Science is neurotic: it is traditionally ambivalent, advocating one purpose while pursuing another. Worse: the sciences and the humanities are parts of a culture that suffers from Koestler's disease of controlled schizophrenia. The cure is in the institutionalization of a better view of science that will place it in its contexts.
My judgment of this book is favorable despite my finding some of its central points rather trite. It may be improper for one of Popper's disciples to review a book by another; so do question the following, especially since my approval is of Maxwell's distinctly Popperian traits: he dismisses anti-science lightly (xii, 73); he expresses dislike for casuistry (152); he opposes reductionism and positivism; and his heart is in the right place, as he casts a friendly but highly critical eye on the Enlightenment Movement. “We suffer not from too much scientific rationality, but from not enough,” he says in the preface, recommending a massive cooperation between science and the humanities. We should officially dismiss the neurotic, still orthodox, view of science as free of metaphysics and of value judgments and of its sociopolitical context. This will institute a revolution, intellectual and organizational, unify our culture, and make it wiser. This concludes the preface.
The book's style is refreshing: simple, clear, and freer of opaque references than the usual. Most similar books are poorly written (40). What makes for a clear style in addition to the avoidance of ambiguities and of referential opacity is the explicit statement of aims, general and specific: the aim of a book, a chapter, and a paragraph. This Maxwell does systematically. Also, a good text aims at a specific audience, defined by interest plus familiarity with the background-knowledge of the discussion that the author requires. Maxwell begins with an explanation of the Oedipus complex; but of all the physics that he mentions he states explicitly only Newton's theory of gravitation. He could explain this choice but did not. This is no cause for complaint, since there are no standards here, and since usually Maxwell requires little background knowledge.
Maxwell preaches “aim-oriented empiricism” (20, note 24, 80, 178–179) and “problem-solving rationality” (83). His presentation of his problem is wanting. This book discusses public aims without notice that these are less clear than aims of individuals, and it seems obvious that he means institutionalized aims. This is satisfactory when discussing institutions that declare their aims. On this point the commonwealth of learning is vague: the aim of science altered when science-based technology prevailed, when professional scientific technologists entered the Royal Society of London and destroyed its status as an amateur society. Maxwell seems to suggest a reestablishment of the dominance of pure science, but without returning to amateur research. Is this possible? We have too few tools to discuss this question. Maxwell is content to ignore it, as he rightly sees no need to decry technology. His approval of Popper's assertion that science has no foundations, that its theories are refutable, and that its endorsement rests on a value judgment, all makes it easy for him to advocate his demand that science should admit that research strongly interacts with its general context, including some metaphysical presuppositions. (He notices that Popper's view, unlike that of Wittgenstein, is not isolationist [106, 220].) It is easy to endorse his prescriptions as suggestions, not as demands. He recommends or demands that the methodological blunders of the traditional Enlightenment Movement (74) be officially corrected. This is a good suggestion, and no one can object to his suggestion to institutionalize a rule that would encourage writers to specify explicitly and repeatedly their aims at each turn. This may indeed open the road to much possible improvement, but regrettably hardly more than that, and not by making any demands.
Popper made a monumental blunder, says Maxwell: he wanted social studies to be scientific the way physics is (81–82). He suggest instead the “social wisdom” that is methodology not limited to knowledge but is applicable to any human end, plus cooperative efforts to attain it (81), plus the ability to articulate and diagnose any problems of living (103)—in the hope to enhance the value of life (119). These proposals, Maxwell admits, are not so new: others are already implementing them (109, 228). Yet the process will die out unless it gains impetus and becomes a revolution—for which it is essential to disseminate his diagnosis and institutionalize Popper's and his views.
Popper would have objected to little of this: he would ask Maxwell, are there refutable social theories and should they not be admitted as scientific? Are they not better refutable than irrefutable? Maxwell should answer. He does not. Admittedly, he is right to note that the love of learning is essential. This seems not contested. It is. Advocates of naturalism (traditional, neurotic empiricism) consider learning a barely avoidable process. Already Bacon said so, adding, much love of learning vitiates it by short-cuts and self-deception. As Popper identified learning from experience with empirical criticism, he advocated limitless love of criticism; he ignored the hatred of criticism of the great Newton, not to mention Louis Pasteur. Popper noted that Hume offered a complete learning theory that has no mention of criticism, even though criticism was Hume's forte. Yet the weight of Maxwell's observations is not clear, at least not to me. I cannot decide how much he differs from Popper and how much he adds to Popper's teaching. His criticism of Popper's ideas and mine are at great variance, but this is not the place to air them.
The book has a seventy page index—a series of them—of a somewhat more technical nature. Maxwell shows there his competence and his weak spots. The book ends with a whimper: it is an argument against John Worrall on the practical problem of induction. Although the division of that problem to its theoretical and practical aspects is an achievement of sorts, the debate is a sad failure.
