Kevin Cherry's guiding insight is that Aristotle's Politics may be fruitfully read as an extended criticism of the teaching of the Eleatic Stranger (ES) in Plato's Statesman. His book offers a detailed comparison of the competing conceptions of nature, political knowledge, the best regime, and phronēsis advanced by Aristotle and the ES. The inquiry broadens in the book's concluding chapters, which include an interesting reflection on philosophy and politics in the ES, Socrates, and Aristotle and a discussion of the way the ES anticipates the early modern notion that “politics arises out of necessity and preservation takes precedence over virtue” (180). Cherry's style is accessible, and he does a good job of situating his argument within the context of contemporary scholarship. But for readers who seek a better understanding of the Statesman, one of Plato's more baffling dialogues, his book is ultimately unsatisfying.
For the ES, politics is about the preservation of life; for Aristotle, politics “fundamentally is—or at least ought to be—about the good life” (4). In Cherry's view, Aristotle wins this argument handily; he therefore presents the ES's teaching as a “foil” against which we may better appreciate Aristotle's superior understanding of the nature and purpose of politics (12). This decision, however, leads him to undervalue the ES's conception of politics. The result is a reading of both Plato and Aristotle that purchases clarity at the cost of depth.
In the first place, Cherry pays insufficient attention to the philosophical context of the Statesman, as well as the larger intellectual context of the Platonic dialogues. He makes much of “the gift of logos,” or “reasoned speech,” that, on Aristotle's view, makes human beings the most political animal (177; cf. 204, 213). But the central issue the ES confronts in the Sophist, the dialogue that immediately precedes the Statesman in dramatic order, is the potential deceptiveness of logos. This problem includes, but is not limited to, the employment of speech to mislead and manipulate others. As cultivated Athenians from Sophocles to Thucydides all understood, speech—particularly in political contexts—can be a curse as well as a blessing; it can inform deliberation or promote injustice, produce consensus or foment faction. More insidiously, speech can be an instrument of self-deception—a danger underscored by the ES's cosmology, which reflects the tragic sensibilities of Hesiod (for whom all things originate in Chaos) and the Athenian dramatists, including the proto-Nietzschean Aristophanes. In the Statesman's great myth, the ES makes it clear that, in the present cycle, the cosmos sinks gradually but inexorably into the “limitless sea of dissimilarity” (273d). What is the proper use of logos in a universe of ever-increasing disorder? Cherry touches on this question when he observes that, because “the whole is unstable and thus unknowable,” the ES “depicts the relationship between kinds as constructed rather than inherent” (149–50). But this insight begs to be developed, for it furnishes a key to understanding the ES's practice of philosophical diaeresis or division. Diaeresis is fundamentally a way of sorting out categories that, in the very nature of things, are continually becoming confused. This is the mixed-up world of Aeschylus's Suppliants, not the ordered universe of Genesis; human existence becomes possible only within cultural spaces opened up by sets of structured oppositions (human and divine, city and family, public and private, masculine and feminine, child and adult, Greek and barbarian, etc.), but in the current cycle of the cosmos—euphemistically termed the “Age of Zeus”—there is no god to help us establish and maintain these life-sustaining distinctions. The ES responds to this situation by means of a mapping activity—diaeresis generates branching trees of varying complexity—that is, in its production of conceptual order, on some level irreducibly poetic and, so to speak, legislative.
The difference between the ES and Aristotle can also be viewed through the lens of their disagreement about nature. Cherry rightly observes that Aristotle understands nature to be less hostile to human existence than does the ES, but he misleadingly tends to restrict the meaning of “nature” to the natural world (cf. 66, on the ES's “negative account of humanity's relationship to nature,” with 178, on the agreement between Aristotle and “environmental theorists” regarding nature's beneficence). This approach occludes not only the metaphysical problem of the increasing instability of the whole in the Age of Zeus, but also the psychological and political problem of the harshness of human nature. For human beings must certainly be counted among the savage beasts who, according to the ES, tear human beings apart at the beginning of the current cosmic cycle (Statesman 274b–c). In general, the ES echoes Protagoras's teaching about the absence of natural or divine providence in human life, and the consequent violence of human existence prior to the establishment of dikē and aidōs (Protagoras 332b–d)—the capacities of justice and shame that allow human beings to be molded into citizens of a particular political community by nomos (law, custom, convention). One cannot adequately evaluate the ES's extreme legal conservatism without appreciating these points.
Much of what Cherry has to say about the Statesman and the Politics concerns the problem of the relationship between the political goals of mere life and the good life. Cherry prefers Aristotle because his focus is the good life, yet he pays insufficient attention to the inseparability of the necessary and the noble in human existence. One is reminded of the rabbinic teaching that, just as there is no Torah without bread, there is no bread without Torah (Mishnah Avot 3:17), which implies (among other things) that virtue is just as necessary for human survival as survival is for virtue. Cherry grasps the first half of this equation—he recognizes that a city of vicious men will soon perish (48, 54, 55)—but in embracing the view that phronēsis or practical wisdom is concerned not with preserving life but with “performing virtuous, noble actions and living well” (125) he ignores what may be the most fundamental and difficult political problem of all, namely, how to decide when considerations of necessity outweigh those of virtue. This is perhaps the deepest issue raised by Aristotle's debate with the ES, and it is one with which the liberal democracies of the West continue to struggle mightily today. But it is effectively obscured by Cherry's excessively high-minded unwillingness to give the ES's sober and relatively pedestrian political teaching its due.
