Franck Michelin, professor of history at Teikyo University, Tokyo, specializes in relations between Japan and Pacific Rim states, most specifically Indochina, leading up to and during the Pacific War. La guerre du Pacifique a commencé en Indochine 1940–1941 is a welcome addition to existing works by Pierre Brocheux, Daniel Héméry, François Guillemot, Éric Jennings, Jean-François Klein, and David Marr, among others; but more than this, it is a stand-alone breakthrough in our knowledge of the beginning of the Pacific War. Michelin's book is the first to use, in addition to the French and American archival sources, an astonishing number of previously unknown Japanese sources that uncover details of Franco-Japanese negotiations as well as Thai, British, and American connections to these negotiations. The main argument of this book is that the Pacific War did not begin on December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor in Hawai‘i, but rather in September 1940, when Japanese forces moved into northern French Indochina.

Chapter 1 focuses on Franco-Japanese relations before 1940; chapter 2 describes the international situation outside Indochina, beginning with Japanese-Soviet clashes in the late 1930s. Blocked from Siberia by the Soviet Union, Japan turned toward Indochina, where the French were powerless to oppose them. Chapter 3 covers the course of Franco-Japanese negotiations in 1940. Chapter 4 analyzes the combination of diplomacy and military force used by Japan in 1940. In chapter 5, Michelin explains Japan's role in the French-Thai conflict, putting it into the context of Japanese plans for expansion into Southeast Asia. Chapter 6 focuses on Japanese ideas about economic exploitation and plans for the place of Indochina in the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Chapter 7 describes the move into southern Indochina by the Japanese, which became the launchpad for their offensive against the British and Dutch colonial territories. Chapter 8 uncovers the ensuing US-Japanese crisis and leads readers to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Michelin's book revises the common understanding of the Pacific War as suddenly breaking out because of the “surprise” Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Japanese decision-making was complex and factionalized with several centers, of which the army, traditionally considered the decisive player, was only one. Michelin argues that the Pearl Harbor attack was the result of a series of events initiated by the Japanese move into northern Indochina in September 1940. The American policy of resisting Japanese expansion by insisting on maintaining the status quo in Asia was doomed once the Japanese had stationed military forces in northern Indochina. The tortuous negotiations involving Vichy France, French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, Germany, the USSR, Japan, and the United States from July 1940 to December 1941 was a whirlwind of dynamic change in which many factors and initiatives struggled for ascendancy. Michelin uses the metaphor of the Gordian knot to describe the relatively static situation in Asia when France fell to Germany. The Japanese advance into northern Indochina was the blow that led to the unraveling of this “knot” and set in motion a sequence of events sliding into the Pacific War.

I now summarize the most salient points of the book.

First, in the summer of 1940, amid Franco-Japanese negotiations, the Indochinese leadership shifted from General Georges Catroux to Admiral Jean Decoux. Contrary to interpretations based on the fact that Catroux subsequently went with Charles de Gaulle while Decoux followed Vichy, there was no fundamental difference between the negotiating strategies of the two men; claims to the contrary arose from subsequent Free French–Vichy enmity (pp. 62–66).

Second, the American factor in Franco-Japanese negotiations was more significant than has been commonly assumed. Vichy kept the United States informed in the hope of eliciting American support to resist Japanese demands; the United States endeavored to prolong negotiations and stiffen the Vichy position without taking any public position. This was true in both 1940 and 1941 (pp. 96–98, 195–96).

Third, the September 1940 Japanese attacks at Lang Son and Dô Son were approved at the highest levels of the Japanese government (including the emperor). The French were led to believe that the Japanese forces were “out of control” and aiming to present Tokyo with a fait accompli; in fact, the Japanese conducted a “good cop/bad cop” scenario to counter French efforts to prolong negotiations and to expeditiously obtain compliance with their demands. Later, French and Japanese historians both followed the idea of Japanese diplomacy being interrupted by an impatient military, but Japanese archives show a different story (pp. 103–39).

Fourth, once the Japanese succeeded in setting foot in northern Indochina, their fear of the United Kingdom and United States was diminished. At the same time, there was a major shift in the Tokyo government with Tojo gaining ascendancy and the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. The United States responded by increasing military aid to China and placing an embargo of kerosine, steel, and scrap iron on Japan (pp. 147–49).

Fifth, the 1940–41 Franco-Thai war and border negotiations continued for months during which Japanese involvement was focused on subordinating southern Indochina and Thailand to Tokyo's plans for advancing into Southeast Asia (pp. 167, 172–80).

Sixth, Japanese planning for the economic exploitation of Indochina began as early as 1937 (pp. 181–88).

Seventh, the failure of Japanese foreign minister Yōsuke Matsuoka's mission to Europe in the spring of 1941, hoping to arrange a four-party Eurasian Bloc with the USSR while being ignorant of Germany's plans to attack eastward, combined with the ultimate failure in June 1941 of prolonged negotiations with the Dutch over access to resources in the East Indies, persuaded Tokyo to occupy southern Indochina as another step toward Singapore and the Dutch East Indies (pp. 205–13).

Eighth, with the Darlan-Katô Accord of July 1941, Japanese-US relations passed the crisis point of no return (pp. 219–25).

Ninth, the Japanese entrance into Indochina in September 1940 “put in gear a course of events leading directly to the Pacific War” (p. 235). The China war was subordinated by the Japanese to second place, below the priority of expanding into Southeast Asia; the pretext of entering northern Indochina to close the border with China masked Japan's first step in this direction (p. 237). This was related to the Tripartite Pact of July 1940: “The occupation of French Indochina and the alliance with Germany were two pillars of the new foreign affairs policy” adopted by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe and Foreign Minister Matsuoka (p. 238).

To sum up, this is a very important, excellently researched publication; it is useful for specialists, students, and history buffs alike. I hope that this book will be translated into English.