The delightful Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies (edited by Dave Cowan) which features mini monographs ranging from “Paths to family justice” through “Resisting economic globalization” to “The Future Regulation of Work” has produced another important instalment – Michael Adler’s combative tract challenging the legitimacy of benefit sanctions in the UK.

The book is highly readable and engaging; an impressive feat, bearing in mind that this is a topic that does not manage to animate many activists and academics (indeed, Adler is quick to clarify that ‘[i]t is a central contention of this book that benefit sanctions ought to be a matter of greater public concern than they are’ [9]). Moreover, the book does not shy away from producing extensive statistical data to buttress the argument, including figures relating to public attitudes towards claimants; frequency of sanctions; their distribution across different benefits; the success of appeals, and so forth. Part of the book’s appeal, it seems, is its author’s unapologetic approach to the subject matter, as indicated in the book’s title, and throughout the text. Whilst not necessarily structured in this way, Adler contends that benefit sanctions, particularly in the field of unemployment, fail on three fronts: morality, effectiveness, and legality.

As a matter of moral concern, Adler’s argument may be seen as encompassing at least two layers. First, the successful implementation of the government’s draconian policies (as explained in the book, and below) towards one segment of the population could not succeed without the employment of an ongoing campaign to portray beneficiaries as fraudsters, in potential or in actual fact, leading the public to perceive them as ‘undeserving’ of assistance [pp. 14-18]. Second, there is the matter of the ‘authoritarian’ [29] nature of the policies and practices. In particular, Adler takes issue with the ‘conditionality regime’ that the government has imposed. Now, while Adler presents the development of the conditionality paradigm since the mid-1980s, it is possible to find its historical antecedents at least in the British Poor Laws, in the early seventeenth century (Paz-Fuchs 2007). Whilst obviously not claiming that contemporary practices and policies are on par with the Dickensian poor houses and labour yards of yore (or, for that matter, that they are worse than their American parallels) there is an argument to be made that, within Britain, conditionality has become increasingly harsher. This is shown across three main realms: namely, scope (the type of claimants governed by new conditions and sanctions), severity (the same infringements now carry harsher sanctions), and escalation (harsher sanctions for recidivists). In addition, as the Welfare Conditionality Project has documented, over a period of 5 years, there is a clear ‘hostile environment’ towards beneficiaries, leading field level (or ‘screen level’, Landsbergen, Reference Landsbergen2004) bureaucrats to dismiss explanations for missing appointments that include a father’s funeral, participating in mandatory work placements, or a collapse due to mental illness [pp. 57–59]. Whilst sanctions are clearly an important part of the picture, and whilst I agree that conditionality is the governing paradigm underpinning ‘active labour market policies’ in the UK, I would suggest that this is the case because sanctions are not its only manifestation. Judging by the inclusion of a chapter on Conditionality and the Changing Relationship between Citizen and the State [ch. 5, pp. 63–73], Adler would probably agree. And yet, the chapter is extremely short, and leaves the reader (at least, this reader) asking for more to be said on the matter.

Seemingly aware that some readers may not be persuaded by the moral argument, Adler argues that they are not even effective. The harsh treatment, it transpires, manages to move only a small minority (in one study, 7.4 per cent) of the unemployed into employment, whilst a far larger cohort (35.9 per cent) ‘drop out’ of the system altogether, i.e. no longer claim benefits, but do not find work. Instead, fed up with the sanction regime, they become homeless or move to live with family or relatives, at least for some time [pp. 73–77]. Those who remain subject to the sanction regime state that it had a negative effect on their wellbeing, has led them to become homeless, use food banks and resort to crime. Under this heading of effectiveness, one may include the institutional element, which surfaces at several points in the book. I refer to the fact that important aspects of the programme have been outsourced to private providers, who are ‘paid by results’ and, thus, may benefit from reducing the welfare rolls by ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ claimants [p. 95, 122].

The final charge in Adler’s assault is devoted to the law pertaining to these policies and practices. Unsurprisingly, as an esteemed legal academic with decades of experience on the subject, this is where Adler has most to say. He explains that the failures are both procedural and substantive. First, building on his previous work, he argues that the current regime fails basic tests of administrative justice, by eradicating independent adjudication; the creation of Personal Advisors who impose conditionality; and introducing ‘Mandatory Reconsideration’ as a precondition to appeal (thus reducing the likelihood of success). Second, at the constitutional level, the sanctions fail to protect an individual’s right to a social minimum, as enshrined in the ECHR, the ICESCR and the ESC (ch. 8); and do not comply with a serious commitment to the rule of law (ch. 10).

In sum, this is not only an informative book, but one written with (perhaps Quixotic) passion and fervour that are not common enough in academic literature. It seeks not only to educate and inform, but to contribute towards making the world (of benefit sanctions in the UK, at least) a fairer place, and for that it should be commended.