The petitioner sought authority to amend the inscription on the memorial of his late father to add the word ‘beloved’ before the existing description ‘father, teacher, linguist’. The petition was opposed by the incumbent and one of the churchwardens. The petitioner had been convicted in 2010 of murdering his father and was serving a sentence of life imprisonment. The memorial with the existing inscription had been authorised under the churchyard regulations by the archdeacon (acting in place of the incumbent during a vacancy in the benefice). The archdeacon had authorised the memorial on condition that the word ‘beloved’ was not included.

In considering the petition, the court was not reviewing the decision previously taken by the archdeacon but was determining the matter afresh, on its merits, taking account of the petitioner's case and the objections advanced by the parties opponent. The principle identified in Re Christ Church, Harwood [2002] 1 WLR 2055 that, when deciding whether to allow a petition for a memorial, the court had to be sure that what is allowed is not an affront to others needed to be refined. It was not enough for someone simply to say that a particular memorial would offend him or her; the court had to decide whether it would be reasonable for a person to be offended. It was clear that the petitioner wished to have the word ‘beloved’ added to the memorial and that he had the support of his mother and his late father's sisters for this. However, the reliance that could be placed on the mother's support was weakened by the fact that she did not believe the petitioner had killed his father, despite his conviction. A letter of support from the chaplain of the prison where the petitioner was serving his sentence was of limited assistance as it only took account of the petitioner's wishes. The objections to the petition were on the basis that the petitioner had been convicted of murdering his father, and the need for pastoral sensitivity to neighbours and other parishioners who had been required to give evidence at the trial of the petitioner and had become involved in the matter in other ways. The sentencing remarks of the Crown Court judge revealed that the petitioner had attempted to burn parts of his father's body before leaving it to decompose for a time and then burying it under three layers of mortar and a layer of cement in the back garden of the home which the petitioner and his father had shared. He then covered the area in soil to avoid discovery. The Crown Court judge also referred to the petitioner having put up a pretence over a considerable period of time to neighbours and others that his father was still alive.

The chancellor concluded that the petitioner's wish to amend the inscription was at odds with the sacrilegious way in which he had treated his father's body after he had killed him, hiding his body and preventing decent burial. That of itself was enough to bring the balance down against the petitioner. It would, objectively considered, be an affront to the parishioners at large for the memorial to state that the deceased was the beloved father of the petitioner, who had not only murdered him but had treated his body in the ways he had. This would be exacerbated by the way the petitioner had treated neighbours over a considerable time, lying to them about his father. Amending the inscription would re-open wounds in the local community. Finally, if the court were to permit the amendment, that could be seen as an expression of disagreement with the verdict returned and sentence passed in the Crown Court. The inscription would be likely to appear to the public at large as an expression of the petitioner's denial that he had murdered his father. That was not something the court should facilitate. The petition was dismissed. [Alexander McGregor]