The research agenda generated by the launch of the “new type of strategic partnership” between China and Africa has tended to treat the Chinese state as a unitary actor. This has been encouraged to a large degree by the rhetoric of the Chinese government which claims that the new relationship is devoted to building “win-win” situations premised on principles of non-interference in domestic politics and non-conditionality in the provision of aid and investment. Yet it is also notable that the Chinese government is encouraging an increasing range of Chinese actors to become involved in African economies and societies. The resulting growth and diversity of types of engagement means that it has now become necessary to go beyond the state-to-state level of analysis that dominates orthodox policy statements.

This has important implications for the way in which policy is made in China, as growing involvement in African politics and societies leaves Beijing facing the kinds of problems long experienced by governments in the developed world when operating on the continent. Various solutions are being sought, ranging from increasing the number of participants engaged in the policy-making process to tentative engagement with international development regimes. However, because some of the most difficult issues involve adverse reactions to the Chinese presence from African civil societies and political opposition groups, it remains unclear how they can be managed when transactions take place mainly through African elites. Moreover, due to the lack of a strong civil society inside China itself, policy makers are not able to draw on the expertise of the kind of independent pressure groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are available to policy makers in the traditional donor and investment states. While the record of the developed world in Africa can rightly be criticized and China can claim a number of successes, it remains to be seen how the Chinese system can make up for these weaknesses without moving further towards the existing models and practices of the developed countries.

Harmony in the “New Type of Strategic Partnership” with Africa

When analysing a relationship like that between China and Africa, the tendency to take the state as the main unit of analysis can rightly be criticized for neglecting that “China” is anything but a unitary actor.Footnote ¹ Rather than take this as a prescription to exclude the state altogether, however, it should be tempered by the possibility that the specific roles that states are seen to play do matter insofar as they constitute the structures that give meaning to their international behaviour.Footnote ² This can be seen in the way that the central government agencies in China (hereafter “Beijing”) invest considerable resources in portraying the country's relationship with Africa as a “new type of strategic partnership” made possible because both have common interests that stem from belonging to the developing world and shaped by the historical impact of colonialism. The result is what the constructivist International Relations theorist Alexander Wendt might call a certain “culture of anarchy,” according to which China's relationship with Africa is different from that of the developed countries because it is not based on exploitation of the continent but on the principles of “mutual benefit and common prosperity,” “non-interference” and “non-conditionality.”Footnote ³

Such principles indicate that the role established by Beijing for China in Africa is highly state-centric. Yet it is easy to overlook that this role has also come to incorporate a new degree of flexibility, which is made possible by locating the “new type of strategic partnership” within Beijing's broader foreign policy themes of building a “harmonious world” (hexie shijie 和谐世界) and “peaceful development” (heping fazhan 和平发展), introduced since Hu Jintao became paramount leader in 2002. That these themes have special implications for Africa can be seen from the fact that the call to build a “harmonious world” was first made by Hu in his address to the April 2005 Asia–Africa summit in Jakarta, the same year in which the State Council began to promote “peaceful development” in the context of South–South relations. The following year, Africa took centre stage with the holding of the Forum on China–Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), described in a report by the National Defence University as an enrichment of the idea and practice of a “harmonious world.”Footnote ⁴

These new themes mediate the state-centric principles of Beijing's Africa policy in important ways because they effectively erode the barrier between China's domestic politics and foreign policy. In fact, the State Council explicitly describes “peaceful development” as an attempt to “unify domestic development with the outside world, linking the development of China with that of the rest of the world, and combining the fundamental interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of all peoples throughout the world.”Footnote ⁵ This linkage is also implicit in the way that the call to build a “harmonious world” is an extension of the promotion of a “harmonious society” inside China.

Such a breaking down of the domestic/international divide can be understood as part of a broader attempt to rationalize China's growing integration into the global economic system that is taking place under the “going-out” strategy. It can be seen more specifically in the interpretation of the stated aims of Beijing's Africa policy, where the task of building “mutual benefit and common prosperity” is interpreted to extend beyond economics into state-building and social development. Similarly, “mutual learning, commonly seeking development,” involves not only scientific, technological and cultural exchanges but also promotes “mutually studying and borrowing from experiences of administration and governance (zhiguo lizheng 治国理政).Footnote ⁶ Even the condition that co-operation between militaries (including conflict resolution and peace-keeping operations) should be under the authority of the African Union and the United Nations (UN) is waived when it comes to dealing with “non-traditional security” threats.Footnote ⁷

Surveying Beijing's framework for China's relationship with Africa thus presents the balancing act of a government that advocates state-centric principles for its general foreign policy stance, while promoting international transactions that span a range of economic sectors, from investing in energy and raw minerals to sectors as diverse as agriculture, finance, building infrastructure, IT, tourism, health care and debt alleviation. Actors encouraged to get involved in these sectors include not only central governments but also local authorities, businesses of all sizes, news organizations, scientists and medics, and what is labelled “people-to-people” (minjian 民间) contacts. The “new type of strategic partnership” with Africa is thus a particularly visible aspect of the way in which China's entry into the global economic system under the “going-out” strategy ultimately forces a degree of malleability when it comes to interpreting the state-centric principles of a foreign policy that has its origins in the Cold War.

Loosening State-centric Principles

Despite the frequent repetition of the state-centric principles of Beijing's foreign policy, therefore, it is important to acknowledge that its Africa policy is adaptive and instrumentalist. The source of change in this process is often located in an exogenous environment which demands innovation and metes out “lessons” to decision makers through a series of recognized successes and failures. Ultimately, this process of change is expressed in the way that the new rhetoric of Africa policy attempts to accommodate a broadening range of activities and actors on the continent within the old paradigm of the Five Principles.

This dynamic of change between practice and foreign policy rhetoric can be seen in the way that the principle of non-conditionality is broken on a range of issues. A good example is the way in which the demand that African states should break diplomatic relations with Taiwan before Chinese investment can be provided (even though this demand has actually been violated in a number of instances) is circumvented by the use of sub-state actors. Provinces, in particular, have been used as semi-official interlopers who can conduct economic activities as well as serve as proxies for official ties, in cases as diverse as South Africa and Senegal.Footnote ⁸

The breaching of traditional interpretations of the non-conditionality principle is even more vividly apparent at the economic level. This can be seen, for example, when Chinese interlocutors claim that the foreign assistance they provide is designed to ensure minimal opportunities for abuse on the part of recipients.Footnote ⁹ The fact that the bulk of Chinese aid is project-based and normally carried out by public or private Chinese contractors is said to limit the scope for waste and corruption on the part of recipients. Rather than recipients directly receiving cash for infrastructure projects, financing is filtered through the Chinese contractors. Disbursements to African sub-contractors are provided incrementally and in each case subject to meeting recognized standards set by the Chinese in conjunction with the African host government requirements.

Furthermore, the focus on defining and measuring project effectiveness on the basis of outcomes rather than an emphasis on correct process, as is the case with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) where donors have developed a subscribed format for “good practice,” has allowed Chinese projects to side-step conventional concerns of cost-to-benefit ratios in their foreign assistance programming. These concerns, coupled with the review of foreign aid expenditure by national legislatures, were a key part of the original impetus for imposition of conditionalities on recipients by traditional donors. Interestingly, there is already some discussion amongst Chinese officials and scholars as to the diminishing appetite in China for foreign assistance to Africa, though any reduction would only affect the already limited provisions for grant aid.Footnote ¹⁰

The establishment of the Economic Processing Zones (EPZs) also creates a lot of scope for Chinese actors to get involved in the organization of African society. To date, five of these have been formally proclaimed, in Zambia, Mauritius, Egypt, Nigeria and Tanzania. In addition, a number of free trade zones or similar entities have been launched, some of them with support from Chinese provinces and municipalities. Although it is not officially stated that the organization of these reflects Chinese pragmatism and concern for local conditions, they are the product of negotiations between Beijing and the African host countries. This allows for adaptation to local conditions, as can be seen in the difference between the conditions which pertain in Mauritius's EPZ, which is open to all foreign investors, and those in Zambia's, which are directed only at Chinese companies.

There are a number of motives for the creation of the EPZs. First, they have been established partly as a response to African critics who are concerned that China is only interested in the extraction of African minerals. They also represent a platform for consolidating Chinese investment in a particular area in Africa. For instance, copper mined in Zambia can be smelted locally in the newly built Chinese smelter and then shipped onwards to markets in China and elsewhere using Chinese constructed or rehabilitated transport linkages and port facilities. Moreover, any preferential forms of access to European and North American markets that Africa might have through formalized arrangements such as AGOA or EU Partnership Agreements could be more fully exploited by Chinese exporters from this position, a point highlighted in Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) material on investment opportunities in Nigeria.Footnote ¹¹

Yet the EPZs also present a challenge for the idea of building a “harmonious world” because they represent prospective sites for the relocation of industry that is at present based in China. With rising labour costs in the south-east coastal areas dampening Chinese competitiveness and a growing consciousness of the environmental and social impact that some industries produce at home, the Chinese are looking into the possibility of relocating some low-skilled, highly polluting industries to other countries in much the same way Taiwan and Japan did with China a few decades ago. Africa, together with South-East Asia – especially Indonesia and Vietnam – is one of the possible candidates for relocation.

The most dramatic departure from the principle of non-interference has been generated by China's management of its presence in Darfur, where Beijing has had to exert pressure on Sudan to curb its militias and took the lead in winning Khartoum's acceptance of a hybrid African Union–UN peacekeeping force in 2006.Footnote ¹² Chinese commentators defend the actions of their firms by claiming that they have changed Sudan from an oil-importing to an oil-exporting economy, providing the wealth needed for a move towards political stability. In addition they point out that their government has provided substantial amounts of humanitarian aid. Yet they are also painfully aware of the damage that their presence in Sudan is doing to China's “soft power.”Footnote ¹³

Drawing attention to the increasingly active but low-profile role that the Chinese government claims to be playing in bringing the warring parties to negotiations and supporting the presence of African Union and UN peacekeepers, however, creates a number of dilemmas. First, describing abstaining from voting in the Security Council on crucial resolutions concerning Darfur as an expression of the independent nature of Chinese foreign policy is unlikely to add to the image of China as a “responsible stakeholder.” Secondly, describing China's actions as “a development of the principle of ‘non-interference’ within certain limits” beggars the question as to just how far Beijing is prepared to move towards departing from what apologistsFootnote ¹⁴ and critics see as a somewhat inadequate and outdated shibboleth of its foreign policy.

Discord and the Limits of Elite Ties

Such attempts to build a harmonious relationship by loosening the limits of the principles of non-interference and non-conditionality are restricted for a number of reasons. It is well known that a strong attachment to the inviolability of state sovereignty is an important plank of Beijing's general foreign policy because of concerns over its own territorial integrity. When this is extended to Africa, however, it tends to limit political relations to ruling elites. This is beneficial insofar as it allows peace to be made with those in Africa who maintain control over sought-after resources through leases and other forms of limiting access. Moreover, the potential for striking deals at this level is considerably enhanced by the tendency for African elites to view China's growing presence as an opportunity to exert a new kind of international leverage over the industrialized countries.Footnote ¹⁵

Confining relations to the elite level, however, does not always sit well with Beijing's appeal for a partnership based on the shared values of anti-colonialism. It is true that many in China see their country – despite its spectacular rise – as above all a victim of imperialism. Yet a parallel anti-imperialist discourse can also be found across Africa, as seen in the widespread popularity of Robert Mugabe's defence of his regime's actions in Zimbabwe across the continent, from individuals on the street to governments.Footnote ¹⁶ Despite repeating Beijing's rhetoric of building a “harmonious world,” many African leaders harbour few illusions about Chinese intentions, recalling that its role in the independence struggle was somewhat more limited in content and scope than the version presented by Beijing.Footnote ¹⁷ Moreover, when the non-interference principle is used to justify opacity in dealings with elites, from aid disbursements to business practices, the view becomes more widespread that China is just another foreign power out to exploit the continent.

Of course, governments in the developed world are also driven to work with African elites by the same kind of economic and strategic motives that drive Beijing. Yet they are not restricted by principles of non-interference from offsetting the compromises they make by exerting direct pressure on African governments or through encouraging positive public actions by businesses and financial institutions with schemes such as corporate social responsibility projects. They also embrace the opportunity to work in partnership with civil society groups that aim to criticize, if not reform, African elite practices.

Beijing's deep concern and surprise about being characterized as a neo-colonial power is apparent in the unscheduled, lightning visit to the continent in February 2007 by Hu Jintao to counter such a critique by key partners like South African President Thabo Mbeki. Yet the response is limited to repetitions of the formulaic “win-win” approach, which may earn licences and supply agreements from African elites but offers little guidance for addressing the complexities of operating in an environment in which many of the key commodity producing countries are distinguished by weakly legitimated regimes, enervated institutions and tepid enforcement of the rule of law. When the situation descends into civil war, China's standing is left tied to the fate of whatever regime happens to be in power.

Beijing's attachment to the principles of non-interference and non-conditionality effectively shuts the door on other segments of African society where a budding concern often spills over into outright hostility. The Chinese presence then becomes a potential target for dissent from any segment of society that is discontented with the prevailing circumstances under the government of the day, whether trade unions concerned about safety standards or businesses that are unable to compete against Chinese imports, superior access to supply chains or low-cost bidding.

Such dangers for China are exacerbated when these complaints are used as political capital by opposition politicians in Africa. Speaking before the parliament of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in May 2008, Jean-Lucien Mbusa, a leading member of the largest opposition party, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, thus decried a ground-breaking US$9 billion deal with China as being incoherent, unbalanced and amounting to the forced sale of the national heritage to the detriment of several generations.Footnote ¹⁸ Similar concerns can be seen in persistent rumours that Chinese telecommunications companies have a special arrangement with the Congolese government through their joint venture that involves an undisclosed exemption from taxes, giving them an unfair competitive edge over the other four telecoms operators and suppliers in the DRC. This perception is only made worse by the inability of the Chinese parties concerned to address public concerns, as witnessed by the unwillingness of CCT (a joint venture with Congolese state's postal and telecommunications company in which Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment Company holds a 51 per cent stake) to join Celtel-DRC, Vodacom Congo, Tigo and Supercell in hosting a press conference to deny that any special deals for the industry had been made.Footnote ¹⁹

Beyond opposition politicians and businesses, within Africa there is an increase in criticism from trade unions and NGOs that is both notable and significant. African trade unions have not only played a part in critiquing the conduct of Chinese firms which ignore local labour laws or for the negative impact that Chinese imports have had on employment but also in other areas such as human rights and the arms trade.Footnote ²⁰ The revelations that China was shipping small arms to Zimbabwe on the eve of contentious elections in March 2008, sparked by the refusal of South African trade unionists to offload the cargo, and the regional condemnation by African leaders (notably, however, not publicly voiced by South Africa's president, Thabo Mbeki) that followed, demonstrated that this is an area where the Chinese have to tread carefully. Again, the fact that China has chosen to forge its ties with African governing elites has laid it open to suspicion if not outright attacks by civil society actors as collaborators with these governments.

The first signs of difficulties came with the explicit targeting of Chinese workers constructing an oil pipeline in Sudan by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement in the late 1990s; this has been followed by threats, kidnapping and even murder of Chinese workers in Sudan, Nigeria and Ethiopia. Endemic corruption in countries like Angola, Nigeria and the DRC has forced Chinese officials to scale back proposed investments in these countries. For instance, previously agreed work on Nigeria's infrastructure was halted with the change in presidency in Abuja, only to be revived with an offer of a US$2.5 billion loan aimed at Nigeria's transport infrastructure alongside Sinosure's US$50 billion extended to Chinese companies investing that country.Footnote ²¹ The political fallout resulting from poor practices adopted by Chinese firms has provoked local criticism and, in the case of Zambia, a firestorm of protest that resulted in an election campaign shaped in part around an anti-Chinese platform by the opposition.Footnote ²² These hazards of engagement, familiar to long-established foreign businesses in the resource sector in Africa, have been exacerbated by the Chinese approach to rapidly securing its resource interests, which links the problems of China's emphasis on forging its ties with elites, the corrosive impact of corruption on trade and the spectre of political instability.

China's experience in Gabon highlights both the appeal of its comprehensive package of financial and diplomatic incentives in exchange for long-term supply contracts with African governments and the complexities of realizing these deals. In Gabon, a modest oil producer with significant under-exploited deposits of iron ore and manganese, the Chinese initially sought a joint venture under the auspices of the Brazilian firm Compania Vale do Rio Doce (now Vale) to secure a stake in the Belinga iron ore project.Footnote ²³ Disagreements resulted in an all-Chinese bid led by China National Machinery and Equipment Corporation which secured exclusive rights to Belinga and its outputs in exchange for investment in Gabon's infrastructure topping US$3 billion. This China ExIm Bank loan would involve the construction of a brand new 560 km railway line linking Belinga to the coast, a deepwater mining harbour for transportation located north of Libreville, a hydroelectric dam in the Ivindo River and the iron mining factory.

For the Gabonese government, which had never invested in its own infrastructure at this level and had only generated 2 per cent of GDP from the mining sector as recently as 2005, this would be opening up new revenue streams as well as expanding local employment possibilities in advance of elections. At the same time, realizing the deal proved more difficult as a coalition of local and international NGOs, along with the World Bank, launched protests over the secretive nature of the contract, the concern over Chinese “control” of national resources and the building of a dam in a national park. As a result, the Chinese were forced to renegotiate the terms of the agreement within a year of signing the original contract so that the government's stake in the company created to run the project, Compagnie Minière du Belinga, was raised to 25 per cent.

Such setbacks show that access to Africa's resource bounty may have been deceptively easy for the first wave of Chinese investment under Beijing's strategy. Limiting political contacts to the African elite according to the principles of non-interference and non-conditionality is resulting in a degree of discord rather than harmony, because of numerous unanticipated obstacles to sustaining the initial gains. Managing this dynamic is made even more complex for Beijing by the sheer explosion of the number of Chinese actors that it is encouraging to enter the continent.

The Proliferation of Chinese Actors

As noted above, a deliberate element of the project of building the “new type of strategic partnership” is to encourage a range of Chinese actors to enter Africa, extending beyond the central government down to local authorities, businesses of all sizes, news organizations, scientists and medics and what is labelled “people-to-people” contacts.Footnote ²⁴ The daily activities of these actors have a direct impact on African societies that is not limited to the elite but extends down to the grassroots level of small shopkeepers and farmers. While they have thus been encouraged by the Chinese government, the range and complexity of their activities tends to generate often unintended consequences that do not chime well with the orthodox rhetoric.

The most influential among these new actors are the very large Chinese enterprises that have been cultivated by the state under the “going-out” strategy. A good example of these is the Chinese National Mining and Electricity Company, which is active in Gabon, Zambia and Angola. Another example is North Industries Corporation, a commercial operation of the People's Liberation Army which is active in the arms and infrastructure sectors in Ethiopia, the DRC and South Africa. Huawei 华为 is an example of a privatized “national champion” that has received considerable support and cultivation from the state to become a global operator. China's Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Group is probably the most notorious firm because of its activities in Zambia. In the financial sector, China International Finance is a somewhat mysterious organization that was established in Hong Kong to handle money transfers to Angola.

Perhaps the most visible and controversial of the large Chinese enterprises in the international media have been the national oil corporations, namely the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec and the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). These have been accused of contributing to the world energy crunch by tying up oil resources. CNPC has also suffered more specific criticisms over human rights issues due to its operations in Sudan, resulting in public pressure on major investors like Fidelity Investments and Berkshire Hathaway to pull out of its publicly listed subsidiary, PetroChina.

It is interesting to ask just why the Chinese government is prepared to suffer such damage to its “soft power.” From a commercial perspective, the search for profits drives the national oil corporations to operate in sensitive areas such as Sudan because their technical capabilities are not up to the challenges of exploring and extracting in deep water or the polar regions. Yet their sheer size and opaque relationship to the state also appears to give them the political capital to promote their own agendas, as witnessed by the push and shove that takes place between them and the government when attempts are made to keep domestic energy prices low, sometimes even resulting in power cuts.Footnote ²⁵

Another example of the problems caused for China's policy by the multiplication of its actors in Africa can be seen in the controversy over the attempt by the Chinese freighter An Yue Jiang 安岳江 to ship arms to Zimbabwe in April 2008, only to be turned back following the refusal of the South African unions to handle the cargo, creating acute embarrassment for Beijing. Most intriguing as an indication of the ability of the Chinese government to control its actors in Africa, though, are claims in the Western press that the shipment was initiated from a connection between President Mugabe and a secretive Chinese arms-manufacturing firm, Poly Technologies. This firm has a controversial track record from the Congo to Darfur and is sometimes referred to as the “supreme headquarters of the China princeling party,” referring to the faction of descendants of high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) veterans who have been among the main beneficiaries of “reform and opening.” The company's chairman, Major General He Ping 贺平, is the son-in-law of Deng Xiaoping and its upper ranks are full of military veterans and their offspring.Footnote ²⁶

Agriculture is another sector where the growing range of actors can be seen to be causing problems for the implementation of Beijing's foreign policy. The state is certainly enthusiastic about encouraging activity in this area, with the policy framework devoting considerable space to it. The 2006 China Africa Summit also committed China to establishing a network of ten agricultural training centres in Africa, since when a more concrete series of measures have been put forward by Chinese officials aimed at promoting investment in the sector.

Yet the priorities of creating a harmonious relationship with Africa were soon jeopardized by pressures to accommodate other domestically driven concerns, including the search for land by large numbers of individual Chinese citizens, when the head of the China ExIm Bank, Li Ruogu 李若谷, declared in Chongqing in September 2007 that his institution would be prepared to provide financial assistance to Chinese farmers, some dislocated by urbanization or massive development projects like the Three Gorges Dam and others through the ongoing consolidation of commercial agriculture in the region, to settle in Africa. As Li explained:

A significant indicator of how this illustrates the problem of co-ordinating policy from Beijing is that the Chinese government officially distanced itself from Li's pronouncement the following day. Subsequent soundings on the possibility of resettling Chinese farmers in Africa have confirmed Beijing's interest, however. Rather than fraternal solidarity, the motive behind this drive is a concern in China over food security, which has been exacerbated by the spike in “soft” commodity prices and the onset of domestic consumer discontent at the sharp rise in food prices.

The Chinese officials behind this agricultural policy seem to have been oblivious to the high likelihood that exporting skilled farmers would be controversial in Africa. However, conflicts over land in countries as diverse as Zimbabwe, Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire certainly illustrate the potential volatility that the issue in its various commercial, identity-based, spiritual and ideological forms raises on the continent.Footnote ²⁸ Moreover, these conflicts are all intertwined with disputes over citizenship and overlays of xenophobia towards “non-authentic” nationals, strongly suggesting the sort of problems Chinese settlers would experience in Africa. Thus while both conventional agricultural investments and actual resettlement of Chinese migrants have been mooted in Liberia, Mozambique, South Africa, Angola and Kenya – and are already in place in modest terms in Zambia and Uganda – this Chinese approach to food security seems destined to incite negative repercussions at the level of the ordinary African, further complicating Beijing's ability to consolidate its position on the continent.Footnote ²⁹

In Mozambique, for instance, the Chinese government has been pressing for long leases to establish “mega-farms” and cattle ranches, with the aim of increasing annual output in rice from 100,000 to 500,000 tonnes.Footnote ³⁰ The China ExIm Bank is not alone in seeking to support investment in agriculture; the China Development Bank is prioritizing agricultural projects in their disbursements of loans from the US$5 billion China Africa Development Fund. Moreover, following the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the China ExIm Bank and the World Bank in 2007 and the expansion of a Chinese role in the institution, the World Bank has itself placed US$6 billion in support of agricultural programmes in Africa.

Despite these problems, however, for individual Chinese in search of economic opportunities abroad, migration to Africa offers the prospect of a relatively untrammelled landscape where competition from other Chinese is limited. With official Chinese figures claiming that three-quarters of a million Chinese have migrated to Africa in recent years – and unofficial soundings suggesting even more – the lure of African riches is fast assuming a mythical character.Footnote ³¹ Interviews with Chinese residents in South Africa, a top destination for emigrants, suggest that they hold a perception that Africa offers low-skilled Chinese opportunities for employment if not enrichment when compared with the competitive labour market in south-east and central China.Footnote ³²

Encouraged in this process is a raft of Chinese government support aimed at providing loans and buyer credits to businesses that set up in Africa as well as a steady diet of programming on Africa in the official media. The proliferation of retail trading shops, driving traditional retailers out of business, as well as the opening of a modest service industry (restaurants, grocery stores, travel agencies) aimed at the Chinese community, shows the limited skills and investment being utilized by this group of self-styled entrepreneurs. Private Chinese businesses, following in the wake of the larger SOEs, have brought in Chinese employees to manage and run activities. Small and medium-sized enterprises, such as those in the timber cutting and export business in Mozambique, Cameroon, Liberia and Gabon, in some cases employ Chinese in all aspects of the production cycle. The 60-odd smelters owned by the Chinese in Katanga province in the DRC used as many as 5,000 Chinese labourers, which fact along with safety violations caused the provincial governor to shut down production and drive out 600 of them.Footnote ³³ In the financial sector, the move by Chinese banks into Africa – highlighted by the purchase of a 20 per cent stake in South Africa's Standard Bank by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in late 2007 – underscores not only the commercial opportunities for financial services in Africa but also the possibility of longer-term expansion into retail banking services in step with this growing Chinese community.Footnote ³⁴

Learning Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

The realization within the Beijing leadership that the increasing number of actors in Africa is leading to friction with African societies can be seen by Hu Jintao's warning to Chinese personnel on the continent that they need to help Sino-African relations by contributing to the welfare of local people.Footnote ³⁵ An awareness of the need to adapt to local conditions can also be seen in tentative initiatives to encourage Chinese firms to behave more like their counterparts from the developed countries by learning how to practise corporate social responsibility.

Some insight into this process can be gained from the report of a January 2008 investigation tour to assess the condition of CSR in Chinese firms in Mali, Ethiopia and Sudan, carried out by a team of five researchers working under the auspices of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the leading social science think tank in China affiliated to the State Council.Footnote ³⁶ On the positive side, this paints a remarkably glowing picture of Africans who are delighted with the attitude of Chinese firms working without the burden of conditionality, in contrast to the unfulfilled promises of aid from the West. Yet it also mentions a number of concerns on the part of Africans. These include the need to expand investment in Africa and establish branches of Chinese financial institutions, to ensure that Chinese enterprises help with the development of native African firms to protect native industries from being wiped out by Chinese imports, and the importance of strengthening cultural exchanges and linguistic training.

The general picture is cloudy, though, as the report acknowledges that the attitude of Chinese firms to CSR is one of “just do it, don't talk about it,” which only engenders suspicion due to the resulting lack of information with which to assess the true situation. Apart from recommending more positive publicity, the group learnt that it is also necessary to have a sense of long-term development to get established in Africa, and that it is important to get a deep understanding of the host country's legal system, customs and religious particularities. The authors warn that a sense of CSR and being part of the host society should accompany the search for profits, and that unwholesome competition between similar Chinese enterprises should be avoided. The report recommends that more effort and resources should be put into doing research into the real conditions in Africa rather than relying on Western sources. Communication should be strengthened with government agencies, academics and NGOs in Africa, and there should be better communication with Chinese embassies and consulates on the continent. Perhaps most intriguing is the acknowledged need for China to learn something from Africa about how it can improve the situation there by looking for new topics of research, such as seeing the “Sudan model” as a successful model of development for new oil economies, the policy of religious harmony in Ethiopia and the multi-party democratic system in Mali.

Rather than see this growing interest in CSR as purely the result of exposure to Africa, it should be stressed that there is already a movement on the part of the Chinese government and firms to develop CSR inside China itself, with the help of international advice from organizations like the European Union (EU). Its extension to the work of Chinese firms operating in Africa can thus be seen as another consequence of the general erosion of the barrier between domestic politics and foreign relations. Within the Chinese political system, it appears that such a development is most likely to succeed when there is a coincidence of interests between firms, civil society and powerful actors inside the state bureaucracy. This is most evident in the growing interest in the relationship between CSR and sustainable development among Chinese academics, autonomous civil society groups and policy makers. The Chinese leadership has in fact created the administrative context within which this is made possible by responding to growing domestic and international concerns over the ecological impact of “reform and opening” by developing a powerful bureaucracy in the form of the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA).

SEPA is well-known for having taken on corporate interests by promoting the introduction of a Green GDP index and even going so far as to shut down large industrial projects when they fail to meet legal requirements for assessing the environmental impact of their investments.Footnote ³⁷ It is, therefore, particularly interesting that SEPA took a significant step towards taking China into the global CSR regime in January 2008, when it signed an agreement with the International Finance Corporation to introduce the Equator Principles to China.Footnote ³⁸ This is important, because the Equator Principles represent a consensus reached by leading financial institutions around the world, aiming to ensure that projects with a total capital cost of at least US$50 million are developed in a manner that is socially responsible and reflects sound environmental practices.Footnote ³⁹

The limitations of even a fairly powerful bureaucracy like SEPA, which is integral to Beijing's drive for sustainable development, is revealed by the fact that none of China's financial institutions has yet signed up to the Equator Principles. One reason for this can be found in the difficulty involved in co-ordinating a large variety of organizations within the Chinese political system in a way that can make optimal use of foreign experience. A good example is the system for providing foreign aid. This can at best be described as being “in formation.”Footnote ⁴⁰ A mere 70 personnel deal with foreign aid in MOFCOM, which is the main organ responsible for its management. Moreover, MOFCOM has to liaise with other powerful actors that may have different agendas, such as the Ministry of Finance, the top echelon of the State Council, Chinese ambassadors, the China ExIm Bank and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to this, none of the academic think tanks that carry out analysis on Africa for the Chinese government has issues of international development as part of its remit.Footnote ⁴¹ If this is the situation for foreign aid, which is a key element of the “new type of strategic partnership” with Africa, it is not surprising that a powerful bureaucracy like SEPA faces an uphill task in extending the domestic concerns over sustainable development from the domestic sphere all the way to Africa.

While the drive for greater CSR is thus a positive development, it is doubtful how far it can move without the right kinds of incentives. It could be argued that the need to promote China's brand names around the world is a significant reason for Chinese firms to work with international development regimes. This can be seen, for example, in the government's support for engagement with the UN's Global Compact, a strategic initiative launched by General Secretary Kofi Annan in July 2000 for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with a set of principles that cover human rights, labour standards, the environment and fighting corruption. Formally introduced into China in December 2001 in a meeting hosted by the China Enterprise Confederation, the 2005 Global Compact summit was held in Shanghai, co-chaired by Deng Pufang 邓朴方, the son of Deng Xiaoping acting in his capacity as president of the China Disabled Persons Federation. The All China Federation of Industry and Commerce has been tasked with guiding its member companies with regard to all aspects of engagement with the Global Compact.Footnote ⁴²

The fact that some 181 Chinese firms are listed as signatories to the Global Compact shows that it may have a bit more mileage than the Equator Principles. While these firms have to post a code of practice that commits them to the Global Compact norms, many of them have only joined very recently and have not posted their required communications on progress which should detail how the norms are being implemented. The firms Haier 海尔 and Huawei, which joined in 2002 and 2004 respectively, are interesting examples of very large enterprises that have been cultivated under the going-out strategy and now have major operations in Africa. Both are listed as having failed to provide a communication on progress by the relevant deadline. Haier has supplied a fairly lengthy document about its operations up to 2005 under the category “communication in progress,” which is a colourful brochure describing the firm's domestic and global operations, management structure and training opportunities, with a lot of stress on its commitment to sustainable development. However, despite the fact that it briefly covers the United States, Europe, the Middle East and the Asia Pacific, it does not even mention its operations in Africa, which are now quite substantial.Footnote ⁴³

Such evidence provides some support for the sceptical view that CSR regimes are ultimately about spin and public relations in the absence of verifiable results.Footnote ⁴⁴ While the temptation to use development regimes to protect one's brand is not unique to Chinese firms, the poor standards achieved by even some of the most prestigious firms in China operating in the domestic market shows that there are good reasons to be sceptical about the relationship between corporate publicity and practice.Footnote ⁴⁵ This ultimately raises the question as to whether even the combination of state pressure and CSR regimes can provide the incentives for Chinese actors in Africa to work according to international development norms.

Chinese Civil Society – the Missing Link

An interesting challenge arises when this question is addressed using the established field of development studies, which tends to assume that the policy makers and actors in donor and investing economies are governed by liberal democratic political systems. This allows some role to be played by what might loosely be termed civil society, with strong and well-organized domestic constituencies seen as a valuable resource for governments in helping to accrue knowledge and shape and implement policy for working in the developing world.Footnote ⁴⁶

Given that civil society remains weak and under-developed in China, however, it remains unclear just how much space there is for independent pressure groups beyond large corporate actors to be used as a resource for policy makers. There is some movement in this direction in the mushrooming of “GONGOs” (government organized NGOs), yet these remain highly regulated and are expected to follow the leadership of the CCP.Footnote ⁴⁷ The scope for them to provide critical feedback into the policy-making process or to balance powerful commercial interests is thus limited.

The development of Chinese NGOs that embrace the welfare of Africans will be particularly difficult given the acute sensitivity of foreign affairs. The only example of a pressure group that might be said to have shaped Chinese foreign policy is the nationalistic movement to “Defend the Diaoyu Islands” from Japan.Footnote ⁴⁸ When it comes to issues of development, it is even harder to find clear constituencies within the political system that could support the emergence of NGOs that might want to influence the discussion and implementation of policy.Footnote ⁴⁹ This is in contrast to traditional donors, whose most ardent civil society advocates for Africa are generally products of volunteer schemes such as Voluntary Services Overseas (United Kingdom), Japanese International Volunteer Centre and the US Peace Corps. It is interesting to note that the government efforts to establish a brigade of similarly inspired Chinese university graduates to work in Africa have floundered to date.Footnote ⁵⁰

It would be wrong, of course, to reify civil society as composed entirely of idealistic groups, when these are often influenced by or compete with self-interested constituencies like diaspora groups and political exiles from crisis-torn African states as well as those more narrowly focused on single issues around, for instance, protection of rivers from hydroelectric dams, or are even local branches of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). Because Chinese policy makers do not operate within this context of push-and-pull politics, however, it is less clear where they can look for alternative sources of information or to make alliances that can balance powerful vested interests. Recognition of this position can be seen emerging from those organs of the state that are at the cutting edge of taking on the corporate sector in domestic politics. Most notable has been Pan Yue 潘岳, deputy minister for the environment, who in 2005 boldly asserted: “If it's safe politically to get involved and help the environment, then all sides will benefit. We must try to convince the central leadership of that.”Footnote ⁵¹ Chen Xiwen 陈锡文, an advisor to Premier Wen Jiabao on agricultural policy, even told the South China Morning Post that the determination of farmers to speak out about injustices should be hailed as a sign of democracy.Footnote ⁵² The possibility for civil society to play a more independent role in policy making appears to be growing as Chinese leaders realize that NGOs can be a useful resource, especially when major disasters such as the Sichuan earthquake of 15 May 2008 stretch the capacity of the state.Footnote ⁵³

A tentative attempt to extend this thinking to Africa policy can be found in Beijing's sponsorship of minjian links with the continent.Footnote ⁵⁴ This should be treated with caution, however, because the term is more accurately rendered as “people-to-people” contacts than “civil society” and involves a broad range of projects. Sometimes these are clearly under the control of the Chinese government, as in the case of the Confucius Institutes that are being established in Africa as elsewhere around the world and are concerned with promoting China's “soft power.” They also include the participation of individual academics and activists in international forums concerning Africa. Rather than representing the emergence of links between Chinese and African civil societies that might call Chinese actors to account, however, it may be better to see such initiatives as a continuation of the “people's diplomacy” used to generate goodwill for China in African states back in the era of Mao Zedong.Footnote ⁵⁵ Again, it is possible to see a degree of change, with the Chinese Society for African Historical Studies actually allowing two African scholars and ten African students to participate in its annual conference in 2008. Within such forums it is possible to see a more critical view of China's role in Africa emerging from Chinese academics.Footnote ⁵⁶ It remains to be seen, however, whether these can be allowed and encouraged to operate in ways that can shape foreign policy, with global networks increasingly providing the momentum and knowledge basis for another kind of “going out.”

A further source of possible pressure on Africa policy from an emergent Chinese civil society might be the growing number of Chinese in Africa. To date, however, this appears to be active only in the pursuit of CCP objectives, as with attempts by the All Africa Association for Promoting Peaceful National Unification to mobilize the nearly 200,000 Huaqiao 华侨 from mainland China and more than 20,000 from Taiwan present in South Africa against “the forces of Taiwanese independence.”Footnote ⁵⁷ A similar trajectory of co-optation by the Chinese state can be seen with the expansion of the Guangcai 光彩organization of philanthropic entrepreneurs to Africa. Originally established by entrepreneurs in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau in 1994 to campaign for poverty alleviation in China, this now includes mainland Chinese firms and is working in Africa with the China Africa Business Council to disseminate the experience of Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa. The fact that the vice-president of the China Society for the Promotion of the Guangcai Programme, Hu Deping 胡德平, is also vice-president of the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce and President of the China Africa Business Council, raises doubts as to whether such a movement could ever constitute an autonomous, critical voice standing outside government and business circles. That Hu could finished a speech to the 2007 Global Compact summit by recalling Mao's poetic image of dividing the sacred Kunlun Mountain into three pieces, representing a world of harmony between America, Europe and the East, can only increase concerns that such initiatives amount to tokenism rather than real engagement with the continent.Footnote ⁵⁸

Given the close control exercised over Chinese GONGOs by Beijing, it is not surprising that INGOs are sceptical about the scope for co-operation with their Chinese counterparts. Efforts are being made in this area, as witnessed by a meeting billed as a forum for Chinese and African civil society groups in Shanghai in May 2007 as well as at discussions held at the World Social Forum meeting in Nairobi earlier that year. While the report on Shanghai proceedings contains the views of representatives of genuine African NGOs, however, the Chinese participants cited are academics from leading universities who are more concerned with rebutting Western accusations of Chinese neo-imperialism than with the concerns of African development. One African participant, Sara Musa Al Saeed, a consultant with Christian Aid in Sudan, admits that she “might be dreaming” when she wonders whether the two sides could actually join hands and form pressure groups and exchange centres that could be a real force against the negative impacts of governmental and economic policies.Footnote ⁵⁹

One problem that the weakness of Chinese civil society presents for Beijing is that it leaves working with global civil society and INGOs as one of the few options for African opposition movements and NGOs to exert pressure on Beijing. The result can be reluctant policy change caused by severe diplomatic embarrassment. The most spectacular example of this is the shift in public and private diplomacy towards Sudan under pressure not only from diplomats in Washington and European capitals but also by parliamentarians and human rights lobbies that came to a head with the campaign to boycott the Beijing Olympics.

Even though the limits of Chinese influence and the obstinacy of the Khartoum regime were revealed by subsequent problems in implementing UN resolution 1769, coupled with the International Criminal Court's levying of charges against Omar al-Bashir in June 2008, Beijing's policy shift shows how operating in this global context has contributed to its growing sensitivity to Western interests in Africa and even a measure of policy co-ordination. This can be seen in a process like the Africa–China–EU dialogue that has been discussing development co-operation since it was promoted by Brussels in 2004. With China unwilling to subscribe to established OECD codes of practice for donors and many Africans feeling uncomfortable when they see external partners engaging in discussions that are aimed at synchronizing their approaches to the continent, the potential for making such co-operation responsive to Africa's needs remains limited. In the absence of direct links between civil society in China and Africa, however, it is hard to see how information can be more effectively accrued and policy shaped in a more sensitive way.