To draw on the words of Elizabeth Grosz, these two books examine the “place of the animal and the inhuman in our conceptions of the human, and their possible role in the humanities” once the human is no longer privileged in relation to nature (p. 11). As Grosz rightly points out: “The animal [and, one might add, ‘the natural’] is a necessary reminder of the limits of the human…. What makes man human is the power of reason, of speech, of response, of shame, and so on that animals lack” (p. 12). In order to challenge the nature/human distinction, Grosz appeals to Charles Darwin, whose work resulted in a “decentering that places man back within the animal, within nature, and within a space and time that man does not regulate, understand, or control” (p. 25). Vicki Kirby, on the other hand, draws on recent developments in physics, chemistry, and biology.
Neither Kirby nor Grosz is a political theorist, let alone a political scientist, although the kind of work they are doing is also being undertaken by contemporary political theorists such as Jane Bennett. Kirby and Grosz are not concerned with politics in a narrow sense (political institutions, and so on), nor even with the politics of the environment and natural resources. Instead, they are interested in how we think about nature, whether in terms of the human body, animals, plants, or natural phenomena such as lightning. Specifically, they ask what our thinking about nature means for how we think about the human and what it means to be a human being. They thus address the age-old distinction between nature and animal on one side and the human on the other side, a distinction that has been used normatively to exclude or marginalize certain groups on the basis that they are less than human (women trapped within unruly bodies, for instance, or races said to be closer to nature than the white European).
Kirby's main concern in Quantum Anthropologies is the distinction between nature and culture, especially the way in which this distinction has been used within critical theory and cultural studies. Her theoretical starting point is deconstruction and, in particular, the work of Jacques Derrida, who (in)famously wrote that “there is nothing outside of the text” (quoted on p. 7; emphasis in original). Traditionally, deconstruction has been understood by both its defenders and its detractors as concerned with texts in the sense of philosophy, language, representation, political discourse, and so on. When deconstruction has been extended to new disciplines, it has been on the basis that the objects of those disciplines are text analogous, for instance political institutions as meaningful practices that can be “read” as texts.
Deconstruction—and, more generally, contemporary work in critical theory and cultural studies—tends to see nature as devoid of meaning. That is, nature is taken to be “outside of the text,” and not a text understood as a meaningful system of differences. When references are made to the nature of things—for instance, sexual differences—they have been met with skepticism. References to nature can only be cultural and are often used to legitimize existing hierarchies, for instance sexual and racial differences. Judith Butler's work has been important in this context, and Kirby offers a chapter on her work. For Butler, “Nature is prescriptive by definition…. Any sign of Nature, inasmuch as it is a sign, will always/already be a cultural interpretation” (p. 90; emphasis in original). Nature does not speak of itself, and when it is spoken, it is so in the name of particular interests.
As Kirby points out, this view of nature effectively posits culture as a ground from which nature can be discerned as devoid of meaning. Nature is the other of culture, but culture is what matters, whereas nature cannot matter because it is meaningless. This is the kind of hierarchical distinction that deconstructivists are keen to deconstruct, and this is just what Kirby does. Drawing on Derrida's writings, she challenges the distinction between nature and culture. Textuality is not limited to culture, she argues. If there really is “nothing outside of the text,” then nature cannot be outside of the text. Nature is meaningful and, presumably, deconstructable, and the distinction between nature and culture breaks down. They are part of one text where everything is connected. This is why we should treat elements of culture as well as of nature as “quantums,” that is, as all connected within one text where “the nature of physical reality exceeds our everyday perceptions in quite fantastic ways” (p. 4). This is not to dismiss the critique of normative uses of “nature,” only to question the assumptions behind this critique.
Kirby's argument would seem a natural extension of deconstruction. As she writes, “deconstruction need not assume that the object that emerges is simply an interpreted object, a discursive effect, a cultural product” (p. 6; emphases in original). From the perspective of the received wisdom within critical theory and cultural studies, it is also deeply problematic, because if nature is textual and meaningful in Derrida's sense, that challenges our conceptions of “text” and “meaning”—and, indeed, language, representation, and discourse. This is apart from the normative and ethical implications of undoing the nature/culture distinction.
I am very sympathetic to Kirby's project. If one accepts the assumptions of deconstruction, it seems important to question any distinction between nature and culture. Nonetheless, even if the natural sciences increasingly treat their objects as textual and contingent, it seems to me important to distinguish between two kinds of claims. Even if such a science may literally work, it would seem one step too far to say that nature is in itself—that is, essentially—textual and meaningful. It would be a different thing to claim that the objects of science are textual, but precisely as the objects of science, not as objects in themselves, about which it is difficult to make any claims.
Where Kirby's theoretical starting point is Derrida, Grosz's starting point in Becoming Undone is Gilles Deleuze. Grosz is critical of Derrida insofar as Derrida takes difference to be situated within representation (language, signification, discourse, and so on). That results in two problems, according to Grosz. First, representation is opposed to materiality, where the latter includes nature. Grosz proposes a different “understanding of difference as the generative force of the world, the force that enacts materiality” (p. 91). Second, according to Grosz, the deconstructive conception of difference makes difference the precursor for the constitution of identity, and identities are therefore always opposed to one another. Instead, Grosz proposes to think of difference as “becoming,” by which she means a constant “generation of ever-more variation, differentiation, and difference” (p. 47). The Deleuzean alternative is to move “away from signification and subjectification toward ontology,” to the nature of nature for instance (p. 45). Whether valid or not, these are familiar Deleuzean criticisms of deconstruction. Here, I want only to note that Kirby uses deconstruction in a way that does not oppose representation to materiality, and where textuality is understood as becoming, though without making the turn to ontology.
Deleuzean difference as “pure difference” is at the heart of Grosz's book and her reading of Darwin, whom she reads as both a scientist and a philosopher. The book is essentially Darwin through Bergson through Deleuze. Grosz is interested in neither differences among the species nor natural selection and its role in survival. Instead, she is interested in differences among humans.
For this purpose, she focuses on Darwin's concept of “sexual selection,” that is, the competition among individuals from the same sex for the attention of individuals from the opposite sex. Among Darwin's interpreters, sexual selection is usually subsumed under natural selection and the function of survival. Going back to Darwin, Grosz argues that while natural and sexual selection cannot always be distinguished in practice, sexual selection cannot be reduced to natural selection and survival. Sexual selection is more than reproduction: “The function of sexual selection is to maximize difference or variation, and it succeeds in doing this by maximizing sexual interest as much as bodily types or forms” (p. 130). Therefore, sexual selection cannot be reduced to a matter of reproducing the strongest genes: “The laws of sexual selection are the principles of aesthetics, not the strategies of game theory” (p. 131). Thus, in order to understand sexual selection, we must turn to art and aesthetics.
Grosz uses Darwin against social Darwinism and evolutionary biology to account for differences among human beings. For instance, she argues, with Darwin, that race is not a function of the environment but must be explained in terms of aesthetics and taste, and in ways that cannot be rationalized. Through the perspective of Deleuze, this becomes “becoming,” that is, the production of ever new differences, in ever new and unpredictable ways.
The last two chapters of the book develop these ideas of difference and aesthetics in the context of art. Art, Grosz writes, should not be reduced to the representation of identities, but should be understood as the expression of the becoming of the artists. She writes, about this art of becoming, that it “is an art that brings new forces into existence by elaborating natural and social forces themselves. It is an art thus directed to the future, an art beyond identity … to making a new kind of real” (p. 201). This is the least convincing part of the book. The last chapter describes the art of Indigenous Australian women. It is entirely uncritical, with nothing on the possible limitations of their art, for instance around the whole question of representation. Grosz is much better on nature, philosophy, feminism, and Darwin.
Grosz's book is well written and easily accessible even for someone who does not know a great deal about the theorists with whom she engages. In contrast, Kirby's book is written in a deconstructivist jargon that may appeal to the initiated few but will be difficult to access for the many who might otherwise find the book of interest. Apart from this, there is little in the two books about the political implications of the arguments. These still need to be explored, although some political theorists have done so, for instance Bennett, who, like Kirby, draws upon the work of Bruno Latour. It seems to me necessary to translate some of the insights into different, and more mainstream, vocabularies and into analyses of political institutions. Doing so may do injustice to some of Kirby's and Grosz's insights, and the danger is to lose sight of the broader and more radical understanding of politics as not only concerned with political institutions. In my judgment, it is a risk worth taking.
