This ambitious and innovative book advances a new theory of electoral authoritarianism. Departing from the dominant, neoinstitutionalist theorizing about electoral autocracies that focuses on the instrumentalist foundations of hybrid (democratic and authoritarian) institutions in such regimes, Aleksandar Matovski brings attention to the specific circumstances that create a popular demand for such regimes. He argues that electoral authoritarian regimes originate in deep systemic crises that create a core popular demand for stability and order. Electoral autocrats deliver to meet that demand, appealing to anxious, insecure populations with the promise of a “strong-armed” rule that would return order and stability. They gain genuine popular support and legitimize their rule through a doctrine that combines three core principles: (1) electoral authoritarianism is a form of emergency rule; (2) no other political force “has the strength, competence, devotion, and integrity to lead the nation in times of national emergency” (p. 50); and (3) their rule rests on the core democratic tenet of majoritarianism.

The big innovation of this approach is the shift from the mainstream, elite-centered analysis characteristic of neoinstitutionalist approaches to electoral authoritarianism to the social drivers of these regimes and the crucial (if somewhat uncomfortable) recognition that they enjoy genuine popular support. Popular Dictatorships thereby adds to the recent literature (unacknowledged in the book, probably due to the proximity of publications), that has made a similar point focusing specifically on Russia: Samuel Greene and Graeme Robertson’s Putin V. People (2019) that advanced a vision of a coconstructed regime in Russia; and this author’s own The Red Mirror: Putin’s Leadership and Russia’s Insecure Identity (2020) that relies on social identity theory to explain the leader–follower dynamic in Russian politics under Putin’s presidency.

As opposed to the single-country studies mentioned in the preceding text, Matovski develops a more systematic testing of the proposed theory and its empirical implications. This is done through (1) a cross-national study in chapter 3 of whether electoral autocracies indeed tend to emerge in the wake of crises (the dataset covers different types of regimes between 1960–2014); (2) a content analysis of the campaign rhetoric of incumbents in these regimes to verify the presence of a distinct “strongman” appeal in chapter 4 (the data covers 3,030 electoral manifestos from 54 countries during 1975–2014); and (3) a two-pronged exploration in chapters 5 and 6 of public opinion dynamics before and after the rise of electoral autocracies. Chapter 5 is an in-depth study of popular attitudes in Russia and chapter 6 is a cross-national study of public opinion patterns in electoral autocracies and democracies around the globe.

Matovski uses an impressive range of multilayered evidence, clear logic, and fine methodological skills to support his strongman theory of electoral authoritarianism that highlights the distinct attractiveness of this regime in the wake of deep systemic crises. In its empirical approach, the study is a model case of a creative use of evidence at different—macro-, meso-, and micro-levels—to test the implications of a theory. The innovative theoretical perspective, along with its methodological sophistication, will undoubtedly ensure that Popular Dictatorship will and should be read and cited widely.

Matovski’s approach draws attention to the different origins of electoral authoritarianism, suggesting the relevance of a specific context (of systemic crisis) and the different preferences such context endangers in societies. A bigger issue that this raises is of a historical nature. Given that electoral authoritarianism is a relatively recent phenomenon but systemic crises are timeless to human societies—we either need to extend this regime type and its existence temporally (which has not been attempted so far) or explain its specific relevance in the twentieth through the twenty-first century. To formulate briefly, the key explanatory factor in this theory is of a more general nature than the outcome it tries to explain. If the key explanatory factor is the societal-level “authoritarian reflex” “when survival is insecure” (a term coined by Inglehart and cited in the book on p. 133), then electoral authoritarianism appears to be the political manifestation of such a reflex at the time when the principle of majoritarianism (realized through elections) is accepted by societies as the best path toward the common good.

Matovski also makes frequent references to anxious, insecure people who are easily cajoled by a strongman’s appeal, and who arrive at the point of genuine support for the rise and continuation of the type of rule that electoral autocrats offer to the public motivated by survival instincts. Electoral authoritarianism then is a product of a popular demand. But can we treat public opinion (or popular demand) as an independent variable in the times when the technologies of communication have elevated the role of manipulation and propaganda to entirely new levels? Through an alternative, technology-focused lens, Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman argue in their recent book, Spin Dictators (2022), that tyranny has changed its face in the twenty-first century because new communication technologies allow for a more subtle and effective control of public opinion. While highlighting the social drivers of electoral authoritarianism, Matovski is more nuanced in recognizing the interplay between popular demand and a skillful manipulation of information and rhetoric by autocrats catering to that demand. This differentiates his argument favorably from another dominant strand in the literature that focus on propaganda and brainwashing. He relies on an in-depth study of public opinion patterns in Russia to show how his theory reconciles contradictory patterns of support for Putin even when his performance is perceived negatively. The argument is that Putin gained support as a protector and restorer of stability in the country after the traumatizing 1990s and many Russians do not see any other, alternative political force in the country.

The term “trauma”—employed too often in public discourse these days—is used numerous times in the book as well. Unfortunately, the concept of trauma is used without sufficient exploration of its possible meanings and applications, especially when it comes to collective traumas. Matovski takes for granted that societies go through trauma when they experience economic decline and armed conflict. Even if we assume that collective traumas exist as such (not inquiring into the constructivist approach to collective trauma advocated by such sociologists as Jeffrey Alexander and his colleagues in Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, 2004), arguably, Ukraine is undergoing such trauma today. Will this experience result in Ukrainians desiring a strong autocrat? I would like to stay more optimistic on this, for one. Russia’s trauma of the 1990s transition, additionally, has many comparable counterparts in most postcommunist countries that went through painful transformation, turmoil, and economic decline. Nonetheless, none of the Baltic states, for example, developed an “authoritarian reflex” despite the economic and social woes experienced in the 1990s. The key difference there was that the elites did not “weaponize” in the 1990s in the same way they did in Russia. Leadership choices and ideological commitments matter.

To summarize, Matovski is on a fresh and productive analytical trajectory when he brings attention to the role of crisis, emotions, collective traumas, and the social underpinnings of electoral autocracies to the study of contemporary dictatorships. However, his focus on electoral authoritarianism limits the potential analytical leverage gained from delving into the social psychology of collective emotions (an approach that is not attempted in the book) and their relevance for would be dictators gaining and, at times, maintaining power today—not only in electoral autocracies but also in established democracies. Economic turmoil and armed conflict are ubiquitous globally, while stability and existential security are scarce. Yet, democracies still survive and might even emerge from crisis.