I teach about fascism in my history courses on modern Japanese history and in a thematic seminar on global fascism developed and co-taught with my colleague Maggie Clinton at Middlebury College.Footnote 1 I have also written on the conditions in which fascism was able to consolidate in Japan in the 1930s as well as some of its particular ideological expressions.Footnote 2 Thus, for my contribution to this roundtable, I would like to draw on the history of Japan to propose three interrelated points concerning how we teach fascism: (1) that it is important for students to understand fascism as a global phenomenon because it is an ideological-political reaction to the dynamics and contradictions of capitalist modernity; (2) that some of the most insightful analyses of fascism were written by those who confronted its first manifestations in the 1920s and 1930s, which students can read in order to reflect on the current political moment; and (3) that when read together, these earlier analyses reveal to students the limits of liberalism to adequately address the conditions in which fascism emerges and the threat that it poses, prompting them to understand fascism beyond simply as a threat to law, rights, or electoral politics. In solidarity with our colleague Sungik Yang's objective to ‘decenter’ Europe when studying fascism, I will elaborate on these points through the particular history of interwar Japan.Footnote 3 And for those interested in integrating more East Asian history into their teaching, I will provide references to English-language sources in the footnotes.Footnote 4
I begin by preparing students with a theory of fascism extrapolated from the European experience, so that they have some working themes and tropes to consider when reading non-western sources. When successful, students identify underlying logics of fascism in the assigned readings but also how these were expressed in particular form in interwar Japan or elsewhere. There is a built-in comparative analysis to such a teaching exercise, since what is presented as a ‘general theory’ of fascism is derived from specific writings and events in European history, and students can then compare these European examples once we start reading primary sources from other regions. However, I purposely assign theories of fascism that describe it as an ideology of reaction rather than a type of movement or state regime (which is how I was taught about fascism as an undergraduate in the 1990s). This provides students with a method to analyse how this ideological form found expression in different national contexts, even as its content varied widely.
For example, I assign Mark Neocleous's introduction to fascism, in which he appropriates Jeffrey Herf's idea of ‘reactionary modernism’ and expands it into a general temporal politics that distinguishes fascism from other forms of reactionary or conservative politics.Footnote 5 Specifically, Neocleous argues that, as an ideological form, fascism presents a vision of radical transformation that emerges from within the temporality of capitalism, but as a revolution that will realise a mythic past ‘for the first time’.Footnote 6 Although Neocleous's study is strictly focused on Europe, I would argue that by grounding fascism's unique ‘politics of time’ in the socio-temporal dynamics of capitalism, his theory suggests that fascism becomes an available form of reaction when the contradictions endemic to capitalism become particularly acute, which compels reactionary elements to plumb the myths unique to their particular nation in order to imagine a radical transformation and national regeneration in the future.Footnote 7 This also helps students distinguish between other forms of rightist politics such as conventional conservatism, which may be reacting against social change or crises in the name of tradition and order, but are not calling for a revolutionary transformation based on a mythic past. This approach has also inspired discussions in my class about how contemporary calls to restore, regenerate or ‘make great again’ derive their appeal more from myth than reference to an empirical past, which also illuminates how these ideas inform a more radical vision of socio-political transformation than simple conservative nostalgia. However, it is also important for students to recognise that, because there is a shared commitment to nation, ethnic purity, patriarchy, and most importantly, property (discussed below), within certain conditions, conservatives will ally themselves with fascist elements despite their different temporal dispositions, as exemplified in every historical case of fascism coming to power, and which we can see occurring in different parts of the world today.
There are numerous historical examples of thinkers or movements in the 1930s espousing a politics in this ideological form – i.e., in fascism's unique ‘politics of time’ – wherein a radical social transformation was envisioned through the symbols and tropes of national myth.Footnote 8 In 1930s Japan, for example, there was a conjuncture of socio-economic crises and geopolitical tensions that produced the conditions in which earlier, more conventional conservative critiques of individualism, materialism and ‘western’ modernity gave way to a more radical ideology envisioning an all-encompassing ‘renovation’ (kakushin) of the Japanese Empire so that it could create a ‘new order in Asia’ (Tōa shinchitsujo).Footnote 9 By the late-1930s, state officials borrowed this once marginal ideology as they used it to justify Japan's invasion of China in world-historical terms and mobilise the empire for total war.Footnote 10 Much of this material has been translated into English, which students can read and compare with European texts.Footnote 11 There were also, for a time, many critiques of fascism written in Japan, the most insightful of which was Tosaka Jun's The Japanese Ideology (1935), which was published just a few years before Tosaka was imprisoned where he languished until his death in August 1945.Footnote 12 I will discuss teaching Tosaka further below, but here I want to emphasise that although Tosaka and other Japanese writers were analysing specific developments in Japan, they all approached fascism as a general phenomenon in which Japan was simply one ‘link in a global chain’ (Tosaka) of fascist reaction to a global crisis.Footnote 13 This general approach allows students to extrapolate themes and concepts from these Japanese texts and to consider their analytical value in other national or historical settings, which is the second point I would like to discuss.
Most students who take my classes arrive with some familiarity with the recent ‘fascism debate’ in the United States in which liberal pundits debated if Donald Trump and the so-called MAGA movement could be labelled ‘fascist’.Footnote 14 This debate hinged on analogies to Italian Fascism and German Nazism, focusing on comparisons of political rhetoric, charismatic leaders, anti-democratic tendencies, campaign style and degree of disregard for the law. Interestingly, the merits of such debate were litigated after the first Trump presidency, when American liberals breathed a sigh of relief and reflected on the debate for what it supposedly revealed about political thinking in contemporary America.Footnote 15 However, my students do not find this debate satisfactory, for two reasons: first, it was largely focused on political style and not the conditions which made reactionary ideology (i.e., MAGA) appeal to a variety of constituencies; and; second, many students closely follow international events and find it myopic to debate contemporary American party politics in isolation from similar developments elsewhere, particularly as MAGA ideologues continued to establish connections with far-right parties in other countries, including in South Korea and Japan.Footnote 16
Here I would argue that interwar analyses of fascism, including those of Tosaka Jun, Ernst Bloch, Antonio Gramsci, Herbert Marcuse, Karl Polanyi and others, provide students with a much more useful array of analytical concepts and themes to study fascism than those found in current debates.Footnote 17 For example, Bloch provides a theory of multi-level dialectics to understand how various classes experienced an objective crisis in a range of different temporal dispositions (what he calls ‘synchronous non-synchronicity’, i.e., the lived social experience of capitalism), but which were captured by the false non-synchronicity of fascist mythology.Footnote 18 Recently, Alberto Toscano has productively considered our current conjuncture – what he calls ‘late fascism’ – through Bloch's theory of synchronous non-synchronicity.Footnote 19 Students find in Bloch a useful way to consider how grievances from different class positions can coalesce around an ideology, while at the same time, learning that it is, in certain conditions, the petit-bourgeoisie that provide the primary social support for reactionary politics (what has been identified as ‘suburban rage’ in the contemporary United States).Footnote 20
Writing at the same time as Bloch, Tosaka analysed the specific situation in 1930s Japan, and saw an ideology forming with the same distinctive temporal politics constitutive of fascism as elsewhere. He called this ideology ‘Japanism’ (Nihonshugi) and characterised it as the ‘Japanese form of fascism’.Footnote 21 Specifically, he analysed how many Japanese ideologues extracted terms and phrases from eighth-century imperial myths and wielded them to answer the socio-economic crises afflicting Japan, an ahistorical and anachronistic move he categorised as ‘restorationism’ (fukkōshugi). Here students learn a different, non-European, expression of the political temporality theorised by Neocleous, and can compare Tosaka's analysis with those of his contemporaries such as Bloch. Together, these thinkers not only teach students about how contemporaries analysed fascism in different regions, but also provide useful categories to consider contemporary reactionary ideologies that invoke myth to imagine a total renovation of society and politics, such as the more extreme versions of white Christian nationalism in the United States.Footnote 22
To my third point, many of these interwar critics of fascism emphasised the relationship between fascism and the constitutive limits of liberalism. Some of the liveliest debates in my classes have been inspired by pairing Marcuse's 1934 essay ‘The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State’ with Tosaka's critique of liberalism in Japan and how it produced the conditions for ‘Japanism’ to coalesce in the 1930s. Both Marcuse and Tosaka problematise the conventional assumption (which many of my students share) that liberalism and fascism are diametrically opposed, and that fascism only forms against and at the expense of liberalism. However, there are differences between how Marcuse and Tosaka understood this relationship, which can be a useful exercise for students to read and compare.
For example, Marcuse works through the totalitarian worldview (fascism) and its ostensible target of critique: liberalism. He notes that fascism's critique of liberalism bypasses the socio-historical reality – the ‘real content’ – of liberalism and renders it simply a ‘vague “Weltanschauung”’ (think here of ambiguous critiques of ‘globalism’ or ‘woke ideology’).Footnote 23 What fascism overlooks is the foundation of liberalism, namely ‘the individual economic subject's free ownership and control of private property and the politically and legally guaranteed security of these rights’.Footnote 24 The ideological move here is that fascism is ‘itself largely in accord with this basic structure’ (i.e., property) – and simply attacks other principles that liberalism had itself failed to produce (e.g., equality, liberty, etc.).Footnote 25 Writing at the same time, Karl Polanyi arrived at a similar conclusion.Footnote 26 This prompts my students to reflect on their own assumptions about what fascism seems to be threatening, or if liberalism provides an adequate response to fascism or other reactionary political threats.
Tosaka approached this relationship by developing a historical schema, finding liberalism unfolding in three historical stages in both Europe and Japan – first as an economic stage, then a political stage, to finally what he saw in his own moment in Japan, a cultural stage. He explained that although liberalism emerged from and corresponded to the historical development of bourgeois capitalism in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and in late–nineteenth–century Japan (i.e., Meiji period, 1868–1912), it no longer corresponded to the contemporary form of accumulation following the Great War; namely, monopoly capitalism, which was highly administered, controlled and consolidated. Unable to account for monopoly capitalism or address its unique contradictions, liberalism retreated further into the realm of idealism – ‘an escape from reality’ – into a kind of ‘religious consciousness’ that sought salvation in culture. This is when Japanism and its mythic restorationism was able to take root and spread. Although very different, students have considered Tosaka's distinctions when debating the contemporary ‘culture wars’ and how these ‘wars’ relate to the social conditions that neoliberal economics generated, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis and the political realignments it made possible.Footnote 27 In his own time, Tosaka believed that liberalism's retreat revealed that it lacked objective standards to evaluate political ideas or proposals to then-current socio-economic problems, allowing various forms of idealism unrelated to contemporary conditions to take root.Footnote 28 Such an approach challenges students to reflect on their own assumptions, and to clarify the underlying principles of their often vague political convictions when discussing difficult problems such as what is the nature of fascism. Along with Marcuse and Polanyi, Tosaka can be productively read alongside contemporary theorists who have also returned to reflect on the relationship between liberalism and fascism.Footnote 29
To conclude, I have argued that it is important for students to learn about historical fascism from a global perspective since it was a reactionary ideology that found expression in various locations that were experiencing the crises and dislocations of capitalism, such as Japan.Footnote 30 Many of the interwar analyses of fascism understood it in this way, thereby producing an archive of insights into the phenomenon which students can read when considering the global but uneven conditions in which various forms of reaction have spread today. I believe that Neocleous's theory of the political temporality unique to fascist ideology provides one way to distinguish fascism from other forms of reaction, a political temporality that Tosaka, Bloch and others saw in their historical moments. Indeed, beyond what Tosaka teaches us about the political history of interwar Japan, he offers a method to analyse various ideological expressions of fascism that, paired with others, can inspire students to rethink many of the assumptions they have about fascism and the conditions that produce it.Footnote 31
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Josh Arthurs and Michelle Kahn for their critical feedback on early drafts of this essay, Contemporary European History for providing us the opportunity to have this important discussion, and the other panellists at the American Historical Association Conference (January 2026) from which this project derived.
Max Ward is Professor of History at Middlebury College, author of Thought Crime: Ideology and State Power in Interwar Japan (Duke, 2019), and co-editor of Critical Approaches to Global Police Power (Bloomsbury, 2026), Transwar Asia: Ideology, Practices, Institutions (Bloomsbury, 2022) and Confronting Capital and Empire: Rethinking Kyoto School Philosophy (Brill, 2017). He has written on a number of topics, including postcolonial theory, Japanese fascism, the ideology of criminal rehabilitation in Japan, as well as the critical possibilities of Japanese film and historical crime fiction. He is currently working on a book project titled The Policification of the Masses: Police Power in Modern Japan, 1870-1970.
