The title of Vickie Sullivan's latest book leads the reader to expect a work of restricted scope. The subtitle suggests a comprehensive study. In practice, although Sullivan does not provide the latter, she lays the groundwork for it while introducing the former.
Her starting point is an old chestnut. There are passages in The Spirit of the Laws which can be—and have been—used to justify the claim that its author was a value-free political scientist intent on description, not prescription. There are other passages in the work that are highly prescriptive, and it is on the basis of these that many scholars argue that Montesquieu was a liberal reformer. It is one of the great virtues of Sullivan's slim volume that she shows that these two sets of passages are compatible with one another.
This she does early on in her book by focusing in on two items: Montesquieu's depiction of despotism and his account of liberty. Despotism, as Montesquieu describes it, generates fear in those subject to it and depends on this fear for its survival. Liberty Montesquieu defines as a species of tranquility of spirit arising from the citizen's sense of his own security. If, in Montesquieu's opinion, despotism is a great evil, it is because liberty, as he understands it, is a very great good. If he is nonetheless reluctant to denounce the far from perfect mores, manners, and institutions of the various peoples whom he studies and if he is, instead, inclined to explore and lay bare the logic and the larger rationale that dictated their adoption, it is because a correction of abuses “counter to a nation's way of thinking” is nearly always experienced by its members as a species of “tyranny.” In consequence, he explains, reform along these lines tends to be counterproductive. It disturbs the tranquility of spirit of those on whom it is imposed. It strikes fear into them and thereby paves the way to further abuse and even despotism.
If there is to be reform, Montesquieu intimates, it needs to be introduced gradually and unobtrusively with an eye to leaving the populace unperturbed. Even more to the point, if there is to be reform, the ground must be prepared by someone who can provide the reformers with an understanding of the various forms of government and of the mores, manners, and practices suited to each. Furthermore, if there is to be reform, this someone must also equip the citizens more generally with the means to cure themselves of the destructive prejudices that stand in the way of salutary change. Montesquieu reserves these tasks for himself. He is, he tells us, free from prejudice and inclined to judge with an eye to “the nature of things.” It is with this insight that Sullivan lays the groundwork for a comprehensive treatment of The Spirit of Laws; and, having achieved this, she turns her attention to one important, neglected aspect of Montesquieu's argument.
To achieve his self-assigned task, as Sullivan shows, Montesquieu believes that, among other things, he must counter the influence of the most authoritative purveyors of the destructive prejudices he has identified. In Europe, he intimates, the most important sources of what he calls “despotic ideas” are the theologians of the Christian church and certain philosophical legislators—most of whom he identifies in what he intended, until the last minute, as the final chapter of his great tome. With this in mind, Sullivan focuses the six substantive chapters of her book on Montesquieu's critique of the thinking of these figures. In the text, she restricts herself for the most part to what Montesquieu published in The Spirit of the Laws. In her notes, which merit attention, she brings his other writings, published and unpublished, to bear on her argument.
The first three chapters of Sullivan's book are quite splendid, and they repay close attention. Her juxtaposition of Montesquieu with Niccoló Machiavelli in the first chapter throws bright light on them both. Among other things, it is a useful antidote to the recurring trend to understate the latter's taste for violence and cruelty and to see him as a humanitarian of sorts. It clarifies wonderfully the logic underpinning the former's passionate interest in criminal procedure. It draws attention to the manner in which Machiavelli's zest for “great and generous executions” inspired despotic conduct on the part of figures such as Catherine de Medici and her sons, and it underlines the reasons for Montesquieu's keen interest in the manner in which a code of honor can elicit from a monarchy's nobility a “great and generous” resistance to the despotic inclinations of its chief magistrate.
Sullivan can nonetheless be faulted for underestimating Montesquieu's admiration for Machiavelli. When the Frenchman calls the Florentine a “great man” and expresses regret that he is unable to embrace one of his maxims, he is not simply alluding to the extent of Machiavelli's influence, as she suggests. He is also acknowledging the extent of his own debt to the man. It was, after all, Machiavelli who drew Montesquieu's attention to the manner in which Christianity had altered the political playing field by providing its adherents with an education incompatible with classical political virtue. It was Machiavelli who persuaded the author of the Considerations on the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline and of the chapter within The Spirit of Laws on “The Constitution of England” that institutionalized conflict is more likely to give rise to good policy than consensus. And it was Machiavelli who first noted the manner in which the French monarchy profited from the fact that the king delegated the judicial power to the Parlements. If, in the manuscript of The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu initially charged that Machiavelli did not understand the difference between monarchy and despotism and then thought better of it and excised the claim, it was because he had no desire to do his preceptor so grievous an injustice.
Sullivan's discussion of Montesquieu's critique of Thomas Hobbes is less striking and novel than her analysis of his response to Machiavelli, but it is more even-handed. She not only explores the various ways in which Montesquieu attacks the author of Leviathan and attempts to reduce the impact of his defense of enlightened despotism. She also draws attention to his tacit acknowledgment of what he owed the man's attempt to reconfigure politics as a quest for security.
The third of Sullivan's chapters is arguably the best in the book. There is a propensity among scholars to exaggerate the hostility with which Montesquieu viewed Christianity. If we had nothing to go on but his Persian Letters, a book he penned prior to discovering what he calls his “principles,” there would perhaps be warrant for this. But, as Sullivan brings out, Montesquieu has much to say in The Spirit of Laws in praise of the Christian religion, and there is no reason to suppose him disingenuous. Where he speaks in Christianity's favor, he is addressing moral questions which he thought of very great weight, and what he has to say accords perfectly with what he so fiercely rejects in the thinking of Machiavelli and his admirers.
Sullivan is equally good in her exploration of Montesquieu's reflections on the manner in which Christianity gave rise to the Inquisition through its emphasis on auricular confession and its propensity to treat as sins not only wicked acts but also thoughts and desires. She does an excellent job of clarifying Montesquieu's analysis of the roots of the persecuting impulse in the Book of Deuteronomy. And she follows up on this, early in the fourth chapter, with a useful discussion of what Montesquieu discerned regarding the origins of the propensity to confuse treason with sacrilege. Here she falls short only in failing to note that all of the ancient monarchies and republics—each equipped with gods peculiar to it—did the like.
There are also gems to be found in the second half of Sullivan's fourth chapter and in the two chapters she devotes to Montesquieu's Auseinandersetzung with Plato and Aristotle. But in the second half of chapter 4, which has celibacy and demography as its focus, and in the chapter on Plato, despotic ideas are less in evidence than views of another sort that Montesquieu considered harmful. Moreover, Sullivan's chapter on Aristotle is uneven. Her discussion of Christian doctrine as it pertains to lending at interest is subtle and penetrating, and she does a good job of making sense of the rationale explaining Montesquieu's tendentious treatment of Aristotle and the Scholastics. But her account of Montesquieu's no less tendentious treatment of Aristotle's discussion of the barbarians and of slavery fails to do justice to the knowledge of its defects that she displays in her notes.
The second half of Sullivan's book deserves attention, but the real substance of this important work is to be found in its first three and a half chapters. Students of Montesquieu will find these indispensable. Students of Machiavelli should take note, and students intent on fathoming the contribution of Christianity to the development of the West and to its travails should do the like.
