Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) have interestingly expanded past speculations by Trivers on self-deception (Trivers Reference Trivers and Dawkins1976/2006; Reference Trivers2000). At the core of this theory is the idea that “by deceiving themselves, people can better deceive others, because they no longer emit the cues of consciously mediated deception that could reveal their deceptive intent.” Self-deception also helps the deceiver to accrue “the more general social advantages of self-inflation or self-enhancement.” However, we think that the role of mental health in self-deception deserves a better place in their model.
There are three levels of deception: denying the truth (as saying that something true is false), advocating the false (as saying that something false is true), and withholding information about truth or falsehood (as in a secret).
Self-deception can occur only by withholding information about truth or falsehood, because this can occur without the subject's being conscious about what she or he is doing: Indeed, throughout the target article, VH&T hold that by “deceiving themselves, people are able to avoid the cognitive costs of consciously mediated deception,” that is, self-deception is based on some mechanism that operates at a non-conscious level.
The process of withholding information about truth or falsehood could occur by cognitive malfunctioning, while still achieving the result of the subject's deceiving others.
Social desirability can be conceived as a proxy for self-deception, given that it involves a positive attribution side (attributing to themselves rare but socially appreciated qualities) and a denial side (denying to have the negative qualities that are common in the general population) (Crowne & Marlowe Reference Crowne and Marlowe1964; Ramanaiah et al. Reference Ramanaiah, Schill and Leung1977; Paulhus Reference Paulhus, Robinson, Shaver and Wrightsman1991).
In the past 20 years, a series of studies showed that people with symptoms of mental disorders have statistically lower scores on measures of social desirability (Lane et al. Reference Lane, Meringas, Schwartz, Huang and Prusoff1990). In particular, we found that adolescents or young adults scoring higher on measures of depression (Miotto et al. Reference Miotto, De Coppi, Frezza, Rossi and Preti2002), psychosis proneness (Preti et al., Reference Preti, Vellante, Baron-Cohen, Zucca, Petretto and Masala2010), or suicidal ideation (Miotto & Preti Reference Miotto and Preti2008) reported concurrently lower scores on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe Reference Crowne and Marlowe1960), in particular on the denial subscale of that questionnaire.
Lower scores on social desirability measures could be a result of the cognitive load produced by ruminations on sad thoughts in depression (Lane et al. Reference Lane, Meringas, Schwartz, Huang and Prusoff1990; Miotto et al. Reference Miotto, De Coppi, Frezza, Rossi and Preti2002) or be caused by hallucinations and delusions in psychosis (Preti et al., Reference Preti, Vellante, Baron-Cohen, Zucca, Petretto and Masala2010). As pointed out by VH&T, a role for cognitive load in self-deception might depend on self-deception being an active strategy, and not merely a faulty cognitive process resulting in the wrong withholding of information about truth or falsehood. Therefore, the investigation of the links between self-deception and psychopathology plays a role in discovering the neuropsychological basis of self-deception.
How can it be that a mechanism implying a loss of information integrity can effectively favor adaptation? As Stich (Reference Stich1990, p. 62) put it, “natural selection does not care about truth; it cares only about reproductive success,” and this is the case when an unbiased system is more detrimental to fitness than a system characterized by occasionally mistaken evaluations.
In the past we proposed that cheaters are part of the mechanism that challenges the subjects' fitness. Because the cognitive abilities leading to cheater's detection might prove useful in all kinds of cooperative exchange (Stevens & Hauser Reference Stevens and Hauser2004), groups of discriminative cooperators will out-compete over groups of non-discriminative cooperators. In fact, cheaters select those individuals who are more able to detect cheating. Conversely, the hosts tolerate some amount of cheaters in their environment because they continuously challenge the hosts' own cognitive abilities, as parasites resident in our skin stimulate the immune system and act as a restraint against more virulent invaders because they keep the niche occupied (Preti & Miotto Reference Preti and Miotto2006).
Because cheaters are likely to take advantage of sexual partners, thus distributing their genes in the general population, some cheating mechanism with a genetic basis is likely to be fixed in the gene pool. Self-deception could be one of these mechanisms transmitted by cheaters to their victims, and it could help individuals detect cheating.
This is paradoxical, because self-deception is expected to favor cheating. However, both mirror-neuron theory (Rizzolatti & Craighero Reference Rizzolatti and Craighero2004) and the embodied cognition paradigm (Grafton Reference Grafton2009) posit that people are more able to detect those motor and emotional cues they have already experienced. In monkeys, “the different modes of presentation of events intrinsically different, as sounds, images or willed motor acts, are … bound together within a simpler level of semantic reference, underpinned by the same network of audio–visual mirror neurons” (Gallese Reference Gallese2007, p. 660), that is, the animal quickly reacts to stimuli that are bound by experience to a predetermined outcome. In humans, “actions belonging to the motor repertoire of the observer (e.g., biting and speech-reading) or very closely related to it (e.g., monkey's lip-smacking) are mapped on the observer's motor system. Actions that do not belong to this repertoire (e.g., barking) are mapped and, henceforth, categorized on the basis of their visual properties” (Gallese Reference Gallese2007, p. 661).
Self-deception implies some kind of resetting of the subject's mental state, and this reflects in the fine motor disposition of the muscles involved in facial expression. People more likely to use a self-deception strategy will also be more able to detect these subtle cues, some kind of dissociation between the communicated content and the real, inner, secretly held content, operating at an unconscious level but withheld at the conscious one.
Therefore in the social war between cheaters and their victims, self-deception can both favor cheating and help detect cheating. It is not merely the advantage of being more convincing at deceiving the others that fixed self-deception as a strategy in our heritage, but also the contribution that the mental states related to self-deception give to cheating detection. This could be tested: People scoring higher on measures of self-deception should also be more able to detect cheating and deceptive attempts.
Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) have interestingly expanded past speculations by Trivers on self-deception (Trivers Reference Trivers and Dawkins1976/2006; Reference Trivers2000). At the core of this theory is the idea that “by deceiving themselves, people can better deceive others, because they no longer emit the cues of consciously mediated deception that could reveal their deceptive intent.” Self-deception also helps the deceiver to accrue “the more general social advantages of self-inflation or self-enhancement.” However, we think that the role of mental health in self-deception deserves a better place in their model.
There are three levels of deception: denying the truth (as saying that something true is false), advocating the false (as saying that something false is true), and withholding information about truth or falsehood (as in a secret).
Self-deception can occur only by withholding information about truth or falsehood, because this can occur without the subject's being conscious about what she or he is doing: Indeed, throughout the target article, VH&T hold that by “deceiving themselves, people are able to avoid the cognitive costs of consciously mediated deception,” that is, self-deception is based on some mechanism that operates at a non-conscious level.
The process of withholding information about truth or falsehood could occur by cognitive malfunctioning, while still achieving the result of the subject's deceiving others.
Social desirability can be conceived as a proxy for self-deception, given that it involves a positive attribution side (attributing to themselves rare but socially appreciated qualities) and a denial side (denying to have the negative qualities that are common in the general population) (Crowne & Marlowe Reference Crowne and Marlowe1964; Ramanaiah et al. Reference Ramanaiah, Schill and Leung1977; Paulhus Reference Paulhus, Robinson, Shaver and Wrightsman1991).
In the past 20 years, a series of studies showed that people with symptoms of mental disorders have statistically lower scores on measures of social desirability (Lane et al. Reference Lane, Meringas, Schwartz, Huang and Prusoff1990). In particular, we found that adolescents or young adults scoring higher on measures of depression (Miotto et al. Reference Miotto, De Coppi, Frezza, Rossi and Preti2002), psychosis proneness (Preti et al., Reference Preti, Vellante, Baron-Cohen, Zucca, Petretto and Masala2010), or suicidal ideation (Miotto & Preti Reference Miotto and Preti2008) reported concurrently lower scores on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe Reference Crowne and Marlowe1960), in particular on the denial subscale of that questionnaire.
Lower scores on social desirability measures could be a result of the cognitive load produced by ruminations on sad thoughts in depression (Lane et al. Reference Lane, Meringas, Schwartz, Huang and Prusoff1990; Miotto et al. Reference Miotto, De Coppi, Frezza, Rossi and Preti2002) or be caused by hallucinations and delusions in psychosis (Preti et al., Reference Preti, Vellante, Baron-Cohen, Zucca, Petretto and Masala2010). As pointed out by VH&T, a role for cognitive load in self-deception might depend on self-deception being an active strategy, and not merely a faulty cognitive process resulting in the wrong withholding of information about truth or falsehood. Therefore, the investigation of the links between self-deception and psychopathology plays a role in discovering the neuropsychological basis of self-deception.
How can it be that a mechanism implying a loss of information integrity can effectively favor adaptation? As Stich (Reference Stich1990, p. 62) put it, “natural selection does not care about truth; it cares only about reproductive success,” and this is the case when an unbiased system is more detrimental to fitness than a system characterized by occasionally mistaken evaluations.
In the past we proposed that cheaters are part of the mechanism that challenges the subjects' fitness. Because the cognitive abilities leading to cheater's detection might prove useful in all kinds of cooperative exchange (Stevens & Hauser Reference Stevens and Hauser2004), groups of discriminative cooperators will out-compete over groups of non-discriminative cooperators. In fact, cheaters select those individuals who are more able to detect cheating. Conversely, the hosts tolerate some amount of cheaters in their environment because they continuously challenge the hosts' own cognitive abilities, as parasites resident in our skin stimulate the immune system and act as a restraint against more virulent invaders because they keep the niche occupied (Preti & Miotto Reference Preti and Miotto2006).
Because cheaters are likely to take advantage of sexual partners, thus distributing their genes in the general population, some cheating mechanism with a genetic basis is likely to be fixed in the gene pool. Self-deception could be one of these mechanisms transmitted by cheaters to their victims, and it could help individuals detect cheating.
This is paradoxical, because self-deception is expected to favor cheating. However, both mirror-neuron theory (Rizzolatti & Craighero Reference Rizzolatti and Craighero2004) and the embodied cognition paradigm (Grafton Reference Grafton2009) posit that people are more able to detect those motor and emotional cues they have already experienced. In monkeys, “the different modes of presentation of events intrinsically different, as sounds, images or willed motor acts, are … bound together within a simpler level of semantic reference, underpinned by the same network of audio–visual mirror neurons” (Gallese Reference Gallese2007, p. 660), that is, the animal quickly reacts to stimuli that are bound by experience to a predetermined outcome. In humans, “actions belonging to the motor repertoire of the observer (e.g., biting and speech-reading) or very closely related to it (e.g., monkey's lip-smacking) are mapped on the observer's motor system. Actions that do not belong to this repertoire (e.g., barking) are mapped and, henceforth, categorized on the basis of their visual properties” (Gallese Reference Gallese2007, p. 661).
Self-deception implies some kind of resetting of the subject's mental state, and this reflects in the fine motor disposition of the muscles involved in facial expression. People more likely to use a self-deception strategy will also be more able to detect these subtle cues, some kind of dissociation between the communicated content and the real, inner, secretly held content, operating at an unconscious level but withheld at the conscious one.
Therefore in the social war between cheaters and their victims, self-deception can both favor cheating and help detect cheating. It is not merely the advantage of being more convincing at deceiving the others that fixed self-deception as a strategy in our heritage, but also the contribution that the mental states related to self-deception give to cheating detection. This could be tested: People scoring higher on measures of self-deception should also be more able to detect cheating and deceptive attempts.