Muhammad: “I was ordered to fight all men until they say, ‘There is no god but Allah.’” Saladin: “I shall cross this sea to their islands . . . until there remains no one . . . who does not acknowledge Allah.” Khomeini: “We will export our revolution . . . until . . . ‘there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah’ [echoes] all over the world.” Osama bin Laden: Same words as Muhammad (p. 1).
Quite a lineup to introduce a book. How does Efraim Karsh boil this down? “Conquering foreign lands and subjugating populations is pure imperialism” (p. 4).
If only history were so simple. Muhammad as Prophet never set foot in a “foreign land.” Saladin chased crusaders from lands that Muslims had ruled for five centuries and never crossed a sea. Khomeini fought back when Saddam Hussein attacked, but Saddam was the subjugator of the Iraqi Shiʿa. In addition, Osama bin Laden's followers aim mostly at expelling foreigners from Muslim lands.
Current politics will incline some readers to agree with Efraim Karsh's thesis that “from the first Arab-Islamic empire of the mid-seventh century to the Ottomans, the last great Muslim empire, the story of Islam has been the story of the rise and fall of universal empires and, no less important, of imperialist dreams” (p. 5). For them, factual errors and gaps between rhetoric and reality—there are many instances of both—will weigh little.
Sweeping generalizations will serve instead. “Neither North African Berbers fighting their Islamic conquerors nor twentieth-century Third World movements resisting European colonialism aspired to conquer the homeland of their imperial masters. Yet . . . this is precisely what Muhammad asked of his followers” (p. 4).
Well, no. Neither the Qurʾan nor Muhammad's traditional biography mention conquering the homeland of imperial masters. As independent polities, Mecca and Medina had no imperial master, and by the end of Chapter One Muhammad sounds much less imperialistic: “[W]hile it is unlikely that Muhammad had imagined the full scope of Islam's future expansion, let alone planned it in detail, ‘his was the far-seeing mind which directed the Arabs' attention to the strategic importance of Syria for the new Islamic state’ [quoting W. Montgomery Watt]” (p. 10). This is a bit like Thomas Jefferson pointing out in 1812 that Canada adjoins the United States.
Pursuing the myriad problems called up by the evidence Karsh presents to support his case would be pointless. The book is selling ideology, not historical acumen. The chapter on the “Last Great Islamic Empire,” for example, devotes a scant five pages (pp. 87–92) to the first six centuries of Ottoman imperialism, its declared subject. The following chapter grants equal space (pp. 109–13) to Ottoman atrocities against Armenians, a subject that has little to do with imperialism but much to do with today's multicount indictment of Islam and Muslims.
Have Muslims over many centuries yearned to see their faith adopted worldwide? Yes. Have they launched invasions to expand their territory? Sometimes, although countries like Malaysia and Indonesia never experienced one. Does this make Islam singularly imperialistic? Karsh says yes, but he engages in such extreme distortion of history to reach this answer that only the ideologically hungry will feel sated at the end.
Does anyone in the world live where their ancestors have always lived? Polynesian islanders, perhaps. However, in acknowledging that empires have been pushing people around for thousands of years, Karsh makes a point of saying that Christ's teachings, unlike Muhammad's, separated God's realm from Caesar's. This Christian innocence of imperialism hardly squares with the Crusades or the dragooning of Native Americans into Christian churches in European colonies.
Karsh knows this but glosses it over: “If Christendom was slower than Islam in marrying religious universalism with political imperialism, it was faster in shedding both notions. By the eighteenth century the West had lost its religious messianism. Apart from the Third Reich [Karsh severs the Communists from the West in a footnote], it had lost its imperial ambitions by the mid-twentieth century” (p. 6). Anti-imperialist struggles worldwide and ferocious wars to preserve imperial control escape Karsh's notice. He dismisses the 1830 French occupation of Algeria as “nibbling at the edges of [the Ottoman] empire” but having “little effect on the Ottoman heartland” (p. 98), as if slapping the sultan's face had been France's goal. He makes no mention of the Algerian struggle to expel the French, even as a prelude to discussing later Islamist movements.
The ideological argument is murky but all encompassing. Roman imperialism preceded Christianity, but imperialism apparently could not survive the loss of Christian fervor and disappeared of its own accord. The result, we infer, is that in the 21st century, Christianity tends its flocks while “Islam has retained its imperialist ambition” (p. 8). The attacks of 9/11 presumably prove the latter proposition. However, what accounts for NATO forces in Afghanistan, the American occupation of Iraq, and Israeli settlements on the West Bank?
It cannot be Western imperialism. That is dead and gone, regardless of ongoing plans for military basing rights, imposition of economic sanctions against the Axis of Evil, and covetous gazes at Muslim oil fields.
What Karsh offers is the idea that the primary cause of today's problems is Islamic imperialism and that Muslims and Arabs whining about Western imperialism has always been a smokescreen to cover the ineffectiveness, but inexhaustible ideological tenacity, of their own imperialist designs. As a history of Islam, Islamic Imperialism is a travesty, but as ideological preaching, it should please the choir to which it is directed.
