Saudi Arabian national population growth, 1992–2004

Note: (—) no data available; CBR, crude birth rate per 1,000 people; CDR, crude death rate per 1,000 people; NI, natural increase rate (%); TFR, total fertility rate.

^a Official and semiofficial data.

Source: Official Saudi data are derived from official publications, namely, the Statistical Yearbook of the Central Department of Statistics or the Annual Report of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Semiofficial data come from various U.N. bodies, particularly from the regional U.N. research body, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia.

At first glance, in contrast to political documents, official demographic data, particularly total population figures, “look innocent.” The common tendency is to accept them “as is” because governments tend not to manipulate the declared number of their citizens. In most cases this assumption is true. Is it also true for Saudi Arabia? In the 1970s and 1990s, Saudi authorities published the results of two demographic censuses that numbered the Saudi citizenry at 6,218,361 in September 1974 and 12,310,053 in September 1992.Footnote ¹ However, many experts found these figures to be highly inflated, as shown in the table.

This essay examines the accuracy of the results of the latest Saudi demographic census, conducted in September 2004. According to this count, the Saudi citizenry numbered 16,529,302. Hence, during the twelve years between the two censuses, the Saudi national population increased by 34.27 percent, at an average annual growth rate of 2.49 percent, as compared with an annual average growth rate of 3.87 percent between the 1974 and the 1992 censuses.

These data raise two main questions. First, as one can see from the table, official Saudi data prior to 2004 are considerably higher than the census results. In mid-2003, the Saudi Central Department of Statistics calculated the citizenry population at 16.96 million. Taking into consideration a 2.49 percent annual growth rate, this means that Saudi citizens should have numbered 17.38 million in mid-2004, and approximately 17.5 million by September, about one million more than the actual census results that month. That discrepancy, equivalent to about 6 percent of the total Saudi citizenry in 2004, seems unreasonable given the various services the Saudi government provides to its citizens, such as health care and education, some of which require precise and updated data not only regarding population totals, but also relating to age and gender. In addition, many direct government payments, such as welfare benefits, to specific persons or families should provide the Saudi government with a more accurate count.

Second, as one can see from the table, data on natural increase (NI) rates of the Saudi citizenry population between the 1992 and the 2004 censuses were consistently higher than 2.49 percent. Population growth is the sum of the NI and migration balance. One explanation for the wide gap between population growth and natural increase is a negative migration balance of Saudi citizens, compensating for higher NI rates. This was not the case, however. Since the beginning of the oil era, particularly after the October 1973 “oil boom,” the migration balance of Saudi citizens has been positive although not in considerable numbers. The only remaining option is that the reported NI rates were largely inflated.

The annual NI rate is the sum of the crude birth rate (CBR) minus the crude death rate (CDR). Either reported CDRs were exaggeratedly low or CBRs were exaggeratedly high. The CDRs seem reasonable: Saudi Arabia's wide-based age structure, a result of high fertility, combined with a steady increase in life expectancy produced extremely low CDRs—one of the lowest rates in the world, averaging about 5 per 1,000 people throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The only explanation left is a sharp CBR decline to below 30 per 1,000 to produce an NI rate of no more than 2.5 percent on an annual average. All available data firmly contradict this hypothesis, however, pointing to CBRs well over 30 per 1,000 during most of the period between the 1992 and the 2004 censuses.

Moreover, worldwide experience suggests that a sharp fertility decline requires a comprehensive national family planning program, such as those implemented in Tunisia and Egypt, or a radical change in women's status, primarily in their employment opportunities, as has been the case in developed countries since the 1960s. In both these cases, however, fertility rates declined gradually, over at least a generation. As none of these variables apply to Saudi Arabia, we must dismiss the thesis that a radical fertility decline led to a sharp reduction of NI rates.

Thus, the question remains: if the migration balance was positive, or at least not negative, and the annual NI rate stayed above 2.5 percent during the 1990s and declined to only 2.5–2.6 percent in the early 2000s,Footnote ² how is it that the Saudi national population increased by only 2.49 percent on an annual average between the 1992 and the 2004 censuses?

In light of this discrepancy, the reported Saudi citizenry number in the 1992 census was inflated or that of the 2004 census was deflated. My assumption is that the 2004 census data is the accurate figure, based on the following three main factors.

1. 1. The Saudi regime has no reason to deflate the number of the kingdom's citizenry.

2. 2. Growing socioeconomic problems, primarily the increasing unemployment rate among young Saudis, require accurate demographic data, as they constitute the prerequisite for formulating Saudi long-term employment strategy.Footnote ³

3. 3. Under the leadership of King ʿAbdallah, a profound change occurred in Saudi Arabia, allowing for open discussion on many political, social, and economic topics previously taboo. Moreover, in recent years, many indications suggest that Saudi authorities are more open to supplying information and data that they were previously reluctant to provide.

How much did the 1992 official data inflate the Saudi citizenry number? Taking into consideration the most accepted NI rates during the 1992–2004 period, namely an annual average of 3.3 percent for 1992–1999 and 2.6 percent for 2000–2004, calculations put the population at approximately 11.6 million for September 1992, about 700,000 less than the actual census data. Even if we assume a higher population growth rate of 3.2 percent on annual average for the whole 1992–2004 period, then the Saudi citizenry numbered about 11.4 million in September 1992. In any case, it seems unreasonable that the Saudi citizenry numbered less than 11 million that month. Thus, the estimates of the U.S. embassy in Riyadh that the number of Saudi citizens in 1988 “ranged between 5 and 6 million”Footnote ⁴ and of Birks and Sinclair, who put the number at 8.1 million in mid-1992,Footnote ⁵ were both tens of percent less than the actual figure.

As for the 1974 census results, even assuming the lowest option of only 11 million Saudi citizens in 1992 and an annual average growth rate of 3.87 percent between the 1974 and 1992 censuses, which is the most reasonable figure, then Saudi citizens in September 1974 numbered 5.5 million. Thus, the figure that Birks and Sinclair suggest for 1975—4.593 millionFootnote ⁶—which was and still is widely quoted, including by me,Footnote ⁷ was probably 20–25 percent less than the actual number.

The surprising 2004 census data has probably solved the half-century debate on the Saudi citizenry number. A database can now be established, although only in broad terms, regarding the number of Saudi citizens since 1974. This database, in turn, will permit researchers to examine Saudi socioeconomic history since the October 1973 “oil boom” not only at the national macrolevel, but also in per capita terms.