Many critics of George W. Bush professed consternation over his infusion of religious values into foreign policy. For most, this practice represented a dangerous departure from the secular traditions of Realpolitik that purportedly characterized recent American policy and a return to the bad old days of “Manifest Destiny” or “Wilsonian idealism.”

William Inboden throws a historical curve ball at this interpretation, arguing that the formative containment policies of the postwar era really did have a “soul,” a central religious meaning. Although his service in the Bush administration may have given Inboden a special perspective, what is most impressive here is his massive documentary research uncovering the religious roots of Cold War policy. Although some will quarrel with his interpretation, students of religious politics may experience one of those “aha!” moments, when lots of things already known come together in a new and meaningful configuration.

Along the way Inboden provides fascinating religious profiles of important political figures (John Foster Dulles, George F. Kennan, H. Alexander Smith), vignettes of illustrative episodes (formation of the World Council of Churches, Truman's wooing of the Vatican), and extended case studies of religious politics (the “save China” campaign). But his primary focus is on the strategies used by two postwar presidents to mobilize religious forces behind their international objectives.

In 1945, American religious communities exhibited a notable lack of consensus on foreign policy. The long-dominant mainline Protestant churches were sharing in the postwar religious boom, but were deeply divided on theology and politics, as liberal ecclesiastical elites were challenged by theological and political conservatives. Although mainline leaders had played a key role in constructing the United Nations and building domestic political support for it, they subsequently disagreed on how strenuously to oppose America's new Cold War enemies. Some reverted to their interwar pacifism and, in any event, most put their hope in multilateral institutions, not American military power.

Nor were mainline leaders inclined to seek religious allies — at least outside their own incestuous circles. Although they fostered the new World Council of Churches, they distrusted religious “competitors” at home. Engaged in theological and domestic policy conflicts with Catholics and fighting off the surging neo-evangelical movement, mainline officials could not — or would not — forge a united religious front to shape foreign policy. For their part, Catholics were just emerging as full-fledged participants in American politics and professed an anticommunism too fervent for mainline tastes. Neo-evangelical leaders, although staunchly anti-communist and suspicious of the United Nation, had no consistent posture on either domestic politics or international relations, and were congenitally hostile toward both mainliners and Catholics.

Truman and Eisenhower were determined to overcome these divisions and forge a united religious front. In some ways, they were well equipped for the task. As Inboden's sensitive analysis shows, neither was conventionally religious, but both had deep spiritual roots that shaped their worldviews and strategies. Neither was interested in orthodox doctrine, but both saw religion as a source of essential ethical and moral norms. As these values were shared by the world's great religions, those faiths should make common cause in the struggle against communist domination. Truman and Eisenhower continually prodded religious leaders to cooperate, often intervened in intramural religious affairs, and regularly used religious institutions and leaders as instruments of policy. Ultimately, both men were frustrated by the sectarian squabbles that hampered construction of broad religious alliances.

Repeatedly stymied by the recalcitrance of church leaders, Truman and Eisenhower were forced to become “religious leaders” in their own right. They appealed directly to the American religious public, emphasizing shared moral values, and the dangers to faith itself presented by Soviet and Chinese regimes. As both public and private communications attest, Truman consistently saw the Cold War as a true “religious war” against “Godless communist.” Eisenhower went beyond this negative perspective by constructing a new affirmative version of civil religion, one to be shared by Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and even Muslims (he conferred with American-Muslim leaders and spoke at the dedication of the Islamic Center in Washington, D.C.). In the end, both men succeeded where religious leaders had failed: they “developed containment not just as a strategic doctrine, but also as an article of faith” (156).

Thus, while contemporary scholars are busy “bringing religion back into international relations,” this fine book reminds it that it has never really been absent. As an historian Inboden does not address many of the theoretical concerns of political scientists, but he certainly does provide a mountain of raw material for our mills.