I thank Maria Popova for her generous, thoughtful, and constructive review of my book and am delighted to hear that despite my exclusively American focus, she finds much of import in my work for scholars of comparative judicial politics. In fact, her breakdown of the potentially generalizable theoretical insights to be drawn from my book was as edifying as it was gratifying. Needless to say, had I been aware of the ways in which some of the empirical phenomena I seek to explain in the American case have since been effectively replicated in, or speak to the circumstances of, other polities, I would have made a deliberate attempt to highlight that fact.
This emphasis on “cross-over appeal” notwithstanding, I sense in Popova's comments and questions a decided curiosity—even if not quite a criticism—about how I might explain the fact that, especially in its early days of potential vulnerability and unquestioned weakness, the American judiciary did not find its independence or integrity compromised or abused by other political actors. This is an important point and I am grateful—in the spirit of intellectual cross-fertilization between our respective fields—to Popova for raising it.
Why do elected politicians obey judicial rulings they do not support? What stops them from dismissing the importance of an independent judiciary and simply making judges subservient to their will? Or, to frame it another way, exactly what is it that compels politicians to seek to fashion the judiciary into a long-term regime partner rather than a short-term regime apparatchik? From the perspective of a comparativist (and especially one focused on emerging democracies), this is surely a bewildering feature of American judicial politics. After all, in many nations around the world, if politicians can force courts to carry out their will, they do it—unless, as Popova shows in her own (wonderful) book, there is a cost to doing so. And, in the United States, there has long been substantial cost to doing so.
In my account, however, that cost came not from violating some amorphous political or popular norm that judges were to be considered “above” or “separate from” politics—indeed, one need look no further than the events following Thomas Jefferson's election in 1800 for a repudiation of that simple notion—but from dismissing a strategic political calculation that, in a constitutional system of checked, overlapping, and conflicting powers, judges might be able to help accomplish some goal that would be otherwise difficult or even impossible to satisfy. In this way, and in seeming contrast to so many of the Russian and Ukrainian officeholders studied by Popova, American political elites have repeatedly exhibited an understanding of “politics” that transcends merely securing reelection or consolidating partisan control to include achieving substantive policy outcomes and heeding citizen concerns for an equitable and efficacious justice system. (Of course, to the extent that voters reward or punish politicians for their behavior, popular demands for a well-functioning judiciary are hardly irrelevant to electoral concerns.)
Even if by the mid-to-late twentieth century, the idea of an independent judiciary had become sufficiently institutionalized in political, public, and media discourse that any attempt to unravel it would have been met with staunch opposition, it nonetheless remains the case that elected officials long ago recognized the potential of an unelected national branch armed with a potential veto over a host of state actions and relatively immune from swings in public opinion. Far from obstructing their agenda, politicians across American history and of virtually all ideological stripes reasoned that such an institution might actually help implement it. Whether Federalists proposing a strong national judiciary to facilitate the interstate trade necessary for widespread commercial growth, National Republicans updating the circuit system to prevent westerners from allying with southerners, or Gilded Age Republicans expanding federal jurisdiction to obliterate local agrarian opposition to industrial capitalism, American politicians have consistently and continuously shown themselves as concerned with political legacy as political survival.
So, to return to a question on Popova's mind (and one raised, albeit in a much different context, in her own book): Why would a leader like Abraham Lincoln, faced with the likely destruction of the political regime, still pay respect to the idea of judicial independence and still prefer co-opting the judiciary to curbing it? Most simply, because he—like most American politicians before and since him—recognized that the structural dynamics of the American constitutional order meant that the power he could wield and the change he could forge alone were no match for the power he could wield and the change he could forge in tandem with other institutions. What needs to happen for leaders in emerging democracies to realize that fact—or whether the institutional architecture needed to make that fact true even exists in emerging democracies in the first place—is, of course, another question entirely, one that I leave in the able hands of Popova and our comparativist colleagues.
