Should the United States Congress grant conscientious and religious pacifists exemptions from military service, even when such exemptions shift burdens of service to other men and women? Should the courts read the American Constitution to exempt Amish parents from compulsory-education laws, even if it diminishes the options in their children's future? Should the courts find, or should Congress and the states enact, religious exemptions from laws that ban drugs used in religious rituals? More generally, should Americans as a people recognize religious exemptions from the pursuit of public purposes like national security and a population that is educated and drug free? The authors of this book debate this question mostly as it applies to businesses and government employees who oppose laws and court decisions that outlaw discrimination against homosexuals and transgender persons. Though the authors test the boundaries, they remain within the assumptions of American constitutional discourse and achieve a well-organized, clear, and civil exploration of the issues.
Now that the US Supreme Court has extended rights of sexual autonomy and marriage to homosexuals, can the country's state and national governments protect these rights while accommodating believers who consider gay sex and marriage sinful? Both sides of our debate—Anderson and Girgis on the religious right and Corvino on the secular left—say yes. Both sides claim that the religious Right and the secular Left can coexist in the same community and, implicitly, under the same constitution. While they purport to agree in general, however, they recognize that “the devil is in the details” (1, 82). These details involve questions like the line between speech and action; the meaning and relative value of moral integrity; whether religious exemptions amount to privileging religion; whether the analogy between race and sexual orientation is sound; whether bigoted beliefs are fairly distinguishable from sincere religious beliefs; how seriously government should avoid dignitary harms as distinguished from material harms; the appropriate levels of judicial scrutiny for different kinds of constitutional questions; and the soundness of numerous state and federal statutes and judicial opinions regarding LGBT rights and freedom of religious exercise.
A paradigm case of the authors’ concern is the bakery owners who feel that a civil rights law that would force them to bake for a same-sex wedding would make them “complicit” in sin and thus violate their religious freedom. The authors’ responses display different views of coexistence between the secular Left and the religious Right. For the Left, Corvino would permit the religious bakers to decline a custom cake for the same-sex couple while requiring them to sell the couple an off-the-shelf cake; Anderson and Girgis would permit them to refuse the couple service altogether, as long as service were available from another baker within reasonably convenient reach (83–84).
In reaching their respective conclusions both sides address a range of issues beyond same-sex marriage, carefully distinguishing ideas frequently confounded and pursuing implications frequently overlooked. High points include Corvino's showing that the claim of believers to avoid “complicity” in sin (as in an evangelical college's refusal to sign a form that would have made college employees eligible for contraceptive insurance coverage at no expense to the college, and a clerk of court refusing to sign the marriage license of a same-sex couple) can often be an effort to impose one party's religious beliefs on others (41–42). For their part, Anderson and Girgis cite numerous exemptions under federal civil rights laws for medical professionals who see abortion as a sin and ask why exemptions cannot be granted to believers who see same-sex sex and marriage as sins (122).
The book's most interesting part is the “basic norm of political morality” that Anderson and Girgis apply to the question of religious exemptions. Positing that there is a “range of good lives,” not a single good life, Anderson and Girgis assert (with little argument) that the state exists to maintain the conditions under which all persons have an adequate chance to pursue all of what they term “the basic human goods.” These goods include moral integrity (living according to one's beliefs about the right relationships to other persons) and religion (living according to one's beliefs about the transcendental source or sources of being, meaning, and value) (124–29). Anderson and Girgis's statement of these basic goods rests on the moral philosophy of John Finnis (128–29), not the thought of the American Founding or the text of the US Constitution. A concern for these “basic goods” provides the “framework” for the Anderson-Girgis position on religious exemptions from generally applicable secular laws. Within this framework, the freedom of religious exercise appears as the nation's “first freedom”—first in value and importance (130–34, 144, 149), and first as foundational to liberal constitutionalism itself (see 143–47, 260–62). Thus do Anderson and Girgis depart sharply from those conservatives (e.g., Walter Berns and Harvey Mansfield) who argued in the years before the Religious Right joined the Republican Party that the Lockean leaders of the American Founding (consistently, I would add, with the US constitutional text) subordinated religion to commerce.
Yet despite their reliance on Finnis, Anderson and Girgis may not really hold religious freedom as the “first freedom,” for they repeatedly concede that “anyone's conscience can be overridden by other demands of justice and the common good” (127, see also 136, 141, 148, 237, 255, 259, 260). This concession is crucial. It presupposes considerations and therefore standards of conduct that are rationally more compelling (either morally higher or materially more urgent) than the commands of scripture. A deist like Thomas Jefferson would readily agree, but it is hard to see how a true believer could agree. This justifies doubt that Anderson and Girgis really hold freedom of religious exercise as foundational to liberal democracy.
Because readers can doubt that Anderson and Girgis really believe what they say about democracy's “first freedom,” readers can excuse Corvino for ignoring the question. After all, neither side of this debate openly rejects American constitutional principles, and Anderson and Girgis say little that could reverse the conventional view of the American Founding as a secular moment. Yet Anderson and Girgis criticize Corvino for ignoring the question (see 260). They speculate that he does so because, with liberal academe generally, he believes theistic religion “is based on delusion, and valuable [not intrinsically but] only instrumentally” (260–61). Accordingly, Anderson and Girgis end the book with a two-page sketch of an argument for God's existence borrowed from Germain Grisez, the late Catholic moral philosopher. By concluding the book in this way, Anderson and Girgis suggest that, at bottom, and despite professions to the contrary on both sides, they disagree with Corvino less on the “details” of liberal constitutional principles than on the fundamental soundness of liberal constitutional principles. In any case, the constitutionality of religious exemptions depends ultimately on whether reason can conclude that commitment grounded in scriptural revelation trumps conclusions based on secular reason or vice versa, and though addressing this question would have meant a different book, our authors’ failure to highlight the question grounds whatever flaws this otherwise excellent book might have.
