particularly significant when understood in the light of the drafting history of the ASEAN Charter. At the 11th ASEAN Summit, the leaders of the various Member States of ASEAN signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter which called for, inter alia, the establishment of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) with “the mandate to examine and provide practical recommendations on the directions and nature of the ASEAN Charter”.Footnote 17 In particular, the Eminent Persons Group was required to “undertake a thorough review of the existing ASEAN institutional framework and propose appropriate improvements if so required”,Footnote 18 and the scope of its work included the roles of the Secretary-General and external relations of ASEAN.Footnote 19 In its report, the Eminent Persons Group recommended that in order to empower the Secretary-General to play a “greater role in managing external relations for ASEAN”, the “Secretary-General shall be delegated the authority to sign non-sensitive agreements on behalf of ASEAN Member States”.Footnote 20 However, as shown earlier, this recommendation was not taken up in the final draft of the ASEAN Charter.Footnote 21 This seems to suggest that ASEAN, acting through its Secretary-General, does not have the power to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States under the ASEAN Charter. What is interesting is that, despite this omission, the ASEAN Secretary-General has nevertheless concluded various treaties on behalf of the ASEAN Member States.Footnote 22
Moreover, the ASEAN Charter, the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat and its protocols, which set out the duties of the Secretary-General, do not explicitly authorize the Secretary-General to enter into treaties on behalf of its Member States.Footnote 23 While the Secretary-General is entitled to “serve as spokesman and representative of ASEAN on all matters”,Footnote 24 this surely does not mean that the Secretary-General is entitled to enter into treaties on behalf of its Member States. Otherwise, the Eminent Persons Group would have no reason to propose that the Secretary-General be allowed to enter into treaties on behalf of its Member States.Footnote 25
Apart from the ASEAN Charter and decisions or resolutions adopted in accordance with it, the VCLTIO also warrants the examination of the “established practice” of ASEAN as a way to determine the capacity of ASEAN to enter into treaties.Footnote 26 It must be a body of practice which “forms an integral part” of the rules of the international organization, and does not include “uncertain or disputed” practice.Footnote 27 While there may be some occasions prior to the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter in which ASEAN had entered into treaties purportedly on behalf of its Member States, they do not constitute established practice. No clear practice can be discerned from the past treaty-making practice of ASEAN. It does not explain why ASEAN is allowed to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States in some cases, but not in others. Moreover, there has been some doubt as to the legal personality of ASEAN prior to the signing of the ASEAN Charter.Footnote 28 If this is true, then it would not matter whether there is an established practice or not. The VCLTIO would not apply in such a case,Footnote 29 and any practice, whether established or not, would be irrelevant in determining the “rules of the organization” which governs the treaty-making capacity of ASEAN.
Hence, the “rules of the organization” in the context of ASEAN do not explicitly provide that ASEAN is capable of concluding treaties on behalf of its Member States. In this regard, the treaty-making practice of ASEAN is problematic given that ASEAN has, on various occasions, purportedly concluded treaties on behalf of its Member States.
B. The Problematic Practice
The treaty-making practice of ASEAN is problematic in more ways than one. There is uncertainty as to what the term “ASEAN” means when it is used in the treaties, whether the international organization or a collective term for the Member States of ASEAN. This confusion is further exacerbated by the fact that ASEAN has concluded treaties “acting for and on behalf of the member states of ASEAN” on several occasions. The cumulative effect is that the treaty-making practice of ASEAN is in a confusing state of disarray.
The term “ASEAN” has been used interchangeably, in various treaties with third-party states and international organizations, to refer to ASEAN in its capacity as an international organization and ASEAN as a collective term for the Member States.Footnote 30 Perhaps one way to rationalize this phenomenon would be to consider that the term “ASEAN” was used as a way to refer to the Member States before it obtained legal personality by virtue of the ASEAN Charter on 15 December 2008. However, the phenomenon can be observed both before and after the entry into effect of the ASEAN Charter.Footnote 31 In other words, even if we accept that ASEAN obtained legal personality as an international organization only after the entry into effect of the ASEAN Charter, this does not explain the interchangeable use of the term “ASEAN” in the treaties.
Beyond the interchangeable use of the term “ASEAN” lies a bigger problem—the use of the phrase “acting for and on behalf of the member states of ASEAN” when there is no clear power vested in ASEAN or the Secretary-General to do so under the ASEAN Charter. In order to better understand the problem, the treaties which reflect the problematic treaty-making practice of ASEAN can be divided into three main categories.
The first category comprises treaties between the ASEAN Secretariat and the other state or international organization, signed by the ASEAN Secretary-General and the authorized representative of the other contracting party.Footnote 32 The treaties in this category are concluded by ASEAN in its own capacity and on its own behalf. Apart from the possible objection that ASEAN does not have separate legal personality prior to the ASEAN Charter, the treaties in this category generally do not present much difficulty.
The second category comprises treaties between the ASEAN Secretariat, acting for and on behalf of the Member States of ASEAN, and the other state or international organization, signed by the ASEAN Secretary-General and the authorized representative of the other contracting party.Footnote 33 The treaties in this category are concluded in the name of the “ASEAN Secretariat” and duly signed by the ASEAN Secretary-General. Thus, on the face of it, the treaties in this category would seem to be properly concluded. Yet, this might not be as clear if we examine the nature and content of these treaties. In the preamble, the treaties state that the ASEAN Secretariat is “acting for and on behalf of the Member Countries of ASEAN”.Footnote 34 The same idea was reflected in the treaties. There were clauses which stipulated that the executing agencies for the implementation would be the “ASEAN Secretariat for the ASEAN Member States”.Footnote 35 The language seems to indicate that the ASEAN Member States are, in fact, the parties to the treaty, albeit the obligations are performed through the ASEAN Secretariat. Moreover, the treaties would state that the ASEAN Secretary-General is “duly authorized by the respective governments of ASEAN Member States” to sign the treaty.Footnote 36 Therefore, the treaties under this category may not be as straightforward, given that they appear to be concluded by the ASEAN Secretariat on behalf of the Member States.
The third category comprises treaties between ASEAN and the other state or international organization, signed by the ASEAN Secretary-General and the authorized representative of the other contracting party.Footnote 37 The treaties in this category present similar difficulties to the previous category, except that the treaties in this category would be concluded in the name of ASEAN or the government of the Member States of ASEAN rather than the ASEAN Secretariat. Since the treaties are already concluded in the name of ASEAN or the governments of the Member States of ASEAN, it follows that the preambles of most of the treaties in this category would not state that the treaty was concluded on behalf of the Member States.Footnote 38 Nonetheless, the language used in the treaties would suggest that the Member States have obligations arising therefrom. An example would be the obligation to “establish a compilation of their national laws and regulation” or “promote personnel contact and exchange among their law enforcement/related officers and experts”.Footnote 39 Moreover, the implementing agencies were designated as the “relevant national agencies of the ASEAN Member States”.Footnote 40 Similar language can be seen in other treaties as well.Footnote 41 One of the treaties even expressly provided for obligations of Member States which were separate and distinct from the obligations of the ASEAN Secretariat.Footnote 42 Moreover, like the treaties in the second category, the treaties in this category would state that the ASEAN Secretary-General is “duly authorized by the respective governments of ASEAN Member States” to sign the treaty.Footnote 43 In some cases, it would also state that the ASEAN Secretary-General is signing “[f]or the Governments of ASEAN Member Countries”.Footnote 44 In sum, the treaties in this category clearly demonstrate that ASEAN, through its Secretary-General, has concluded treaties on behalf of its Member States, and that these treaties affect the legal rights and obligations of the Member States vis-à-vis the other party to the treaty.
The second and third categories present difficulties, given that the ASEAN Charter does not explicitly confer ASEAN with the authority to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States. This is not to say that the treaties have been concluded without the consent of the Member States. In fact, the treaties were concluded by ASEAN under the express authorization of the Member States.Footnote 45 This is significant, as the practice cannot deviate from the fundamental principle of treaty-making, namely that the state must consent in order for it to be bound by the treaty.Footnote 46 This remains true even if the manner in which consent is obtained may be flexible.Footnote 47 Hence, the question is whether ASEAN can, under international law, conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States when the Member States have consented, and if so, what the legal rights and obligations of ASEAN and the Member States are under such treaties.
While one may attempt to brush aside the idea that ASEAN is attempting to enter into treaties on behalf of its Member States by arguing that the use of the phrase “acting for and on behalf of member states of ASEAN” is mere rhetoric that does not carry legal meaning, this is hardly acceptable, for two reasons. First, the difference between rhetoric and reality in this instance would have a direct impact on the legal rights and obligations of the parties involved. If it was true that ASEAN is acting on behalf of its Member States, then it would follow that the Member States are parties to the treaty, and consequences flow from their status as contracting parties to the treaty. For example, it may be that the other party to the treaty can require that the Member States of ASEAN comply with the obligations under the treaty. Second, the phrase has also been used by other international organizations in a similar fashion.Footnote 48 This suggests that the phrase cannot be a form of rhetoric used by ASEAN that has no legal significance under international law.
The practice of ASEAN concluding treaties on behalf of its Member States may possibly stem from the self-perception that ASEAN is no more than the collective representation of its Member States.Footnote 49 If this was so, then any treaty concluded by ASEAN, which has no separate legal personality, must surely be concluded on behalf of its Member States.Footnote 50 However, this cannot be accurate in the light of the ASEAN Charter, which clarified that ASEAN has legal personality.Footnote 51 Yet, the ASEAN Charter does not go on to specify what the separate legal personality for ASEAN entails, especially in terms of treaty-making power. Even after the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter, there continues to be doubt as to whether ASEAN is anything more than “a mere collective of Southeast Asian nation-states”.Footnote 52 Hence, it might be that the problematic treaty-making practice of ASEAN stems from a lack of certainty about the role that ASEAN should play vis-à-vis third-party states and international organizations in the area of treaty-making. Indeed, it has been said that what ASEAN lacks is “not legal personality but a shared vision of the purpose of that existence, of its place in the world”.Footnote 53 Nonetheless, this does not justify the treaty-making practice of ASEAN in concluding treaties on behalf of its Member States, especially when no such power has been vested in ASEAN or the Secretary-General to do so under the ASEAN Charter.
II. TREATIES “ON BEHALF OF” MEMBER STATES
A. Law of Treaties
1. The “default rule” under VCLTIO
The status and effects of the treaties purportedly concluded on behalf of ASEAN Member States are unclear. It is uncertain if ASEAN Member States are parties under these treaties, and whether the ASEAN Member States can and should have rights and obligations under these treaties. Assuming that these treaties are accepted as having been concluded on behalf of ASEAN Member States, then it is necessary to determine the rights and obligations of ASEAN (as an international organization) under such treaties. In order to ascertain who are the proper parties, and have rights and obligations under such treaties, it would be crucial that we examine the VCLTIO to see if there is a “default rule” in the absence of an explicit conferral of such treaty-making power upon the international organization under the “rules of the organization”.
The VCLTIO, as it stands, does not seem to provide that an international organization could conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States. Rather, the situation would apparently be governed by Section 4 of the VCLTIO (“Treaties and Third States or Third Organizations”).Footnote 54 The general rule is that a treaty “does not create either obligations or rights for a third State … without the consent of that State”.Footnote 55 A “third State” has been defined simply as “a State … not party to the treaty”,Footnote 56 and in this regard, a “party” would mean “a State … which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force”.Footnote 57 The VCLTIO provides for a bifurcated system in which third states may have rights or obligations under treaties. The VCLTIO adopted a liberal stance in relation to the rights of third states. In particular, a third state is presumed to have assented to any right if it is the intention of the parties to the treaty to accord that right to the third state.Footnote 58 On the other hand, a strict approach was preferred for obligations arising for a third state under such treaties. The third state must, in addition to the requirement that parties intend to establish such an obligation, expressly accept the obligation “in writing”.Footnote 59
In other words, it would seem that the “default rule” under the VCLTIO is that the Member States would be considered as “third States” in relation to the treaty concluded by their international organization.Footnote 60 However, such an understanding would be accurate only if we were to accept that the Member States of an international organization should be considered as “third States” even when the international organization purportedly concluded the treaties on their behalf. While it may not be as problematic if the treaties concluded by an international organization on behalf of its Member States only created rights but could not impose any obligations, this can hardly be the case in reality.Footnote 61 In most cases, the treaties concluded would have a mixture of rights and obligations,Footnote 62 and hence would require the Member States to consent “in writing” in order for those obligations to have any effect vis-à-vis the Member States as non-signatories or, in the expression used in the VCLTIO, “third States”.
It is surprising that the VCLTIO draws a bright-line distinction between a “party” to the treaty and a “third State”. The current regime under the VCLTIO only recognizes two mutually exclusive categories, a “party” to the treaty and a “third State”,Footnote 63 which are separated by the consent to be bound by the treaty. This reflects the position adopted by the International Law Commission, which is that “where a treaty was concerned, a State must be either a party or a third party … in relation to a treaty concluded by an international organization, its member States were third States”.Footnote 64 Yet, this does not seem to consider the possibility that an international organization might have good reasons to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States. In such an instance, the Member States cannot be accurately called a “party” to the treaty or a “third State” that has no relation whatsoever to the treaty.Footnote 65 Such a conclusion would arguably be “in conflict with practical requirements and even with the necessities of the proper functioning of international organizations”.Footnote 66
In the light of the unsatisfactory position in the VCLTIO, one might hope that perhaps some clarity on this issue may be derived from the drafting history of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties (VCLT)Footnote 67 and the VCLTIO.
2. The drafting history of the VCLT
The drafting history of the VCLT is relevant as the Reports of the Special Rapporteurs, including Mr James Brierly, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and Sir Humphrey Waldock, have attempted to deal with the law of treaties concluded by both states and international organizations initially, only to separate the two topics subsequently.Footnote 68 Therefore, the Reports of the Special Rapporteurs might contain some valuable information on the question of whether an international organization may conclude a treaty on behalf of its Member States.
The question of whether an international organization may conclude a treaty on behalf of its Member States was first brought up by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur, in his Third Report on the Law of Treaties in 1953.Footnote 69 The Report was accompanied by a set of draft articles, and was presented “primarily as a formulation of existing law”.Footnote 70 Draft Article 1, which was entitled “Essential Requirements of a Treaty”, provides that “Treaties are agreements between States, including organizations of States, …”.Footnote 71 The peculiar way in which the Article was drafted has been interpreted subsequently to mean that Sir Hersch Lauterpacht was of the view that “all treaty commitments are governed by the same political reality, that of States”.Footnote 72 In other words, there seems to be an implicit assumption that when international organizations conclude treaties, they are always done on behalf of their Member States, and never in their own capacity. It is interesting that an eminent international jurist like Sir Hersch Lauterpacht was of such an opinion, in the light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Reparation case, just a few years earlier, confirming the separate legal personality of international organizations.Footnote 73
However, this does not necessarily reflect the position today. It might be argued that the peculiar choice of words by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht was meant to reflect the “existing law” in 1953, which had not fully recognized the capability of international organizations to conclude treaties on their own behalf, even though international organizations had been acknowledged as having legal personality distinct from their Member States. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the default position in 1953 was that international organizations would conclude treaties on behalf of their Member States.
The question was then addressed by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, in his Third Report on the Law of Treaties in 1964.Footnote 74 This was brought up together with the question of whether one state can conclude a treaty on behalf of another state. It was proposed that, to deal with this issue, the VCLT should include Draft Article 60, which reads:
1. When a State, duly authorized by another State to do so, concludes a treaty on behalf and in the name of the other State, the treaty applies to that other State in the capacity of a party to the treaty. It follows that the rights and obligations provided for in the treaty may be invoked by or against the other State in its own name.
2. Similarly, when an international organization, duly authorized by its constituent instrument or by its established rules, concludes a treaty with a non-member State in the name both of the organization and of its Member States, the rights and obligations provided for in the treaty may be invoked by or against each Member State.Footnote 75
It was pointed out that there is a question as to “how far the institution of ‘agency’ may play a role in cases where treaties are concluded by international organizations on behalf of their members”.Footnote 76 However, it was observed that it is:
Easy … to imagine cases, especially in the economic sphere, where the Organization intends to conclude a treaty with a third State on behalf of its Member States in such a manner as to place them individually in the position of parties to the treaty. Footnote 77
Hence, the effect of Draft Article 60(2) was such that when an international organization concludes a treaty on behalf of its Member States, the treaty is concluded “not merely on behalf of the organization as a collective legal person but also on behalf of its Member States individually”.Footnote 78
In contrast with the views of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in 1953, it seems that Draft Article 60(2) proposed by Sir Humphrey Waldock departed from the position that treaties concluded by international organizations are always on behalf of their Member States and never in their own capacity. Instead, the default position under Draft Article 60(2) seems to be that an international organization generally concludes treaties in its own capacity but can conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States when duly authorized by its “constituent instrument” or “established rules”. One possibility for this change might be that, in the light of the Reparation case, international organizations are increasingly being viewed as having legal personalities which are separate and distinct from their Member States.
However, Draft Article 60(2) was eventually deleted from the VCLT as Sir Humphrey Waldock and the members of the International Law Commission felt that the issue was “too closely connected with the general problem of the relations between an organization and its members” to be dealt with under the law of treaties.Footnote 79 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that Sir Humphrey Waldock was quick to clarify that the deletion of Article 60(2) did not mean that the International Law Commission was taking a position on the substance of the matter but merely that it was better dealt with subsequently, as and when it may be “necessary or desirable”.Footnote 80
Having considered the Reports of the Special Rapporteurs on the Law of Treaties, it can now be said that the treaty-making practice of ASEAN, in concluding treaties on behalf of its Member States, cannot be mere rhetoric but may potentially have some legal significance behind it. It suggests that the issue of an international organization concluding treaties on behalf of its Member States is not a matter of theoretical or academic concern, but rather one that may have practical implications on the interactions between international organizations, their Member States, and other non-Member States. It seems to be that an international organization may, under the correct circumstances, conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States.Footnote 81
Moreover, the drafting history of the VCLT seems to incline in favour of the fact that international organizations can conclude treaties on behalf of their Member States and, in doing so, affect their legal rights and obligations vis-à-vis the other party to the treaty. Nevertheless, the drafting history of the VCLT does not provide an answer since Draft Article 60(2) was eventually deleted. Indeed, the reason given for not dealing with the question was because it was “too closely connected with the general problem of the relations between an organization and its members”,Footnote 82 and that it involves the “law governing international organizations”. Accordingly, it would be pertinent to examine the drafting history of the VCLTIO.
3. The drafting history of the VCLTIO
The question of whether an international organization may conclude a treaty on behalf of its Member States was one of the “basic problems” that was raised again during work by the International Law Commission on the VCLTIO.Footnote 83
As a preliminary inquiry to the question of the content of the obligation of a Member State for the treaties concluded by the international organization on its behalf, the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Treaties Concluded Between States and International Organizations or Between Two or More International Organizations, Mr Paul Reuter, found it necessary to first ascertain the question of “with respect to whom” the obligation, if any, would be owed. In this regard, he laid down two possibilities.Footnote 84 Under the first possibility, the obligations assumed by the international organization on behalf of its Member States would be “directly binding” on the Member States with respect to the other party to the treaty.Footnote 85 Under the second possibility, the treaty concluded by the international organization would have no effect on the Member States even though it was concluded on their behalf.Footnote 86 In such a case, however, the Member States may, depending on the constituent instrument of the international organization, have an obligation to assist or co-operate with the international organization in the performance of its obligation under the treaty.Footnote 87 No obligation would be owed directly to the state which concluded the treaty with the international organization.Footnote 88 Accordingly, Mr Reuter concluded in his Second Report, albeit on a “provisional basis”, that the treaties cannot be ignored by the Member States vis-à-vis the organization in the light of the obligation to assist or co-operate with the organization, and that, in any event, the international organization could get the consent of Member States in writing as “third States” to the treaty.Footnote 89
Nonetheless, the fact that Member States may be obliged under the constituent instrument to assist or co-operate with their international organization in the fulfilment of the obligations under the treaty concluded by the international organization does not resolve the problem. The real question, as the Special Rapporteur came to realize subsequently, was not whether the treaty concluded by the international organization has de facto consequences for the members or de jure consequences in the relations between the organization and its Member States.Footnote 90 The former is inevitable and the latter depends on the relevant rules of the international organization.Footnote 91 Instead, the real question was “how direct relationships can evolve between States members of an organization and parties other than the organization to a treaty concluded by the organization”.Footnote 92 Moreover, the competence of international organizations to conclude treaties is often “uncertain” and “ill-defined”, as compared to Member States, and there is every reason for the contracting state or organization to want the Member States to be “associated with the obligations of the organization”.Footnote 93
Bearing in mind the need to associate Member States with treaties concluded by their international organizations and the basic framework of consensus, the Special Rapporteur proposed a new Draft Article 36 bis, which read:
Article 36 bis. Effects of a treaty to which an international organization is party with respect to State members of that organization
1. A treaty concluded by an international organization gives rise directly for States members of an international organization to rights and obligations in respect of other parties to that treaty if the constituent instrument of that organization expressly gives such effects to the treaty.
2. When, on account of the subject-matter of a treaty concluded by an international organization and the assignment of the areas of competence involved in that subject-matter between the organization and its member States, it appears that such was indeed the intention of the parties to that treaty, the treaty gives rise for a member State to:
(i) rights which the member State is presumed to accept, in the absence of any indication of intention to the contrary;
(ii) obligations when the member State accepts them, even implicitly.Footnote 94
The effect of Draft Article 36(1) bis was to consider that the Member States had expressed consent in advance, by virtue of their constituent instrument, to having the effects of the treaties concluded by the international organization extend to them.Footnote 95 In order for this to apply, the party concluding the treaty with the international organization must be “fully cognizant” of the capacity of the international organization to conclude the treaty on behalf of its Member States under its “constituent instrument”.Footnote 96 In essence, Draft Article 36(1) bis allows Member States to accept the effects of treaties concluded by the international organization on their behalf “en bloc and in advance by the relevant clause of the constituent instrument of the organization”.Footnote 97
In the words of Mr Reuter, Draft Article 36(1) bis was of “great importance” if considered from a “practical point of view”.Footnote 98 Without such a clause, it would be necessary for the international organization to not only incorporate a reference to the clause in the constituent instrument on the effects of treaties concluded by the organization, but also expressly stipulate that the other party to the treaty accepts the rights and obligations deriving from that clause in the constituent instrument.Footnote 99 Hence, Draft Article 36(1) bis affirms the general principle that the other party to the treaty ought to know and accept the clause in its constituent instrument providing for the effects of its treaties on Member States.Footnote 100 This gives greater security to the commitments under the treaty and reduces uncertainty regarding the assignment of competence between the organization and its members.Footnote 101 Moreover, it does away with the need to rely on “the much more cumbersome technique of mixed agreements” which entails more arduous negotiations and potential problems due to delay in ratifications by the states.Footnote 102
The Draft Article 36(1) bis proposed by Mr Reuter is similar to Draft Article 60(2) proposed by Sir Humphrey Waldock in the sense that both depend on the constituent instrument of the international organization to extend the effects of the treaties concluded by the international organization to its Member States. Therefore, it would be necessary for the Member States to have included such a clause in the constituent instrument in the first place.
In contrast, Draft Article 36(2) bis operates on a different basis. It is invoked when the subject matter of the treaty concluded by the international organization relates to the competence of both the international organization and its Member States, and is premised upon presumptions (in the case of rights) and implicit acceptances (in the case of obligations).Footnote 103 Where it is inconceivable that the respective competencies of the Member States and the organization should operate independently of each other, then it must have been intended that the treaty gives rise to direct effects in respect of the Member States.Footnote 104 Nonetheless, this limb was dropped in the subsequent versions of Draft Article 36 bis.Footnote 105
It is uncontroversial that Draft Article 36 bis must be consistent with state sovereignty, i.e. a state must consent to undertake rights and obligations under the treaty even if it was concluded by its international organization on its behalf.Footnote 106 Instead, what is at issue would be the flexibility in the manner in which the consent of Member States can be obtained.Footnote 107 The flexibility can be justified based on the relationship between the organization and its Member States which renders “excessive formality” unnecessary and an “unjustified obstacle to the functioning of international organizations”.Footnote 108 It is perhaps not surprising, in the light of earlier discussions, that the question boils down to whether Member States should be treated in the “most strictly formal manner” in relation to any obligation arising from treaties concluded by the international organization, and should be regarded as “third parties in the fullest sense of the term”, or to whether the “solidarity and close ties” justify that the consent of Member States be given in a “less formal manner”.Footnote 109 The International Law Commission, in the first reading of the draft articles, preferred the second alternative.Footnote 110
Nonetheless, Draft Article 36 bis remains controversial. After various changes to the “form and content” of Draft Article 36 bis,Footnote 111 the International Law Commission finally approved the following text:
Article 36 bis. Obligations and rights arising for States members of an international organization from a treaty to which it is a party
Obligations and rights arise for States members of an international organization from the provisions of a treaty to which that organization is a party when the parties to the treaty intend those provisions to be the means of establishing such obligations and according such rights and have defined their conditions and effects in the treaty or have otherwise agreed thereon, and if:
(a) the States members of the organization, by virtue of the constituent instrument of that organization or otherwise, have unanimously agreed to be bound by the said provisions of the treaty; and
(b) the assent of the States members of the organization to be bound by the relevant provisions of the treaty has been duly brought to the knowledge of the negotiating States and negotiating organizations.Footnote 112
The International Law Commission noted that “Article 36 bis is unquestionably the one that has aroused most comment, controversy and difficulty, both in and outside the Commission”.Footnote 113 Yet, at the same time, the International Law Commission acknowledged the utility of having such a provision in the VCLTIO.Footnote 114 The content of Draft Article 36 bis had to undergo “profound change as a result of all the observations submitted by Governments and of the very lengthy debates in the Commission” and be given a “more specific, more precise and more modest direction than in its initial substance”.Footnote 115 Notably, it can be observed that the second limb under the first version of Draft Article 36 bis had been removed.
Under the final version of Draft Article 36 bis, there are three conditions to be satisfied. First, the parties to the treaty concluded by the international organization must expressly consent to the treaty.Footnote 116 Second, the Member States of the international organization must consent, either by virtue of the constituent documents or otherwise, to the provisions of the treaty which will create rights and obligations for them.Footnote 117 Third, the consent of the Member States must be made known to the other party to the treaty.Footnote 118 This was unanimously approved by the International Law Commission.Footnote 119
Notwithstanding the support of the International Law Commission, Draft Article 36 bis was eventually deleted from the VCLTIO at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations.Footnote 120 Draft Article 36 bis was said to have “given rise to the largest number of difficulties and objections”.Footnote 121 It is noteworthy that the decision to delete Draft Article 36 bis was made only after intensive debate between the delegations, with various amendments proposed and considered,Footnote 122 and after Mr Reuter was called in as an “Expert Consultant”.Footnote 123 The delegations from Austria and Brazil proposed deletion because of the difficulties surrounding Draft Article 36 bis coupled with the limited scope of application.Footnote 124
Moreover, various international organizations and states considered that the subject was not ripe for codification in the light of the lack of practice.Footnote 125 Some delegations thought that the deletion would allow for the future development of practice in this area.Footnote 126 However, one might argue that such a possibility had been foreclosed by the VCLTIO, since the deletion of Draft Article 36 bis would suggest that Member States should be considered as “third States” and the rules governing third states would apply.Footnote 127 This coincides with the position taken by the International Law Commission that “where a treaty was concerned, a State must be either a party or a third party … in relation to a treaty concluded by an international organization, its member States were third States”.Footnote 128
4. VCLTIO—the end of the story?
In the light of the text of the VCLTIO and its drafting history, it seems that there is little room left to suggest that the international organization should be capable of concluding treaties on behalf of its Member States and thereby extend the effects of the treaties to them. Yet, it is not the end of the story. In fact, it might be arguable that the issue of whether an international organization can conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States had not been foreclosed by the VCLTIO.
First and foremost, Article 74(3) of the VCLTIO provides that the Convention “shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to the establishment of obligations and rights for States members of an international organization under a treaty to which that organization is a party”. The inclusion of Article 74(3) was proposed by the International Labour Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations, when it was apparent that Draft Article 36 bis was not going to be accepted in the final draft of the VCLTIO.Footnote 129 This can be understood to mean that the VCLTIO does not foreclose the possibility that the international organization might be capable of concluding treaties on behalf of its Member States.Footnote 130
In addition, it must be pointed out that the VCLTIO has not entered into force.Footnote 131 Article 85 of the VCLTIO requires at least thirty-five ratifications by states for the treaty to enter into force. At the moment, there are only thirty states which have ratified the VCLTIO.Footnote 132 In other words, the provisions do not yet have the force of law. In any event, neither ASEAN nor its Member States have either signed or ratified the VCLTIO. Hence, the VCLTIO regime on “third States” would not, strictly speaking, govern the treaties concluded by ASEAN on behalf of its Member States.
Moreover, there is little, if any, support for customary international law prohibiting international organizations from concluding treaties on behalf of their Member States. States have conceded that there is hardly any practice, much less consistent practice, on this particular issue.Footnote 133
Even if we were to accept that the issue has not been foreclosed by the VCLTIO, it remains to be answered if there is any reason to examine the feasibility of such an approach in the light of the fact that the proposal for Draft Article 36 bis was rejected. It is argued that there are compelling reasons why international organizations should be entitled to conclude treaties on behalf of their Member States.
First, it might strengthen the role of the international organization with respect to external relations.Footnote 134 If international organizations may be delegated with treaty-making power such that they can conclude treaties on behalf of their Member States in specific cases, then other states or international organizations might be persuaded or even compelled to engage with international organizations on certain issues. Put differently, it is not simply a “talk shop”, but would be capable of taking action as well. This would require other states to take international organizations seriously.
Second, it could improve the bargaining power of the Member States of the international organizations vis-à-vis the other party to the treaty. In particular, Member States in regional organizations, like ASEAN, might consider it beneficial to rely on the organization in the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty. In doing so, Member States effectively “bind” themselves to a common position represented by the organization. This way, the other negotiating party will be obliged to deal with ASEAN as a whole and cannot “divide and rule”.
Third, it would be preferable for the other party to the treaty as well since it is only required to negotiate and conclude the treaty with the international organization instead of dealing with all of the Member States individually.Footnote 135 Beyond efficiency and convenience, the other party to the treaty may be able to directly enforce the treaty obligations against the Member States. The direct enforceability of the obligations greatly increases the level of confidence for the other party in the treaty, and this cannot be achieved by the mere fact that the Member States may be obliged under the constituent instrument to assist and co-operate with the international organization in the performance of their obligations under the treaty.Footnote 136
Moreover, there is no clear reason why an international organization should not be allowed to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States, especially when such treaty-making powers have been clearly delegated by the Member States either under the constituent instrument or on an ad hoc basis. This is so even if the same results may be achieved by having Member States becoming parties to the treaty or consent to accept the obligations as “third States” in writing. While the delegations at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations may have considered that the practice was not ripe for codification, the utility of such practice should not be doubted.
While it is unfortunate that Draft Article 36 bis was removed from the VCLTIO, it does not mean that there can be no alternative means for an international organization to justify its practice of concluding treaties on behalf of its Member States. One way would be to rely on the concept of agency under international law.
B. The Law of Agency
1. Agency—does it exist in international law?
The concept of agency in international law is uncommon. Nonetheless, there is some agreement that the concept of agency exists under international law, and particularly in the relationship between the international organization and its Member States.
For a start, some of the distinguished members of the International Law Commission have considered that agency exists as a concept in international law. In the discussion on whether states should be entitled to conclude treaties on behalf of other states, Professor Roberto Ago observed that “as the agency relationship was freely established between two States, the Commission should not express a favourable or an unfavourable opinion on that practice”.Footnote 137 Moreover, Professor Jimenez de Arechaga pointed out that the International Law Commission “should not adopt a negative attitude to the legitimate institution of agency merely because it might have been used in the past to set up protectorates”.Footnote 138 This is particularly so given that such relationships arise out of treaties which are subject to the safeguards afforded under the VCLT, e.g. nullity on grounds of coercion.Footnote 139 Both comments were premised upon the existence of the concept of agency in international law. Furthermore, Mr Reuter, in his capacity as the Special Rapporteur for the VCLTIO, also remarked that “it must be acknowledged that there is room in international law for wide recourse to representation” in the context of treaty-making.Footnote 140
This position is supported by eminent international law academics as well, particularly in the context of the relationship between the international organization and its Member States. As Professor Christine Chinkin notes, “an organization might be seen as acting as agent for its member States”.Footnote 141 Sir Ian Brownlie shares the same view, stating that “[b]y agreement between the states and the organization concerned, the latter may become an agent for member states, and others, in regard to matters outside its ordinary competence”.Footnote 142
Significantly, the International Law Commission and the Institut de Droit International have acknowledged that Member States may incur liability vis-à-vis a third party “if the international organization has acted as the agent of the State, in law or in fact”.Footnote 143 While the statements were not made in the context of treaty-making, they do support the proposition that the concept of agency exists under international law, and possibly between international organizations and Member States.
More specifically, it has been argued that an agency relationship can exist between an international organization and its Member States when the requirements of separate legal personality and consent are met.Footnote 144 The Member States can use the constituent instrument or a separate treaty as the mechanism to confer treaty-making power on the international organization.Footnote 145 Nonetheless, it has been suggested that there is a presumption against the establishment of an agency relationship between an international organization and its Member States merely based on the ratification of the constituent instrument.Footnote 146 This is because when Member States ratify the constituent instrument of the international organization, they do not consent to have the international organization exercise power “on their behalf (as an agent) such that it can change their legal rights and obligations”.Footnote 147 The constituent instrument is a “membership agreement” rather than an “agency agreement”.Footnote 148 Accordingly, the international organization has separate legal personality and generally acts on its own behalf and not on behalf of its Member States.Footnote 149 It is only when the Member States consent to have the international organization act on their behalf that an agency relationship would arise. The type of agency relationship can be differentiated based on the nature of consent.Footnote 150 If consent is derived from the constituent instrument, then it would be a “constitutional” agency.Footnote 151 However, it would be a “factual” agency if consent was established through an ad hoc basis.Footnote 152
Accordingly, the concept of agency has been recognized to exist in international law and it can arise between an international organization and its Member States when the requirements are met. The question, then, is whether such an agency relationship can exist between an international organization and its Member States in the context of treaty-making.
2. Agency in treaty-making
While there is no clear-cut position on whether an international organization may act as the agent of its Member States when concluding treaties, there is certainly evidence to show that such an agency relationship can exist in the context of treaty-making.
In the discussion on the law of treaties, Professor Ago pointed out that it would be strange if the International Law Commission “decided to rule out the possibility of concluding a treaty by agency”,Footnote 153 and that while it was acknowledged that “institution of agency was not so common in international law as it was in private law … it existed in international law and its use was more widespread than was generally recognized”.Footnote 154 This position was seconded by the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, Sir Humphrey Waldock, who commented that he “believes that … the phenomenon of agency does exist in international law and does, in principle, belong to the general law of treaties”.Footnote 155
In fact, once it is accepted that the concept of agency exists in international law, it might be difficult to reject the logical conclusion that the agency relationship would likewise extend to the conclusion of treaties.
One major difficulty with the idea of having the concept of agency in the context of treaty-making would be the identity of the parties to the treaty. When an international organization validly concludes the treaty on behalf of its Member States, does it mean that the Member States, and not the international organization, are parties to the treaty? Or are the international organization and the Member States both parties to the treaty? The proper identification of the parties to the treaty is of utmost importance. If the international organization is the proper party to the treaty, despite having concluded the treaty on behalf of its Member States, then complications might arise. This would mean that the Member States would still be “third States” under the VCLTIO and that they must express their consent to the obligations under the treaty “in writing”.Footnote 156 Yet, this conflicts with what it means for the international organization to have concluded the treaty “on behalf of” the Member States as their agent.
It might be more appropriate to consider that when the international organization concludes treaties on behalf of its Member States, the proper parties to the treaty are the Member States and not the organization. In such a situation, the Member States would not be considered as “third States”.Footnote 157 There is support for such a position. The acts of the international organization, as an agent for the Member States, affect only the legal relations of the Member States. As Professor Chinkin rightly noted in the context of agency in international law, when “[a]n agent enters into a contractual relationship with the third party on behalf of a principal; the legal relationship is established between the principal and the third party, not the third party and agent”.Footnote 158 In a similar context, Mr Angelo Piero Sereni observed that the “acts performed by the agent within the limits of its authority bind the principal as if they had been personally performed by the latter”, and as for the agent, it “assumes no responsibility towards either the principal or the third parties”.Footnote 159 Nonetheless, the agent must explicitly state that it is concluding the treaty on behalf of its principal, for there “can be no undisclosed principal in international law”.Footnote 160
This does not preclude the possibility for the international organization to be a party to the treaty as well. It merely clarifies that where the international organization concludes treaties solely on behalf of its Member States, the Member States alone are parties to the treaty. The international organization may, if it so desires, express consent to be bound by the treaty on its own behalf as well. In such an instance, the language of the treaty should be altered to reflect the fact that the international organization is not merely concluding the treaty on behalf of its Member States, but also on behalf of itself.
As it turns out, it seems that it might be possible, where the requirements have been met, for an international organization to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States. When this happens, the Member States would be parties to the treaty and have direct relations vis-à-vis the other party to the treaty.
III. THE WAY FORWARD
As the law currently stands, there is no specific rule under the law of treaties (in particular, the VCLT and the VCLTIO) which governs whether an international organization can conclude a treaty on behalf of its Member States. Instead, it was considered that the issue was not ripe for codification.Footnote 161 As a result, neither the VCLT nor the VCLTIO provides any guidance on this issue. This is regrettable for several reasons.
First, the absence of a default rule under the VCLTIO stating that international organizations may conclude treaties on behalf of their Member States might be confusing or even misleading. This is particularly so in the light of the VCLTIO regime on “third States”, which seems to suggest that Member States which have not expressed consent to be bound—by signing the treaty—would be considered as “third States”. Moreover, the purpose of Article 74(3) of the VCLTIO may not be clear, especially when the clause is not appreciated in the light of the drafting history.
Second, the choice for the VCLTIO to take the form of a convention might not be desirable at that point in time. The treaty-making practice of states had developed over many years before the International Law Commission sought to codify the practice into a convention. In contrast, there has not been sufficient time for the treaty-making practice of international organizations to develop. While there may have been an exponential increase in the volume of treaties concluded by international organizations, the practice cannot be said to have been fully developed by the 1980s. This should not be surprising given that the VCLTIO was codified merely thirty-seven years after international organizations were affirmatively recognized as having separate legal personality.Footnote 162 Indeed, the delegations at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations conceded that there was a significant lack of practice in 1986 on the issue of whether international organizations can conclude treaties on behalf of their Member States.Footnote 163 Since then, there have been quite a number of treaties concluded by international organizations on behalf of their Member States.Footnote 164 Likewise, the use of “mixed agreements” became widely used by the European Union.Footnote 165 Yet, the VCLTIO does not feature either of these treaty-making practices. In this respect, the VCLTIO appears deficient.
Nonetheless, the lacuna in the VCLTIO has also been beneficial to the development of international law insofar as it creates more practice in the area of agency in international law. In order to justify the treaties concluded by ASEAN on behalf of its Member States, it would be necessary to rely on the concept of agency under international law. Hence, the use of the phrase “acting for and on behalf of the member states of ASEAN” may have the significance of indicating that ASEAN is acting as an agent for its Member States in concluding the particular treaty in question.
While it may be possible for ASEAN to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States based on the concept of agency, there are still some changes that ought to be made to the treaty-making practice of ASEAN. In particular, it might be desirable for ASEAN to standardize the use of terms such as “ASEAN”, “ASEAN Secretariat”, or “ASEAN Member States”. The interchangeable use of “ASEAN” may lead to unnecessary confusion, particularly in cases where ASEAN, acting through its Secretary-General, is concluding the treaty as an agent acting for and on behalf of the Member States. In such cases, ASEAN, as the agent of the Member States, should conclude the treaty in its own name, and expressly specify that it is “acting for and on behalf of the member states of ASEAN”. To do otherwise would simply obfuscate the treaty-making practice and the concept of agency in international law.
Once it is accepted that ASEAN may conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States, it follows that the Member States would be the proper parties to the treaties. This would affect the legal rights and obligations of ASEAN and its Member States vis-à-vis the other contracting parties. Most importantly, the other party to the treaty may proceed directly against the Member States for them to comply with obligations under the treaty.Footnote 166 If the other party to the treaty is a state, it may also be possible, assuming all prerequisites are met, to bring the case before the International Court of Justice.Footnote 167 On the other hand, ASEAN may or may not, depending on the circumstances, be a party to the treaties. In most of the treaties concluded by ASEAN on behalf of its Member States, there is little evidence to suggest that ASEAN has also expressed consent to be bound by the treaty itself. The interchangeable use of the term “ASEAN” has made it difficult to ascertain in each case if ASEAN was simply concluding the treaty on behalf of its Member States or on its own behalf as well. Even so, it is unlikely that this would adversely affect the arrangement between ASEAN and its Member States in terms of the performance of the obligations under the treaty. The Member States can agree and stipulate in the treaty that ASEAN shall act on their behalf in the co-ordination and implementation of the treaty obligations.Footnote 168 This is possible even if ASEAN is not a party to the treaty. While the other contracting party would not be able to proceed against ASEAN for the non-fulfilment of the treaty obligations, it is doubtful if such recourse would have been more effective than proceeding directly against the Member States. In any event, ASEAN can become a party to the treaty by using clear language to demonstrate that it is concluding the treaty both on behalf of its Member States and of itself.
As for the lacuna in the VCLTIO on the issue of international organizations concluding treaties on behalf of Member States, it might warrant a review by the International Law Commission in due course. The International Law Commission has in fact reviewed certain gaps left unaddressed in the VCLT and VCLTIO, like the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, and issued “single issue codifications” to fill the gaps.Footnote 169 It is proposed that the same can be considered for the issue of international organizations concluding treaties on behalf of Member States as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the discussions in the preceding parts have shown, it may be justified under international law for ASEAN, as an international organization, to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States. There may be good reasons, both for the Member States and for the other party to the treaty, for international law to recognize such a practice. While it is unfortunate that Draft Article 60(2) and Draft Article 36 bis were eventually deleted from the final draft of the VCLT and VCLTIO respectively, it might have been a correct decision to leave the matter for future development.
Strangely enough, what seems like a problematic practice of ASEAN and its Member States has, in a twist of fate, evolved into valuable practice for the development of international law, namely the law of treaties and the concept of agency under international law. While the law of treaties has largely been codified and is well established in the light of the hard work that was put into the VCLT and VCLTIO by the International Law Commission, it is inevitable that there are some lacunae that are left to be filled by subsequent practice.Footnote 170 In this respect, the treaty-making practice of ASEAN temporarily bridged the gap left by the law of treaties, by relying on the concept of agency under international law. Notwithstanding the ingenious stopgap measure applied by ASEAN, it might be preferable, in the long run, for the International Law Commission to re-examine the issue and provide clearer guidance in the near future.
