Yes, Robert Pippin has written another book about Hegel. However, while his earlier works focus primarily on the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right, this latest book employs the broad approach to pictorial art elucidated in Hegel’s Aesthetics to think through the ‘credibility crisis’ in representational painting that began with the likes of Manet and Cézanne. Obviously, since modernist art took flight long after Hegel’s lectures were delivered, Pippin’s arguments here are necessarily somewhat speculative, and quite a bit of stage-setting is required to determine what aspects of Hegel’s complex philosophical narrative can be relevantly extended to cover the art-historical period in question. In the hands of a lesser guide, this sort of project could fail spectacularly, but Pippin’s superb command of both the philosophical and art-historical issues produces instead a small gem of interdisciplinary scholarship.
As a reworking of his 2011 “Adorno Lectures,” this is not an exhaustive study of its subject matter. Do not expect, accordingly, a detailed reading of Hegel’s lectures, but rather an ‘imaginative projection’ of a selectively ‘Hegelian’ approach to comprehending and assessing the distinct mode of aesthetic intelligibility found in a small cluster of modernist paintings. After an introductory chapter that helpfully explains the philosophical significance of art in the wake of Kant’s critical project, Pippin then briskly lays out the distinctive features of Hegel’s often dizzyingly abstract understanding of art—including the relationship between art and philosophy, art and (its) history, art and the realization of freedom, etc.—in a fashion that clarifies the theoretical stakes, yet resists the temptations of oversimplification.
Along the way, Pippin also addresses Hegel’s notorious, yet overplayed, remark that art is ‘a thing of the past,’ arguing that there is nothing internal to Hegel’s thinking that necessitates this conclusion. As Pippin notes, this claim “is not primarily based on an evaluation of art practices but on a premature assessment of the nature of modern society and the state of modern philosophy.” (97) This means that there is nothing ‘un-Hegelian’ about using Hegel to reflect upon impressionist and post-impressionist painting, and no reason to think that modern art, moving forward, cannot play an integral role in Geist’s self-reflective practices. Paintings like Manet’s Olympia thus hold our philosophical interest precisely in their capacity to capture, through a sensuous-affective mode of understanding, the out-of-jointness of modern life. Given that, for Hegel, the “modern shape of spirit” was supposed to be a “world of freedom realized,” (37) Pippin sums up this predicament by suggesting that Hegel misunderstood both “the potential (and limitations) of his own approach.” (38) Ironically, Hegel “may be the theorist of modernism, malgrélui and avant la letter.” (38)
To provide a more concrete account of what a ‘left-Hegelian’ approach to art might look like, Pippin’s next chapter furnishes an overview of the work of two prominent art historians, T.J. Clark and Michael Fried. No living art historians have influenced the way we look at post-Romantic European painting more than these two figures, and Pippin recruits their remarkably different, although complimentary, ways of assessing the crisis of intelligibility and credibility first registered in the works of Manet. For instance, after convincingly demonstrating that Manet’s Olympia is a depiction of a prostitute, Clark argues that the painting accordingly “functions as a challenge to bourgeois self-representation” (75) by placing the “beholder in the position of the potential client,” (75) thereby implicating modern capitalism in the reduction of sexuality to mere exchange value. Clark further suggests that Manet’s painting undermines the history of nude painting: after Olympia,“the desexualizing idealization” (77) of the traditional nude simply loses credibility in the eyes of the modern audience. These socio-historical issues aside, Clark also attends to the work qua painting, suggesting how Manet’s convention-busting refusal of depth (‘flatness’) in Olympia and other works was a strategy designed to prevent the viewer from imaginatively entering the world of the picture, thus highlighting again the crisis of capitalist culture to successfully represent itself to itself. Fried, on the other hand, is more focused on ‘ontological’ issues, particularly the efforts of modern painters to negate the mannered ‘theatricality’ of their predecessors’ works by adopting the more credible strategy of depicting the ‘absorption’ of their subjects in everyday practices. Once again, it is Manet who reveals the limits of absorption as an anti-theatrical tactic, and instead embraces a technique of ‘facingness’—in short, “turning the subject’s gaze to the beholder and directly, even aggressively, confronting the beholder” (90)—to hold the interest of contemporary audiences.
In sum, Manet’s paintings challenge our status as mutually recognitive subjects inhabiting a world of shareable meaning. While Hegel never anticipated the breakdown or failure of modern institutions to mediate our social lives, it is only a broadly Hegelian approach to art, Pippin argues, that is fully sensitive, and responsive, to these sorts of philosophical issues. Properly understood, such an approach does not consign modern art to historical irrelevance, but rather shows that “it is art that best manifests the unavoidably amphibian status of the human,” (142) as both material and minded creatures.
In his chapter on art and truth, Pippin first alerts us to what Hegel has in common with Heidegger—despite Heidegger’s consignment of Hegel’s Lectures to the history of metaphysics. Both philosophers see art as an historical phenomenon; they both deny that painting is essentially representational; they claim that ‘something of great philosophical significance is conveyed by great art,’ insofar as it is capable of bearing (non-propositional) truth; and finally, they both point to features of modernity that encumber, if not thwart, this crucial role. Thus, in contrast to traditional aesthetics, (including even Kant’s, despite some qualifications) both Hegel and Heidegger highlight the inadequacy of theoretical discussions of beauty, taste, and the reductively hedonic accounts of our subjective responses to artworks that became prominent in the Enlightenment. Heidegger departs from Hegel, however, due to his innovative distinction between ‘world’ and ‘earth,’ which opens the way for the more controversial claim that “the truth that happens in the ‘unconcealing’ of the ‘world’ of the work … is also at the same time a concealing.” (106) This level of theoretical abstraction, however, makes it difficult for Heidegger to address (in prose) the painterly qualities of artworks, even as he has much to say about the dynamic ‘happening’ of truth in artworks more generally. While Pippin is a reliable guide through “The Origin of the Work of Art,” this chapter loses some focus near the end, with just too many important theoretical balls in the air to do them all justice.
While this book could be longer (and the Henry Jamesian sentences a little shorter), I highly recommend Pippin’s demanding work to anyone interested in modern painting—philosophers and art historians alike.
