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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
For more than 50 years after the Second World War, the luxury end of the American automobile industry was dominated by two venerable domestic marques, Cadillac and Lincoln. Unlike Pierce-Arrow, Stutz, and Cord, Cadillac and Lincoln survived the 1930s, perhaps because they were parts of much larger corporations. Equally importantly, in contrast to Packard, the Cadillac and Lincoln marques were not degraded by the introduction of smaller, less luxurious cars that generated sales but ruined public perceptions. (Packard's image was not helped by the sale of the dies for its 1942 model to the Soviet Union. For decades afterwards, viewers of television news shows were exposed to shots of Soviet leaders in what were apparently vintage Packards.) Since the early 1970s, Cadillac and Lincoln have been affected by severe shocks including the two petroleum crises and the rising popularity of Mercedes, BMW, Lexus and other foreign luxury cars. These have led to frequent redefinitions of the meaning of luxury (for example, when it was decoupled from size beginning in the 1970s) and placed the American producers in a series of reactive situations. By the late 1990s, when the production of Lincolns temporarily overtook that of Cadillacs, sales of both marques had declined drastically from their peaks. The output of Cadillacs, for example, was halved between the late 1970s and the end of the century.
Thomas E. Bonsall traces these changes in his two companion volumes. But as the books are intended for automobile enthusiasts, a much larger and more lucrative readership than economic and business historians, the information is buried among hundreds of pictures and lengthy discussions of changing wheelbases and dashboards. Nevertheless, Bonsall, a journalist as well as an automotive historian, does make pertinent remarks about firm strategy and management. He believes that Lincoln has suffered from management instability since the death of its champion, Edsel Ford, in 1943. As a result, the nature of Lincolns and Continentals vacillated for decades, undermining attempts to create a general perception that they were comparable in prestige and luxury to Cadillacs despite the production of some of the most beautiful models of the period. Cadillac, however, benefited from its relatively secure position within the General Motors framework to achieve a consistency in design which, even if not always aesthetically pleasing, left the public in no doubt as what a Cadillac was. Bonsall is more critical of performance in recent years, when GM has changed its management structures and undermined Cadillac's privileged position in the corporation. But given the uncertainty that GM has faced, its failure to keep on top of ever-changing conditions is arguably more justifiable than Bonsall contends.
Because the business part of his story is buried among detailed accounts of changing body styles and engines, these books are not efficient tools for business and economic historians. For readers who want handsomely illustrated accounts of the evolution of an important aspect of American aspirations, however, they are worth reading.