Introduction
The issue of how a government comes to power generally falls within the domestic domain and is not a concern of international law. However, the African Union (AU, established 2002), like its predecessor the Organisation for African Unity (OAU, 1963–2002), views coups as significant threats to the peace, security, stability, and development of African states.Footnote 1 To shape change, the AU codified the anti-coup policy that the OAU had progressively adopted from 1997, and broadened it into a normative framework.
Since the OAU/AU's restrictions, there has been a decrease in the numbers of coups in the African region. Between 1997 and 2018, there were seventeen coups in thirteen African states.Footnote 2 Prior to that, there were fifty-three coups in twenty-six African states between 1970 and 1996.Footnote 3 But seven successful coups in five states since 2019—Sudan (2019 and 2021); Chad (2021); Mali (2020 and 2021); Guinea (2021); and Burkina Faso (2022)—have led to concerns about the re-emergence of coups in Africa and the adequacy of AU response.Footnote 4 This introductory note considers the first responses of the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) on the occurrence of unconstitutional changes in the latter three situations in the light of the AU framework.
The Coups
The 2021 coup in Mali was aimed at disrupting transitional arrangements agreed following a coup the previous year. On August 18, 2020, soldiers calling themselves the National Committee for the Salvation of the Peoples (CNSP) detained President Ibrahim Boubacar and Prime Minister Boubou Cisse. The CNSP installed its leader, Colonel Assimi Goita, for a three-year transition.Footnote 5 In response, the AU suspended Mali from participating in their respective institutions pending a return to constitutional order. The AU lifted its sanctions after mediation by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had led to an agreement in which civilians were installed to lead the transition period of 18 months.Footnote 6 In line with that, Bah N'Daw was installed as President, Moctar Ouane became Prime Minister, Goita became Deputy Prime Minister, and four senior army leaders joined the cabinet.Footnote 7
Goita seized power for the second time in May 2021 and detained Bah N'Daw and Ouane.Footnote 8 Goita accused the civilian authorities of sabotaging the 2020 agreement by removing two senior army officers from office during a cabinet reshuffle.Footnote 9 Goita became President, selected a civilian as Prime Minister (Chogeul Kokolla Maiga), and announced that elections would be held as planned in February 2022.Footnote 10 In response, the local transition monitoring team, the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA, a peacekeeping force established in 2013 after the Tuareg invasion of 2012), issued a joint statement condemning the coup and demanding the immediate release of the President and Prime Minister.Footnote 11 The AU PSC then issued a communiqué in which it suspended Mali and “[c]all[ed] on Transitional authorities to respect and abide by the originally stipulated 18 months transitional period.”Footnote 12
The 2021 coups in Guinea and in Burkina Faso were more traditional. In these, repressive, corrupt, or ineffective leaders were removed and replaced by a military regime. In Guinea, on September 5, 2021, the Committee for Reconciliation and Development (CRND) arrested President Alpha Conde and in his place installed Commander Mamady Doumbouya.Footnote 13 The CRND justified its removal of Conde on the grounds of “poverty and endemic corruption.”Footnote 14 The coup was widely welcomed in Guinea. In response, the AU PSC suspended Guinea and “[d]emand[ed] a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led government, and a rapid solution to the current crisis.”Footnote 15
In Burkina Faso, on January 23, 2022, the Patriotic Movement for Preservation and Restoration (MPSR) arrested President Roch Kabore and in his place installed Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba.Footnote 16 The MPSR justified its action on the deterioration of the security situation in the country.Footnote 17 No time limit was placed on the transition—Damiba is reported to have promised a “return to normal constitutional life … when the conditions are right.”Footnote 18 The coup received broad support in Burkina Faso.Footnote 19 In response, the PSC expressed concerns about the resurgence of coups in Africa, and it suspended Burkina Faso from all AU activities until constitutional rule is restored in the state.Footnote 20
During the period of suspension, representatives of these three states would be barred from sitting in AU organs, and the governments would be barred from putting forward new candidates for AU elected positions.Footnote 21
The AU's Peace and Security Council Responses
With minor exceptions, the PSC's responses to the coups in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso are formulaic and intended to return the country to constitutional order through presidential elections as quickly as possible. Each communiqué refers to the AU's normative framework rejecting unconstitutional changes of government.Footnote 22 That framework is provided under three current AU treaties and policies:Footnote 23
• The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol, in force Dec. 26, 2003).Footnote 24 The Protocol has been ratified by fifty-three of fifty-five AU states, including Mali (Feb. 28, 2003), Guinea (Jan. 20, 2012), and Burkina Faso (Dec. 1, 2003).Footnote 25
• The AU Constitutive Act (in force May 26, 2001).Footnote 26 All fifty-five African states have ratified this treaty: Mali (Aug. 11, 2000), Guinea (Apr. 23, 2002), and Burkina Faso (Feb. 27, 2001).Footnote 27
• The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance (Democracy Charter, in force Feb. 15, 2012). Thirty-six African states have ratified the treaty and are bound under it, including Mali (Aug. 13, 2013), Guinea (June 17, 2011), and Burkina Faso (May 26, 2010). Footnote 28
In condemning and rejecting the coups, the PSC refers to Article 4(p) of the AU Constitutive Act. That provision establishes the prohibition of unconstitutional change as a key AU principle.Footnote 29 The PSC establishes its general authority under Article 7 of the PSC Protocol. That article provides the PSC wide powers of response for conflict prevention, management, and resolution.Footnote 30 Under Article 7, member states accept and agree to implement the PSC decisions and agree to fully cooperate with that organ (Articles 7(3)–(4)). That includes the state in which the coup has occurred.
The key provision on unconstitutional change is Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol, which the PSC draws on in Burkina Faso.Footnote 31 Under that provision, the PSC is required to “institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a Member State, as provided for in the Lomé Declaration.”Footnote 32 The Lomé Declaration, a policy document of the OAU, sets out a non-exhaustive list of situations that are illegal. These are coup d'état against a democratically elected government; intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; replacement of a democratically elected government by armed dissident groups and rebel movements; or refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair, and regular elections.Footnote 33
In relying on Article 7, in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, the PSC shows that it has concluded that the situation in question fits the AU's definition of unconstitutional changes of government. One challenge is that the situation in Mali does not fit easily within those definitions. That is because it relates to the ouster of a transitional government, an authority that is not democratically elected. It is possible to argue that the PSC can act in support of transitional governments under the Democracy Charter, as it prohibits situations that “may affect [a state's] democratic political institutional arrangements or the legitimate exercise of power” (Article 24). The Democracy Charter covers both illegal access and maintenance of state power (Article 23). The AU Assembly's 2010 “Decision on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of Government” establishes
the need for a comprehensive approach to the issue of unconstitutional change based on a zero tolerance policy for coups d'etat but also for violations of democratic standards, the persistence and reoccurrence of which could result in unconstitutional changes.Footnote 34
Read together, Articles 23–24 of the Democracy Charter and the Assembly Decision would enable PSC action in support of transitional authorities and against authorities that refuse to hold democratic elections to end the transition.
In Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, the PSC threatened targeted/punitive sanctions.Footnote 35 But the PSC might be acting ultra vires. The Lomé Declaration provides that the PSC can impose targeted sanctions (travel, diplomatic, and trade) on perpetrators after six months if they fail to restore the state to constitutional rule.Footnote 36 The coups in Guinea and Burkina Faso fall outside that timeframe, and Mali would fit only if the 2020 and 2021 coups are treated as continuous acts. Further, strictu sensu, it is the AU Assembly that has the power to impose targeted sanctions and punitive measures, including those of an economic nature against perpetrators of unconstitutional change (Democracy Charter, Article 25(7)) or political and economic sanctions on a member state that fails to comply with AU decisions and policies (Constitutive Act, Article 23(2))—which would include AU decisions to reverse an unconstitutional change.Footnote 37 Arguably, the threat and its completion could give effect to AU objectives. Alongside that, the PSC's flexible practice is in line with the AU's less formalistic approach to its powers. For example, it imposed sanctions on non-party states to the PSC Protocol (Mauritania, 2005 and Guinea, 2008) and non-party states to the Democracy Charter (Gambia, 2017).Footnote 38 As de Wet puts it: the AU views the treaty measures as guiding principles rather than binding obligations.Footnote 39 But that leaves the AU and the PSC's actions open to challenge by a target state. Unfortunately, there is currently no judicial organ in operation that can give clarification on the interpretation and application of AU treaties.Footnote 40
In each communiqué, the PSC makes clear it is collaborating with ECOWAS, the regional economic community (REC) for the West African region, in addressing each crisis. RECs form part of the AU framework for peace and security (Article 16, PSC Protocol). Reflecting that hierarchy, the AU Assembly Decision (2010) provides that the RECS are bound by the PSC's decisions on unconstitutional change and cannot admit a state that the AU has suspended.Footnote 41 Nevertheless, the ability of an REC to respond to coups in its sub-region will depend on its constitution, capability, and capacity. The ECOWAS legal framework provides powers to impose sanctions where democracy is abruptly ended by any means and power to intervene in a member state to assist a democratically elected government against a coup or attempted coup.Footnote 42 It has a zero-tolerance policy towards unconstitutional changes of government, whether used to assume power or maintain power. It can act through the ECOWAS Standby Force.Footnote 43 With AU PSC endorsement, ECOWAS deployed ECOMOG when an incumbent refused to relinquish power in Gambia (2017).Footnote 44
Technically, there is a hierarchy of authority. In practice, however, the RECs have autonomy and the position taken by the REC can determine the AU's response.Footnote 45 ECOWAS is especially muscular in the approach it takes, and it acts swiftly in suspending the state and in establishing political routes for a resolution of the crises early on. On May 30, 2021, ECOWAS continued its mediation work in Mali and its collaboration with the local transition monitoring team.Footnote 46 The PSC endorsed that and sent a PSC evaluation team to collaborate with ECOWAS and the local team and to provide AU-specific support to Mali.Footnote 47 On September 8, 2021, ECOWAS sent a high-level assessment mission to Guinea.Footnote 48 On January 28, 2022, ECOWAS sent two missions to Burkina Faso, of which one would assess the security situation in the country and the other would assess the political situation.Footnote 49 All these initiatives are useful to the AU.
The communiqués, however, show three significant differences in the PSC's approach to the coups. One key difference is that in Mali the PSC barred the leaders of the transition process from taking part in the presidential elections when these would be held to restore constitutional order. However, it did not place similar restrictions on Guinea and Burkina Faso juntas. Presumably the PSC scaled its responses—acting more firmly against a junta that had carried out two coups within one year. The restriction is in line with the Democracy Charter (Article 25(4), but it is only part of the provision. The remainder requires that perpetrators be prevented from holding high office in the political institutions of the state.Footnote 50 It is not clear why the PSC did not impose that.
The second key difference is in the way the PSC used its threat of targeted/punitive sanctions. In Mali, the PSC directed its threat to those who would undermine an early return to a civilian-led transition and timetable.Footnote 51 In Guinea, it directed it against the junta if the military failed to return to barracks, and their continued interference in the political processes.Footnote 52 In Burkina Faso, it directed it against those who violated the human rights of the deposed President and other political detainees.Footnote 53 The difference in approach is not explained. Presumably, the PSC had by then realized that targeted sanctions aimed at punishing the junta for remaining in power would likely prove ineffective. Certainly, targeted sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on Guinea on September 16, 2021 (travel bans and frozen financial assets members of the CRND and their families) had little demonstrable effect on the behaviour of the junta.Footnote 54
The third key difference is the PSC recognition in the Guinea and Burkina Faso communiqués that anti-democratic practices of incumbent leaders underlie some coups and explain the local populations' support for a change of government. Following the coup in Guinea, the PSC requested that the AU Commission (Secretariat) consider “the root causes and impact of the unconstitutional change of government arising from non-consensual and/or politically manipulated democratic processes.”Footnote 55 In response to Burkina Faso, the PSC expanded that to include an “examin[ation of] existing AU instruments on democracy and good governance, with a view to factor in contemporary challenges to African peace and security and modalities to address the surge in unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.”Footnote 56
Throughout, in each situation, the PSC's underlying goal is the maintenance of peace and security, and it seeks to avoid actions by the regime and outside actors (including assassinations) that might further inflame tensions and lead to armed conflict and violence in the state.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the PSC relies on wide powers granted to it under the African Union's framework and adapts that when groups seize power illegally in AU member states. But there are issues of clarity and scope, and conflict between provisions. A careful consolidation of AU treaties and policies could likely resolve these issues.
The deterrence effect of AU treaties and PSC actions seems to be waning. The PSC is aware of this. The specific reference to “the root causes and impact of the unconstitutional change of government arising from non-consensual and/or politically manipulated democratic processes” is significant. It suggests that an examination of the anti-democratic practices of incumbents in African states might be imminent. That is overdue. One key driver of coups is the difficulty of democratic change in Africa. For example, incumbents have removed or extended presidential term limits twenty-four times in eighteen states between 2002 and 2020.Footnote 57 Additionally, through electoral fraud and violence in particular, incumbents rarely lose elections.Footnote 58 Further, allegations of fraud are rarely upheld in national courts.Footnote 59 More broadly, the AU's focus on elections overlooks the lack of substantive democracy signalled in the abuses of civil, political, and human rights, corruption, and the intentional denigration of the judicial and legislative branches of government, all of which impact peace and security, and drive coups.Footnote 60 Until these issues are addressed, coups are likely to continue, including after the return to the mandated constitutional order.Footnote 61
Regrettably, at the time of writing (May 23, 2021) neither diplomacy nor sanctions have dislodged the perpetrators of the unconstitutional changes. The cohesive regional approach is under strain—unlike ECOWAS, the AU so far seems unwilling to ratchet up its sanctions and it continues to allow adjustments to the transition. That split and the AU's position will do little to deter those who would assume power illegally in Africa.
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PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1001ST MEETING
ADDIS ABABA,
ETHIOPIA
1 JUNE 2021
PSC/PR/COMM.(1001(2021))
COMMUNIQUÉ
Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its 1001st meeting held on 1 June 2021, on the situation in Mali.
The Peace and Security Council,
Recalling its previous communiques and press statements on the situation in Mali and in the Sahel region, in particular Communique [PSC/PR/COMM. (M)] adopted at its 1000th meeting held on 25 May 2021 and Communique [PSC/PR/COMM.(CMXLl)] adopted at its 941st meeting held on 19 August 2020;
Taking note of the opening remarks by the PSC Chairperson for June 2021 and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Burundi to the AU, H.E. Ambassador Joel Nkurabagaya and the statements by the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye; H.E. Ambassador Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU, as the representative of ECOWAS Chair and Ambassador Fafre Camara, Permanent Representative of Mali to the AU, as well as the briefing by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Mission for the Sahel (MISAHEL), H.E. Ambassador Maman Sidikou;
Deeply concerned about the evolving situation in Mali and its negative impact on the gains made thus far in the transition process in the country;
Also recalling the Communique of the Extraordinary Summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of State and Government, held on 30 May 2021, in Accra, Ghana;
Mindful of the provisions of all relevant AU normative instruments, including the AU Constitutive Act; the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; and the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Lomé, Togo, July 2000 (the Lomé Declaration);
Reaffirming the unwavering commitment of the AU to respect the sovereignty, unity and the territorial integrity of Mali, as well as the AU's solidarity with the people and Government of Mali;
Acting under Article 7 of its Protocol, the Peace and Security Council,
1. Endorses the decisions adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, as outlined in paragraph 8 of its Communique issued on 30 May 2021, in Accra, Ghana;
2. Condemns in the strongest terms possible and totally rejects coups d'état and unconstitutional changes of government in the Continent, consistent with the provisions of Article 4(p) of the AU Constitutive Act;
3. Decides, accordingly, in line with the relevant AU normative instruments, to immediately suspend the Republic of Mali from participation in all activities of the African Union, its Organs and institutions, until normal constitutional order has been restored in the country;
4. Strongly urges the Malian military to urgently and unconditionally return to the barracks, and to refrain from further interference in the political processes in Mali, while calling for the creation of conducive conditions for an unimpeded, transparent and swift return to the civilian-led transition, based on the agreed transition roadmap for Mali, failing which, the Council will not hesitate to impose targeted sanctions and other punitive measures against any spoilers of the current transition;
5. Calls on the Malian defence and security forces to immediately lift all restrictions on all political actors, including the house arrest of H.E. Bah N'Daw and H.E. Moctar Ouane;
6. Calls upon the transitional authorities to respect and abide by the originally stipulated 18 months transitional period and, therefore, appeals once again to the Malian people to place the supreme interests of the country and its people above all else, to remain calm and to continue to work together within the framework of the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Mali, which emanated from the Algiers process, with the effective participation of women, the youth and Malians in the Diaspora, to resolve the current crisis, and organize free, fair and credible democratic elections on 27 February 2022;
7. Requests the Chairperson of the Commission through his Special Representative and Head of AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) to continue to closely coordinate with the ECOWAS Special Envoy and Mediator to Mali, H.E. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
8. Expresses support for the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and commends its efforts in Mali, while reiterating AU's readiness to actively collaborate with the UN in maintaining peace, stability and security in Mali;
9. Demands unambiguously that the current leadership of the transition process, including the Head of the Transition, Vice-President and Prime Minister, should not, under any circumstances, be candidates for the forthcoming presidential election in Mali;
10. Calls on the military leadership and all political stakeholders to fully and unconditionally respect the transition charter while urging for the immediate appointment of a civilian Prime Minister to lead the conclusion of the transition process and to coordinate a genuinely inclusive national reconciliation and dialogue process for the stability of Mali;
11. Further decides to constitute a PSC evaluation mission to Mali, to engage with all concerned stakeholders and the ECOWAS Special Envoy and Mediator, in order to identify areas in which the AU could provide support to Mali, particularly as this relates to the implementation of the transition programme and the holding of elections;
12. Appeals to the international community to extend financial support to Mali in order to enable it to address the grave macroeconomic challenges facing the country and ensure that the transition plan is not derailed;
13. Also requests the Chairperson of the Commission to monitor the situation in Mali closely and to provide regular updates to Council, at least once every quarter and as necessary; and
14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
1030TH MEETING
10 SEPTEMBER 2021
ADDIS ABABA
PSC/PR/COMM.(1030(2021))
COMMUNIQUÉ
Adopted by the Peace and Security Council at its 1030th meeting held on 10 September 2021, on the situation in the Republic of Guinea,
The Peace and Security Council,
Recalling the relevant provisions of the July 2000 AU Constitutive Act, the July 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, in particular, Article 2 establishing the PSC as the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict in Africa, and the January 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance;
Mindful of the provisions of all relevant AU normative instruments, in particular the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Change of Government, adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Lomé, Togo, from 10 to 12 July 2000 (the Lomé Declaration);
Further recalling its previous communiqués on the situation in Guinea, including PSC/PR/COMM.(CLXV), PSC/PR/COMM.(CCIV) and PSC/AHG/COMM.2(CCVII), adopted by its 165th, 204th and 207th meetings held, respectively on 29 December 2008, 17 September 2009, and 29 October 2009; also recalling press statement PSC/PR/BR.1(CCXX) adopted at its 220th meeting held on 11 March 2010, and communique [PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCLII)] adopted at its 252nd meeting, held on 9 December 2010;
Noting the joint statement issued by the Chairperson of the AU, H.E. Felix Tshisekedi, President of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the AU Commission, H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, the statement of the Chairperson of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), H.E. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, President of the Republic of Ghana, as well as the communique adopted by the Extraordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, on 8 September 2021;
Further noting the statement by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Chad to the African Union, H.E. Ambassador Mahamad Ali Hassan, Chairperson of the PSC for the month of September 2021, and the briefing by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye; also noting the statements made by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Guinea to the AU and the Representative of Ghana, in its capacity as Chairperson of the ECOWAS;
Reaffirming the unwavering commitment of the AU to respect the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Guinea and AU's continued solidarity with the people of Guinea in their aspirations for improved and sustainable democratic governance.
Acting under Article 7 of its Protocol, the Peace and Security Council:
1. Expresses its deep concern over the situation in Guinea following the coup d'état, on 5 September 2021, which resulted in the unconstitutional takeover of power, the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of Government and all state institutions, and its impact on the country, the region and the Continent;
2. Pursuant to Article 4(p) of the AU Constitutive Act, totally rejects and strongly condemns the unconstitutional change of government in Guinea, through military coup d'état of 5 September 2021;
3. Endorses the communique adopted by the Extraordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, on 8 September 2021, in particular paragraph 11 and looks forward to the outcome of the ECOWAS high-level mission to Guinea;
4. Decides, accordingly, in line with the relevant AU normative instruments, to immediately suspend the Republic of Guinea from participation in all activities of the African Union, its Organs and institutions, until normal constitutional order is restored in the country;
5. Calls on the Guinean military to immediately release President Alpha Conde, along with other officials arrested unconditionally, while ensuring their personal safety and health;
6. Demands the Guinean military to urgently and unconditionally return to the barracks, uphold the principle of constitutionalism, and to refrain from further interference in the political processes in Guinea, failing which the Council will institute further targeted sanctions including punitive measures against all the actors involved in the military takeover of power;
7. Urges the Guinean people to remain calm, while calling on the military actors to refrain from all acts that could lead to violence and to give primacy to the supreme interest of the country in the promotion of peace, security and stability;
8. Demands a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led government, and a rapid solution to the current crisis;
9. Appeals to all external actors to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Guinea, which could further complicate the situation in the country;
10. Calls on the United Nations Security Council to also endorse the decision of the ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit on the situation in Guinea, herein endorsed by the PSC and support its implementation, with a view to ensure restoration of constitutional order in Guinea;
11. Requests the Chairperson of the Commission to continue consultations with the relevant stakeholders in Guinea and ECOWAS, as the concerned regional economic community, on the evolving situation on the ground, and provide quarterly briefings to the PSC;
12. Also requests the Chairperson of the Commission to establish an inclusive monitoring mechanism, comprising the AU, ECOWAS, UN and all other relevant stakeholders, to closely follow up on the situation in Guinea and the implementation of the ECOWAS and PSC decisions in the country;
13. Also requests the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive and objective analysis focusing on the root causes and impact of the unconstitutional change of government arising from non-consensual and/or politically manipulated democratic processes;
14. Decides to undertake an assessment mission to Guinea, to engage with all concerned stakeholders, in order to identify areas in which the AU could provide support to Guinea to address challenges facing the country;
15. Also decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
1062ND MEETING
ADDIS ABABA,
ETHIOPIA
31 JANUARY 2022
PSC/PR/COMM.1/1062(2022)
COMMUNIQUE
Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its 1062nd meeting held on 31 January 2022, on the Situation in Burkina
Faso: The Peace and Security Council,
Recalling its previous decisions on the situation in Burkina Faso, in particular Communiques PSC/PR/COMM/3.(DXLIV) adopted at its 544th meeting held on 18 September 2015; PSC/PR/COMM (CDLXVIII), adopted at its 468th meeting held on 18 November 2014; and PSC/PR/COMM(CDLXV) adopted at its 465th meeting held on 3 November 2014;
Also recalling the Press Release of the Chairperson of the Commission issued on 24 January 2022, as well as the Communique of the Extraordinary Summit of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of State and Government on the political situation in Burkina Faso adopted on 28 January 2022;
Evoking the relevant provisions of the AU Constitutive Act, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, particularly Article 7 (g) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance;
Mindful of the Decisions AHG/Dec.141(XXXV) and AHG/Dec.142(XXXV), adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Algiers, Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999; the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Change of Government, adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Lomé, Togo, from 10 to 12 July 2000 (the Lomé Declaration); and the Solemn Declaration of the 50th OAU/AU Anniversary adopted in Addis Ababa on 25 May 2013;
Takes note of the opening remarks by H.E. Ambassador Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, PSC Chairperson for January 2022 and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Ghana to the AU; the briefing by H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security; as well as the statements made by H.E. Ambassador Olivia Rouamba, Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso and the Representative of the Chair of the ECOWAS;
Reaffirms the unwavering commitment of the AU to respect the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Burkina Faso, as well as the AU's solidarity with the people and Government of Burkina Faso; and
Acting under Article 7 of its Protocol, the Peace and Security Council,
1. Expresses deep concern over the resurgence of military coups d'état which undermines democracy, peace, security and stability in the Continent;
2. Condemns in unequivocal terms, the military coup d'état in Burkina Faso, which resulted in the ousting of a democratically elected President, H.E. Marc Roch Christian Kabore, by a faction of military officers; and reiterates its zero tolerance of unconstitutional changes of government in line with Article 4(p) of the AU Constitutive Act and reaffirm total adherence to the AU normative frameworks on illegal takeover of governments on the Continent;
3. Endorses the Communique of the Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on the political situation in Burkina Faso adopted on 28 January 2022; and expresses strong support to the efforts of the ECOWAS in addressing peace and security challenges facing the region, including the resurgence of military coups;
4. Demands the immediate unconditional release of President Marc Rock Christian Kabore and all other detainees, and respect of human rights, including protection of their physical health and moral integrity and warns that in a situation of any abuse of human rights, Council will not hesitate to take necessary action, including punitive measures against those who will be found responsible;
5. Decides, in line with the relevant AU instruments, in particular, the AU Constitutive Act, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, to suspend, with immediate effect, the participation of Burkina Faso in all AU activities until the effective restoration of normal constitutional order in the country;
6. Pledges the resolute support of the AU to the people of Burkina Faso and reaffirms the unwavering commitment of the AU to continue to provide requisite technical and other necessary support in accompanying the country towards the return to a democratic and civilian- led government;
7. Notes with concern the deteriorating security situation and the surge in insurgency and violent extremism in Burkina Faso and the broader Sahel region, which has been further compounded by heightened population displacement, in particular, women and children amidst the precarious impact of drought and climate change;
8. In this context, welcomes the joint initiative by the Chairperson of the Commission and the United Nations Secretary-General on the AU-UN Joint Strategic Assessment on sustainable financing of G5 Sahel Joint Force, as a strategic milestone towards a comprehensive response to security challenges in the Sahel region;
9. Requests the Chairperson of the Commission through his High Representative and Head of AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) to continue to closely monitor the situation in close coordination with ECOWAS and to report to Council regularly;
10. Reiterates its communique [PSC/PR/COMM.(1030(2021)] adopted at its 1030th meeting held on 30 September 2021 which called for a comprehensive and objective analysis of the root causes and impact of unconstitutional changes of government in the Continent and the recommendations of the 8th High Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa held in Oran, Algeria in December 2021, which called for the review of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government; and in this regard, underscores the need for such analytical review to also examine existing AU instruments on democracy and good governance, with a view to factor in contemporary challenges to African peace and security and modalities to address the surge in unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, and report to the Council within two months, with practical recommendations on steps to be taken;
11. Calls on the international community to continue supporting Burkina Faso in order to enable it address the deteriorating security situation and prevailing socio-economic challenges facing the country, cognizant of the fact that only a sustained redress of the structural dynamics underlying the current challenges in the country can guarantee lasting stability and development; and
12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
