This is a very timely book that covers an important subject. It is timely not because it can tell us much about how Syria may be permanently disfigured after years of civil war, but rather because it provides perspective on the role that Syria used to play in the regional system as well as how Washington has interacted with Damascus. Syria and the United States have been on opposite sides of many Middle Eastern conflicts, with a few notable exceptions, such as the Persian Gulf War (1990–91). Moreover, the Bush administration (2001–9) included Syria as part of the “Axis of Evil” along with Damascus's ally, Iran. Thus, the book has two main aims: to analyze the factors that have led to a legacy of mistrust in Syrian–American relations; and to understand the extent to which ideational factors affect decision making and in turn lead to cooperation or conflict as international outcomes. The latter aim is the author's primary focus.
The book argues that Syria's opposition to US foreign policy in the region has been significantly but not exclusively influenced by ideology. In line with what would be considered a revisionist account of this history, the book also contends that the United States “has played a major role in fostering hostile relations with Syria” by pursing its own strategic interests above the concerns of the region and by marginalizing Damascus in the process (p. 6). The combination of these sets of factors has led to misperceptions by both sides that has fueled antagonisms and reinforced ideological positions.
The book primarily focuses on the role of ideology in the articulation of Syrian foreign policy and less on how ideology affected decision making in the United States. The book is structured around important time periods in US–Syrian relations beginning with Syrian independence and ending with the death of Hafiz al-Asad. Each of the book's four sections is preceded by a helpful preface that summarizes the author's findings.
The book seeks to contribute to international relations scholarship on the Middle East as well as Middle East studies. Gani's attempt to combine these areas of study—international relations and Middle East studies—is a welcome effort. She joins a number of scholars who try to engage the international relations literature in which the theoretical implications of the theories are not always amenable to area studies scholars. For example, those who argue realism best explains the Middle East are accused of imposing an ethnocentric, Westphalian system on a region that does not fit the model, while also ignoring culture as an important variable. If one emphasizes ideologies and identities, some area studies scholars might see that as “essentializing” culture or claim the work is “orientalist” because ideology and identity may impact political decision making. The book tries to be sensitive to the debates within political science as well as area studies.
The book suffers from three main issues. First, it tries to do too much. Pages 4–5 contain a battery of interesting questions but many are not central to assessing one of the books primary tasks, examining the role of ideology. The four central questions on page 20 show a much greater focus on how to assess the role of ideology on the Syrian side; these questions should have been the central focus. These broad questions and additional lines of inquiry may be a product of the author's ambition to argue ideational factors matter for the relationship. But the problem is that Gani, by her own admission, examines mostly one side of the relationship. To be sure, the author could have relied more on official Syrian media sources in Arabic or in translation using the Foreign Broadcast Information Services, instead of relying heavily on US and UK sources. Analyzing the official Syrian media in media can tell us a lot about what the government wanted its people to believe and what it did not want its people to know. Moreover, Western sources, which serve as the basis for reporting Syrian perceptions, may contain the ideological biases that Gani seeks to examine and expose.
Second, this leads to the another area: the book oversimplifies US foreign policy and misses the broader context. The idea of Jewish influence on US foreign policy as an ideological factor seems to be a lurking theme that unfortunately undermines the credibility of the argument. In one unforgiveable error, the author claims that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Jewish ancestry may have had something to do with his warm attitude toward a future Jewish state (p. 39). Not only is there no support for this false claim about his ancestry and its putative influence, Roosevelt's public support for the Zionist movement as well as private assurances to Arab leaders are well documented. In other cases, the author cites the Jewish ancestry or Jewish influence as the reason for particular policy attitudes. To interpret this charitably, the author should have made the point that Syrians (and other Arabs) may have seen this factor as an influence on US policy toward Syria.
On a related note, the archival evidence needed to be put in its proper and historical context. As previously mentioned, the author uses US archival material to make claims about Syrian perceptions. The problem is that the evidence from these reports by various institutions and agencies are often treated with equal weight across different time periods. For example, the State Department of the 1950s was not the same as the State Department of the 1970s both in terms of its composition and its influence on policy. There should have been greater engagement with the American foreign policymaking process to provide readers with a better sense of how and to what extent these institutional influences mattered.
Third, the book ends too soon, and not where the author claims it ends. The book does not discuss the 1999–2000 negotiations that could shed more led on the US–Syria relationship even though the introduction claims the book covers the period until al-Asad's death in 2000. It is generally assumed that Syria and Israel were closer than they had ever been to achieving an agreement and the United States was heavily involved in the process. There are many accounts that describe these events from various perspectives and that could have been consulted.
Despite these drawbacks, some more serious than others, the book has merit. It pushes us to revisit our assumptions about revisionist and ideological actors. A revisionist actor may in fact want to revise the system, but doing so may be simply to return it to the status quo ante. This actor may be considered ideological and nonrational, especially if his or her posture and actions involve high costs and risks, and there is some aspect of identity attached to the territory. Overall, the book encourages us to consider how other actors may view US foreign policy.
