In 1748, the highest officials of the Qing Empire, some Manchu and some Han Chinese, engaged in a spirited debate about whether compulsory purchasing to replenish state granaries was exerting inflationary pressure on grain prices. Even before all the evidence was in, the reigning Qianlong emperor reached his decision. He slashed purchasing quotas for the granaries, justifying the decision on the economic arguments provided by his ministers. But fiscal concerns were really behind the decision: he had to find the money to support a military campaign to put down an unruly local potentate in far-off Sichuan, and cutting procurement expenses was one way to do it.
If this account seems unremarkable, it shows how far the political history of late imperial China has come in recent decades. It describes a Chinese political order that is not immobilized by tradition or ritual, but capable of adapting to changing situations. (The title of Peyrefitte's L'empire immobile reminds us that this historiographical transformation has not entirely permeated popular history.) It presents the emperor neither as autocratic despot nor effete sensualist, but actively engaged in the daily grind of government work, if somewhat arbitrary in his decisions. And it describes bureaucratic decision-making based not on Confucian moral philosophy but on sophisticated understandings of political economy.
Helen Dunstan's new book is an exhaustive study, based mainly on detailed readings of the bureaucratic correspondence, of a policy debate over granaries that had been going on for a decade before it came to a head in 1748. The state granary system in the Qing is not untrod ground. Pierre-Étienne Will's Bureaucratie et famine en Chine au 18e siècle and Will and Bin Wong's Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary System in China, 1650–1850, two key works in the new institutional history of the Qing, used the granary system to argue that state institutions could be flexible, effective, and innovative. But Dunstan's book does far more than simply fill in the details of one episode in the larger history of the institution. Eschewing the broader sweep of Will and Wong allows Dunstan to explore “the interest and significance of specific initiatives, specific arguments, and specific decisions at the specific points in time when they were made or taken” (405). The advantage gained, a significant one, is that Dunstan is able to reconstruct important parts of the intellectual and political life of eighteenth-century high officials. She shows what statistics were available to them and asks how these shaped their decision-making, revealing both the capacities and the limits of their technical analysis. She gives us a clear sense of what these men knew of the world, how they thought about the world, and how they sought to change the world. The first part of the book explores ideas and practical methods around ensuring food supply and preventing speculation and hoarding. A careful examination of the discussion suggests that by the eighteenth century, there existed in China a rationale “expressed in terms of rudimentary economic theory” for abandoning dirigiste approaches to the grain trade (p. 9). Part 2 turns to the bureaucratic debate over state granaries. On the basis of the economic theory, some officials built arguments that stockpiling by means of state purchasing actually worked against the public interest. Better, some argued, to stock granaries through in-kind sales of official titles for grain. Or, suggested others, to give famine relief in the form of cash and let the hungry buy grain on the market.
As Dunstan's title suggests, Qing officials were well aware that the market could accomplish many of their objectives. In the syllogism that disdain for commerce explains China's economic backwardness, both terms are dubious shibboleths. But official willingness to make use of the market did not mean trust in the market or in merchants, whose profit motive might lead them into hoarding or transshipments that would exacerbate rather than relieve shortages. Indeed, the contrast between state and merchants runs through much of their, and Dunstan's, analysis. So Qianlong's seemingly radical decision to cut grain storage targets was soon undermined by concerns about popular subsistence. When the situation returned to normal, state granaries filled up again. “In the absence of abnormal fiscal pressure, bureaucratic common sense, abetted by climatic hazard, triumphed over welfare-weariness . . . and/or proto-liberalism” ( 414). The outcome of the debate, thus, did not bring about a fundamental shift in policy, but for Dunstan that is beside the point. The debate itself shows the limits of the possible in China in the 1740s, and those limits were rather broader than previous historians have noticed.
The book is longer than it needs to be; the analysis of the official memorials and other communications is dense and technical, and it is at times difficult to see the real import of a specific proposal. Dunstan makes few concessions to nonspecialist readers unfamiliar with the mechanics of the Qing state. This is a pity, for the work may not get the wide readership it deserves. But perseverance will reward, for this is a book that touches on big themes. Her account of regional difference in responding to national policy will sound familiar to scholars of China since 1978 (Given the Qing principles that bureaucrats did not serve in their native areas and were frequently rotated, one wonders how a consistent provincial policy tradition could have emerged. To what extent was it the product of widely held stereotypes about regional differences rather than real conditions? Were there any differences in the attitudes of Manchu and Han officials?). Dunstan is rightly too cautious to propose a symmetry between Qing thought and the history of economic liberalism in Europe, though she does suggest some intriguing parallels between the granary debate and the “grain-centered liberalism” that Steven Kaplan finds in France in the 1760s. These parallels raise a fundamental question. Is liberalism a universally applicable set of economic theories that different societies may discover independently, or did premodern states face similar issues and so tend to develop common understandings of political economy? Either way, this book is one more nail in the coffin of the notion that liberalism was the product of the unique genius of the West or that its appearance led inevitably to modern, Western-style economic development.
